JUDGMENT : R.C. Patnaik, J. - The Appellants in both the appeals instituted a proceeding u/s 41 of the Orissa Hindu Religions Endowments Act, 1951 (for short the Act) for a declaration that the institution of Sri Nilakantheswar Mahadeb was a private institution belonging to Appellants 1 and 2; alternatively for a declaration that the Appellants were its hereditary trustee if it was found that the Institution was a public one. They alleged that the deity in village Pahana in the district of Cuttack was installed by Sambhu Das, their ancestor. They furnished the genealogy to trace their descend. Sambhu Das bad also endowed certain properties for the seba puja of the deity. The seba puja and management of the institution had vested with the successors until a Board of Management was constituted by the endowment authorities and their management was threatened. The institution was being maintained out of their personal fund without any contribution from the public though members of public used to have darshan of the deity but that was not as a matter of right. Appellant No. 3 is a purchaser in respect of certain properties of the deity mentioned in paragraph-14 of the application. Members of Hindu public - Respondents 2 and 3. refuted the assertions. They averred that the deity had been installed by the ancestors of the villagers. Management has stayed throughout with the villagers. The institution is a public temple dedicated for the worship by the villagers and residents of nearby villages. Besides the properties alienated to Appellant No. 3, other properties which had also belonged to the deity but had been alienated. They appended data its of such properties to their written statement. Respondent No. 4 who was opposite party No. 4 in the anginal proceeding, however, took the plea that though the institution was a public temple, the seba puja and management of the deity had remained with Appellants 1 and 2 and their ancestors and the alienation in favour of Appellant No. 3 being void, did not confer any right on him. The parties went to trial and led evidence. On the evidence, the Additional Assistant Commissioner of Endowments held that the institution-Respondent No. 1 was a public temple but Appellants 1 and 2 (the typographical error bad been noticed by the appellate Court) were hereditary trustees. The parties went to trial and led evidence. On the evidence, the Additional Assistant Commissioner of Endowments held that the institution-Respondent No. 1 was a public temple but Appellants 1 and 2 (the typographical error bad been noticed by the appellate Court) were hereditary trustees. He further held that the properties mentioned in paragraph 14 of the application and in the schedule appended to the written statement belonged to the institution. 2. Aggrieved by die decision of the original authority declaring that Appellants 1 and 2 as the hereditary trustees, Respondents 1 to 3 lodged First Appeal No. 19 of 1984. Appellant No. 3 preferred First Appeal No. 23 of 1984 aggrieved by the finding that the institution was a public temple and alienation in his favour was void. The Appellants also tiled cross-objection in First Appeal No. 19 of 1984 against the findings recorded by the original authority which were adverse to the. 3. The appellate authority confirmed the finding that the institution was a temple within the meaning of Section 3(xv) of the Act and its property except those at Paikana and Banikuda was religious endowment. It reversed the finding of the original authority that Appellants 1 and 2 are the hereditary trustees of the institution. It, therefore, dismissed the appeal filed by Appellant No. 3 and allowed the appeal filed by Respondents 1 to 3, giving rise to the two appeals filed by the Appellants. 4. At the nearing of the appeals, the concurrent findings of the Courts below that Respondent No. 1 was a temple and its property was religious endowment, were not assailed. The only contention that was urged by Sri S. Misra (1), the learned Counsel for the Appellants was that on the materials in record, the appellate authority erred in law in negativing the claim of Appellants 1 and 2 as hereditary trustees. 5. In support of the argument, the learned Counsel draw my attention to the record-of-rights of 1930 wherein Udaynath Das, Panda Das. Gelha Dibya and Mani Das bad been described as Marfatdars of the deity. 5. In support of the argument, the learned Counsel draw my attention to the record-of-rights of 1930 wherein Udaynath Das, Panda Das. Gelha Dibya and Mani Das bad been described as Marfatdars of the deity. He also drew my attention to the admission of Mayadhar Das, Respondent No. 4 opposite party No. 4 before the original authority, wherein he admitted that the Appellants and their ancestors were rendering sebapuja and were in management of the institution uninterruptedly since the time at the founder, It was argued that the claim of Appellant No. 3 as hereditary trustee did not detract from the right of the other Appellants or Appellant No. 1 for that matter, as hereditary trustee. An outsider allowed to share in management did not extinguish the right of the hereditary trustee if otherwise he had such right and it was contended that by application of the principle of lost grant and backward presumption, it should have been held that since the time of the founder, the sebapuja and management devolved uninterruptedly by hereditary right. Sri S. Misra (2), the learned Counsel for the Respondents 1 to 3, however, urged that the admission of Respondent No. 4 who did not offer himself as a witness was of no consequence having regard to the fact that he was the son-in-law of Appellant No. 3 and was impleaded as a member of the Hindu public with a view to supporting the case of the Appellants. It was further urged that having regard to the unsatisfactory nature of evidence, the Binding of the Appellant authority that the Appellants had failed to establish that they were the hereditary trustee within the meaning of Section 3(vi) could not be faulted. It was also urged that' the principle of lost grant and backward presumption were not applicable on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. 