ORDER R.P. Singh, J. - Since the facts of both the writ petitions are common and the impugned orders are also the same both these writ petitions are being disposed of by a common judgment. 2. The facts of Writ Petition No. 21803 of 1987 are that the petitioners are the tenants of the accommodation in dispute of which the respondent No. 3, Kamlesh Kumar Gupta filed an application for the release of the accommodation under S. 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 on the ground that, he was living in a tenanted accommodation which was inadequate and that his need for the accommodation in dispute was bona fide and genuine and further that greater hardship would be caused if the accommodation is not released in his favour. The application was contested by the petitioners on the ground that the need of the respondent No. 3 for the accommodation in dispute was not bona fide and genuine and further pleaded that the likely hardship to be suffered by him would be greater than that which might be caused to the landlord, respondent No. 3. The Prescribed Authority, on a consideration of the evidence on record, held that the need of the-landlord, respondent No. 3, was bona fide and genuine and further that greater hardship would be caused if the accommodation was not released in his favour. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners went up in appeal before the learned Addl. District Judge, who also dismissed the appeal and affirmed the finding on the question of bona fide need and comparative hardship. Against the said orders, the petitioners filed a Writ Petition No. 10643 of 1981 before this court and this court also upheld the concurrent finding recorded by the Prescribed Authority and the Addl. District Judge on the question of bona fide need and comparative hardship but sent back the case to the Addl. District Judge to consider the question whether the release of only a part of the building under tenancy would satisfy the requirements of the landlord and thus vide its order, dated 18-3-1986, this court remanded the case to the Addl. District Judge to consider the said question of part release of the accommodation. After remand of the case, the VI Addl. District Judge to consider the said question of part release of the accommodation. After remand of the case, the VI Addl. District Judge, Varanasi, vide his order, dated 12-11-1987 held that if the first and second floors of the accommodation are released in favour of the landlord, the need of the landlord for his residence will be satisfied and thus by his order, dated 12-11-1987 ordered the release of the first and second floors of the accommodation while allowing the ground floor of the accommodation to be retained by the petitioners. The petitioner still not being satisfied have filed the present writ petition challenging the order passed by the VI Addl. District Judge, Varanasi, dated 12-11-1987. . 3. The learned counsel for the petitioners Sri R.N. Singh strenuously contended that in view of the provisions of R. 16(1)(d) of the Rules framed under the Act, it was incumbent on the Addl. District Judge to have considered the need of the tenant while considering the question of part release of the accommodation, but the Addl. District Judge in his impugned order has considered the need of the landlord alone while considering the question of part release of the accommodation under R. 16(1)(d) of the Rules. Rule 16(l)(d) of the Rules provides as follows : "In considering the requirements of personal occupation for purposes of residence by the landlord or any member of his family, the Prescribed Authority shall, also have regard to such factors as the following (a) to (c) ................... (d) Where the tenants needs would be adequately met by leaving with him a part of the building under tenancy and the landlord's needs would be served by releasing the other part, the prescribed authority shall release only the latter part of the building." 4. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that it was incumbent on the Addl. District Judge to have considered whether the need of the tenant would be adequately met by leaving a part of the accommodation in his tenancy while releasing the other part in favour of the landlord which fact has not been considered by the Addl. District Judge and hence the impugned order is vitiated. 5. District Judge to have considered whether the need of the tenant would be adequately met by leaving a part of the accommodation in his tenancy while releasing the other part in favour of the landlord which fact has not been considered by the Addl. District Judge and hence the impugned order is vitiated. 5. Sri B.D. Mandhyan, learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 on the other hand contended that this Court had sent back the case for considering whether the release of only a portion of the building under the tenancy would satisfy the requirements of the landlord and the building in question being a three storeyed building, the Addl. District Judge release only the first and second floors of the building while allowing the tenant to retain the ground floor of the building. In so doing, the learned Addl. District Judge has fully complied with the order passed by this court earlier on 18-3-1986. 6. A perusal of the order passed by this Court earlier on 18-3-1986 will clearly reveal that this court had upheld the concurrent findings of the Prescribed Authority and the Addl. District Judge on the question of bona fide need and comparative hardship of the landlord and tenant and thus the concurrent finding that the need of the landlord, respondent No. 3, was bona fide and genuine for the accommodation in dispute and that greater hardship would be caused if the accommodation is not released in his favour was affirmed. The judgment further reads as follows : "Sri R.N. