TIRUR SERVICE CO-OP. BANK v. JOINT REGISTRAR — 1988 DIGILAW 400 (KER)

Judgment :- 1. Petitioner is the President of Tirur Service Co-operative Bank Ltd, a Society registered under the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 (the Act for short). For purposes of convenience I shall hereinafter refer to the Bank as "the Society". Election to the managing committee of the Society was held on 28-8-1983, and the committee assumed office on 1-9-1983. in accordance with bye-law 35 (b) which specified the term of the committee as from 1st September to 31st August. As per bye-law 35 (a), as it then stood, the tenure of the committee was three years, that is, upto 31-8-1986. The bye-laws were subsequently amended at a general body meeting held on 24-8-1985. By the amendment, the term of the committee was increased to five years; and the year of the Society was changed to "January-December" from "September-August". 2. This change in the year to January-December has resulted in controversy about the date of expiry of the committee's term. According to the respondents, the committee's term of five years expired on 31-12-1987, whereas according to the petitioner it extends upto 31-12-1988. How exactly this dispute arises, I shall explain later. 3. The respondents did not apparently realise their stand in time, and the committee continued in office even after 31-12-1987. There was an inspection of the Society by the Co-operative Inspector, Tirur unit, on 23-4-1988, pursuant to which he submitted a report Ext. P3 pointing out that the term of the committee had expired on 31-12-1987. On receipt of this report, the Joint Registrar appointed an Administrator for the Society on 11-5-1988 under S.33 of the Act, to be in office for a period of four months, but the Administrator did not take charge because of the pendency of this original petition. 4. The committee had meanwhile passed resolution on 25-4-1988 to hold the election for the new committee on 26-6-1988. Request was made to the Assistant Registrar to appoint a Returning Officer, but no Returning Officer was appointed. The petitioner apprehended that an Administrator will be appointed and filed this original petition on 3-5-1988 for a declaration that the committee was entitled to continue in office till 31-12-1988, and for other consequential reliefs. 5. Petitioner's case is that the committee's term of five years is from 1-9-1983 to 31-8-1988. The year of the Society is from January to December after the amendment. 5. Petitioner's case is that the committee's term of five years is from 1-9-1983 to 31-8-1988. The year of the Society is from January to December after the amendment. According to the petitioner, this court has held in Mohammed Basheer v. State of Kerala 1987 (2) KLT 791 that a committee could continue in office till the expiry of the "year" in which its term comes to an end. Therefore the committee of the Society could remain in office till 31-12-1988, when the year of the Society (in which the five year term comes to an end) expires. 6. The Government Pleader points out on the other hand that when the year of the Society is from January to December, the first year of the, Committee expired on 31-12-1983 even though it was only a truncated period, and not a whole year. On this approach, the term of five years expired on 31-12-1987. The Committee has overstayed its term and therefore, an Administrator was liable to be appointed under S.33. 7. I must even at the outset state that the petitioner has grossly misunderstood.the decision in Mohammed Basheer and that it has no application to cases like this. That was a case in which the scope of R.39 (1) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules was under consideration. R.39 (1) requires the bye-laws of every Society to provide that the term of its Committee shall expire on the same date as may be specified. If no such date is specified in the bye-laws, the date of expiry of the term shall be 30th of June of that year in which the term expires. Interpreting this provision, the Division Bench held that if no definite date is fixed in the bye-laws for the expiry of the term of the Committee R.39 will operate and the term of the Committee will expire on the 30th of June of the year in which its term expires. The "year" contemplated by the rule was the calendar year. There was no definite date fixed for the expiry of the term of the Committee in question before their Lordships. R.39(1) therefore operated. The term of the Committee elected in April 1985 therefore expired on the 30th June of the calendar year in which its term expired, namely 1988. The "year" contemplated by the rule was the calendar year. There was no definite date fixed for the expiry of the term of the Committee in question before their Lordships. R.39(1) therefore operated. The term of the Committee elected in April 1985 therefore expired on the 30th June of the calendar year in which its term expired, namely 1988. The decision was based on the language of R.39 (1) and the meaning to be attributed to the term "year" in that rule. The decision is not applicable to cases where definite date is fixed in the bye-laws for the expiry of the term of the committee. That this is so, is evident from the observations in Para.16 to 19 of the judgment to distinguish the unreported decisions referred to therein. 