JUDGMENT Nainar Sundaram, J. 1. This Writ Appeal is directed against the order of the learned Single Judge in W.P. No. 2526 of 1976. The appellant herein was the first-respondent in the Writ Petition; the first - respondent herein was the petitioner in the Writ Petition and the second respondent herein was the second-respondent in the writ petition. We propose to refer to the parties as they stood arrayed in the writ petition. The first respondent, who was employed at the relevant point of time as an Assistant Station Master at Kokkalancheri in Madurai Division of the Southern Railway was allotted quarters, which he did not occupy. However, the rent of Rs. 178.60 was recovered from his wages for the period from 10.12.1972 to 10.11.1973. Complaining that the deduction was not authorised Under the provisions of the payment of wages Act 4 of 1936, herein after referred to as the Act, the first-respondent filed P.W. Case No. 24 of 1974, on the file of the second-respondent, seeking for recovery back of the amount recovered. The second-respondent allowed the claim of the first-respondent for the period 10.2.1973 to 10.11.1973, and with regard to the rest of the period the claim of the first-respondent was rejected by the second-respondent as time barred. The petitioner filed the, Writ petition, impeaching the order of the second-respondent. 2. Before the learned single Judge, it was contended on behalf of the petitioner that as per paragraph 1716 of the Indian Railway Establishment Manual, which is a rule framed pursuant to Rule 157 of the Indian Railways Establishment Code, unless eligible for free quarters, the incumbent of a post, whether permanent or temporary, for which a quarter is allotted, is responsible for the prescribed rent during the period of his incumbency, and this rule must govern and the first-respondent must be held to be responsible for the rent for the quarters allotted to him. On behalf of the first-respondent, it was contended before the learned single Judge that when the first-respondent has not occupied the quarters, he could not be mulcted with the liability to pay the rent therefor. The learned single Judge did not accept the contention put forth on behalf of the first-respondent and the writ petition was allowed. That was how the first-respondent was obliged to prefer this writ appeal. 3. The learned single Judge did not accept the contention put forth on behalf of the first-respondent and the writ petition was allowed. That was how the first-respondent was obliged to prefer this writ appeal. 3. Mr T. Fenn Walter, learned Counsel for the first respondent, would submit that under Section 11 of the Act before there could be deduction; the house accommodation amenity ought to have been accepted by the first-respondent as a term of employment and in the instant case, the first-respondent has not specifically and expressly accepted the amenity of the quarters allotted to him and on the other hand, he did not occupy the same; and merely by invoking the rule, referred to above, it cannot be stated the first-respondent accepted the house accommodation amenity as a term of employment and on that basis, he could be held responsible for the rent. In contrast, Mr. K. Venkateswara Rao, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, would submit that the first-respondent, by the nature of his employment, occupied a status and he is governed by the service rules framed from time to time and the first-respondent by the very force of the rule must be deemed to have accepted the house accommodation amenity as a term of employment. Further, learned Counsel for the petitioner would also submit that the rule was there from the very inception when the first-respondent got into service and the first-respondent cannot resile therefrom. On an analysis of the legal position, we are obliged to countenance the submissions of the learned Counsel for the petitioner. It is well-settled that the legal position of a servant like the first-respondent is more one of status than of contract and the hall-mark of status is the attachment to a legal relationship of rights and duties imposed by the public law and not by mere agreement by the parties, and his terms of service are governed by statutory rules, which may be unilaterally altered without his consent. The obligations of such status are determined by the statutory rules and in the enforcement and effectuation of these obligations, the public have an interest. These principles could be gleaned from the following pronouncements of the Supreme Court in Roshanlal v. Union of India A.I.R. 1967 SG 1889) and Dinesh Chandra v. State of Assam. 4. The obligations of such status are determined by the statutory rules and in the enforcement and effectuation of these obligations, the public have an interest. These principles could be gleaned from the following pronouncements of the Supreme Court in Roshanlal v. Union of India A.I.R. 1967 SG 1889) and Dinesh Chandra v. State of Assam. 