6. The real contestants in the case were Respondents 2 and 3 representing the Hindu public. Admission of Respondent No. 4 in his written statement when he did not dare enter the witness box to stand cross-examination is of no consequence especially when he was related to Appellant No. 3 as his son-in-law. 6. The real contestants in the case were Respondents 2 and 3 representing the Hindu public. Admission of Respondent No. 4 in his written statement when he did not dare enter the witness box to stand cross-examination is of no consequence especially when he was related to Appellant No. 3 as his son-in-law. The Appellants especially Appellants 1 and 2, claimed their right to hereditary trusteeship under the first clause of Section 3(vi) and the burden was on them to establish that succession to the office devolved by hereditary right since the time of the founder. The Appellants besides examining themselves as P.Ws. 1 to 3, did not examine anybody else by way of corroboration of their claim from any independent source. P.W. 1 stated that the deity was installed by Sambhu and Kambu. The name of Kambu does not find place in the genealogy. On the other band, P.W. 2 states that the deity was installed by Sambhu Das. She admits in cross-examination that she bad seen papers showing endowment of property by her forefathers. She could not trace the relationship of her father with Sambhu. The evidence of P.W. 3 is not of much relevance on this aspect. The record-of rights, Ext. A, describes Udaya Panda, Gelha and Mani as the marfatdars of the deity. Even as per the genealogy, there is a gap between Sambhu and these four persons. Hence, assuming that the father of Appellant No. 1 and the grand-father of Appellant No. 2 had been recorded as marfatdars there is no evidence that Udaya Panda and Gelha were removed from Sambhu by four degrees and Mani by three degrees. There is no evidence to fin in the gaps. Besides, Nira belonged to different family admittedly. Her claim that her father was the hereditary trustee detracted from the claim of the Appellants that succession to the office bad devolved by hereditary succeeds. The appellate authority has taken note of the fact that Appellant No. 3 had been in management since his purchase. That also weakens the case of the Appellants that the sebapuja and management had continued with them uninterruptedly till the date of application. The counsel for the Appellants has relied on the principle of lost grant and backward presumption. It was observed in Dhruba Charan Swain and Others Vs. Jagannath Panda and Another, . That also weakens the case of the Appellants that the sebapuja and management had continued with them uninterruptedly till the date of application. The counsel for the Appellants has relied on the principle of lost grant and backward presumption. It was observed in Dhruba Charan Swain and Others Vs. Jagannath Panda and Another, . But when a founder is unknown and the time of the founder is not known, and there is no deed regarding foundation, one is to rely upon the theory of lost grant and has to presume that the system as is obtained from the time immemorial was the System that has been continuing from the time of the founder. Here, however, the founder and the time are known and it is not the case that the foundation is lost in antiquity. Hence, the principle of lost grant is not applicable. In Ambika Prasad v. Ram Ekbal Rai 1966 S.C.D. 485, it has been held: .... If a thing or a state of things is shown to exist, an inference of its continuity within a reasonably proximate time both forwards and backwards may sometimes be drawn. The presumption of future continuance is noticed in Illustration (d) to Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. In appropriate cases, an inference of the continuity of a thing or state of things backwards may be drawn under this section though on this point the section does not give a separate illustration. The rule that the presumption of continuance may operate retrospectively has been recognised both in India and England. The broad observation that there is no rule of evidence by which one can presume the continuity of things backwards cannot be supported. The presumption of continuity weakens with the passage of time. How far the presumption may be drawn both backwards and forwards depends upon the nature of the thing and the surrounding circumstances.... The above principle was followed by this Court in Chintamani Pati Vs. Krishna Chaudra Panda and Others, Madan Pati and Others Vs. Birabara Das and Others. There is, however, paucity of materials to draw the presumption either forwards or backwards. The first discordant note is the evidence of P.W. 1 when he states that the institution was founded by Sambhu Das and Kambu Das. That was a departure from his own case in para-2 of the application u/s 41. Birabara Das and Others. There is, however, paucity of materials to draw the presumption either forwards or backwards. The first discordant note is the evidence of P.W. 1 when he states that the institution was founded by Sambhu Das and Kambu Das. That was a departure from his own case in para-2 of the application u/s 41. Kambu is completely omitted from the genealogy and secondly, there is no evidence that the descendants of Sambhu, namely, Pitambar, Arta, Chakradhar, Madhu, Krutibas and Bharat were in management until we reach the record-of-rights where four names are recorded. What happened in between is shrouded in mystery. Admission of Appellant No. 2 or her father who had no hereditary right of succession to the office detracted from the claim of the Appellants; so also the claim of Appellant No. 3 as hereditary trustee. The trump-card of the Appellants was the record-at-rights of 1930. But the presumption backwards could be drawn within a reasonably proximate time. It could not be over-stretched. Having regard to the unsatisfactory state of evidence, if the appellate authority upon consideration of the evidence held that the Appellants had failed to establish that they were hereditary trustees within the meaning of Section 3(vi), it is difficult -for me to upset the said finding, may there is no cogent and convincing reason for taking a different view. I, therefore, confirm the said finding and dismiss the appeals; But in the facts and circumstances, there would be no order as to costs. Appeals dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed