Judgment :- 1. The Kerala Motor Vehicles (Taxation of Passengers and Goods) Act, 1963 (the Act) for the first time imposed a tax on all passengers, luggages and goods carried by any stage carriage and on all goods transported by goods vehicles. It was made payable by the operator who has to collect and remit the same. Operator is defined in the Act as to include owner or the person having possession or control of the vehicle or any person whose name is entered in the permit as holder thereof. Regional Transport Officer (D2) is the prescribed officer who has to issue demand notice and collect the amount. His demand notice is appealable before the District Collector (first defendant is the State represented by the District Collector). No further provision is there to challenge his order even though the order is not described as final. 2. There is no specific provision in the Act barring suits or other proceedings against the Government except a period of limitation fixed under S.22. That period is applicable to suits, prosecutions or other proceedings in Civil or Criminal Courts against officers and servants also. All acts done in good faith by officers and servants are saved from liability before courts under S.21(2). For criminal prosecution against them sanction of Government is also made a condition precedent under S.21(1). This is the scheme of the Act. A reading of the various provisions of the Act shows that in the matter of demand and collection the action of the Regional Transport Officer subjected to the appellate jurisdiction of the District Collector was not intended to be interfered with by anybody provided they acted in good faith within bounds. 3. Third respondent Mr. Namboodiri was the permit holder of the stage carriage involved in this case. When second defendant demanded tax from him, he denied liability stating that the vehicle was transferred to the plaintiff. Second defendant rejected that objection. But in appeal the District Collector after issuing notice to the plaintiff and hearing him also, passed a considered order based on relevant materials finding that the vehicle has been transferred to the plaintiff and he is in possession and control. He was made liable by Ext. Al order which is challenged in this suit as null and void. But in appeal the District Collector after issuing notice to the plaintiff and hearing him also, passed a considered order based on relevant materials finding that the vehicle has been transferred to the plaintiff and he is in possession and control. He was made liable by Ext. Al order which is challenged in this suit as null and void. A declaration to that effect and injunction from collection of tax are claimed on the grounds of collusion, absence of authority, want of materials and absence of liability on his part. All these contentions are found against on the merits and according to me rightly. The District Collector had authority and he acted within bounds observing all the legal formalities required. It is not for the civil court to sit in judgment over his order. Therefore normally the other contentions do not arise. But elaborate arguments were addressed before me on the question of jurisdiction and hence I feel bound to consider it. 4. The trail court rejected the contention of the defendants that the jurisdiction of the civil court is ousted, but dismissed the suit for the reason that Mr. Namboodiri who is a necessary party was not impleaded. On non joinder the appellate judge agreed with the trial court ignoring his order allowing an application to implead Mr. Namboodiri. On the back of the impleading application now there are two orders by the District Judge, one allowing the same and impleading Namboodiri and another dismissing it without reviewing the earlier order. Judgment also refers to the non-impleading and dismissal of the impleading application as a ground for dismissal of the appeal. At the same time the District Judge disagreed with the trial court and found that the jurisdiction of the civil court is ousted. Now, Mr. Namboodiri is the third respondent before me. He is represented by a counsel who took part in the arguments. Impleading him at the appellate stage is impleading for all subsequent stages in all the courts and it cannot be erased by what the District Judge said or did. 5. Now, therefore, the only further question to be considered is whether the jurisdiction of the civil court in entertaining and trying the suit is, ousted. Jurisdiction is the authority to decide. 5. Now, therefore, the only further question to be considered is whether the jurisdiction of the civil court in entertaining and trying the suit is, ousted. Jurisdiction is the authority to decide. Jurisdiction of the civil courts to try all suits of a civil nature (which includes proceedings also) under S.9 of the Code of Civil Procedure is the fragment of the judicial power of the State conferred by that provision. Judicial power of the State is being distributed between various Courts and Tribunals in the form of jurisdiction. Ouster or restriction of such powers could be had by express provisions or by necessary implication. When such restrictions are there the power could be exercised only subject to such restrictions. Jurisdiction conferred by statutory provisions could be taken away or restricted by similar provisions. What is given by the right hand could be taken away by the left hand or limited in its application. 