JUDGMENT 1. THE impugned order striking out the defence of the petitioner-husband before us, who is the respondent in a matrimonial proceeding in the court below, on the ground of his failure to pay alimony pendente lite and expenses of the proceeding under Section 36 of the special Marriage Act to the wife-respondent before us, who is the petitioner in that matrimonial proceeding in the court below, has been very strongly assailed as having been passed in illegal assumption or, at any rate, in illegal and materially irregular exercise of jurisdiction. The matrimonial proceeding in the court below has been instituted by the respondent against the petitioner for a decree for dissolution, or alternatively for a decree of nullity of marriage and on an application being made under Section 36 of the Special Marriage Act by the respondent as the petitioner in that proceeding, an order was made directing the respondent in that case and the petitioner before is to pay alimony as well as cost of litigation. That order appears to have been made exparte and the petitioner-husband attempted to have the same set aside on an application purported to be under Sectionl51 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but without success. It has been averred that the petitioner-husband has thereafter taken steps to move this court in revision against that order and that though he has entrusted his lawyer in the High Court, with that matter, no revision has yet been filed as the certified copies of the relevant orders, though applied for in the due time, could not be obtained. 2. ADMITTEDLY the petitioner has not made any payment in compliance with that order and the respondent-wife has then filed an application, and that too. purporting to be under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for rejection of the Written statement of the petitioner-husband or for striking out his defence and the learned Judge has struck out his defence by the impugned order. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner has very strongly urged that the court had no jurisdiction to do so and that, even assuming it had, the court exercised the same illegally and with material irregularity to warrant our intervention in revision. The matrimonial proceeding in the court below, wherein on an application under Section 36 of the Special. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner has very strongly urged that the court had no jurisdiction to do so and that, even assuming it had, the court exercised the same illegally and with material irregularity to warrant our intervention in revision. The matrimonial proceeding in the court below, wherein on an application under Section 36 of the Special. Marriage Act the impugned order has been passed, is, as provided in Section 40 of the Act, to be regulated, as far as may be, by the Code of Civil Procedure, subject of course to the express provision of the Act and the Rules made thereunder. There is no dispute that there is no express provision in the Act or the Rules or the Code providing for striking out the defence of the opposite party for his failure to comply with an order to pay alimony and costs ordered under Section 36. Can the Court still do so under its inherent powers without any statutory provision to that effect? 3. AS early as in 1882, Sayed Mahmood, J., in his separate judgment in the full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Narsingh Das vs. Mangal dubey (ILR 5 Allahabad 163 at 172) observed that "courts are not to act upon the principle that every procedure is to be taken as prohibited unless it is expressly provided for by the Code, but on the converse principle that every procedure is to be understood as permissible till it is shown to be prohibited by the law" and that "as a matter of general principle, prohibitions cannot be presumed". But still then, the debate as to whether a Civil Court must always act within or may also act beyond the Code went on and on, notwithstanding section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1908 staring at the face indicating irresistibly that the Civil Courts have inherent powers " to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court". Even as late as in 1962, the four-judge bench of the supreme Court in Manohar Lal Chopra (A. I. R 1962 S. C. 527) could not be unanimous on the point when the majority of the three learned Judges, speaking through Raghubar Dayal, J., dissenting, ruled that in spite of the specific provisions in the Code in Section 94 and Order 39 providing for granting of temporary injunctions, such injunction can be granted under the inherent powers in cases not covered by those specific provisions. The majority in Manohar Lal Chopra (supra), speaking through Raghubar Dayal, J., has approved the earlier decision of a three-Judge Bench, speaking through the same learned Judge in Padam Sen (A. I. R 1961 S. C. 218) which also has in effect ruled that notwithstanding the specific provisions in Section 75 and order 26 of the Code providing for issuance of Commissions, a Commission may nevertheless be issued by Court under its inherent powers. Now, if, notwithstanding