JUDGMENT 1. - This is petition under Section 482, Cr.PC praying that the proceedings taken against the petitioner under Section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (here in after referred to as the 'Act') may be quashed. 2. The petition came up before learned Single Judge (MB. Sharma, J.) and arguments commenced. Learned Counsel for the petitioner relied on some decisions of this court which we shall refer later, and submitted that in view of those judgments, this petition should be allowed. 3. Learned Counsel for the State referred decision of the Supreme Court in State of Bombay v. Parshottam Kanhaiya Lal ( AIR 1961 SC 1 ) , which was not considered by this Court in any of those judgments, which were relied by learned Counsel for the petitioner. Learned Single Judge was inclined to take a view different from that had been taken in the earlier judgments of this Court. Therefore, he thought it proper to refer the following two questions for decision by the larger bench: "1 Whether, in view of the Notification dated June 7, 1974 referred to above, of the State Government authorising the Asstt. Public Prosecutors Grade-I and II to conduct the cases of Food Adulteration in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, can it be said that presentation in person of the complaint by the Food Inspector is necessary and if the complaint is not presented by the Food Inspector and it was presented by the Asstt. Public Prosecutor Grade-I or II, whether if will be contravention of Section 20(1) of the Act? 2 Whether, the complaint signed by the Food Inspector who has been given written consent for instituting the case is required to be presented by him. personally and if the complaint is not presented personally by the Food Inspector then whether there is contravention of Section 20(1) of the Act? 4. Since this was an important matter, we had directed that a general notice be issued to all the learned Advocates about hearing of this case so that submissions could be made by them, if they so liked. Mr. S.R. Bajwa, Advocate has appeared and has assisted this Court. 5. Kutubddin was appointed as a Food Inspector on December 10. 4. Since this was an important matter, we had directed that a general notice be issued to all the learned Advocates about hearing of this case so that submissions could be made by them, if they so liked. Mr. S.R. Bajwa, Advocate has appeared and has assisted this Court. 5. Kutubddin was appointed as a Food Inspector on December 10. 1975, under Section 9 of the Act, vide Ex.P.l On December 20, 1980, he visited the shop of the petitioner and took sample from the mustard oil tin, kept there for sale. The sample was divided into three parts; each sample was sealed and one sample was sent to the Public. Analyst, who on analysis found that the sample of mustard oil was adulterated, vide Ex.P. 11. The Food Inspector produced the relevant papers before the local health authority (Chief Medical and Health Officer, Tonk) who accorded written sanction under Section 20 of the Act, for prosecution of the petitioner,(vide Ex.P. 20). Complaint (Ex.P21) was presented by the Assistant Public Prosecutor in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tonk. This complaint was signed by Kutubddin, Food Inspector and the case proceeded. Charge under Section 7/16 of the Act was framed against the petitioner and Ors. on 7-4-1984. When the case was in progress, a written objection was raised by way of an application dated 7-2-1985 that the Assistant Public Prosecutor was not authorised to present the complaint and therefore, the proceedings should be quashed. This application was rejected by the Chief Judicial Magistrate vide order dated 28-5-85 and it is against this order that the present petition has been filed for getting the proceedings quashed. 6. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on State v. Jai Narayan 1983 Cr. LR (Raj) 459 , where learned Single Judge (Justice S C. Agrawal) had taken the view that the Assistant Public Prosecutor had no authority to present the complaint before the Judicial Magistrate, and since there was nothing on the record to show that the Assistant Public Prosecutor had authority to present the complaint on behalf of the Food Inspector to conduct the case on his behalf, relying on a decision by Justice M.C. Jain of this court, in Dhaliya v. State of Rajasthan S.B. Cr. Revision No. 159/76 decided on 29-11-1982 , holding that the complaint was presented by an unauthorised person and the trial was also conducted by an unauthorised person and as such, the trial stands vitiated and conviction was set aside. 7. Learned Single Judge of this Court (S.C. Agrawal, J ) again in State of Rajasthan v. Nagji Ram 1983 Cr. LR (Raj) 666 relying on his earlier decision in Jai Narain's case (supra), allowed the revision petition and quashed the judgment convicting the accused, on the same ground. 8. Relying on these two authorities i.e. Jainarain and Nagji Ram's case another learned Single Judge of this court (Justice S S. Byas), in Sadra v. State of Rajasthan 1984 Cr. LR (Raj) 444 held that the Assistant Public Prosecutor had no power to present or to prosecute the complaint. Justice Byas again in Deo Kishan v. State of Rajasthan 1984 Cr LR (Raj) 465 relying on these earlier cases, quashed the judgment of the lower court convicting the accused under Section 7/16 of the Act, holding that the Assistant Public Prosecutor had no power to present the complaint, and since the complaint was not filed by a person duly authorised under Section 20 of the Act, the prosecution and trial of the accused stands illegal ab initio. 9. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on A.K. Ray and Anr. v. State of Punjab and Ors. (AIR 1986 SC 160) , wherein their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that Rule 3 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration (Punjab) Rules, 1958 must be read subject to the provisions contained in Section 20(1) of the Act and cannot be construed to authorise sub-delegation of powers by the Food (Health) Authority, Punjab, to the local Food Inspector. It has further been held that Section 20(1) of the Act do not envisage further delegation of powers by the person authorised. The use of negative words in Section 20(1) "No prosecution for an offence under this Act...shall be instituted" except by or with the written consent of plainly make the requirements of the section imperative. Where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all. The use of negative words in Section 20(1) "No prosecution for an offence under this Act...shall be instituted" except by or with the written consent of plainly make the requirements of the section imperative. Where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all. In that particular case, since the prosecution was launched by the Food Inspector under purported authority given to him by Food (Health) Authority, vide notification to that effect, without any written consent by Central or State Government for such prosecution, such launching of prosecution was held to be illegal. Much reliance has been placed on this judgment by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. 10. On the other hand, Mr. S.R. Bajwa, Advocate, brought to our notice a recent decision of this Court in Bhairun v. State of Rajasthan 1988 Cr. LR (Raj) 134 wherein learned Single Judge (D.L. Mehta) has held that there is no illegality or violation of Section 20 of the Act, if the Assistant Public Prosecutor presented the complaint which has been shown in the name of Food Inspector. Justice Mehta has of course not referred to earlier decisions of this court which had taken a contrary view at it appears, they were not cited before him. 11. Mr. S.R. Bajwa has also brought to our notice a decision of the Supreme Court in Parshottam Kanhaiyalal (supra), which has later been considered, explained emphasised by later decision of the Supreme Court in The Corporation of Calcutta v. Mohd. Omer Ali and Anr. ( AIR 1977 SC 912 ) , and both these judgments of the Supreme Court, have been followed and relied by the Supreme Court in A K. Ray's case (supra). 12. Shri S.R. Bajwa further submitted that the word 'institute' means launching or taking cognizance by the Magistrate, and not filing of complaint, and has placed reliance on Jamuna Singh and Ors. v. Bhadai Shah AIR 1964 SC 1541 . 13. Mr. Bajwa has further drawn our attention to Section 200 Cr.PC wherein the words 'at once' have been deleted in the 1973 amendment which shows the intention of the legislature, specially in view of the proviso, it is not necessary that the public servant should be examined personally and his presence is not necessary. 13. Mr. Bajwa has further drawn our attention to Section 200 Cr.PC wherein the words 'at once' have been deleted in the 1973 amendment which shows the intention of the legislature, specially in view of the proviso, it is not necessary that the public servant should be examined personally and his presence is not necessary. Therefore, complaint could be presented by the Assistant Public Prosecutor. 14. Mr. G.C. Chaterjee, Government Advocate and Mr. C.P. Sharma, Dy. G.A. have adopted the arguments of Mr. S R. Bajwa and have placed before us a copy of the notification dated 7th June, 1974, issued by the Government of Rajasthan. Home (Gr. I), Department with regard to authorising the conduct of food adulteration cases in the Judicial courts by the Asstt Public Prosecutors. They have also brought to our notise State of Punjab v. Devinder Kumar and Ors. ( AIR 1983 SC 545 ) where in their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that the courts should hot quash the proceedings under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act on technical or slender grounds. 15. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the whole matter and have also perused the various authorities cited before us. 16. Section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act runs as under: "20. Cognizance and trial of offences--(1) No prosecution for an offence under this Act, not being an offence under Section 14 or Section 14A shall be instituted except by, or with the written consent of the Central Government or the State Government or a person authorised in this behalf,' by general or special order by the Central Government or the State Government; Provided that a prosecution for an offence under this Act may be instituted by a purchaser referred to in Section 12, if he produces in court a copy of the report of the public analyst along with the complaint. (2) No court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try an offence under this Act. (3) Not with standing any thing contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 an offence punishable under Sub-section (1AA) of Section 16 shall be cognizable and non-bailable. 17. The very purpose of enacting Section 20(1) was to avoid frivolous prosecution. (3) Not with standing any thing contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 an offence punishable under Sub-section (1AA) of Section 16 shall be cognizable and non-bailable. 