JUDGMENT 1. - By this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have prayed for issuance of a writ of certiorari for quashing the convening order No. 408/102/40/Engr/Case/1141 A, dated 25th November, 1987, whereby the trial of the petitioners by a General Court Martial was ordered. The petitioners have further prayed for quashing the order of the General Court Martial dated 26th January, 1988, whereby the petitioner's application marked as Annexures E, E-1 and E-2 were rejected, wherein the petitioners prayed to the General Court Martial to remove/replace/change the Judge Advocate Lt. Col. Nilendra Kumar, respondent No. 7, on the ground that he was biased and prejudiced against the petitioners. It is also prayed that the order of the General Court Martial dated 29th January, 1989, whereby the petitioners' applications, marked as Annexures-J and J-1, wherein the petitioners to the General Court Martial that they be not asked to plead to the charge on the ground that the charge mentioned in the charge-sheet Annx. D-1 was grossly vague, ambiguous and did not say the specific offence as required under the Army Rules 28 to 30 in general and Army Rule 30 (3) in particular and, that it was not in accordance with the Army Rules 34 and 37, be quashed. 2. A few essential facts would elucidate the nature of controversy. The petitioners were serving as Junior Commissioned Officers, Non-commissioned Officers and Sapper in 14 Engineering Reg went on 12th July, 1986, the day when the incident occurred. It is alleged that on the night of 11th and 12th July, 1986, a theft of TV set at the house of Maj. Jile Singh and another theft of Rs. 2,500/- in the quarters occupied by Capt. J.M. Mehrotra, took place It is further alleged that 7 or 8 Sahayaks were tortured and harassed to extort confession regarding commission of theft. Some JCOs and Jawans advised the officers concerned to stop harassment and release 'sahayaks'. Sub-Major informed in his connection to the Commanding Officer. Lt. Col. Satish The Commanding Officer Lt. Col. Satish appeared at the scene at about 18.30 Hrs. and advised the unit personnel who had gathered there that nobody had given any beating to Sayaks. It is also alleged by the petitioners that Lt. Col. Sub-Major informed in his connection to the Commanding Officer. Lt. Col. Satish The Commanding Officer Lt. Col. Satish appeared at the scene at about 18.30 Hrs. and advised the unit personnel who had gathered there that nobody had given any beating to Sayaks. It is also alleged by the petitioners that Lt. Col. Satish and other officers who indulged in the beating of Jawans/Sayaks gave distorted version of the incident to the higher authorities to save themselves, and Lt. Col. Satish further exaggerated the happening intentionally and gave it a colour as if be had suppressed the mutiny without using force. It may be mentioned that the distorted story given by Lt. Col. Satish resulted in winning an Award for himself and to Maj. S. Sengupta. The petitioners have further pleaded that a Court of Inquiry was instituted to investigate into the circumstances which led to the incident and collective insubordination by the men of Engineering Regiment on 12th January, 1986. The petitioners further case is that no action was taken against Lt. Col. Satish, Maj. S. Sengupta and, other officers and JCOs who were responsible to lead the incident; but a case of alleged mutiny was made out against the petitioners by the said officers. It was alleged that on 12th January, 1986, there was a case of collective insubordination in the Regiment over the alleged ill-treatment with Sabayaks by the unit officers during the investigation of a theft that had occurred in the officers' quarters on the previous night and a charge-sheet of the following description was served upon the petitioners : "Army Act Section 37(b), Joining in a mutiny in the military force of India. In that they together at Field on 12 July, 86, in company of a number of other personnel of 14 Engineer Regiment, in a mutinous spirit marched, shouting slogans, damaging Govt. Vehicles and using criminal force to 10-26981 M. Maj. Zila Singh, I.C. 16625Y Lt. Col. Satish and SL-3047W, Cant. R.K. Mishra of the same Regiment." 