JUDGMENT D. K. Sen, CJ & S.N. Jha, J. By this criminal writ petition Haridwar Pandey, the petitioner, seeks to impugn, under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, an order dated the 8th December, 1986, of the Secretary, Law Department, Government of Bihar, the respondent no. 5, sanctioning prosecution of the petitioner under section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure under the Prevention of Corruption Act. 2. The said sanction was a culmination of proceedings which were initiated by raid and search conducted in the residential house of the petitioner and his close relatives on the 30th April, 1978. The search was concluded en the 22nd May, 1978, after which an F.I.R. was lodged by the then Deputy Superintendent of Police (Vigilance) against the petitioner, The said F.I.R. was numbered as Vigilance Case No. 37 (4)/78 dated the 30th April, 1978, under section 5(1) of the Prevention of Corruption, Act. It was alleged in the said F.I.R. that the petitioner had acquired assets disproportionate to his known source of income. The proceedings were filed in the court of the Special Judge (Vigilance), Patna. 3. It is alleged that thereafter the investigation against the petitioner in the said case continued for about three years after which the investigating officer, the then Deputy Superintendent of Police (Vigilance) came to the conclusion that the allegations against the petitioner were not established and he submitted his final report under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure recording that there was mistake of fact. The said report of the investigating officer was examined by the then Commissioner, Vigilance, who affirmed the report of the investigating officer by his order dated the 24th February, 1981. The final report was accordingly submitted before the Court of the Special Judge on the 3rd June, 1981. 4. It is alleged that the Special Judge (Vigilance) Patna, kept the said case pending in his Court for over four months and ultimately on the 31st August, 1981, passed an order rejecting the final report submitted by the Police authorities and suggested that the investigation should be entrusted to the Central Bureau of Investigation. 5. Pursuant to the aforesaid the Government of Bihar asked the Vigilance Department to make a fresh investigation in the case de novo by another set of officers. 6. 5. Pursuant to the aforesaid the Government of Bihar asked the Vigilance Department to make a fresh investigation in the case de novo by another set of officers. 6. The successor investigating officer, the then Deputy Superintendent of Police (Vigilance), who made an independent investigation by his order dated the 8th July, 1982, recorded that the allegations against the petitioner of having disproportionate assets have not been established. The said report was examined by the Superintendent of Police (Vigilance), as also the Deputy Inspector-General of Police (Vigilance) who affirmed the findings of the investigating officer and decided to submit a final report accordingly. 7. The Legal Remembrancer after examining the investigation report and the case diary was of the opinion that a final report that there was mistake of fact should be submitted in the case. However, the Inspector General (Vigilance) in spite of the aforesaid advice had directed that a final report should be submitted as “true insufficient evidence.” The investigating officer, however, insisted that the final report should be submitted as one as ‘mistake of fact’ and the matter was referred to the then Advocate-General for his opinion. The then Advocate-General came to the conclusion that the Inspector-General (Vigilance) was not competent to give a direction to the investigating officer suo motu and direct the investigating officer to submit a final report in accordance with his dictates. 8. The investigating officer ultimately submitted a final report as true, insufficient evidence". The said final report was submitted in the Court of the Special Judge. 9. By his order dated the 3rd May, 1985, the Special Judge on perusal of the case diary came to the conclusion that there was prima facie evidence on the record to show that the petitioner had made acquisitions exceeding his known source of income and, therefore, recorded that he was unable to accept the final report as submitted by the police authorities. He noted that the petitioner was a Government servant and as such sanction for his prosecution was necessary which had not been obtained. He directed that the concerned authorities should be informed so that necessary steps may be taken in the matter. 10. On the basis of the said order dated the 3rd May, 1985, sanction to prosecute the petitioner was given on the 8th December, 1986, is noted hereinabove. 11. The petitioner is aggrieved by the aforesaid. He directed that the concerned authorities should be informed so that necessary steps may be taken in the matter. 10. On the basis of the said order dated the 3rd May, 1985, sanction to prosecute the petitioner was given on the 8th December, 1986, is noted hereinabove. 11. The petitioner is aggrieved by the aforesaid. He contends that the said order dated the 3rd May, 1985, was forwarded to the Road Construction Department (Administrative Department) without any recommendation as to prosecution. The Administrative Department examined the said order of the Court dated the 3rd May, 1985, in detail and came to the conclusion that there was no material on the record to prove the allegation that the petitioner had acquired disproportionate assets as alleged, on the basis of which sanction for prosecution could be given. A comparative dart was prepared by the Administrative Department, analysing the facts, on record 12. Thereafter it is alleged that the file was sent to the Law Department which after examining the records; namely, the case diary, and other materials, sent the file to then Advocate-General, Bihar. It is alleged that the then Advocate-General Bihar did not apply his mind and recorded his opinion as follows :- “Seen the order dated 3.5.85 of the Special Judge at flag 97. He has found a prima facie case. As per direction of the court the sanction may be accorded.” 