JUDGMENT S. Padmanabhan, J. 1. B-Schedule property is a portion of A-schedule which belonged to Karutha Panicker. First defendant was his only son and Ammukutty was the wife of the first defendant. Plaintiff Chandrika Bai is their sole daughter. In 1950 Karutha Panicker executed Ext. A-1 Will bequeathing A-schedule property to these three persons with the following provisions. (1) I want the properties to devolve on my son, his wife Ammukutty and daughter Chandrika and hence this Will is executed subject to the following conditions. (2) They must get the properties in full right after my death and enjoy the same after mutation and paying tax. (3) First defendant will be entitled to encumber one of the properties upto Rs. 10,000. (4) If any other document is to be executed it should be by all the three jointly. (5) First defendant should take the income and maintain his wife and daughter and the balance income will belong to the three equally. (6) After the death of the first defendant all the properties will devolve on Ammukutty, Chandrika Bai and her children. 2. Ammukutty died. Thereafter first defendant married second defendant and defendants 3 and 4 are their children. Sixth defendant is the sister of the 2nd defendant and 5th defendant is her husband. A portion of the suit property was sold by the 1st defendant to 6th defendant under Ext. B-2. After the second appeal first defendant also died. Appeal was filed by defendants 1 to 4 and defendants 2 to 4 were recorded heirs. 3. Plaintiff claims that under the Will at present she alone is entitled to all the properties subject to the life estate of the first, defendant. The suit is for injunction Against alienation, waste and induction of strangers as against the first defendant and trespass and other acts against the other defendants. Plaintiff claimed to be in possession of B-schedule property alleging that it was given to her for maintenance by the first defendant under the provisions of Ext. A-1 Will. Defendants contended that first defendanty Ammukutty and plaintiff were entitled to 1/3rd share each under the Will and in an oral partition B-schedule property was allotted to plaintiff. They supported Ext. B-2 sale deed and wanted plaintiff to be non-suited regarding A-schedule property excluding B-schedule. Both the courts did not accept the maintenance arrangement or oral partition. 4. A-1 Will. Defendants contended that first defendanty Ammukutty and plaintiff were entitled to 1/3rd share each under the Will and in an oral partition B-schedule property was allotted to plaintiff. They supported Ext. B-2 sale deed and wanted plaintiff to be non-suited regarding A-schedule property excluding B-schedule. Both the courts did not accept the maintenance arrangement or oral partition. 4. Trial court accepted the case of the defendants that each of the three legatees was entitled to 1/3rd share. Including the share of the deceased mother, the plaintiff was found entitled to 1/3rd while the first defendant entitled to 1/3rd. Injunction was granted directing plaintiff to appropriate remedy regarding Ext. B-2. The appellate court disagreed with the trial court and held that the last clause in the Will is a defeasance clause which restricted he interest of the 1st defendant to a life estate and made a gift over to the plaintiff and her children after his death. The decree was modified to that extent and injunction was granted except regarding 56 cents covered by Ext. B-2. The finding that Ext. B-2 was not liable to be challenged in this suit was vacated. 5. In this second appeal filed by defendants 1 to 4, especially after the death of the first defendant, the only question for consideration is the devolution of interest under Ext. A-1 Will. If first defendant had only a life estate, that must determine on his death, the appeal has only to be dismissed. In that case Ext. B-2 is an invalid sale deed also. On the other hard if first defendant had 1/3rd share that must devolve on plaintiff and defendants 2 to 4, subject to Ext. B-2, and the decree will have to be modified accordingly. 6. Both sides are claiming under Ext. A-1. What is involved is only construction of its provisions. The combined effect of the various relevant provisions in the Indian Succession Act regarding construction of a Will by its "interpretation is that it is the duty of the court to find out the real intention of the testator. It is that intention that has to be given effect to. That intention has to be gathered from the language used by him because his wishes could be understood from his words alone. When meaning of the words are affected by surrounding circumstances, those circumstances also will have to be taken into consideration. It is that intention that has to be given effect to. That intention has to be gathered from the language used by him because his wishes could be understood from his words alone. When meaning of the words are affected by surrounding circumstances, those circumstances also will have to be taken into consideration. The meaning of any clause cannot be taken in isolation but to be collected from the entire instrument. All the parts of the Will are to be construed with reference to each other so as to form a consistent whole, if possible. When that is not possible the latter part must prevail. The construction should be as if to give to every expression some effect rather than that which would render any of the expressions inoperative. For that purpose the court is entitled to put itself into the arm chair of the testator and is bound to consider his family relationship, probability of words being used in a particular sense etc. Those considerations are only to be used as aids. In reading the Will and its provisions as a whole and giving effect to all of them to the extent possible, apparently conflicting dispositions should be reconciled by giving effect to every word used in the document instead of cutting down the clear meaning of words used by the testator. When one of the two reasonable obstructions would lead to intestacy that should be discarded in favour of a construction which does not create such a result. If it is legally possible, effect should be given to every disposition contained in the Will unless any provision of law prevents so doing. These are the fundamental guiding factors in the construction of a Will. In short, courts will have to go to the farthest extent to avoid repugnancy and giving effect to each and every testamentary intention in the Will. See Ramachandra v. Hilda Brite, AIR 1964 S.C 1323 , Rameshwar Bakhsh v. Balraj Kumar, AIR 1935 P.C 187 , and Navneet Lal v. Gokul, AIR 1976 S.C. 794 . 7. If there are two repugnant provisions conferring successive interests and if the first interest created is legally valid, the subsequent interest created cannot take effect. But such a construction also has to be only when the attempt to avoid repugnancy fails. 