the specific provisions of the Code in Section 75 and Order 26, a Commission can still be issued de hors those provisions under the inherent powers as held by the Supreme court in Padam Sen (supra), and if, notwithstanding the specific provisions of the Code in Section 94 and Order 39, a temporary injunction can still be granted de hors those provisions under inherent powers as held by the Supreme Court in Manohar Lal (supra), then it is difficult to hold that a Court, even in most deserving cases and for the ends of justice, can not strike out the defence under inherent powers and can only do so under the specific provisions of Order 11, Rule 21 and the like. As held in Padam Sen (supra at paragraph 8) and in Manohar Lal (supra, at paragraph 21), the inherent powers recognised and protected under Section 151 are additional and supplimentary powers and the Court is free to exercise them whenever and wherever necessary for the purpose mentioned in Section 151, subject, however, to the well-recognised limitations that such exercise must not be in any way in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or its clear legislative intent and in a manner contrary to the procedure expressly provided in the Code. 4. 4. HOLDING therefore, as we should, that the Court can under its inherent powers strike out the defence in a fit case for the ends of justice or for preventing the abuse of the process of Court, let us consider as to whether when a respondent-husband in a matrimonial proceeding, ordered to pay alimony pendente lite and expenses of the proceedings under Section 36 of the special Marriage Act, does not comply with that order, the Court can strike out the defence under its inherent powers, there being no specific provision authorising the Court to do so under the Act or the Code. In Rayden's Law and practice in divorce and Family Matters (13th Edition - Vol. 1, Page 574), it has been started that "if a husband who has been ordered to pay maintenance pending suit or costs to his wife, neglects to do so, she may apply to have the petition dismissed or to have the suit stayed". Quoting this with approval, a learned single-Judge of this Court has held in Anita vs. Birendra (A. I. R 1962 Calcutta 88), that when a husband-petitioner ordered to pay alimony under corresponding provisions of Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, refused to pay under the order, the hearing of his petition may be stayed by the Court under its' inherent powers until that order is complied with by the husband. Following inter alia this Calcutta decision, a Division Bench of the Himachal Pradesh high Court has held in a converse case In Jai Singh vs. Khimi Bhiklu (A. I. R 1978 Himachal Pradesh 45) that where the husband is the respondent and having been ordered to pay pendente lite alimony and expenses, does not comply with the order, the Court may strike out his defence under inherent powers, as a stay of the proceeding, which has been intuited by the wife, would serve no purpose in that case. The trial Judge has relied on and applied the ratio of the Himachal Pradesh Division Bench decision in Jai Singh (supra) in passing the impugned order. The trial Judge has relied on and applied the ratio of the Himachal Pradesh Division Bench decision in Jai Singh (supra) in passing the impugned order. The learned Counsel for the petitioner-husband has urged that since the order to pay alimony and costs could be enforced by levying execution under section 39a of the Act and the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and the husband-respondent could also be suitably dealt with for contempt, if any, committed by him not complying with that order, the inherent powers of the Court could not be exercised because of the existence and availability of these remedies. One must not forget that an order to pay alimony pendente lite and costs in favour of a wife is made under Section 36 of the Special marriage Act only when the Court is satisfied that she has no independent income sufficient for her support and for the conduct of the proceeding, the public policy behind this provision being that an Indigent wife is not to be deprived of a reasonable opportunity to represent her case because of financial disabilities. Not only the parties to the lis, but the society at large is interested in a speedy and proper disposal of matrimonial disputes and that is why section 40b of the Special Marriage Act, corresponding in Section 21b of the hindu Marriage Act, now provides that not only such proceedings "shall be tried as expeditiously as possible" but that "endeavour shall be made to conclude the trial within six months from the date of service of notice of the petition on the respondent". There should be no doubt that ends of justice can not but require that the indigent wife gets the necessary fund as ordered under section 36 as early as possible so that she may support herself and conduct her case and knowing, as we do, the long-drawn, dilatory and the time-consuming process of execution, which prompted Sir James Colvile to observe as early as in 1872 in General Manager of Raj Durbhunga (14 Moores Indian appeals 605 at 