13. It is contended that the above opinion was recorded by the Advocate-General, Bihar, without perusing the relevant materials, including case diary and had merely based his opinion on the observation of the Special Judge. It is submitted that the Government was required to satisfy itself about necessity or propriety of according sanction for prosecution of the petitioner on the basis of the materials gathered. The earlier opinion of the Law Departmental the then Advocate-General and two final report of the investigating officers were ignored. 14. it is alleged that the note of the Advocate-General was thereafter send to the then Chief Minister on the 17th September, 1985, with papers. The matter was kept pending before the Chief Minister for one year after which the same was returned to the Law Department on the 11th August, 1986, for further examination and for consideration of the Law Minister. The matter was kept pending before the Chief Minister for one year after which the same was returned to the Law Department on the 11th August, 1986, for further examination and for consideration of the Law Minister. It is alleged that the Law Minister mechanically approved the proposal of the Advocate-General without applying his mind to the materials on the record. The only file, which was referred to was file no. 10137/85 of the Road Construction Department, with did not contain any relevant material on the basis of which sanction could have been given. 15. It is alleged that subsequent to the sanction given on the 8th December, 1986, a charge sheet has been submitted by the Police authorities on the 27th April, 1987, under the direction of the Special Judge, Patna, who has taken cognizance. 16. The further grievance of the petitioner is this that though the proceedings were initiated on the 30th April, 1978, sanction was accorded after over ten years in an improper manner as alleged. The petitioner has suffered physically, mentally, financially and also in his service by reason of pending prosecution for over ten years. The petitioner has to take premature voluntary retirement in September, 1986, and by reason of the pendency of the said criminal proceedings his post-retirement benefits have been withheld. All the properties of the petitioner and his family member have remained seized in the custody of the police authorities of the Vigilance Department, though it has been ascertained from the Income Tax Department that the properties and assets of the petitioner or his relatives were not required for satisfying any income-tax demand. 17. Learned Standing Counsel No. 11 appeared on behalf of the respondents. A counter affidavit affirmed by one Arbind Prasad, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Cabinet (Vigilance) Department, affirmed on the 11th October, 1988, has been filed in answer to the writ petition. It is averred in the said affidavit that sanction has been accorded for the prosecution of the petitioner on the authorities concerned being satisfied on examination of the relevant records and such satisfaction was not subject to judicial scrutiny even under the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. It is averred in the said affidavit that sanction has been accorded for the prosecution of the petitioner on the authorities concerned being satisfied on examination of the relevant records and such satisfaction was not subject to judicial scrutiny even under the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. It is contended further that under the Rules of Executive Business framed under Article 166 of the Constitution the business in respect of sanction of prosecution against public servant is assigned to the Law Department under Entry No. 19 of Part 34 of the First Schedule. It is alleged that a copy of the F.I.R. lodged in the case, final report submitted by the investigating officer and order dated the 3rd May, 1985 of the Special Judge had been sent to the sanctioning authority along with the request for granting sanction. Copy of the case diary had also been sent to the Law Department earlier. It is also recorded in the order that the sanction had been accorded after examination or the relevant papers. 18. It is alleged further that the conclusion or opinion of the investigating agency is not binding on the Court trying the offence. The trial court was competent in law to take a different view and direct further investigation or trial. It is also alleged that the Law Department’s not bound by the opinion of any other Departments like the Administrative Department. It is in the discretion of the Law Department to obtain opinion of the Advocate-General in any particular case. It is not open to the petitioner to challenge the validity or correctness of the legal opinion submitted by the Advocate-General. It is alleged that sanction in the instant case was granted after due application of mind and after due consideration of the materials kept on the file. 19. The petitioner has affirmed an affidavit on the 4th November, 1988, which has been filed in reply to the said affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents. 20. In support of the respective contentions of the parties the following decisions were cited at the bar. (a) M. K. Gopalan and another V. The State of Madhya Pradesh reported in A.I.R. 1954 S. C. 362 This decision was cited on behalf the respondents. 20. In support of the respective contentions of the parties the following decisions were cited at the bar. (a) M. K. Gopalan and another V. The State of Madhya Pradesh reported in A.I.R. 1954 S. C. 362 This decision was cited on behalf the respondents. It was held in this case by the Supreme Court, following the decision of the Privy Council in Gokulchand Dwarkadas V. The King reported in A.I.R. 1948 P. C. 82, that if the order of sanction does not disclose that all facts constituting the offence to be charged were placed before the sanctioning authority nor does the sanction state particulars of the offence, namely, the time and place of occurrence, the transaction involved or persons along with whom the offences were committed, such a lacuna can be remedied in course of trial by specific evidence to be adduced by the prosecution. (b) Jaswant Singh V. State of Punjab reported in A.I.R. 1958 S. C. 124. In this case the Supreme Court quoted with approval the observation of the Federal Court in Basdeo Agarwala V. Emperor