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, however, contended that the need of the land lord can be adequately satisfied by the release of only a part of the building under tenancy. It was urged that the courts below should have addressed themselves to this question in view of the mandatory requirements of the law, namely, R. 16(1)(d) of the rules framed under the aforesaid Act." 7. It was urged that the courts below should have addressed themselves to this question in view of the mandatory requirements of the law, namely, R. 16(1)(d) of the rules framed under the aforesaid Act." 7. Since the only question raised by the petitioners' counsel in the earlier writ petition was that the lower courts should have considered whether the need of the landlord can be adequately satisfied by release of only a part of the building under tenancy, and hence this Court, in view of the submission made, ordered as follows : "The only question is, therefore, which survives for consideration is whether the release of only a portion of the building under tenancy would satisfy the requirements of the landlord. This is the sole controversy for which the matter is being sent back to the appellate court as I have affirmed other findings of the courts below." 8. Hence the question that was to be considered by the Addl. District Judge was only whether the release of only a portion of the building would satisfy the requirements of the landlord. 9. The present writ petition arises out of proceedings under S. 21(1)(a) of the Act which reads as follows : "The Prescribed Authority may, on an application of the landlord in that behalf order the eviction of a tenant from the building under tenancy or any specified part there of if it is satisfied that any of the following grounds exists, namely : (a) that the building is bona fide required either in the existing form or after demolition and new construction by the landlord for occupation by himself or any member of his family, or any person for whose benefit it is held by him, either for residential purposes or for purposes of any profession, trade, or calling or where the landlord is the trustee of a public charitable trust. for the objects of the trust ...................... 10. A reading of the section clearly indicates that the release of the building can be ordered only if the Prescribed Authority is satisfied that the need set up by the landlord of the building under tenancy is bona fide and genuine. The section does not contemplate that the need of the tenant has also to be seen in proceedings under S. 21(1)(a) of the Act. The section does not contemplate that the need of the tenant has also to be seen in proceedings under S. 21(1)(a) of the Act. R. 16(1)(d) on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners provides that various factors shall be taken into consideration by the Prescribed Authority while ordering the release of the accommodation in favour of the landlord and in that connection it will have to be seen whether the landlord's need would be served by releasing only a part of the building while leaving the other part of the building with the tenant. In the present case, the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 being satisfied about the bona fide need of the landlord and also on the comparative hardship that greater hardship would be caused to the landlord, respondent No. 3, if the building under tenancy is not released in his favour, had ordered the release of the entire building in favour of the landlord. When the submission was made by the learned counsel for the petitioners before this Court that the case may be sent back to find out if the need of the landlord could be satisfied by releasing only a part of the building under tenancy in place of the entire building being released in his favour, then this Court had sent back the case only for considering whether the release of only a portion of the building under tenancy would satisfy the need of the landlord. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that while considering this question, the Addl. District Judge should have seen whether the need of the tenant would be satisfied by leaving with him the part of the building. I am of the opinion that, in the circumstances of the case, the Court had to be satisfied about the bona fide need of the landlord and not of the tenant. The need of the landlord having been found to be bona fide and genuine concurrently by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 and while comparing the need of the landlord and tenant when considering the comparative hardship, the concurrent finding on the comparative hardship having been affirmed by this Court earlier and the case was sent back only to consider if requirement of the landlord would be satisfied by releasing only a part of the building under tenancy, the Addl. District Judge has rightly considered this question and on being satisfied that the need of the landlord would be satisfied by release of only first and second floor of the accommodation has now ordered the release of the first and second floor of the accommodation alone while allowing the tenant to continue to occupy the ground floor of the accommodation. In the case of Smt. Rajrani Mehrotra v. 2nd Addl. District Judge, reported in 1980 All Rent Case 311, the Supreme Court has laid down that the issue arising under R. 16(1)(d) of the Rules as to whether the landlords' need could have been satisfied by releasing. only a part of the premises has also to be gone into and considered while considering the requirement of personal occupation of the landlord. Hence the Supreme Court held that it was the duty of the court to examine the question as to whether the landlord's need would be satisfied by releasing only a part of the building under tenancy. This is precisely what has been done in the present case. The Addl. District Judge has held that the landlord is a man of status paying income-tax and wealth tax and his wife is also an income-tax and wealth tax assessee. Considering the status of the landlord and his need for the accommodation, the Addl. District Judge has ordered the release of the first and second floor of the accommodation in his favour. The result is that whereas earlier the entire building was ordered to be released in favour of the landlord, now as a result of the question of consideration of part release of the accommodation, only the first