JUDGMENT S. B. Sinha, J. This second appeal arises out of a judgment and decree dated 11.8.1981 passed by Shri Leo Walter Kujur, 1st additional Subordinate Judge, Hazaribagh in T. A No. 52/78 whereby and whereunder the said learned court affirmed a judgment and decree dated 7.6.1979 passed by Shri Uma Shankar Prasad, Munsif, Hazaribagh in T. S. No. 63/77. 2. By an order dated 18.2.1982 the following substantial question of law were formulated :- “Whether a suit for specific performance of contract is maintainable on the basis of an oral agreement for sale of immovable property? Whether the right of a subsequent purchaser for value without notice is protected under section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act ?" 3. The case of the plaintiff-respondent appears to be that he entered into an oral agreement of sale in respect of the property in question on 15.1.1976 for a consideration of Rs. 3,000/-. According to the plaintiff out of the aforementioned consideration a sum of Rs. 1500/- was paid in advance and in part performance of the aforementioned agreement he was put in possession in respect of the land - in question. The further case of the plaintiff is that he constructed a building with the knowledge and consent of the defendant nos. 1 to 7. However the defendant nos. 1 to 7 sold away the said property to defendant no. 8. The defence of the defendants in the aforementioned case was common. 4. The defendants alleged that in fact the defendant nos. 1 to 7 had entered into an earlier agreement for sale with the defendant no.8. The defendant no. 8 further took the plea that he was a subsequent purchaser for value and without notice of the agreement on the basis of which the plaintiff claimed the property and as such no decree for specific performance of contract could be granted. 5. Mr. Debi Prasad, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant took me through the entire judgment of the learned appellate court and instead of making submission on the questions of law formulated in the aforementioned second appeal contended that as the plaintiff was in possession of the building in question not in part performance of the contract but as a tenant thereof, he was not entitled to a decree. 6. 6. From a perusal of the judgments of both the courts below it would appear that the findings of fact arrived at by them are as follows ;(a) The plaintiff had entered into an agreement for sale with the defendant nos.1 to 7 and in part performance of the contract and he was put in possession of the land in question. The plaintiff paid a sum of Rs. 1500/- by way of advance in terms of the said agreement. (b) The plaintiff has constructed a building on the aforementioned land with the knowledge and consent of the defendant nos. 1 to 7. (c) the story that the defendant nos.1 to 7 that they had entered into an earlier agreement of sate with the defendant no. 8 was incorrect and they had not proved the said fact. (d) the defendant no. 8 is not a bonafide purchaser without notice of agreement of sale entered into by and between the plaintiff and the defendant nos. 1 to 7 inasmuch as the said defendants had notice of the possession of the plaintiff in his own right, as he himself constructed the building. 7. In view of the finding of the fact arrived ,at by the learned courts below which are binding upon this court, in my opinion, the substantial questions of law formulated in this appeal do not arise for consideration in this appeal at all. 8. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever nor Mr. Debi Prasad has raised any contention to the contrary that an oral agreement for sale in respect of immovable property is valid in law. 9. It is well known that by reason of an agreement for sale no transfer in the right of the vendor in the property itself takes place and in that view of the matter it is possible for two contracting parties to enter into an oral agreement, for sale. 10. The first question raised in this appeal, therefore, must be answered in the affirmative. 11. So far as the second question is concerned the reference to section 41 of the Transfer' of Property Act therein is wholly misconceived. 12. In the instant case, as indicated above, it has been found that (sic) by the learned courts below that the defendant no. 11. So far as the second question is concerned the reference to section 41 of the Transfer' of Property Act therein is wholly misconceived. 12. In the instant case, as indicated above, it has been found that (sic) by the learned courts below that the defendant no. 8 was not a bonafide purchaser without notice so far as the agreement of sale entered into by and between the plaintiff and defendant nos. 1 to 7 ,dated 15.1.1976 is concerned. The plaintiff being in possession of the property in suit in his own right, the same itself constitutes due notice. 13. This finding being a finding of the fact is binding upon this court in the second appeal. It is, therefore, evident that in terms of section 19 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 a suit for specific performance of contract can be decreed not only against the contracting party but also against the subsequent purchaser. 14. In this view of the matter there is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed with costs.