S.N. BHARGAVA, J.—This is second bail application filed on behalf of the two petitioners on the ground of violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 2. FIR No. 86/87 was lodged at Police Station Bayana, on 15.4.1987 against the accused petitioners and other persons for offences u/s 147, 149 and 302 I.P.C. During the course of investigation, the accused petitioners were arrested on 27.4.1987, and since then, they are in custody. After completing the investigation, police submitted challan on 16th May, 1987 against the accused petitioners and 12- others while with regard to Dwarka Prasad, Om Prakash, Ved Prakash and Jinna, the police submitted final report. 3. The complainant filed an application on 21.5.1987 before the Additional Munsif and Judicial Magistrate No. 1, Bayana, that challan should be filed against the accused person in respect of whom police had filed the final report. Learned Magistrate, by his order dated 2.6.1987 ordered that application dated 21.5.87 filed by the complainant may be treated as protest petition and should, be separately registered, and fixed 10th June, 87 for recording statements in that protest petition, and committed the case against the accused persons to the court of Sessions. 4. The complaint, being aggrieved of this order of the Magistrate, dated 2-6-87 filed a revision petition in the court of Sessions Judge, Bharatpur, which was disposed of by the Additional Sessions Judge, No. 1, Bharatpur who vide his order dated 7.10.87 accepted the revision petition and directed the Magistrate to take cognizance against Dwarka Prasad and three others and comit the case to the court of Sessions. 5. The accused persons were committed to Sessions where charge had already been framed on 2.11.1987 and the case was fixed for recording evidence on 4.12.1987. 6. The accused petitioners had moved an application for grant of ball u/s 439 Cr.P.C. before the Additional Sessions Judge No. 1, Bharatpur but the same was rejected vide order dated 19.9.1987. 7. The petitioners had also filed a bail application on 3.10.1987 before this Court which was rejected by a speaking order dated 20.1.1988. 8. On a revision petition having been filed by the complainant on 11.6.1987, learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bharatpur, vide his order dated 7.10.87 took cognizance against some of the co-accused persons against whom the police had submitted final report and those co-accused persons have filed S.B. Cr. 8. On a revision petition having been filed by the complainant on 11.6.1987, learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bharatpur, vide his order dated 7.10.87 took cognizance against some of the co-accused persons against whom the police had submitted final report and those co-accused persons have filed S.B. Cr. Revision Petition No. 257/87 in this Court on 15.10.87 which came up for admission on 30.11.87. Shri Jagdeep Dhankhar had filed power on behalf of the complainant. The case was adjourned for 14.12.87 and learned counsel for the parties were directed to come prepared for final disposal of the case on that day. The said revision petition was admitted on 14.12.87 and since the matter was at the initial stage, it was ordered that the revision petition should be finally disposed of at the stage of stay application itself and the case was posted for 18.1.88. The case was listed in Court on 22.2.88, 29.2.88, 25.3.88 and 12.4.88 but the case could not be taken up and it was adjourned to 15.4.1988; and on that day the case was ordered to be listed on 9.5.88 as first case, with the clear understanding that it shall be finally argued on that day, because learned counsel for the complainant Mr. Dbankhar was busy in a part heard matter before some other court. The case could not be taken up on 9.5.1988 on account of sad demise of Shri N.D. Mantri, Advocate and it was ordered to be taken up on 10th May, 1988. On 10th May, 1988, due to change of roster, case was to be listed before another bench but since the file was not available, it could not be taken upon 10th May, 1988 inspire of best efforts of learned counsel for the petitioner. On 11.5.88, it was fixed for 23rd May, 1988. On 23.5.88. after completion of the arguments by the learned counsel for the accused petitioners, learned counsel for the complainant submitted that record of the case would be necessary, hence, the record had been called for and the revision is now posted for orders on 11-7-1988 and the same has been released from being a part heard case. 9. On 23.5.88. after completion of the arguments by the learned counsel for the accused petitioners, learned counsel for the complainant submitted that record of the case would be necessary, hence, the record had been called for and the revision is now posted for orders on 11-7-1988 and the same has been released from being a part heard case. 9. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor, Bharatpur on 4.12.87, when the sessions case was fixed for recording evidence on behalf of the prosecution, submitted an application in the court of Additional Sessions Judge No. 1, Bharatpur, praying that evidence on behalf of the prosecution may not be recorded till the disposal of the revision petition pending in the High Court, against the order dt. 7.10 87, as it was likely to prejudice the case of the prosecution, placing reliance on 1987 Cr.L.R (SC) 558. Since the revision petition was listed in the High Court on 14.12.87, learned Addl. Sessions Judge did not record the evidence of the prosecution witnesses on 4.12.87 and 5,12.87 and posted the case for 27.1.88 to await decision of the High Court, in the revision petition. 