Judgment :- 1. Plaintiffs are the appellants. They sued for declaration of a right of way scheduled in the plaint through the property of the defendants both as an easement of necessity and by prescription. Consequential injunction was also prayed for against obstruction to toe user. While admitting existence of the pathway the defendants contended that it is for their own use and that the plaintiffs who are having alternate access cannot claim any necessity. Prescriptive right was also denied and it was contended that occasional user with permission will not enable any prescriptive right. 2. Accepting the oral and documentary evidence including the reports and depositions of two commissioners and the admissions of defendants, the trial court and the appellate court found that the pathway scheduled in the plaint is there and it is being used by the plaintiffs and defendants. The trial court further found that the user of the way by the plaintiffs is only by permission and not as of right. The appellate court went to the extent of saying that it is only a licence. Both the courts negatived the easement of necessity on the ground of availability of alternate accesses. Though that finding is disputed, plaintiffs now claim only prescriptive easement right. The other grounds, on which the prescriptive easement right was negatived, are: (i) the documents of title in favour of the plaintiffs are within twenty years of the date of suit; (ii) the dominant tenement was outstanding on mortgage from 1963 to 1966; (iii) the pathway is not mentioned in the title deeds; and (iv) the predecessors of the plaintiffs, who used the pathway, were not examined. The suit was dismissed and the decision was confirmed in appeal. 3. The Appellate Judge did only an easy job. He did not care to consider the evidence or arrive at conclusions of his own. He only agreed with the Munsiff without even looking into the evidence. 4. Findings regarding permissive user and licence are from the vacuum without any material and against the weight of the plaintiffs' evidence. As many as eight witnesses were examined by the plaintiffs. pws.1 and 2 are plaintiffs and Pws. 3 and 4 are independent witnesses. Pw. 5 is the commissioner who prepared Exts. C1 and C2. pws 6 to 8 are also independent witnesses. Pw. 6 was discarded as interested while Pws. As many as eight witnesses were examined by the plaintiffs. pws.1 and 2 are plaintiffs and Pws. 3 and 4 are independent witnesses. Pw. 5 is the commissioner who prepared Exts. C1 and C2. pws 6 to 8 are also independent witnesses. Pw. 6 was discarded as interested while Pws. 7 and 8 were rejected as inimical. All these witnesses except pw. S gave evidence categorically that the way was in existence for the past more than 100 years and plaintiffs and their predecessors were using it openly as of right for all these times. Suggestion of permission or alternate access were denied by them. Pw. 3 is the mother of the vendor of the defendants. Her evidence was rejected not on the basis of any interest or enmity or want of trustworthiness. but solely on the ground that she was never in possession of the property sold to the defendants. Pw. 4 was rejected solely for the reason that he was not a user of the pathway. It is really an illegality to reject the otherwise acceptable evidence of Pws. 3 and 4 for the above reasons. In order to become competent to give evidence one need not be owner or possessor of the properties involved or user of the disputed pathway. What is relevant is only his personal knowledge regarding the user and the consequent competence and trustworthiness. On these aspects, pws. 3 and 4 were not at all discredited. Even discarding the evidence of Pws. 6 to 8 for the reasons assigned by the courts below, there are sample materials to show that the pathway was there for more than 100 years and plaintiffs and their predecessors were using it as of right openly and continuously. 5. Exts. C1 to C3 and the depositions of the two commissioners examined as pw. S and dw. 2 also proved the existence of the old pathway and its user. It was Pw. 5 who visited the property first in 1979. He was not able to find any alternate access. Disputed pathway was the only access be found. dw. 2 visited nearly one year later found two alternate paths, one crossing six properties and the other five. They could evidently be accesses used after pw. 2 visited, presumably because the plaint schedule pathway was obstructed. He was not able to find any alternate access. Disputed pathway was the only access be found. dw. 2 visited nearly one year later found two alternate paths, one crossing six properties and the other five. They could evidently be accesses used after pw. 2 visited, presumably because the plaint schedule pathway was obstructed. Even otherwise in considering the prescriptive right, the availability of another access is only of ratiocinative and in the appreciation of evidence. It cannot affect the otherwise available prescriptive right. Such an access could negative only the easement of necessity and not the prescriptive easement. Ext B5 rough sketch produced by the defendants noting alternate passages is only a self serving document. The facts noted therein were denied by the witnesses when put to them. The evidence conclusively established the existence of the schedule pathway and its user peaceably and openly, as an easement and as of right, without interruption for more than twenty years within two years prior to the date of suit. 6. Normally in second appeal the factual findings of the trial court and the appellate court may not be disturbed. But when the findings are completely against the weight of evidence, without the support of any materials and are perverse and on wrong understanding of the legal provision, it is the duty of this court to intervene and correct in an attempt to do justice. Both the courts were prejudicially influenced in the appreciation of evidence by wrong notions on certain legal and factual aspects. As I have earlier stated the finding of permissive user or licence is not only without any evidence but against the evidence also. 7. The first fundamental error of law committed by both the courts below is the finding that a person who claims prescriptive easement of a right of way must by himself use it for the statutory period before suit and after the sale deed in bis favour. Ia this case. Ext. A1 gift deed by which the first plaintiff got the property is in 1975 and Ext. A2 sale deed in favour of the second plaintiff is in 1960 and the suit was in 1979.20 years interval is not there. So also in between these periods the property went out to a mortgagee for three years from 1963 to 1966 under Ext. B6. 