4. The rule expressed in paragraph 1716 is unambiguous when it speaks about the responsibility of the incumbent of a post for which a quarter is allotted to pay the prescribed rent during the period of his incumbency. The rule speaks about the allotment of quarters for the post; and there after the incumbent of the post, irrespective of any act of acceptance, being responsible for the rent during his incumbency. The first-respondent must be deemed to have accepted this as a term of employment. It is not a question of the first-respondent accepting the house accommodation amenity by any volition or act of his. The very force of the rule makes him have the quarters facility and thrusts upon him the responsibility to pay the rent therefor. He must be deemed to have accepted that as a term of employment. That is the implication of the rule. It does not require any further specific act of acceptance. The acceptance has got to be spelt out of the legal implications. If so, there is no difficulty for holding that the first-respondent accepted the house accommodation amenity as a terms of employment. The responsibility for the rent under Paragraph 1716 does not depend upon the actual occupation of the quarters. That is how the rule is couched. However, Mr T. Fenn Walter, learned Counsel for the first-respondent, would submit that under paragraph 1702 rent shall be charged for all quarters occupied by railway servants and in the instant case the first-respondent having not occupied the quarters, rent should not be charged from him. It is true that paragraph 1702 speaks about the charging of rent for the quarters occupied by railway servants. Paragraph 1702 is general in nature. But, paragraph 1716 is specific and that must govern. Hence, the force of the rule in paragraph 1716 cannot be watered down by merely looking into the expression 'occupied', used in paragraph 1702. It is true that paragraph 1702 speaks about the charging of rent for the quarters occupied by railway servants. Paragraph 1702 is general in nature. But, paragraph 1716 is specific and that must govern. Hence, the force of the rule in paragraph 1716 cannot be watered down by merely looking into the expression 'occupied', used in paragraph 1702. Paragraph 1716 being unambiguous in its language, it leaves no room for doubt in our mind that the responsibility to pay the rent for the quarters arises on the allotment of the quarters for the post. The responsibility is that of the incumbent of the post during the period of his incumbency. 5. Mr. T. Fenn Walter, learned Counsel for the first-respondent, would also contend that there has been a by-passing of the statutory remedy of an appeal under the Act by the petitioner singling out the case with regard to the first-respondent involving only Rs. 178.60 from the batch of similar cases, dealt with by a common order of the second-respondent. Learned Counsel for the first-respondent would content that the totality of the amounts involved in the batch of cases, covered by the common order exceeded Rs. 1,000, and as such the entire common order was amenable for being canvassed by way of an appeal under the Act and the petitioner by-passed the statutory appellate remedy only by taking away the case with regard to the first-respondent separately and putting in issue in the writ petition and this ought not to have been permitted. He places reliance on the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Bennet Coleman and Co. Ltd. v. Pathak (1960) 2 LIJ 16 in this behalf. That pronouncement does not at all support this contention of the learned Counsel for the first-respondent. That pronouncement has countenanced that where there had been different applications preferred by employees and those applications were treated as a single application and a common order was passed, that for the purpose of assessing the competency of an appellate remedy, there could be consolidation of the amounts directed to be paid in that common order and each case need not be viewed separately. There was no embargo as such laid down by the Supreme Court for a separate agitation by the process of writ petition with regard to an individual claim, though dealt with along with other claims by a common order. There was no embargo as such laid down by the Supreme Court for a separate agitation by the process of writ petition with regard to an individual claim, though dealt with along with other claims by a common order. Here the individual claim of the first respondent related to an amount, which could not enable the petitioner to seek the appellate remedy. Besides, the questions involved being that of construction of the service rules, and that of following the legal implications thereof, this court will be in order to entertain the writ petition and this court will not be in order to throw out the writ petition on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy, assuming it to be so. After all the existence of an appellate remedy is not a bar to the jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the discretion is that of this court to find out as to whether in appropriate cases the matter could be probed into an reliefs granted in writ jurisdiction. We must also hold, as, contended by Mr. K. Venkateswara Rao, learned Counsel for the petitioner, that the rule being there even at the time of the induction of the first-respondent into service, he is bound by the same and he cannot resile therefrom. Under these circumstances, we dismiss this writ Appeal. We make no Order as to costs in this writ Appeal.