3. Thereupon a summary of evidence was recorded against each petitioner. The petitioners were put under close arrest on 12th January, 1986 and aye still under the same. In pursuance to the convening order Annexure/D. dated 25th Nov. 1987, it was ordered that the General Court Martial of the petitioners would be held on 30th November,1987. Thereupon a summary of evidence was recorded against each petitioner. The petitioners were put under close arrest on 12th January, 1986 and aye still under the same. In pursuance to the convening order Annexure/D. dated 25th Nov. 1987, it was ordered that the General Court Martial of the petitioners would be held on 30th November,1987. In the convening order, the names of that petitioners were mentioned. Seven Officers were named as members of the General Court Martial (for short, GCM). The GCM assembled on 30th Nov., 1987 As per the requirement of the Army Act. Lt. Col. Nilender Kumar was appointed as Judge Advocate. On 30th November, 1987, the GCM was adjourned as the defence counsel of the nine petitioners was not present at the trial. The trial commenced on 25th January, 1988. At the start of the trial, petitioner No. 11 submitted an application challenging the appointment of the Judge Advocate on the plea that he was biased and prejudiced against them. A similar application was also presented by the other petitioners. The objection of petitioner No. 11 with regard to Judge Advocate was that in the matter connected with the same incident in issue, a JCO JC-91724-H-Nb/Sub(A)(Sub) P.C. Thomus & Shri K. Krishanan were tried by a General Court Martial. In the said trial Lt. Col Nilender Kumar was Judge Advocate. In the trial, the Judge Advocate gave a summing-up after the prosecution and defence closed and addressed in the said trial. In the said trial, the Judge Advocate stated that it was a mutiny and one of the petitioners Nab. Subedar Sethuwachnam was the main architect of the mutiny. In was, thus, contended by the petitioners that they can have no confidence in the Judge Advocate who has expressed the said opinion. The petitioners, thus, prayed that in the interest of justice, fair play and equity the trial be conducted by some other Judge Advocate. It has also been contended by the petitioners that the Judge Advocate, respondent No. 7 asked the prosecution to reply to the said application, wherein objections were raised against the Judge Advocate. This was objected to by the petitioners, but the Judge Advocate did not record the objection and on the advice of the Judge Advocate, the prosecution submitted its reply. The petitioners even objected to the presence of the Judge Advocate in the GCM. This was objected to by the petitioners, but the Judge Advocate did not record the objection and on the advice of the Judge Advocate, the prosecution submitted its reply. The petitioners even objected to the presence of the Judge Advocate in the GCM. He joined in the deliberations on the merit of the application and also played an important role in getting the application dismissed. It is also contended by the petitioners that they submitted an application for obtaining copy of the GCM's order rejecting their applications and staying further proceedings so that the petitioners may move to the High Court for getting appropriate orders. The same application was also processed by the Judge Advocate and the application was rejected. 4. The petitioners moved an application before the GCM under Rule 49 of the Army Rules. 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) stating therein that the charge against the petitioners was ambiguous, vague and did not disclose specific details of the offence as per the Army Rules 30(4) and it was violative of Army Rules 34 and 37. The contention of the petitioner was that, in fact, the convening authority did not apply its mind on perusal of the summary if evidence before ordering for the trial and that there was no evidence warranting trial against the petitioners. 5. The petitioners thus, prayed that the convening order, dated 25th Nov. 1987, ordering trial of the petitioners by GCM be quashed. They have further prayed that the order of the GCM dated 26th January, 1988, whereby the application of the petitioner was rejected he also quashed and they have also prayed for quashing of GCM's order dated 29th January, 1988 rejecting the applications of the petitioners wherein they have prayed to the GCM that they may not be asked to plead on general, vague and ambiguous charge which does not disclose particulars and details of the offence. 6. On 10th February, 1988, a notice was issued to the respondents to show cause why the writ petition be not admitted and disposed of. In reply to the show cause notice. the respondents have filed reply. In the reply, the respondents have contended that Judge advocate is neither biased nor prejudiced against the petitioners. 6. On 10th February, 1988, a notice was issued to the respondents to show cause why the writ petition be not admitted and disposed of. In reply to the show cause notice. the respondents have filed reply. In the reply, the respondents have contended that Judge advocate is neither biased nor prejudiced against the petitioners. It was admitted by the respondents that the Judge Advocate, respondent No. 1 acted as Judge Advocate in the joint trial of other accused persons charged with similar of offences but it was denied that the Judge Advocate has formed or expressed any opinion regarding the facts of the case at any stage. It was contended by the respondents that the Judge Advocate in the common course of his duties, inter alia, summarised the