17. The very purpose of enacting Section 20(1) was to avoid frivolous prosecution. Therefore, it had been provided under this section that no prosecution for an offence under this Act; except an offence under Section 14 or Section 14A shall be instituted, except by or with the written consent of the Central Government or the State Government or a person authorised in this behalf, by general or special order, by the Central Govt, or the State Govt, This implies that some responsible authority should examine the whole matter very closely and take an independent view whether upon the material and evidence before it, it will be proper to launch prosecution under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, so that innocent persons are not harassed. The language of Section 20(1) is very specific and clear. It says "no prosecution shall be instituted." It does not say that no complaint shall be filed or presented. More over, this section does not envisage that the complaint should be presented by the complainant or the Food Inspector the person authorised, personally, and these words cannot be imported so as to give a meaning that the complaint has to be presented personally by the Food Inspector or the person who has been authorised and given consent under Section 20(1) of the Act. Emphasis in Section 20(1) of the Act is On the consent to the filing of the prosecution and not to the particular person who should file it. This is obvious by the observations of the Supreme Court in Parshottam Kanaiyala's case (supra), para 13 where of runs as under: "The learned Counsel for the appellant-State challenged the correctness of this construction. He referred us to the analogy of the decisions rendered on Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code where it has been held that "the sanction" referred to need not name the person who could institute the prosecution. We consider it unnecessary to canvass the relative scope of the language of Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code and of Section 20(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. We prefer to rest our decision on the terms of Section 20(1) itself. We consider it unnecessary to canvass the relative scope of the language of Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code and of Section 20(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. We prefer to rest our decision on the terms of Section 20(1) itself. To start with the Statute does not in terms prescribe that the complainant shall be named in the "written consent." The only question, therefore, is whether such a limitation or condition could be gathered as a necessary intendment of the provision. In the first place, the reason of the rule could not suggest or imply such a condition. The rule has undoubtedly been designed to prevent the launching of frivolous or harassing prosecutions against traders. It therefore provides that the complaint should be filed, either by a named or specified authority or with the written consent of such authority To read by implication that before granting a written consent, the authority competent to initiate a prosecution should apply its mind to the facts of the case and satisfy itself that a prima facie esse exists for the alleged offender being put up before a Court appears reasonable but further implication that the complainant must be named in the written consent does not, in our opinion follow. In the present case the Analyst's Report was before the Chief Officer of the Municipality and it was after coasidering that report and the connected documents that the written consent or sanction was given. In the second place the sub-section itself contains an indication that the written consent is for the launching of a specified prosecution, and not one 'in favour' of a complainant authorising him to file the complaint. Omitting for the moment the State Government and "the local authority" of which are specified in the provision as competent by themselves to initiate prosecutions, persons "authorised by" these two authorities are further included. The expression "person authorised in this behalf" obviously refers to a named person who is so authorised. In the case of these four categories, the authority or person filing the complaint has itself or himself to consider the reasonableness and propriety of the prosecution and be satisfied that the prosecution is not frivolous and is called for. Turning next to the other class, the relevant words are "no prosecution shall be instituted except with the written consent of". Turning next to the other class, the relevant words are "no prosecution shall be instituted except with the written consent of". Here the emphasis is on the consent to the filing of the prosecution, not to the person filing it. The preliminary examination of the facts to ascertain the desirability and propriety of the prosecution is in this last case, the responsibility of the person or authority giving the written consent not of the person who figures as the complainant. The two classes are distinct and the employment of different phraseology to designate the two types of devolution of authority, constitute an indication that in the second class of cases where prosecutions are filed on the basis of written consents granted by the competent persons or authority, the specification of the name of the complainant is not a statutory requirement the consent being to a specified prosecution. We, therefore, consider that the prosecution in the present case was instituted on a complaint which fulfilled the requirements of Section 20(1)of the Act. 18. The word 'institute' has not been defined under the Act. The "Words and Phrases Judicially Defined" Vol. 3 by Roland Burrows KC, defines 'Institution of a prosecution' at page 123 as follows: "The institution of a prosecution seems to me to mean ordinarily the commencement of the proceedings by which a person is brought before the court. 