8. Mohammed Basheer's case did not thus deal with cases like the petitioner's where there is a definite date fixed for the expiry of the term. In such cases, R.39(1) does not apply and the matter has to be decided with reference to the other provisions. 9. S.28 of the Act provides for the constitution of a Committee in accordance with the bye-laws of the Society. R.35 stipulates that at least 60 days in advance of the expiry of the term of a Committee, resolution shall be passed fixing the time, date and place for the conduct of election to the new committee. R.39, as stated earlier, provides only for cases where no definite date is fixed for the expiry of the term of office of the committee. If, on the other hand, the date of expiry is fixed, by the bye-laws, the term of the committee has to be computed with reference to the year of the Society. The first "year" of the Committee will be the period from the date of assumption of office till the expiry of that year of the Society, even if it be less than one full year. Thus if the year of the Society is January-December, the first year in office should be deemed to end with the 31st of December of that year irrespective of the date on which the committee assumed office. This view finds support in the decision in Sri Ram Pyare Choudhary v. State of U.P. AIR 1982 S. C. 831, though that case was not directly concerned with this question. This view finds support in the decision in Sri Ram Pyare Choudhary v. State of U.P. AIR 1982 S. C. 831, though that case was not directly concerned with this question. The question involved therein was whether the term of office of a managing committee commenced from the date of poll or from the date on which the results were declared. The year of the society in that case was the Co-operative year from July 1 to June 30th. In dealing with the question, the Supreme Court observed as follows in Para.7: "The co-operative year, as pointed out earlier commences on July 1 and ends on June 30 of the next succeeding year. Therefore, if the term commences from the date of poll which happened to be Sept. H, 1978, the whole of co-operative year commencing from July 1, 1978 would have to be taken into reckoning for computing the term of three years and, therefore, three years would expire on June 30, 1981." In Their Lordships' view, if the term of the committee commenced on September 11, 1978 with the co-operative year as the year of the Society, its first year will expire on June 30, 1979 and the three year term will expire on June 30, 1981. In this view of the matter, the term of office of the petitioner's committee which commenced on 1-9-1983 will expire on 31-12-1987, as the first year of the term ended on 31-12-1983. 10. The petitioner's contention that the term has to be reckoned by computing five years from 1-9-1983 and then extending it upto the expiry of that calendar year is not therefore sustainable. It proceeds on a misunderstanding of the decision in Mohammed Basheer's case. That method of computation will apply only to cases falling under R.39(1). In fact, the view taken by me is supported by two unreported decisions of this court, to which I shall refer. In O. P. Nos. 1349 of 1960 and 767 of 1961, election to the committee, which had a term of two years, was held on 27-4-1959. The year of the Society was the co-operative year. It was held that the term commenced on 1-7-1958 when the co-operative year began and ended on 30-6-1960, reckoning the truncated period from 27-4-1959 to 30-6-1959 as one whole year of the two year term of the committee. The year of the Society was the co-operative year. It was held that the term commenced on 1-7-1958 when the co-operative year began and ended on 30-6-1960, reckoning the truncated period from 27-4-1959 to 30-6-1959 as one whole year of the two year term of the committee. Similarly in O. P. No. 2523 of 1967, in which also the year of the society in question was the co-operative year, the election was held in October 1964 and the committee assumed office in November 1964. It had a term of three years. This court held that the first year of the term ended on 30-6-1965 and the committee had to vacate on 30-6-1967 at the expiry of its three year term. 11. These decisions are in consonance with the view which I have taken that in cases where a definite date is fixed for the expiry of the term, the period ending with the said date for the first time will be taken as the first year of the term, and the term of office be reckoned accordingly. 12. I hold that the committee of the society of which the petitioner was the President could have continued in office only till 31-12-1987 and that they have overstayed. The appointment of the Administrator was in accordance with law. The Original Petition therefore, fails and is dismissed. No costs. Issue carbon copy on usual terms.