6. When part of the jurisdiction of the courts is assigned to another body, the question may naturally arise how far it has affected the all comprehensive jurisdiction of the civil courts to try all disputes of a civil nature. For that purpose the provisions of the statutes themselves will have to be looked into to get the answer. If there is an express provision ousting or restricting the jurisdiction there may not be difficulty. When a person's liberty or property is interfered with under the cover of statutory powers, he has a cause of action which the civil courts are bound to entertain unless there is a bar either express or by necessary implication. There are certain guiding factors to be looked into in deciding whether there is ouster of jurisdiction of civil courts. The guidelines given in the famous decision in Wolverhamptron New Water Works Co. v. Hawkesford (1859) 6 C. B. (N. S) 335,356 quoted with approval in several subsequent decisions could be safely accepted and followed. 7. Take the case of a liability or right already existing at common law for which the concerned parties were entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts at common law, but a statute is enacted providing a special machinery to workout the remedies. In such a case unless the statute expressly exclude the common law remedy the plaintiff can elect either forum. In such a case unless the statute expressly exclude the common law remedy the plaintiff can elect either forum. That is because even without the statutory provision he had a remedy at common law and the statute must foreclose that remedy in order to make it extinct. Just the opposite is the case when a right or liability which was not there at common law till then was created for the first time by the statute. In such a case the machinery created by the statute alone will be available to the parties unless the right which was till then not there is conferred on the courts by the statutory provision. In cases when a new statute creates a right or liability for the first time but did not provide for any special remedy, the party can have resort to common law to enforce his remedy through court. That is because of S.9 C.P.C. by which in the absence of express or implied bar, all disputes of a civil nature could be tried by civil courts. Otherwise the parties will be left without any forum for their remedies. Such a situation cannot be conceived in an orderly Society in which the State with its judicial power is having the responsibility to provide for settlement of disputes and machineries for the same. These are the general guiding factors deciding jurisdiction of courts in the light of statutory provisions. In the absence of specific statutory provisions there is no question of the jurisdiction of the civil courts under S.9 C.P.C. being ousted. In this case the liability was created for the first time by the Statute and machineries are also provided. Therefore jurisdiction of the civil courts will depend upon the power conferred under the Act. Two principles therefore evolve. They are (1) for the purpose of exclusion of an existing jurisdiction at common law or statutory there must be explicit or at least implied ouster, and (2) For the purpose of getting invested with new jurisdiction there must be conferment or at least a vacuum without a forum except S.9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 8. There is no specific bar of jurisdiction of courts in the Act. S.22 may indicate that suits are contemplated even though that provision provides only a period of limitation. 8. There is no specific bar of jurisdiction of courts in the Act. S.22 may indicate that suits are contemplated even though that provision provides only a period of limitation. The period of limitation prescribed is for suits or other proceedings against the Government before the civil court in respect of anything done or purported to be done under the Act and suits, prosecutions or other proceedings in civil or criminal courts against officers and servants, also for anything done or purported to be done under the Act. But sub-sections (1) and (2) of S.21 indicate that previous sanction of Government is necessary for prosecutions and good faith excludes the liability of officers and servants. A combined reading of S.21 and 22 along with S.10 and 13 providing the functions of the prescribed officer, the appellate power of the Collector and the absence of any other remedy indicates that courts are not intended to be conferred with any jurisdiction in the discharge of the duties within bounds under the Act. At any rate there is no investiture of jurisdiction in civil courts. 