19. The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines the terms 'institute' which means 'initiate the inquiry etc.' 20. In view of the observations of the Supreme Court in Jamna Singh's case (supra), the case can be said to be instituted in a court only when the court takes cognizance of the offence alleged therein. In other words, when a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon receipt of a complaint, on facts which constitute such offence, a case is instituted in the Magistrate's court and such a case is one instituted on a complaint. In the present case, there is no dispute that there was written consent by the proper authority to launch prosecution, as per (Ex.P 20) wherein the Local Health Authority authorised Kutubddin, Food Inspector, to launch prosecution. In view of notification dated 7-6-1974, it can also not be disputed now that the Asstt. Public Prosecutor was authorised to conduct the cases under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act,in courts of Judicial Magistrates.The Supreme Court in Mdhd. In view of notification dated 7-6-1974, it can also not be disputed now that the Asstt. Public Prosecutor was authorised to conduct the cases under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act,in courts of Judicial Magistrates.The Supreme Court in Mdhd. Omer's case (supra) has very lucidly explained their observations in Parshottarn's case (supra). Justice P.N. Bhagwati, as he then was has very emphatically observed that it is not necessary to name the complainant in the written consent. The competent authority or person has to give his written consent to a specified prosecution and it is not necessary that the name of the complaint should be mentioned in the written consent. In fact any person can file a complaint for an offence under the Act on the basis of written consent given by the competent authority. Once a written consent is given by the competent authority, requirement of Section 20(1) is satisfied and thereafter, any person can file such prosecution. 21. In view of the above weightly observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court, it cannot be said that it was incompetent for the Food Inspector to file the complaint in the court personally or that the Assistant Public Prosecutor was not authorised to file the complaint which had fully complied with the requirement of Section 20(1)of the Act. More over, in Section 200 Cr.PC which has been amended in 1973, the words 'at once', have been deleted and that shows the intention of the legislature. More so, the proviso provides that if the complaint had been filed by a public servant, he need not be examined personally, which shows that the presence of the public servant, a complainant, is not necessary for filing or submitting the complaint in the court. 22. In view of what we have discussed above, we answer the question referred to us, as under: "Assistant Public Prosecutor is authorised to present a complaint before the Magistrate and it is not necessary for the Food Inspector to present the complaint personally, provided of course, there is a written consent of the competent authority for instituting the case, as required by Section 20(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. 23. Before parting with the case, we would like to observe that is really very unfortunate that adulteration and mis-branding of food stuff are rampant evils in our country. 23. Before parting with the case, we would like to observe that is really very unfortunate that adulteration and mis-branding of food stuff are rampant evils in our country. The Prevention of Food Adulteration Act was brought into force, to check these social evils, in the larger public interest for ensuring public welfare. While construing such food laws, courts should keep in view that the need for prevention of future injury is as important as punishing a wrong doer if the injury is actually inflicted and, therefore, the , courts should be reluctant to quash the convictions on slender or technical grounds, as has been observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Devendra Kumar's case (supra). 24. We would also like to mention here that it is rather very unfortunate that the Supreme Court decisions in State of Bombay v. Parshottom Kanhaiyalal (supra) and Mohd Omer Ali(supra) were not brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge while deciding the earlier cases. We expect from the lawyers that decision of the Supreme Court on the point which is under consideration, should be brought to the notice of the Court, whether those judgments are in their favour or against them so that the correct law is laid down for the guidance of the lower courts. Lawyers are after all officers of the court. They are here to assist the court and not to obtain judgments in their favour by hook or crook. 25. We, therefore, confirm and approve the decision in Bhairon v. State of Rajasthan (1988 Cr. I R (Raj) 134) and hold that the authorities Jai Narain, Jaji Ram Sadra and Deo Kishan (supra) do not lay down the correct law and we respectfully dis-agree with the observations made therein. 26. In the result, the revision petition filed by Kuntilal is rejected. Record of the case be sent back to the trial court immediately.Revision rejected. *******