JUDGMENT Mohan, J. 1. These Writ Appeals are directed against the judgment of our learned brother Ramanujam, J. (Printed at page 177 infra). The short facts are as follows: The petitioners before him were carrying on garment export business at Madras. They were granted necessary export quota on the strength of their past export performance. 2. The Cotton Textile Export Promotion Council had been entrusted with the function of granting export assistance for cotton textiles. The ratio of such assistance was decided by Export Promotion Council for the period 1.4.1978 to 31.3.1979. The terms and conditions of the assistance were informed to all garment exporters. The petitioners relying on the said announcement, began to prepare for the export by buying huge stock of cloth and cutting them to various export garment specifications and quantities. As and when they were ready, they were exported to foreign buyers. The petitioners firm and other exporters received a circular from the Export Promotion Council informing the exporters of the constitution of a sub-committee to streamline the procedure for disbursement of cash assistance to the exporters of cotton textiles. As stated above, the period of validity of the said scheme of assistance was from 1.4.1978 to 31.3.1079. All of a sudden, it was decided by the respondent to withdraw the same with effect from 1st January, 1979 in the following terms: Sub: Discontinuance of Compensatory Support on specified items of garments to quota countries. Will you kindly refer to this Office circular No. STT-36(1)/1620-78 dated 19th April, 1978 giving rates of Cash Compensatory support applicable to export of cotton textiles effected between 1st April, 1978 and 31st March, 1979: It has since been decided that Cash Compensatory Support applicable to the exports of following items of cotton garments will be discontinued with effect from 1st January, 1979. It was under these circumstances, the 1st respondent herein, as petitioners in the writ petitions urged that the Union Government has no jurisdiction to withdraw the export compensation scheme retrospectively when the validity of the scheme was available from (sic) (till?) 31.3.1979. Further, whatever export had been made the respondents herein will be entitled to have the benefit of the said scheme notwithstanding the withdrawal of the scheme. Further, whatever export had been made the respondents herein will be entitled to have the benefit of the said scheme notwithstanding the withdrawal of the scheme. They invoked the doctrine of promissory estoppel and contended that they had incurred very huge sums of forty lakhs from March, 1979 (sic) to implement the scheme and hence, they claimed the benefit. In the counter affidavit, inter alia by the appellant before us, it was claimed that the withdrawal of cash assistance was in the exercise of sovereign power. It was done after due deliberation and consideration of all relevant factors, and no question of promissory estoppel will come into play. The learned Judge who dealt with the matter at great detail, came to the conclusion that the principle of promissory estoppel as laid down by the decisions reported in Union of India v. Anglo Afghan Agencies (1968 SC 713) and Robertson v. Minister of Pensions (1949-I KB 227) would squarely apply to the facts of this case. Accordingly, he allowed the writ petitions directing grant of export assistance after factual verification with regard to the actual export of garments done by the respondents 1 & 2 herein during the period between 1.1.1979 to 31.3.1979. Hence the appeals. 3. Mr. P. Narasimhan, learned Senior Additional Central Government Standing Counsel would urge that this is not a case of promissory estoppel because such a doctrine would apply only if there is a total withdrawal of the scheme. On the contrary, there was partial modification by an order dated 6th January, 1979. Under those circumstances, there is no scope for the application of the scheme. This is the only point urged before us. 4. We are not unable (sic) to accept this point because insofar as the appellant herein had implemented the scheme of export assistance and the respondents herein had acted on the representations made under the scheme, certainly, they have every right to claim the benefit of promissory estoppel. The law on the subject has been recently laid down as seen from the decision reported in Asstt. C.CT. v. Dhannendra Trading Co.. The law on the subject has been recently laid down as seen from the decision reported in Asstt. C.CT. v. Dhannendra Trading Co.. The Supreme Court held as follows: (Para 4 at page 64 of 21 ECC): The first contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants is that the doctrine of promissory estoppel was not applicable in the present case because it was found by the Government of Karnataka that the concessions granted under the said order dated June 30,1969 were being misused and undue advantage was being taken of the same. It was submitted by him that in view of this, it would not be proper to hold the Government to the promises or the assurances it had given under the said order dated June 30, 1969. We are afraid it is not possible to accept this submission. No counter-affidavit was filed by the appellants before the trial court in the writ petition. Beyond the statement of counsel, there is nothing to show that any misuse was made of these concessions or undue advantage taken of the same. It is true that the preamble to the order dated January 12, 1977 does recite that the concessions given by the earlier order had given room for many types of misuse but such a recital by itself cannot establish that the concessions were, in fact, misused. If that were so, it was the duty of the Government and the concerned authorities to file a counter-affidavit and place the relevant facts establishing the misuse before the court. This they have totally failed to do. It is well settled that if the government wants to resile from a promise or an assurance given by it on the ground that undue advantage was being taken or misuse was being made of the concessions granted the court may permit the government to do so but before allowing the government to resile from the promise or go back on the assurance the court would have to be satisfied that allegations by the government about misuse being made or undue advantage being taken of the concessions given by it were reasonably well established. In the present case, there is nothing on record to show that any such misuse was being made or undue advantage taken of the said concessions by the newly established industries. In the present case, there is nothing on record to show that any such misuse was being made or undue advantage taken of the said concessions by the newly established industries. The government had, therefore, failed to establish the requisite ground on the basis of which it might be allowed to go back on its promise. The first submission of the learned Counsel for the appellants must, therefore, fail. It also held that the doctrine of promissory estoppel could be regarded as good law on the basis of the earlier decision reported in State of Bihar v. Usha Martin Industries Ltd, 1988 SCC (Tax) 116. Therefore, we see no scope for interfering with the order in writ appeals. Hence the appeals are dismissed.' However, there will be no order as to costs. 5. Should the appellant be obliged to pay the amounts due to the respondents (Writ Petitioners), it can always claim proportionate contribution from All India Mill Owners' Association.