prosecution version in evidence; but he did not express any opinion or finding regarding the facts of the case. It was also contended that as per Section 129 of the Army Act, it is imperative that every GCM should be conducted by a Judge Advocate The presence of a Judge Advocate at GCM is a legal necessity. The respondents further stated that it is the duty of the Judge Advocate to advise the GCM on any point of law or procedure. It is the Court which is charged with the responsibility for arriving at a decision. The respondents further pleaded that the Judge Advocate acted strictly within the confines of his charter of duties as laid down in the Army Rules 60 and 105. In the reply, the respondents denied that the charge is vague or bad in law or that it does not show specific particulars. It was contended that the charge was in exact in conformity with the rules bearing on the subject. In accordance with rule 30, the charge states one offence only has been divided into parts-statement of offences, statement of particulars of act and statement of offence. The particulars clearly spell out the substance of the offence which is intended to be proved against the accused petitioner by the prosecutor. The respondents also contended that there has been no violation of Army Act or the rules made thereunder. The particulars clearly spell out the substance of the offence which is intended to be proved against the accused petitioner by the prosecutor. The respondents also contended that there has been no violation of Army Act or the rules made thereunder. Each charge was duly heard in the presence of the accused petitioners, summary of the evidence was recorded and after due consideration of summary of evidence and considering the evidence, the Convening Authority remanded the accused for trial by the GCM, The Convening Authority duly applied his mind and having considered the gravity of the offence and also all the circumstances under which the same was committed thought it appropriate that all the accused should be tried jointly and accordingly he convened the GCM. 7. The respondents raised an objection that the petitioners are not entitled to revoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court over the procedure of dealing with the matter of gross indiscipline i. e. mutiny and the alleged offence committed by JCOs, NCOs, & ORS of the Army. 8. Shri N.N. Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioners, in the facts of the case, required us to decide the following three points : l. That the Judge Advocate being biased and prejudiced against the petitioners was disqualified to be associated with GCM as be has expressed his opinion in the trial relating to the same incident. In the said trial, the Judge Advocate opined that the incident was a mutiny and that petitioner No. 11 was the main architect of the said mutiny. The Judge Advocate also over-stepped his jurisdiction. In the instant case, he processed the applications wherein objections we re-raised against the Judge Advocate himself. His participation in the GCM in deciding the petitioners' application was in violation of principles of natural justice Which dictates that a man cannot sit as a Judge in a matter which is related to him. 2. In the instant case, he processed the applications wherein objections we re-raised against the Judge Advocate himself. His participation in the GCM in deciding the petitioners' application was in violation of principles of natural justice Which dictates that a man cannot sit as a Judge in a matter which is related to him. 2. That the petitioner cannot be forced to plead guilty or not guilty on a charge which is general, vague and ambiguous and does not disclose any particulars, details or circumstances relating to the alleged offence as will enable the accused to know as to what act, negligence or omission is intended to be proved against him constituting the offence and that the petitioners cannot be tried and brought before the GCM without compliance of the mandatory provisions of law under the Army Rules 24 and 37 when there is no evidence whatsoever incriminating the accused and warranting trial for any offence and that the charge is not in accordance with the Army Rule 49. 3. That the GCM erred in rejecting the applications of the petitioners without referring the matter to the Convening Authority as per the provisions of the Army Rules 41, 42 and 49. 