Judgment S. C. Mookherji, J. 1. In this application the point involved being a short one, only the relevant facts need to be stated. 2. The petitioner if a public servant and during the relevant period he was posted at Patna as Deputy Superintendent of Police (town ). It appears that there was some controversy between opposite-party No.2 and one Rameshwar singh in respect of their claim of possession over a residential Flat bearing No.191 M. I. G. in Hanuman Nagar Colony of Kankarbagh. 3. Two cases were instituted, one by opposite-party No.2 against the petitioner and and other, by the said Rameshwar Singh against opposite-party No.2 and others. The present controversy relates to the case instituted by opposite-party No.2 against the petitioner and others alleging therein that they had committed offences under Sections 457, 448, 461 and 120b of the Indian penal Code as detailed in the complaint petition The complaint was dismissed whereafter, opposite-parly No.2 preferred a revision before this Court. Upon an order of further enquiry, the learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offence. Against that order, the petitioner moved this Court for quashing that order on the ground that he being a public servant and the offences complained of having been committed in discharge of his official duties, no prosecution can be made without obtaining sanction from the competent authority as provided under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Relying on a decision of the supreme Court reported in A. I. R.1979 S. C.1841 equal to 1979 Cr. L. J. page 1267, this Court observed that the petitioner could raise this point at any stage and in that event the learned Magistrate should dispose of the objection in accordance with law. Thereafter, it appears that the petitioner appeared before the Magistrate and raised the issue which was rejected against which the present revision has been filed. 4. Mr. Jagdish Singh, the learned Advocate for the petitioner has raised only one point that the trial court while passing the order had not taken into consideration other relevant facts and circumstances although it were brought to his notice and hence, the order on this ground alone is bad in law. 4. Mr. Jagdish Singh, the learned Advocate for the petitioner has raised only one point that the trial court while passing the order had not taken into consideration other relevant facts and circumstances although it were brought to his notice and hence, the order on this ground alone is bad in law. The learned advocate has also tried to justify the action of the petitioner in the alleged offence as being a part of his official function and according to him, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court, reported in A. I. R.1956 S. C.44, the Court could not have taken cognizance of the offence against him without obtaining prior sanction of the State Government. In support of his contention, the learned counsel has submitted that the petitioner being a public servant and in-charge of law and order, had to rush to the spot on receipt of a telephonic message along with some other police officials to control the situation as there was serious apprehension of the breach of peace between the parties for possession of a flat and therefore, in any event, the said action of the petitioner can be taken to be his official duties. So far as the allegation against the petitioner that he had forcibly dispossessed opposite-party No.2, as stated in the petition of complaint, the learned Counsel has submitted that if the cases of opposite-party No.2 and the said Rameshwar, who claims to be a tenant in the house and other connected matters are taken into consideration, it will appear that there was no case of dispossession. In other words, according to the learned Counsel, the allegation of the opposite-party No.2 that the petitioner was instrumental in dispossessing the opposite-party No.2 from his house is absolutely incorrect. He has also submitted that it would be evident that the learned Magistrate solely on the basis of the allegation made in the petition of the complaint, passed the order. 5. On the other hand, the opposite-party No.2 who has argued in person has submitted that at this stage the learned Magistrate was only required to say as to whether the allegation complained of was committed in discharge of his public duty or not and if a prima facie case is there, that offence alleged could not be taken to be official function, the court was competent to proceed with the trial. Further, he has submitted that he was in possession of the house, but in order to help Rameshwar Singh, the petitioner along with some police officials forcibly dispossessed him from the house. 