10. On 15.3.1988, the accused petitioners submitted an application in the trial court that the revision petition has not been decided so far by the High Court and there are no chances of the same being disposed of at an early date; the accused are in custody for nearly one year, therefore, prosecution evidence should be recorded by the court, on which the trial court passed order on 16.4.88 and since the revision petition was fixed in the High Court on 9.5.88 at No. 1, for final disposal, the prosecution evidence was not recorded and the case was fixed for 20th May, 1988. But since the revision petition had not been disposed of by the High Court till then, no further progress took place in the trial court. 11. Under these circumstances, the present bail application was filed in this Court on 31st May, 1988 and it came up for orders on 6.6.88 when the case was adjourned for 8.6.88 and later to 9.6.88. Arguments were heard at length on 9.6.88 and parties have also filed their written submissions. 12. 11. Under these circumstances, the present bail application was filed in this Court on 31st May, 1988 and it came up for orders on 6.6.88 when the case was adjourned for 8.6.88 and later to 9.6.88. Arguments were heard at length on 9.6.88 and parties have also filed their written submissions. 12. Meanwhile, the trial court vide its order dated 6.6.88 rejected the application filed by the accused petitioners on 15.3.88 praying that the prosecution evidence should be recorded without awaiting the decision of the revision petition. The trial court vide its order dated 6.6.88 while dismissing the application dated 15.3.88 filed by the accused petitioners, ordered that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses shall be recorded only after the final disposal of the revision petition pending in the High Court. 13. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on Hussainara Khatoon V. Home Secretary, State of Bihar (1) wherein their lordships while emphasising the need of speedy trial observed as under :-. "There is also one other infirmity of the legal and judicial system which is responsible for this gross denial of justice to the under-trial prisoners and that is the notorious delay in disposal of cases. It is a sad reflection on the legal and judicial system that the trial of an accused should not even commence for long number of years. Even a delay of one year in the commencement of trial, is bad enough...Speedy trial is of the essence of criminal justice and there can be no doubt that delay in trial by itself constitutes denial of Justice." After quoting Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights which provides that "every one arrested or detained-shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable, time or to release pending trial", their lordships further observed- though speedy trial is not specifically enumerated as a fundamental "right, it is implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as interpreted by this Court in Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India ( AIR 1978 SC 597 ).. They have further observed that speedy trial and by speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21". 14. Learned counsel for the petitioners has also placed reliance on State of Bihar Vs. Union of India ( AIR 1978 SC 597 ).. They have further observed that speedy trial and by speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21". 14. Learned counsel for the petitioners has also placed reliance on State of Bihar Vs. Uma Shanker Kotriwal (2) wherein their lordships observed that there has to be a limit to the period for which criminal litigation is allowed to go on at the trial stage. 15. Both these cases were referred to and relied by a full bench in Madheswardhari Singh Vs. State of Bihar (3) where their lordships have observed that in all criminal prosecutions the right 10 a speedy public trial is now an unalienable fundamantal right of the citizen under Art. 21 of our Constitution and this cannot be allowed to be whittled down on any financial ground of the hoary origin of this right in the constitutional history of Great Britain and America, nor considerations of affluence of developed countries are even remotely relevant or germane in this context. Their lordships further observed that fundamental right to a speedy public trial entends to all criminal prosecutions for all offences generically, irrespective of their nature. It is not confined or constricted to either serious or capital offences only. 16. Their lordships also referred a decision given by Chief Warren, in Peter H. Klopfer Vs. State of North Carolina (4) where their lordships held that right to a speedy trial is as fundamental as any of the rights secured by the Sixth Amendment. That right has its roots at the very foundation of our English Law heritage. 