9. Before we deal with the aforesaid questions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners it would be better if we may make a reference of some of the provisions of the Army Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and Army Rules, 1954. Section 109 provides that a General Court Martial may be convened by the Central Government or the Chief of Army Staff, or by any officer empowered in this behalf by warrant of the Chief of the Army Staff. Section 113 provides for the composition of GCM. It lays down that a GCM shall consist of not less than five officers, each of whom has held a commission for not less than three whole years and of whom not less than four are of a rank not below that of captain. Section 118 enumerates the powers of GCM, and provides that a GCM shall have powers to try any person subject to this Act for any offence punishable therein and pass any sentence authorised thereby. Section 118 enumerates the powers of GCM, and provides that a GCM shall have powers to try any person subject to this Act for any offence punishable therein and pass any sentence authorised thereby. Section 129 provides that every General Court Martial shall be attended by a Judge Advocate who shall be either an officer belonging to the department of Judge Advocate General or if no such officer is available to an officer approved of by the Judge Advocate General or any of his deputies. Section 10 provides that after the Court has been assembled the order convening the Court, the names of the Presiding Officer and members shall be read over to the accused and he shall thereupon be asked whether he objects to being tried by any officer sitting on the court, and any such objection shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Section 130. An accused if objects to any such officer his objection and also the reply thereto of the officer objected to shall be heard and recorded and the remaining officers of the court shall in the absence of the charged officer decide on the objection. If the objection is allowed by 1/2 or more of the officers entitled to vote, the objection shall be allowed, and the member objected to shall retire, and his vacancy may be filled in the prescribed manner by another officer, subject to the same right of the accused to object. When no challenge is made, or when challenge has been made and disallowed, or the place of every officer successfully challenged has been filled by another officer to whom no objection is made or disallowed, the court shall proceed with the trial. Section 131 provides that an oath or affirmation in the prescribed manner shall be administered to every member of every court-martial and to the judge advocate before the commencement of the trial. Section 131 provides that an oath or affirmation in the prescribed manner shall be administered to every member of every court-martial and to the judge advocate before the commencement of the trial. A Judge Advocate is required to take oath that he will to the best of his ability carry out the duties of Judge Advocate in accordance with the Army Act and the rules made thereunder and without partiality, favour or affection and he is required to declare further that he will not on any account at any time whatsoever disclose or discover the vote or opinion on any matter of any particular member of this court-martial, unless required to give evidence thereof by a court of justice or a court martial in due course of law. Section 132 provides for voting by members. Section 133 lays down the rule as to evidence. Section 135 gives power to the Presiding officer of the Court Martial to power of summoning witnesses. Section 153 provides that (no) finding or sentence of a general, district or summary general, court-martial shall he valid expect so far as it may be confirmed as provided by the Army Act. Section 154 provides for the confirmation of the finding and sentence of the General Court Martial by the Central Government or by any officer empowered in this behalf by the warrant of the Central Government. Section 132 provides for power of revision with regard to the finding of sentence. it lays down that any finding or sentence of court-martial which requires confirmation may be once revised by order of the confirming authority and on such revision the Court, if so directed by the confirming authority, may take additional evidence, 10. For deciding the controversy raised in this writ petition, the relevant rules are Rr. 22, 24, 25, 28, 30, 39, 41, 43, 44, 60, 105 and 129. Rule 22 prescribes procedure for hearing of charge to the convening of court-martial. Rule 23 prescribes procedure for recording of summary of evidence. Rule 24 enables the commanding officer either to remand the accused for trial by a court-martial or refer the case to the proper superior military authority, or if he thinks it desirable, re-hear the case and either dismiss the charge or dispose of it summarily. Rule 23 prescribes procedure for recording of summary of evidence. Rule 24 enables the commanding officer either to remand the accused for trial by a court-martial or refer the case to the proper superior military authority, or if he thinks it desirable, re-hear the case and either dismiss the charge or dispose of it summarily. Rule 25 provides procedure for enquiry of charge against officer Rule 28 sets out general form of charge-sheet and Rule 30 prescribes contents of charge-sheet. Rule 33 provides detailed