8. A2 sale deed in favour of the second plaintiff is in 1960 and the suit was in 1979.20 years interval is not there. So also in between these periods the property went out to a mortgagee for three years from 1963 to 1966 under Ext. B6. 8. The very definition of easement in S.4 of the Easements Act shows that it is a right which the owner or occupier of certain land possesses, as such, for the beneficial enjoyment of that land. S.12 makes it clear that not only the owner of immovable property, but somebody on his behalf also could acquire that right and such acquisition can also be by any person in possession of the property. Enjoyment as an occupier could also be tacked on to enjoyment as owner on the basis of a subsequent purchase. For acquiring the right one need not necessarily be the owner (see Chinnasami Goundan v. A.S. Balasundara Mudaliar and others (AIR 1934 Madras 575). Till the acquisition of the right by user for the statutory period as an easement peaceably and openly as of right and without interruption it is only an inchoate right, which also the courts will protect in case of necessity from invasion. When once the right is acquired it passes with the land as an advantage to the dominant tenement in the hands of the successors also and likewise as an obligation to the servient tenement. As in the case of adverse possession of land, the user could be tacked on. What is essential is that there should be privity between the successive occupants either of contract, estate or blood. User of persons between whom such privity is there could be tacked on to make up the time necessary to acquire an easement by prescription even during the inchoate period provided it is not interrupted and exercised for the statutory period. This could be had as between ancestor and heir, landlord and tenant, vendor and purchaser, mortgagor and mortgagee or persons claiming under the same title. 9. There may be days and weeks and months during which the right may not be exercised at all and yet during all these periods the person claiming the right could be deemed to be in full enjoyment of it. 9. There may be days and weeks and months during which the right may not be exercised at all and yet during all these periods the person claiming the right could be deemed to be in full enjoyment of it. The essential requirements of continuous and uninterrupted user will be sufficiently satisfied, provided the cessation of actual user are consistent with the enjoyment required by law. Explanation II to S.15 makes it clear what interruption is. It is actual cessation of the user by reason of an obstruction by the act of some person other than the claimant. So also such obstruction must be submitted to or acquiesced in for one year after the claimant had notice thereof. Otherwise it cannot be interruption to deny the right. The question of tacking may not be possible when an interval has elapsed between the periods of enjoyment of the successive owners during which the easement has not been used. So also when the adverse enjoyment of an easement has been for a time interrupted by the unity of seizin and possession of the dominant and servient estates, the times of enjoyment before and after such interruption cannot be added together to make up the full period of prescription, because during the period of unity of holdings in the same persons there is no question of user of an easement in ones own land. 10. Even though a mortgagee or a tenant cannot prescribe an easement against the mortgagor or lessor on account of the derivative title, their user against another tenement can be tacked on by the mortgagor or lessor. So also when an easement of way was enjoyed by the owner or occupier of the dominant heritage and the prescriptive right acquired, it would pass with the transfer of the dominant tenement, no matter that right of way does not find special mention in the transfer deed. At the best such omission could only be used for appreciation of the evidence of acquisition or existence of the right in doubtful cases. So also no rule of law says that acquisition of the prescriptive right could be proved only by the evidence of the owners or possessors of the dominant or servient heritage or persons who bad occasion to use the way. What is relevant is only the knowledge of the person giving evidence and his credibility. So also no rule of law says that acquisition of the prescriptive right could be proved only by the evidence of the owners or possessors of the dominant or servient heritage or persons who bad occasion to use the way. What is relevant is only the knowledge of the person giving evidence and his credibility. If his evidence stands these tests nothing prevents his evidence being accepted, though actual acceptance of evidence is a matter to be decided on the facts of each case. 11. Going by these standards, I have no doubt that both the courts in ignorance of the legal and factual positions rejected the evidence, influenced and prejudiced by the mistakes. The witnesses examined were competent and trustworthy (except probably pws. 6 to 8). The dominant heritage belonged to the family of the plaintiffs and possessed and enjoyed by the predecessors from very early times. The user is proved to be continuous also. Parties appear to be relatives also. There is no allegation or evidence of any cessation or interruption of the user. The prescriptive right matured even before Exts. A1 and A2 by which plaintiffs came by the property. The right goes with the land and plaintiffs are entitled to it. The second appeal is allowed and in reversal of the decrees of the courts below the suit is decreed as prayed for with costs throughout.