17. All the above three decisions have been considered by this Court in Laxman Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan (5) where his lordship was considering a bail application pending trial of sessions case wherein he was charged for the offence u/s 302, 449, 458 & I.P.C. Sec. 25 and 27 of the Arms Act. 17. All the above three decisions have been considered by this Court in Laxman Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan (5) where his lordship was considering a bail application pending trial of sessions case wherein he was charged for the offence u/s 302, 449, 458 & I.P.C. Sec. 25 and 27 of the Arms Act. The petitioner, in that case, had been in jail for one and half year and since the prosecution had not been able to produce a single witness within ten months of the committal, learned Single Judge observed that the prosecution is not free to deprive the liberty of a citizen by denying him speedy trial even of capital offence and that it would be unfair and unjust to continue the petitioner to be in jail for no fault of his and therefore, the petitioner in that case was ordered to be enlarged on bail. 18. This court in another case Lokesh Bhardwaj s/o Kailash Chand Vs. State of Rajasthan (6) allowed the fifth bail application in a case arising out of an FIR registered for offences u/s 307/302, 34 IPC in which case the petitioner was arrested on September 11, 1985 and the trial had not been completed till 9th September, 1986, nearly one year inspite of several directions by the High Court for early disposal, while disposing of the earlier bail application. 19. My attention has also been drawn to Raghubir Singh Vs.. State of Bihar (7), wherein their lordships after referring to earlier decisions in Hussainara Khatoon (supra), Kadra Pahadia Vs. State of Bihar (8), Kadra Pahadia Vs. State of Bihar (9), State of Maharastra vs. Champa La! (10), Strunk Vs. United States(il) and Barker Vs. Wingo (l2) as also Bell V. Director of Public Prose-cuttions, Jamaica (13) held that right to a fair trial within reasonable time is a constitutionally protected right. Enfringement of that right has been held in appropriate cases, sufficient to quash conviction or to stop further proceedings. The right to a speedy trial is one of the dimensions of the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed by Article 2 of the Constitution of India. Thereafter their lordships have posed several questions was there delay? How long was the delay? Was the delay inevitable having regard to the nature of the ease, the sparse availability of legal services and other relevant circumstances? Was the delay unreasonable? Thereafter their lordships have posed several questions was there delay? How long was the delay? Was the delay inevitable having regard to the nature of the ease, the sparse availability of legal services and other relevant circumstances? Was the delay unreasonable? Was any part of the delay caused by the wilfulness or the negligence of the prosecuting agency? Was any part of the delay caused by the tactics of the defence? Was the delay due to causes beyond the control of the prosecuting and defending agencies? Did the accused have the ability and the opportunity to assert his right to a speedy trial? Was there a likeli hood of the accused being prejudiced in his defence? Irrespective of any likelihood of prejudice in the conduct of his defence, was the very length of the delay sufficiently prejudicial to the accused? The question whether the right to a speedy trial which forms part of the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed by Art. 21 has been infringed is ultimately a question of fairness in the administration of criminal justice. 20. Learned counsel for the petitioners has also placed reliance on Noor Taki @ Mammu V. State of Rajasthan (14) wherein their lordships have observed while dealing with the point as to whether an approver can be released on bail, detention of a person even by due process of law, has to be reasonable fair, and just and if it is not so, the delay amounts to violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Reasonably expeditious trial is warranted under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and in case this is not done, an approvers bail application can be considered. 21. Reliance has also been placed on Sitaram V. State of UP(15) wherein the Allahabad High Court was dealing with the second bail application, where trial was pending for offences u/s 302/323 IPC and where the accused was in jail since November, 1985 and the case had not been even committed till October, 1986 when this judgment was pronounced. Their lordships also referred to the cases of Hussainara, Maneka Gandhi and Maqsoodan Singh (supra) and allowed the second bail application and ordered to release the accused on bail. 22. Their lordships also referred to the cases of Hussainara, Maneka Gandhi and Maqsoodan Singh (supra) and allowed the second bail application and ordered to release the accused on bail. 22. On the other hand, learned counsel for the complainant as well as the Public Prosecutor very vehemently argued that the accused petitioners are facing trial for a very heinous offence u/s 302 I.P.C. and that their earlier bail application had been rejected on merits, after considering the facts of the case in detail. Therefore, they are not entitled to grant of bail; because in the present case, challarn was filed within a month of the arrest of the accused petitioners and the charges have also been framed and prosecution witnesses are available. Therefore, the trial can be completed within a short period; that this application deserves no consideration looking to the nature of accusations and the allegations against the accused petitioners, promptness in filing the FIR and completion of investigation and commital proceedings. 23. Reliance has also been placed on Shahzad Hassan Khan V. Ishtiaq Hasan Khan (16) wherein their lordships observed that although liberty of a citizen must be zealously safeguarded by court nonetheless when a person is accused of a serious offence like murder and his successive bail applications are rejected on merits there being prima facie material, the prosecution is entitled to place correct facts before the Court. One of the salutary principles in granting bail is that the court should be satisfied that the accused being enlarged on bail will not be in a position to temper with the evidence. 24. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the whole matter and have also carefully gone through the various authorities cited at the bar. 25. One of the salutary principles in granting bail is that the court should be satisfied that the accused being enlarged on bail will not be in a position to temper with the evidence. 24. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the whole matter and have also carefully gone through the various authorities cited at the bar. 25. In the present case, the incident took place on 15.4.1987 and the accused petitioners were arrested on 27.4.1987 and challan was filed on 16th May, 1987 and since then the trial is pending before the Additional Sessions Judge No. 1, Bharatpur, but the trial is not proceeding and the evidence of the prosecution witnesses is not being recorded because the prosecution had moved an application that the trial should not proceed unless the S.B. Criminal Revision No, 257/1987 filed by co- accused Dwarka Prasad Tiwari and others, against the order dated 7.10.1987 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge No. 1, Bharatpur, taking cognizance against them, is finally disposed of by the High Court The revision petition was filed in the High Court on 15.1.0 1987. Till date, it has not been possible to dispose of the revision petition inspite of specific orders of the Court for early disposal and the revision petition is now posted for final disposal on 11.7.1987 and it cannot be said positively or certainly that the revision petition will be disposed of on 11.7.88 or in near future, looking to the pressure of the work in the Court. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge No.I, Bharatpur has also rejected the prayer made by the accused petitioners vide his order dated 6.6 88, that the prosecution evidence should be recorded and therefore the trial will not proceed till the disposal of the revision petition. Record of the case has also been called by this Court and it will be only after the revision petition is finally decided that the record will be sent back to the trial court and then, if revision petition is finally dismissed, the Magistrate shall take cognizance, commit the four co-accused persons to Sessions and then learned Addl. Sessions Judge No. 1, Bharatpur will frame the charges against the accused persons; then, the case will be fixed for recording prosecution evidence. It is absolutely indefinite and uncertain as to how much time all this process will take. Sessions Judge No. 1, Bharatpur will frame the charges against the accused persons; then, the case will be fixed for recording prosecution evidence. It is absolutely indefinite and uncertain as to how much time all this process will take. The accused petitioners have been in custody since 27.4.87 i.e. for more than a year. 26. Keeping in mind the questions considered by the Supreme Court in Raghubir Singh (supra) quoted above, I find, in the present ease, that there is delay in trial; the delay has been for more than a year and it is indefinite as to how long it will take in commencing the trial; the delay has been caused by the prosecution when they moved an application for not examining the prosecution witnesses and in opposing the application filed by the petitioners that the prosecution evidence should he recorded without awaiting the result of the revision petition pending in the High Court. The delay is unreasonable. The prosecution is responsible for the delay. The delay was not caused by" the tactics of the defence. The delay cannot be said to be beyond the control of the prosecution or defending agency.. The accused cannot be said to be responsible in any manner, for the delay. 27. In view of the consistent view of the Supreme Court right from Champa Lals case (supra) to Raghubir Singhs case (supra), it is now well settled that the right to a speedy trial is one of the dimensions of the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed . under Article 21 of the Constitution of India In the facts and circumstances of the present case this right of speedy trial which forms part of the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution, has been infringed for no fault of the petitioners. The importance of speedy and expeditious trial need not be emphasised any more in view of number of decisions of the Supreme Court quoted earlier. This court also in Laxman Singhs case (supra) has also granted bail where the accused had been in jail for one and half year. In Laxman Singh and Lokesh Bhardwaj (supra) also the accused, who were facing trial under sec. 302 IPC, were granted bail though their previous bail applications were rejected, on merits. Allahabad High Court has also taken the same view in Sita Rams case (supra). 28. In Laxman Singh and Lokesh Bhardwaj (supra) also the accused, who were facing trial under sec. 302 IPC, were granted bail though their previous bail applications were rejected, on merits. Allahabad High Court has also taken the same view in Sita Rams case (supra). 28. In this view of the matter, keeping in mind the observations in the various decisions mentioned in the earlier part of this order, I am of the opinion that the accused petitioners should be granted bail u/s 439 Cr.P.C. provided each of them furnishes a persona! bond in the sum of Rs. 20,000/- (Rs. Twenty thousand only) with two sureties each Rs. 10,00/- (Ten thousand only), to the satisfaction of learned Additional Sessions Judge No. 1 Bharatpur for their appearance in the Court as and when required to do so.