procedure for preparation for defence by the accused. Rule 37 provides for convening of general court-martial. Rule 41 provides that on the court assembling the order convening the court shall be laid before it together with charge-sheet and summary of evidence or a true copy thereof and also the ranks, names and corps of the officers appointed to serve on the court and the court shall satisfy itself that it is legally constituted and one such duty being that the court can ascertain, shall satisfy itself that it has been convened in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules and that each of the officer composing the court-martial is eligible and not disqualified for serving on court-martial and further in the case of general court-martial, the officers are of the required rank, and after the court has satisfied itself about its constitution. it shall call the accused to be brought before it as provided under Rule 43. Rule 44 provides and it enables the accused as required by Section 130 of the Army Act to state whether he has any objection to be tried by any officer sitting on the court. A detailed procedure is prescribed for disposing of the objections. Rule 39 lays down the qualifications of an officer to serve as general or district court-martial and disqualifies an officer of general court martial if he has a personal interest in the case Rule 102 says that an officer who is disqualified for sitting on a court-martial shall be disqualified for acting as Judge Advocate. Rule 105 lays down powers and duties of the Judge Advocate. Rule 60 provides for summing up by Judge Advocate. It sets out that a Judge Advocate shall sum up in open court the evidence and advise the court upon the law relating to the case. 11. Rule 105 lays down powers and duties of the Judge Advocate. Rule 60 provides for summing up by Judge Advocate. It sets out that a Judge Advocate shall sum up in open court the evidence and advise the court upon the law relating to the case. 11. After enumerating the various provisions of the Army Act and the Rules made thereunder, we shall now deal with the objections raised by the Petitioner. Firstly, we will deal with the objection as to whether a Judge Advocate is disqualified in the alleged ground of bias. Section 130 read with Rule 44 enables an accused to raise objection about any member constituting court-martial. Rather Section 130 mandates the court to inform the accused whether he objects to be tried by any officer sitting on the court-martial. In the present case, there is no objection of the nature enumerated under Section 130 of the Act, i.e. none of the petitioners have raised any objection to be tried by any officer sitting on the court. It may be stated that Judge Advocate is not a member of court-martial. The presence of the Judge Advocate is required by Section 129. It is obligatory that a Judge Advocate must be associated with every general court-martial. His qualifications are prescribed in Section itself and disqualifications are prescribed in Rule 102 and powers and duties are prescribed under rule 105. In the Act, tinder Sec 130 there is a note appended, which states that the accused has no right to object to the Judge Advocate or prosecutor. From the above statement of law and the rules, it is clear that, though the procedure is provided for raising objection about the member constituting court-martial, but such a challenge is not available to the accused if he wants to challenge the authority of the Judge Advocate who is appointed to associate with the General Court Martial. We have stated that qualifications are mentioned in Section 129 itself and disqualifications are prescribed in Rule 102. It may he stated that it is not a case of the petitioners that he is not qualified to be associated with the GCM on account of lacking in the qualification, or on account of being disqualified under Rule 102. We have stated that qualifications are mentioned in Section 129 itself and disqualifications are prescribed in Rule 102. It may he stated that it is not a case of the petitioners that he is not qualified to be associated with the GCM on account of lacking in the qualification, or on account of being disqualified under Rule 102. The case of the petitioners is that since in a similar case arising out of the same incident the Judge Advocate had expressed his opinion wherein he had stated that there was a mutiny and the accused Naib Subedar Sethurathinarn was the main architect Shri N.N. Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioners, has submitted that if the Judge Advocate is biased or prejudiced against the petitioners then he becomes disqualified to be associated with the GCM. Shri Gupta placed reliance on (1) Sansar Chand v. Union of India, 1960 (3) SLR 124 , which is a judgment of a Division Bench of Himachal Pradesh High Court. In that case. Maj Ajwani was appointed as Judge Advocate. He addressed a letter to Capt. Ved Vyas which shows that he was anxious to see that petitioner Sansar Chand is punished. Petitioner Ajwani did not raise any objection against Maj. Ajwani at the initial stage, but the moment he came to know of his interest, he had apprised the court-martial and had written to the Army HQs. The letters written by Maj. Ajwani were placed on record of the case. After considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned Division Bench came to the conclusion that Maj. Ajwani had assumed the role of a prosecutor either suppressing some evidence or by producing tutored witnesses Maj. Ajwani's letter to also that he was hand-in glove with Capt. Ved Vyas and anxious to see that the petitioner was convicted, it leaves no doubt that he was biased. In any case, there was a real likelihood of bias. In that case, it was also observed that ;summing up by a Judge Advocate should be fair. In that case, summing up by a Judge Advocate should be fair. In that case, summing up made by the Judge Advocate was also challenged on the ground that it was not balanced. However, the Court did not discover any fault in the summing up. 12. In that case, summing up by a Judge Advocate should be fair. In that case, summing up made by the Judge Advocate was also challenged on the ground that it was not balanced. However, the Court did not discover any fault in the summing up. 12. Now, coming to the facts of the case, there is no doubt that there was a trial by GCM in respect of the case arising out of the same incident in which respondent No 7 Lt. Col. Nilendra Kumar was the Judge Advocate. It is also contended that the same Judge Advocate during his summing up in the earlier trial while advising the then General Court Martial gave his opinion regarding the present petitioner who was neither the accused nor the witness in the particular trial. The Judge Advocate gave the finding that the accused participated in the mutiny and that accused No. 11 was the main architect of the mutiny. 13. In the reply filed by the respondents to the show cause notice, it is admitted that the Judge Advocate, respondent No. 7, acted as a Judge Advocate in the trial of other accused persons charged with similar offence i.e. mutiny, the alleged offence. However, it is denied that the Judge Advocate is biased or prejudiced against any accused at any stage. It was also denied that the Judge Advocate has formed or expressed any opinion regarding the facts and circumstances of the case at any stage. It was contended that the Judge Advocate had summed up in the open Court the entire evidence brought before the court and had advised the Court on law regarding the case strictly as enjoined by the Army Rule 60. It was also contended that while summing up the evidence the Judge Advocate faithfully brought versions of both prosecution as well as defence and in doing so he did not at any stage express any opinion regarding the facts of the case, in his summing up, it was further contended, the Judge Advocate had clearly and in unambiguous terms advised that it was no part of his duty to form much less to express his views or opinion regarding the facts of the case. He had also emphasised that it was the duty of the members of the court only to decide on the facts of the case. He had also emphasised that it was the duty of the members of the court only to decide on the facts of the case. The respondents have stated that the Judge Advocate had also unconditionally advised the court that if inadvertently he at any stage hid expressed even remotely any opinion pertaining to any facts of the case, the, members, of the court should categorically ignore the same and also should totally disabuse their mind thereof, while considering the evidence in arriving at their decisions. The respondents have denied that the Judge Advocate gave any finding that the accused participated in the mutiny and that petitioner No. 11 Naib Subedar Sethurathenam was the main architect of mutiny as alleged. It is true that the Judge Advocate is required to sum up the evidence and advice the court upon the law relating to the case. It is also the procedure as laid down in Rule 61 that the court shall deliberate on its finding in closed court in the presence of the Judge Advocate. The various duties which are to be performed by the Judge Advocate are quite important. His advice has crucial role in the trial. As such, if Judge Advocate is found to be biased or prejudiced, or even there is likelihood of bias and the Judge Advocate becomes hand-in-glove, with the prosecution, or becomes personally interested in the trial of the case to see that the accused are convicted, it can be assumed that the Judge Advocate is biased and such Person would positively incur disqualification to be associated with the court in the trial by GCM. In the instant case, in the circumstances as alleged by the petitioner even if assumed to be true and correct, we are of the opinion that the facts stated would not constitute any bias against the petitioners. It is a common practice in the cases of criminal trial where there are more than one accused, in which one of the accused absconds, then the trial is conducted in the absence of the accused the finding is recorded by the Magistrate or Sessions Judge, as the case may be and the same Judge is competent to try the accused who is later on arrested and put under trial for the same offence. It is not the case of the petitioners that the alleged opinion given by the judge Advocate in the previous case was not based on evidence on record or there was perversity in his opinion. It is assumed that the Judge Advocate must have summed up the case on the basis of the evidence in that case. A Judge Advocate remains under oath where he undertakes to be partial (sic) and it is expected that the Judge Advocate shall play a role of a friend for the Court as well as the defence. He is not expected to be hand-in glove with the prosecution. The other allegation that the Judge Advocate Participated in the disposal of the applications wherein the petitioners raised objections against the Judge Advocate, to be associated with the trial of the case. We do not find any irregularity or illegality in the manner in which the Judge Advocate had acted. A Judge Advocate is required to give his advice and in the due discharge of bis duties be is to advise the court as to in what manner the applications will be required to be disposed of. We, thus, find no merit in the objections raised by the petitioners. However, in case the Judge Advocate behaves or acts in a mariner which causes prejudice to the petitioners or they are able to prove that he is biased against them. they may raise objection in this regard before the GCM itself, or before the authority when the finding will be plated for confirmation. 14. Coming to the second objection about vagueness of the charge. Rule 49 provides that the accused when required to plead to Article charge, may object to the charge on ground that it does not disclose on offence under the Act or is not in accordance with these rules. The court after hearing any submission which may be made by the prosecutor or by or on behalf of the accused, shall consider the objection in closed court and shall either disallow it and proceed with the trial, or allow it and adjourn to report to the convening authority or if it is in doubt, it may adjourn to consult the convening authority. The petitioners raised objections with regard to the charge. The petitioners raised objections with regard to the charge. Their objection is that the charge is of general nature, which is vague, unambiguous and does not disclose any Particulars or details of particulars or such circumstances in respect of the offence as will enable the accused to know as to what act, negligence or omission is intended to be proved against them as constituting the offence and it is in violation of the provisions of Army Rule 30 (4) Rule 30 prescribes that each charge shall state one offence only and in no case shall an offence be described in the alternative in the same charge. Each charge shall be divided into two parts(a) statement of the offence and (d) statement of the particulars of the Act, neglect or omission constituting the offence. The offence shall be stated, if not a civil offence, as nearly as practicable, in the words of the Act and if a civil offence in such words as sufficiently describe in technical words. The particulars shall state such circumstances respecting the alleged offence as will enable the accused to know what act, neglect or omission is intended to be proved against him as constituting the offence. It is true that the accused when required to plead to any charge may object to the charge and the court after hearing any submission which can be made by the prosecutor, by or on behalf of the accused to consider the objection and to act as per the procedure laid down in Rule 49. Rule 50 provides for amendment of charge. It is also true that the charge should be specific. It is also true that the charge which the person is called upon to meet must be clear, precise and accurate because fair hearing pre-supposes a precise and definite catelogue of charges so that the person charged may understand and effectively meet them. If the charge is imprecise or indefinite it may prejudice the case of the defence and the resulting enquiry would not be fair and just enquiry. The petitioners' various objections with regard to vagueness of charge have been over ruled by the GCM and it did not think it proper to either consult the convening authority or respect to the convening authority. The petitioners' various objections with regard to vagueness of charge have been over ruled by the GCM and it did not think it proper to either consult the convening authority or respect to the convening authority. The questions posed before