612) that " the difficulties of a litigant in India begin when he has obtained a decree", we do not think that enforcement by execution can at all be said to be an adequate or efficacious remedy which can meet the ends of justice in a case where an indigent wife has obtained an order for pendente lite maintenance and costs, because the original proceeding in respect of which such an order is made might be heard out before the process of execution process can be brought to a fruitful end. Enforcement by contempt proceeding, even if otherwise maintainable is also not likely to yield any better result or quicker relief and it may be doubted as to whether the amount ordered to be paid can eventually be made payable in such proceeding. Both the calcutta decision in Anita (supra) and the Himachal pradesh decision in Jai singh (supra) considered the inadequacy and inefficiency of enforcement by execution and the Himachal Pradesh decision adverted to the contempt aspect also and we respectfully concur with the observations made in those decisions. 5. IT is true that, as observed by the Supreme Court in Nainsingh vs. Koonwarjee (A. I. R. 1970 S. C. 997 at 998), "inherent jurisdiction of the Court must be exercised subject to the rule that if the Code does contain specific provisions which would meet the necessities of the case, such provisions should be followed and inherent jurisdiction should not be exercised". As we have already indicated, the provisions relating to enforcement of order under section 36 of the Special Marriage Act by execution or by contempt can not meet the necessities of the case, the primary necessary for her support and reasonable representation in the proceeding in the Court. As we have already indicated, the provisions relating to enforcement of order under section 36 of the Special Marriage Act by execution or by contempt can not meet the necessities of the case, the primary necessary for her support and reasonable representation in the proceeding in the Court. It may be noted that the Division Bench of this Court in Balaram vs. Star Trading (A. I. R. 1978 calcutta 160) has, after referring to the Supreme Court decision in Nainsingh (supra) and also an earlier Full Bench decision of this Court in Bimala vs. Aghore (A. I. R 1975 Calcutta 80), which, however, did not notice the aforesaid supreme Court decision, held that even though the Code provides for an appeal in Order 43 Rule 1 (f) against an order striking out defence under Order 11, Rule 21, an application to set aside that order under Section 151 of the code would be competent as for all practical purposes, an appeal against such an order can not provide any adequate and fruitful remedy. We are, therefore, of the view that if a husband respondent ordered to pay alimony and expenses of proceeding to the wife-respondent under Section 36 of the Special Marriage act, fails or refuses to pay the same, the Court may in appropriate cases order striking out the defence of the husband respondent under its inherent powers for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court, as the remedy available to the wife-petitioner for enforcement of that order by execution or otherwise is neither adequate nor efficacious to meet necessities of the case. 6. OUR attention has been drawn to a Division Bench decision of this Court in Shah Kaliluddin vs. Matnube (48 Calcutta Weekly Notes 677) where the division Bench, though not deciding the question, appears to have expressed some doubts' as to whether defence can be struck off by the Court under its inherent powers adding, however, that the circumstances in that case were such as did not call for any such action under inherent powers. While a later division Bench should follow the ratio decidendi of an earlier Division Bench, it is under no obligation to share the former's doubts and nothing should prevent a later Division Bench was dubitante. While a later division Bench should follow the ratio decidendi of an earlier Division Bench, it is under no obligation to share the former's doubts and nothing should prevent a later Division Bench was dubitante. A three-Judge Bench of this court in Tara Singh vs. Jaipal Singh (I. L. R 1946-1 Calcutta 606) has been referred to and relied on by a learned single Judge of the Bombay High Court in Prithvirajsinghji vs. Bai Shivtrabhakumari (A. I. R 1960 Bombay 325) as the authority for the view that the defence is not to be struck of unless the refusal to obey the order to pay alimony and costs is contumacious. But while we may not have any difficulty in agreeing with and applying this principle, we do not think that Edgley, J., speaking for the Bench, attempted to enounce any such law and all that the learned Judge said was that he was "hesitant" in that case to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the wife-petitioner to refuse to hear the husband when the decree nisi already passed came up for confirmation before that three-Judge Bench under Section 17 of the Divorce act, solely on the ground that the husband did not comply with the order to pay. In suit having already been decreed by the District Judge and coming up before the three-Judge Bench