and second floor have been ordered to be released in favour of the landlord, respondent No. 3, while allowing the tenant petitioners to retain the ground floor of the accommodation with them. The tenant petitioners not being satisfied with their part success in retaining the ground floor of the accommodation, have now attempted to set up their need for the remaining part of the building also. This is not the intention of R. 16(1)(a) that the need of the tenant has to be seen and then only it would be seen whether the need of the landlord would be served by releasing the remaining part of the accommodation. This is not the intention of R. 16(1)(a) that the need of the tenant has to be seen and then only it would be seen whether the need of the landlord would be served by releasing the remaining part of the accommodation. The very basis of the proceedings under S. 21(1)(a) is the need of the landlord which has to be established as bona fide and genuine for the accommodation in dispute and the same having been found concurrently by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 which having been affirmed by this Court in the writ petition earlier, vide its order, dated 18-3-1986, now the tenant cannot start afresh and raise the plea that the release of the part of the accommodation can be seen only after the court is satisfied that the tenant's need would be met by leaving with him the other part of the accommodation. The primary object in the present proceedings is to examine the need of the landlord and find out if his need for the accommodation is bona fide and genuine. The need of the landlord having been found to be bona fide and genuine, the only question that remained to be seen was whether the need of the landlord could be satisfied by release of only part of the accommodation or that his need would be satisfied only if the entire accommodation is released in his favour. The intention of the legislature, therefore, to my mind, appears to be to consider whether the need of the landlord would be satisfied by releasing only a part of the accommodation or the entire accommodation. The Court cannot, therefore, again at this stage of consideration of the part release of the accommodation, examine whether the need of the tenant would be satisfied by leaving with him a part of the accommodation and in that view allow release of the remaining part of the accommodation in favour of the landlord. In my opinion, if the court has to see the need of the tenant and as to what part of the accommodation is required by the tenant to satisfy his need so that the -remaining portion _ of the accommodation be ordered to be released in favour of the landlord, that would defeat the very object of S. 21(1)(a) of the Act. Since .the very basis of the proceedings under S. 21(1)(a) of the Act is the satisfaction of the court regarding the bona fide and genuine need of the accommodation under tenancy for the landlord, the Act contemplates that the need of the landlord has to be examined and gone into by the court while ordering the release of the entire accommodation or part of the accommodation. S. 21(1)(a) of the Act itself lays down that the Prescribed Authority may on an application of the landlord order the eviction of the tenant from the building under tenancy or any specified part thereof, if it is satisfied that the building is bona fide required by the landlord. Hence keeping in view the provisions of S. 21(1)(a) of the Act .and in that view reading R. 16(1)(d), it is clear that the intention seems to be to see whether the need of the landlord would be served by releasing only a part of the accommodation. In that view of the matter, the Addl. District Judge has rightly gone into and examined whether the need of the landlord would be served by releasing only a part of the accommodation instead of the entire accommodation. The Addl. District Judge having found that the need of the landlord would be satisfied by releasing only a part of the accommodation i.e. first and second floor of the accommodation alone, has rightly ordered the release of that part of the accommodation by the impugned order And I do not see any manifest error committed by the Addl. District Judge so as to warrant interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. In any case, when earlier the entire building was ordered to be released in favour of the landlord and the petitioners would have been-evicted from the entire accommodation as a result thereof, now after remand only a part of the accommodation has been ordered to be released in favour of the landlord allowing the tenant petitioners to retain ground floor portion of the building under their tenancy and hence this is not a fit case for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. 12. In the result, I find no merits in this writ petition which is accordingly dismissed. For the reasons stated above, Civil Misc. 12. In the result, I find no merits in this writ petition which is accordingly dismissed. For the reasons stated above, Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 22605 of 1987, which is filed by the landlord against the part release of the accommodation is also accordingly dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs. 13. While delivering the judgment, the learned counsel for the petitioners made a prayer that some time may be allowed to the petitioners to vacate the accommodation and hand over peaceful possession of the first and second floor of the accommodation to the landlord, respondent No. 3. In case an undertaking if filed by the petitioners, within one month from today, before the prescribed Authority, respondent No. 2 that the petitioners (tenant) shall vacate and hand over peaceful possession of the first and second floor of the building which is in dispute to the landlord Kamlesh Kumar Gupta, respondent No. 3, till 31st July 1988, the petitioners shall not be evicted from the accommodation in dispute till 31st July, 1988. In case the undertaking, as stated above, is not filed by the petitioners, it will be open to the respondents to evict the petitioners forthwith if accordance with law.