us are whether the accused should not be asked to plead on a general, vague and unambiguous charge which does not disclose the particulars of the offence as alleged and, the further objection is that the summary of evidence does not disclose any case under Section 37 (b) against the petitioner and the order dated 29th January, 1988 being illegal is liable to be quashed by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In this case, the trial commenced, the prosecution is required to prove its case and the prosecution is further required to prove the case beyond any doubt. The onus of proving the charge lies heavily upon the prosecution and the accused are entitled to the benefit of doubt. However, at this stage of the case, we would not like to make any comment on the merits of the case and with respect to the fact as to whether the charge is vague or indefinite or incapable of sustaining the offence for which the petitioners are charged as after the trial is over and in case any finding is recorded against the petitioners they can challenge the finding on the ground of vagueness of the charge if they could prove that it has caused prejudice to their defence before the confirming authority, or before the Central Government or some other officer mentioned in Sub-section (2) of Section 164 of the Army Act after the order, finding or sentence is confirmed by the confirming authority under Section 164 (1) of the Army Act. There are thus two remedies available to the person aggrieved by an order, finding or sentence of the court-martial. 15. From the discussions made above, we are of the opinion that the order dated 20th January, 1988, whereby the applications of the petitioners Annx. There are thus two remedies available to the person aggrieved by an order, finding or sentence of the court-martial. 15. From the discussions made above, we are of the opinion that the order dated 20th January, 1988, whereby the applications of the petitioners Annx. E, E-l and E-2 praying for disqualification of respondent No. 7, were rightly rejected, though, this Court should ordinarily be slow in examining the merits of the interlocutory orders and specially where statutory remedy is available, but the objection raised related to the disqualification of the Judge Advocate whose participation is a legal necessity in the GCM, therefore, we have proceeded to examine the issue at this stage in the interest of justice. However, we do not want to interfere in the convening order dated 25th November, 1987, at this stage and we also do not want to interfere in the order dated 29th January, 1988, whereby the petitioners' applications Annx. J, J-1, and J-2 praying to the General Court Martial that the petitioners be not asked to plead to the general, vague and unambiguous charge which does not disclose an offence under Section 37(b) of the Act. We leave it open to the petitioners to agitate the same after an adverse finding or sentence is recorded by the GCM before the officer or authority empowered to confirm any finding or sentence and the confirming authority would take such steps as may be considered necessary to satisfy itself to the correctness or propriety of the order passed or as to the regularity of any proceedings to which the order relates and thereafter if still grievance continues may present a petition to the Central Government or some other officer mentioned under Sub-section (2) of Section 164. Thus, Section 164 provides a statutory remedy to the aggrieved person. 16. We are of the opinion that our jurisdiction to interfere in the trial by the GCM is very much limited as discipline being the most powerful and potent equipment for the armed forces. Security of the country is the first concern of all people of a Nation. Thus, Section 164 provides a statutory remedy to the aggrieved person. 16. We are of the opinion that our jurisdiction to interfere in the trial by the GCM is very much limited as discipline being the most powerful and potent equipment for the armed forces. Security of the country is the first concern of all people of a Nation. Discipline is the bedrock upon which the entire edifice of the army has been built Special jurisdiction has been conferred on the court-martial when by the word of the court-martial is made final and the disciplinary jurisdiction of the court-martial is made virtually water-tight, of course, subject to the statutory remedy as discussed above. It is only in rare cases that this Court has limited jurisdiction to interfere (Sic) Certainly, the Court can interfere if there is blatent violation of principles of natural justice, irrationality and perversity of (Sic) recognised grounds of Judicial review, as held by the Supreme Court in (2) Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 2386 . 17. in the result for the foregoing reasons, the writ petition is disallowed. The parties are left to bear their own costs.Petition Dismissed. *******