7. If there are two repugnant provisions conferring successive interests and if the first interest created is legally valid, the subsequent interest created cannot take effect. But such a construction also has to be only when the attempt to avoid repugnancy fails. When an absolute estate is created by a Will in favour of a devisee, the clauses in the Will which are repugnant to such an absolute estate cannot cut down the estate, but they must be held to be invalid. In such a case the provisions of section 88 of the Succession Act, that the last of the two irreconcilable clauses Will prevail, has no operation because the first clause created an absolute estate and the second one places restrictions on it repugnant to the absolute estate created and cannot prevail according to law. In this respect, section 138 of the Indian Succession Act which is almost the same as section 11 of the Transfer of Property Act comes to the rescue of the absolute estate to treat the subsequent direction as non-existant in the eye of law. But in so invalidating the subsequent clause as invalid the courts should always bear in mind the distinction between a repugnant clause and a defeasance clause in the light of the principle that the attempt should always reconciliatory to the extent legally and factually possible. 8. When there is a bequest to A which is apparent absolute, followed by a gift of the same to B absolutely on or after or at the death of A, A must be prima facie held take a life interest alone and B an interest in remainder, the apparent absolute estate of A being cut down accommodate the interest created in favour of B. Such construction must necessarily be given to compromise the two clauses because if the first clause is treated as a life interest the second is according to law perfectly valid. Sections 131 and 134 of the Indian Succession Act a relevant in that respect. 9. The distinction between a repugnant clause and defeasance clause is rather subtle. Sections 131 and 134 of the Indian Succession Act a relevant in that respect. 9. The distinction between a repugnant clause and defeasance clause is rather subtle. When the intention the testator is to maintain an absolute estate on the devisee, but he simply adds some restrictions in derogation of the incidents of such absolute estate which cannot stand the scrutiny of law for maintenance of the absolute estate, such restrictive clauses would be repugnant to the absolute transfer and hence void. But if the intention expressed or necessarily to be implied, is to extinguish the absolute estate arid make it subject to a defeasance on the happening of a contingency and when the effect of such defeasance or termination of the said absolute estate would not be violation of any rule of law, the clause is only a defeasance clause and not a repugnant clause and it would act according to its tenor. In such a case the earlier clause must be considered as conferring only a life interest. When the original estate is thus curtailed on the happening of contingency or its not happening, and a gift over take place, it must be held to be valid and operative. That is because the gift over is a valid disposition on the termination of the earlier estate by the death of the devisee or such other contingency provided for. Everything depends upon the intention that is gatherable and the possibility a reconciling the provisions instead of making one in effective Such a reconciliation is possible even if the earlier provision conferred an apparently absolute estate and there is no legal bar in treating the subsequent provision as not repugnant but only as a defeasance clause. Sections 28 and 31 of the Transfer of Property Act and sections 131 and 134 of the Indian Succession Act are relevant in that respect see Gopalakrishna Pillai v. KunjiAmma, 1966 KLT 1092 , P. Krishna v. Narayana, AIR 1962 Kerala 322, Scaria Korah v. Korah Mathu, AIR 1962 Kerala 323, Govindaraja v. Mangalam Pillai, AIR 1933 Madras 80, Rameshwar Kuer v. Shiolal, AIR 1935 Patna 401, Golak Behari v. Suradhani Dassi, AIR 1939 Culcutta 226, and Antony Thommen v. Thommen Alexander and another, 1965 II KLR 283. The real question is the intention of the testator, whether he created an absolute estate and wanted to restrict it by an invalid, repugnant provision which is not legally operative or whether he wanted to terminate or extinguish the apparently absolute right on the happening or non-happening of an event. In the former case the clause is void as repugnant to the estate created, but in the latter it is valid and it is only a defeasance clause. Section 131 of the Indian Succession Act provides for a gift over and section 134 deals with extinguishment of the right without gift over. In either case the effect of the defeasance clause is cutting down the estate. 10. In this case what is given to the devisees under the second clause can at the best be treated only as an apparently absolute estate. The first clause itself says that the bequest is subject to all the conditions. By the third clause first defendant by himself was given only the right of encumbrance and that too only in respect of one item. In case of necessity for executing other documents the fourth clause says that it should only be by all the three jointly. The fifth clause makes the intention further clear that except the right of encumbrance first defendant was given only the right to enjoy, maintain his wife and child and share the balance income with them. The last clause clearly indicates that on the death of the first defendant his estate is reduced to a life interest and the absolute estate is thereafter created only in favour of Ammukutty, plaintiff and plaintiff's children. If at all the second clause is taken as creating an absolute estate and clauses 3, 4 and 5 as conditions or restrictions repugnant to such an absolute estate, the last clause removes all doubts to show that the right of the first defendant is terminated or extinguished on his death cutting it down to a life interest with a gift over to the other two and the children of the plaintiff. It is therefore not a condition or restriction repugnant to the absolute estate, but a termination or extinguishment of it conditional on the death of the first defendant converting it into a life interest with a gift over as provided in section 131 of the Indian Succession Act. Ext. It is therefore not a condition or restriction repugnant to the absolute estate, but a termination or extinguishment of it conditional on the death of the first defendant converting it into a life interest with a gift over as provided in section 131 of the Indian Succession Act. Ext. B-2 is therefore an unauthorised document from. which no right will flow. Now the plaintiff is the absolute owner and she is entitled to the injuction prayed for (subject to possession of 56 cents under Ext. B-2 which the District Judge found). The second appeal is therefore dismissed without costs.