only for confirmation under Section 17, Divorce act and, as already noted, all that Edgley, J, said was that he was hesitant and not inclined to decline hearing to the husband at that stage solely on the ground that he did not comply with the order for payment, particularly when the materials before us are not sufficient to show that he is actually in contempt". Be that as it may, as already indicated herein before, in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court and the Full Bench and the Division Bench of this Court as noted hereinbefore, we entertain no doubt as to the inherent powers of the Court to strike out the defence in appropriate cases, including cases where a husband-respondent disobeys am order under Section 36 of the special Marriage Act to pay pendente lite alimony and costs of the litigation to the wife-petitioner. 7. BUT it is one thing that the Court has power while it is a different thing as to whether the Court should exercise that power. 7. BUT it is one thing that the Court has power while it is a different thing as to whether the Court should exercise that power. To borrow from Shakespeare, it may be good to have a giant's power, but it may not be good to use it as a giant. There must", as observed by Vivian Bose, J, in the decision of the Supreme court in Sangram Singh (A. I. R. 1955 S. C. 425 at 429), "be ever present to the mind the fact that our laws of procedure are grounded on a principle of natural justice which requires that men should not be condemned unheard, that decisions should not be reached behind their back, that proceedings that affect their lives and property should not continue in their absence and they should not be precluded from participating in them" unless the relevant law mandates such a course without any option. But where such a course is not obligatory but discretionary, the discretion should, wherever reasonably possible, be exercised in favour of a person's being heard and allowed to participate in a proceeding to which he is a party. There is nothing on record to show that the respondent has deliberately and contumaciously violated the order to pay alimony and costs. Non-compliance with an order is not necessarily violation of that order and there may be various reasons for one's failure to pay, like want of fund and the like. It is the wife's own case in paragraph 4 of her original petition for the matrimonial relief in the trial court that "before marriage the respondent (husband) gave a picture of his income and status to the petitioner, but after the marriage the petitioner came to know that all great stories with regard to the respondent regarding his income and status are false" and that" in fact the respondent has meagre income". That being the clear admission of the wife herself as to the paucity of her husband's income, we do not know on what basis the trial court ordered payment of Rs. 400/- per month as alimony pendente lite and Rs. 500/- as costs of the litigation. That being the clear admission of the wife herself as to the paucity of her husband's income, we do not know on what basis the trial court ordered payment of Rs. 400/- per month as alimony pendente lite and Rs. 500/- as costs of the litigation. Be that as it may, we have taken due note of that admission of the wife from which an inference may reasonably be drawn that the non-payment by the husband was not deliberate or contumacious but might be due to indigence or other economic disabilities. We have also taken note of the fact that such payment by the husband was not at any stage made co addition precedent to his right to participate in and contest the proceeding. We have also taken note of the fact that the averments of the petitioner-husband in his written objection in the court below that he has taken steps to entrust his lawyer to move this Court in Revision against the exparte order directing payment of alimony and costs and also the order rejecting his application for recall of the former exparte order, but has not been able to do so for not getting the certified copies of those orders in spite of applying therefore in time, has not been controverted by the other party at any stage. We are afraid that the court below acted illegally in not adverting to these facts and circumstances which would have shown that there was nothing on record to indicate that such non-payment was deliberate or contumacious. 