9. But even in cases of absence of jurisdiction by ouster, express or implied, or by absence of investiture, the civil courts have certain powers as guardians of the civil rights of citizens. As held in Raleigh Investment Co v. C. C. in Council (AIR 1947 PC 78) jurisdiction cannot be given by consent. It is pars judicis to take jurisdiction of statutory authorities into consideration even where it is not raised. Exclusion of jurisdiction is not to be readily inferred. It must be either explicitly expressed or clearly implied. (Secretary of State v. Mask & Co. AIR 1940 PC 105). The civil courts are always having the jurisdiction to examine into every case when the provisions of the Act have not been complied wither the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. But in doing so the courts must be jealous to see that the decision of a tribunal having jurisdiction on a question of law or fact is not allowed to be impeached collaterally. It has to be borne in mind that a wrong conclusion will not make the decision of a quasi judicial authority with jurisdiction one without jurisdiction. The essential question should be whether it binds (Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1962 SC 1621). It has to be borne in mind that a wrong conclusion will not make the decision of a quasi judicial authority with jurisdiction one without jurisdiction. The essential question should be whether it binds (Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1962 SC 1621). When a special Statute is a self contained Code in the matter of determination of liability created by it, the jurisdiction of the civil court is ousted even without a specific provision (Kunjappan v. Toddy W.W.F. Inspector 1987 (1) KLT 633). A mistake committed by such a special tribunal in respect of "a matter of detail" cannot be characterised as violation of the provisions of the Statute to give jurisdiction to the civil court to sit in judgment over the proceedings. Such errors are only to be rectified under the provisions of the Statute and not by recourse to a court of law. But clear and plain violation of the principles of natural justice, assumption of non-existent jurisdiction, excessive exercise of jurisdiction, fraud or collusion or other vitiating circumstances could invoke jurisdiction of the civil court to challenge the same. (Corporation of Trivandrum v. Bhaskaran Nair (1985 KLT 213). 10. When the question of jurisdiction of the court is considered nobody should be allowed to oust the jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal to confer jurisdiction on the court by moulding the allegations and the reliefs cleverly (Ram Singh v. Gram Panchayat, Mehal Kalan (AIR 1986 SC 2197)). At the same time it should not be lost sight of that finality of the orders of the Special Tribunals under the provisions of the Statutes can apply only to acts which are within the purview of the Act and not to acts not warranted by the Act or prohibited by it. In such cases of excesses ordinary civil courts would have jurisdiction (State of Kerala v. Gopalakrishna Pillai (1961 KLJ 338)). Normal rule is that when a particular forum alone is provided, that forum alone could decide ( Munshi Ram and Others v. Municipal Committee (AIR 1979 SC 1250)). But even in such cases, the jurisdiction of the civil courts is not completely ousted. Not only abuse of power including disregard of the provisions for hearing and enquiry and other factors mentioned above, but also the applicability of the particular Statute to the action of the special tribunal is a matter that the court can go into. But even in such cases, the jurisdiction of the civil courts is not completely ousted. Not only abuse of power including disregard of the provisions for hearing and enquiry and other factors mentioned above, but also the applicability of the particular Statute to the action of the special tribunal is a matter that the court can go into. (See Firm Seth Radha Kishan (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and others v. Administrator, Municipal Committee, Ludhiana (AIR 1963 SC 1547), Dhulabhai etc v. State of M.P. and another (AIR 1969 SC 78) and The Pabbojan Tea Co. Ltd v. Deputy Commissioner Lakhimpur and others (AIR 1968 SC 271). But in the wake of the ouster of jurisdiction, while acting as the protector or guarantor of the civil rights of citizens alone, the civil courts should not assume the role of correcting the mistakes as an appellate court. It must always keep within bounds and refuse to interfere with functions discharged by special tribunals within the limits of law when none of the above mentioned grounds justifying interference are there. It may not be conducive to the administration of justice to have parallel tribunals exercising simultaneous jurisdiction resulting in conflicting decisions and inroads into the rights of each other. 11. The suit is mala fide and it was intended only delay liability. Both the courts have not exercised the judicial discretion properly in disallowing costs to the respondents. But in the absence of atleast a cross objection, I am not in a position to rectify that error. The second appeal is dismissed with costs.