reported in 1945 F.C. 16, that sanction under the Code of Criminal Procedure is not intended to be nor is an automatic formality and it is essential that the provisions in regard to the sanction should be observed with complete strictness. The object of the provision for sanction is that the authority giving sanction should be able to consider for itself the evidence before it comes to the conclusion that the prosecution in the circumstances should be sanctioned or forbidden. In this decision also the Supreme Court quoted with approval the observation of the Privy Council in Gokulchand Dwarka das (supra) which has been noted earlier. (c) Major Som Nath V. Union of India and another reported in A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1910. This decision of the Supreme Court was cited for the following observations. “......For a sanction to be valid it must be established that the sanction was given in respect of the facts constituting the offence with which the accused is proposed to be charged. (c) Major Som Nath V. Union of India and another reported in A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1910. This decision of the Supreme Court was cited for the following observations. “......For a sanction to be valid it must be established that the sanction was given in respect of the facts constituting the offence with which the accused is proposed to be charged. Though it is desirable that the facts should be referred to in the sanction itself, nonetheless if they do not appear on the face of it the prosecution must establish allude by evidence that those facts were placed before the sanctioning authorities.......” The Supreme Court also quoted with approval the observation of the Privy Council in Gokulchand Dwarkadas (supra). 21. As has been rightly contended on behalf of the respondents whether sanction should be accorded in a particular case or not for prosecution of a public servant is a matter depending on the subjective satisfaction of the Authority concerned. By the very fact that sanction has been accorded it has to be assumed that the Authority concerned has reached such satisfaction. It is not for this Court to adjudicate on the propriety or validity of such sanction on the ground that satisfaction so arrived at was not proper. An order according sanction under section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is basically an administrative and not a quasi judicial or judicial decision and as such the question of error on record of law or fact does not and can not be relevant. Even if a sanction is accorded by the Authority concerned whether the prosecution will follow or be continued or even whether cognizance will be taken or not will be decided by the trial court. 22. The only ground on which an order according sanction for prosecution can be challenged is possibly that of mala fide which has not been alleged in the instant case. On the contrary the ground alleged is that the Authority concerned did not apply its mind and consider all relevant records and in particular the case diary in the instant case. This allegation, however, is not admitted by the respondents. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents it has been specifically stated that the case diary had been forwarded to the Law Department and was available for consideration in the Department along with other records. This allegation, however, is not admitted by the respondents. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents it has been specifically stated that the case diary had been forwarded to the Law Department and was available for consideration in the Department along with other records. The Authority concerned has taken time in the matter and their decision does not appear to be hurried or sudden. The bona fide of the Authority is also established by the fact that it has obtained the opinions of the respective Advocate Generals in the matter and finally acted on the basis of the last opinion obtained. It is stated that the sanction was accorded after due application of mind and due consideration of all materials on record. This dispute of fact cannot be resolved by us in the present proceeding under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. If it be the case of the petitioner that all facts alleged to be constituting the offence committed by the petitioner were not before the sanctioning Authority or that the same were not considered by the Authority, it will be open to the petitioner to challenge the sanction at the trial, as has been laid down clearly by the Privy Council in Gokulchand Dwarkadas (supra) which has been followed by the Supreme Court in, the subsequent decisions noted, hereinabove. If such a challenge is thrown at the trial it will be open for the prosecution to produce specific evidence to show that all material facts were placed before the sanctioning Authority before the sanction was accorded. 23. For the above reasons, we are unable to entertain the present application and reject the same. The same is being rejected at the stage of admission inasmuch as the parties have made their submissions in detail and cited decisions in support of their respective contentions. 24. We, however, make it clear that we have not adjudicated on the merits of the disputes raised. It will be open to the parties to agitate all their contentions in the pending proceedings. It will be open to the petitioner to raise all points which have been raised in the present petition in his defence in the said proceedings. 25. We note that the proceedings initiated against the petitioner has been pending from 1978. It will be open to the parties to agitate all their contentions in the pending proceedings. It will be open to the petitioner to raise all points which have been raised in the present petition in his defence in the said proceedings. 25. We note that the proceedings initiated against the petitioner has been pending from 1978. By the pendency of such proceeding over a long time the petitioner has no doubt been prejudiced. We direct the respondents, that if they are serious in their intention to prosecute the petitioner, they should proceed in the matter expeditiously without any further delay. The application is disposed of accordingly without any order as to cost. HP. Application Dismissed.