6. In order to have the applicability of Sec.197 of the Code of Criminal procedure, it has to be seen whether the act complained of had been committed by the public servant either in his official capacity or under colour of the office held by him. In the decision of the Supreme Court stated above (A. I. R.1979 S. C.1841) in which the decision cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner has also been taken into consideration it has been observed that "while the question whether an offence was committed in the course of official duty or under colour of office, cannot be answered hypothetically, and depends on the facts of each case, one broad test for this purpose, first deduced by Varadacbariar, J. of the Federal Court in Hari Ram V/s. Emperor, 1939 F. C. R.159 is generally applied with advantage. After referring with approval to those observations of Varadachariar. J, Lord Simonds in H. B. Gill V/s. The King (A. I. R.1948 P. C.128) tersely reiterated that the "test may well be whether the public servant, if challenged, can reasonably claim, that what he does, he does in virtue of his office". The Supreme Court has also quoted the observation of Chandrashekhar aiyar, J, which is as follows : ". . . . . . in the matter of grant of sanction under Sec.197, the offence alleged to have been committed by the accused must have something to do, or must be related in some manner, with the discharge of official duty. . . . . . there must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty, the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty. " 7. Therefore, where a public servant has asserted that the offence allegedly committed by him is related in some manner with the discharge of official duty and there is a reasonable connection between act and the discharge of the official duty, the court, where such a plea was raised, should hold an enquiry for this limited purpose. " 7. Therefore, where a public servant has asserted that the offence allegedly committed by him is related in some manner with the discharge of official duty and there is a reasonable connection between act and the discharge of the official duty, the court, where such a plea was raised, should hold an enquiry for this limited purpose. In the instant case, when the protection available to a public servant under the provisions of Sec.197 Cr. P. C. was raissd by the petitioner, the only material available before it was the allegations made in the petition of complaint. As a matter of fact, the learned Magistrate, while dealing with this issue observed that "i find that the facts of Kankarbagh P. S. Case No.432/84 are not available on the record. We have been left with mainly the complaint petition brought by the complainant. . . . . . It has already been pointed out that two cases had been instituted separately, one by the opposite-party No.2 against one Rameshwar and others and the other one by Rameshwar against opposite party No.2. In the impugned order, the learned Magistrate has further observed that an information was sent to police upon which, the petitioner and other police officials arrived at the spot and some persons were arrested. The petitioner has asserted that at the relevant period of time he was posted as Dy. Superintendent of police (town) and in that capacity, on receipt of a message that there was apprehension of breach of peace between the main contestants over a particular fiat went to the spot and took actions against them in discharge of his official duty. It appears that all these matters could not be considered by the learned magistrate for the reasons stated above. If the circumstances, as indicated above where such a claim has been made by an accused public servant and there appears prima facie controversial facts in that regard, the court, while dealing with the same should hold an enquiry for this limited purpose by affording an opportunity to the public servant concerned to place relevant, materials for its consideration instead of directing him to face trial simply on the allegation made in the petition of complaint. If, in an appropriate case, without holding an enquiry the accused public servant is directed to face the trial, the very purpose of the protection available to him under Sec.197 Cr. P. C. will be meaningless. This is all the more necessary in a case of the present nature, which is based on a complaint as in a police reported case there is a scope for an investigation, but no such scope is available in a case instituted on a private complaint. 8. In the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the view that the petitioner should be given an opportunity to place the relevant materials for the purpose of deciding the limited question as to whether he is protected under Sec.197 Cr. P. C. or not. Accordingly, this Court, in exercise of its powers under Sec.482 Cr. P. C. direct that if an application is filed by the petitioner before the learned Magistrate within a month from today claiming his protection under Sec.197 Cr. P. C. the learned Magistrate shall hold an enquiry for this limited purpose, for which an opportunity should be given to the petitioner to produce the relevant materials within a specified time and after hearing the parties, dispos of the same in accordance with law. This should be done with least possible delay, preferably, within six months from the date of receipt of this order. If the petitioner fails to produce any material within that time limit, it will be open to the court to proceed with the trial. 9. With the above observations/directions the order impugned is set aside. The application is allowed. Let a copy of this order along with the entire lover court records be sent down atonce through special messenger. Appeal allowed.