8. THE learned Counsel appearing for the husband has also agreed that the husband-petitioner before us would pay off all the amount payable within such reasonable period as we would direct and would continue to comply with the order passed under Section 36 of the Special Marriage Act. As we have already observed, and that is what the Supreme Court has also ruled in Sangram Singh (supra), a person should be allowed opportunity to participate in a proceeding to which he is a party, wherever that is reasonably possible, unless the relevant rules rule out such participation. One word more before we conclude. As we have already observed, and that is what the Supreme Court has also ruled in Sangram Singh (supra), a person should be allowed opportunity to participate in a proceeding to which he is a party, wherever that is reasonably possible, unless the relevant rules rule out such participation. One word more before we conclude. In Padam Sen (supra at 219), the supreme Court has ruled that the inherent powers saved by Section 151 of the Code are with respect to the procedure to be followed by the Court in deciding the case before it" and " these powers are not powers over the substantive rights which any litigant possesses". These observations have also been quoted with approval by the Supreme Court, in Manohar Lal (supra, at 533) and relying on these observations the learned Counsel for the petitioner husband has urged that as the right to defend by filing written statement or otherwise is a substantive right of the defendant, the same can not be taken away struck out or otherwise affected by the Court in exercise of the inherent powers. The observation of the Supreme Court that inherent powers are not powers over the substantive rights" must be read along with the preceding observation that the inherent powers" are with respect to the procedure to be followed by the Can in deciding the cause before it,and that would at once make it. clear that while the substantive night for protection or enforcement of which the parties are litigating, is to be decided and determined by and under the substantive law can not under inherent powers, the matters relating to the conduct of the litigation, including as to when and how a party may or may not be allowed to present his pleading, when and how a party is or is not be heard and the like, are matters of procedure to regulate the course of litigation and are not matters relating to any substantive right which is litigated. A right to proceed with the suit or with the defence may be legal right, and very often a substantial right, but not substantive right within the meaning of those observations. A right to proceed with the suit or with the defence may be legal right, and very often a substantial right, but not substantive right within the meaning of those observations. The expression substantive right in the context would mean right, whether personal, proprietory or otherwise, for which a court may be moved, but not the rights as to how the Court is to be moved, which are remedial rights however substantial, and reference may, if need be, be made to any of the standard tretises on Jurisprudence for the purpose. Be it noted that even in the Supreme Court decision in Manohar Lal (supra) itself, a duly constituted suit was stayed under the inherent powers and it could not be so done if it was to be held that the right to proceed with the suit or the defence is also a substantive right, as Manohar Lal (supra) relying on Padam sea (supra), has made it clear that inherent powers can not be exercised in respect of substantive rights. As we have already indicated, the right to sue or to defend or otherwise to participate in a proceeding, are remedial rights, and not substantive rights, however substantial they may be. 9. YET another word. While it is good that orders relating to injunction, attachment, receiver and the like may be made under inherent powers in cases where the relevant specific provisions of the Code may not meet the ends of justice, yet we can not but note that while such orders purported to be made under the specific provisions of the Code are clearly appealable under Section 104 read with Order 43, similar orders, when made under inherent powers, can not be challenged in appeal. It may be difficult to appreciate that if interlocutory orders of attachment, injunction or receiver under the specific provisions of the Code in Order 38, Order 39 or Order 40 are assailable in appeal under Order 43, why similar orders of similar nature and rigour, purported to be made under inherent powers, are immune from the appellate supervision and why all such orders, whether made under the specific provisions of the Code or under inherent powers, have not been made amenable to appeal. Can it, therefore, be said that the framers of the Code might not have contemplated such orders beyond the limits of the specific provisions ? Can it, therefore, be said that the framers of the Code might not have contemplated such orders beyond the limits of the specific provisions ? We need not, however, wait for the answer. 10. BE that as it may, in view of what have been pointed out hereinbefore as to the failure on the part of the trial court to advert to some of the important considerations and in view of the submissions of the learned Counsel for the petitioner-husband that he is ready to comply with the order of alimony and costs, we direct that if the petitioner-husband pays in the court below all the amount in arrears payable under the order passed under Section 36 within one month from this date, the impugned order striking out the defence shall stand quashed and the court shall proceed on the basis as if no such order was passed. But if he fails to do so, the impugned order shall stand affirmed an if the court shall proceed accordingly. Records, if any, along with a copy of this order to go down at once. No costs. Appeal disposed of.