JUDGMENT K.C. Agarwal, J. - In pursuance of the Tender Notice No. 2/1986 inviting lumpsum tenders from the qualified contractors for construction of a bridge over river Ganga at Varanasi on National High Way No. 2 (Varanasi - Ramnagar - Mughalsarai bye - pass) the following four firms submitted their tenders : 1. M/s Hindustan Construction Company Limited, Bombay. 2. M/s Gammon India Limited, Bombay. 3. M/s U.P. State Bridge Corporation Limited, Lucknow, and 4. M/s National Building Construction Corporation Limited, New Delhi. On September 25, 1986, the tenders were opened. The bids received from the above four firms are as follows : 1. M/s U.P. State Bridge Corporation Limited Lucknow. Rs. 17.45 crores 2. M/s Hindustan Construction Company Limited, Bombay. Rs. 19.63 crores 3. M/s Gammon India Limited, Bombay. Rs. 23.99 crores 4. M/s National Building Construction Corporation Limited, New Delhi. Rs. 33.30 crores 2. Under clause 2.24.81 the Employer is to award the contract to the tenderer whose tender has been determined to be substantially responsive to the Tender Documents and who has offered the lowest evaluated tender price provided that, in the opinion of the Employer, the tenderer has the capability and resources to carry out the contract work effectively. Clause 2.25 reserves the right of to employer to accept or reject any tender, and to annual the tendering process and reject on or all tenders at any time prior to the award of contract, without thereby incurring any liability to be affected tenderer. 3. The aforesaid clause further gives the procedure, which is to be followed before accepting the tenders. It provides that the recommendations on the tenders will be sent by the State Government to the Ministry of Transport, Government of India, which will, in turn, examine them and send its recommendation to the World Bank. Its recommendation thereafter will be transmitted the Government of India to the State Government, who would then authorise the Superintending Engineer to accept the tenders. This procedure was, however, not provided in the tender Documents. 4. Its recommendation thereafter will be transmitted the Government of India to the State Government, who would then authorise the Superintending Engineer to accept the tenders. This procedure was, however, not provided in the tender Documents. 4. While the matter was still pending consideration, Gammon India Limited, the petitioner, filed the present writ petition stating that the tenders submitted by M/s Hindustan Construction Company limited, Bombay and M/s U.P. State Bridge Corporation limited, Lucknow, were not responsive, therefore, the lenders are liable to be rejected and that the tender of tire petitioner alone was required to be considered by the State Government for being awarded the work. 5. It was urged on behalf of the petitioner that Gammon India Limited is not only a larger Civil Engineering construction concern in India, but can lay claim for the largest number of bridges built in the whole of the commonwealth. As builders to the nation, Gammon has made concrete contributions, by designing and constructing bridges, ports, harbours, thermal and nuclear power stations. According to the petitioner, those resounding achievements have won Gammon the status of an R & D. Institution an unequalled honour for an unmatched performance. Having created unequalled place for itself, the petitioner submits that the quotation given by the petitioner was most reliable and being in conformity with the Tender Notice, the State of Uttar Pradesh is bound to grant the same. 6. In paragraph 22 of the writ petition, the petitioner has stated that the tender of M/s Hindustan Construction Company (for short the 'HCC') was 'non - responsive'. Amongst these, the last ground against MCC mentioned is : "It contained material deviation and reservations inasmuch as it affected in a substantial way the scope, quality and performance of the bridge and limited in a substantial way, not consistent with the Tender Documents the Government' is right and tenderer's obligation under the contract. It also affected entirely the competitive position of the petitioner as a tenderer. The tender was no a substantially responsive tender." 7. Amongst the reliefs, one of them was that the mandamus be issued directing the State Government to award the contract of construction or the bridge over river Ganga at Varanasi to it, but the same was not pressed before us. 8. The tender was no a substantially responsive tender." 7. Amongst the reliefs, one of them was that the mandamus be issued directing the State Government to award the contract of construction or the bridge over river Ganga at Varanasi to it, but the same was not pressed before us. 8. Sri R.N. Trivedi and Sri A.M. Masoodkar, appearing for the M/s. U.P. State Bridge Corporation (for short 'the UPSBC) and M/s Hindustan Construction Company 9 (for short' the HCC') respectively contended that the writ petition was pre - mature as no decision had been taken by the 'Employer' about the award of contract. 9. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that from the answer given in the parliament by the Minister for Surface Transport it was clear that the Government of India had made up its mind to ask the State Government to accept the lender of HCC. 10. For the construction of bridge over river Ganga, along with a viaduct on Ramnagar side, Rs. 26,58,14,000/ - had been sanctioned. In sub - para (u) of Paragraph 3, it has been stated : "That the Government has not so far made any decision and the matter is under consideration of the Government as the procedure laid down for award of contract is as under." 11. In reply the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 have stated that neither the UPSBC nor HCC was ever asked to make any change in the tenders submitted. In accordance with clause 2.19 of Volume 1 of N.I.T. clarification had been given to the aforesaid Wo tenderers. 12. We may first examine the right acquired by the petitioner on having submitted its tender in pursuance of the Tender Notice. An advertisement inviting tenders or bids is not in itself an offer, which creates no right until accepted. The invitation of tender is a mere attempt to ascertain whether an offer can be obtained within such a margin as the employer is willing to adopt. In other words, it is an offer to negotiate, an offer to receive offers. An offer is to be distinguished from a mere invitation to treat. For an invitation the employer does not bind himself to accept the last or any tender. In order to constitute a valid, legal and binding contract, it is essential that the offer must be accepted and its acceptance is communicated to the offerer. 13. An offer is to be distinguished from a mere invitation to treat. For an invitation the employer does not bind himself to accept the last or any tender. In order to constitute a valid, legal and binding contract, it is essential that the offer must be accepted and its acceptance is communicated to the offerer. 13. In Spencer v. Harding (1870) LRSCP 8561, it was laid down that an invitation for tenders or offers does not by itself confers right on the tenderer or offer that his tender or offer should be accepted. 14. petitioner's learned counsel submitted the although the State of Uttar Pradesh has not accepted either the offer of the HCC or the UPSBC, the petitioner's cannot be denied on relief on that ground. From the defects pointed out in paragraphs 20 and 22 of the writ petition as well as in the rejoinder - affidavit the learned counsel urged that there can be no two opinions on the tenders of HCC and UPSBC being not responsive and, as such, the State Government should have evaluated their tenders and passed a final order rejecting the same. Inviting our attention to clauses 2.22 and 2.24 the learned counsel urged that evaluation of the tender and comparing only these tenders which were determined to be substantially responsive to the requirement of the tender Documents in accordance with clauses 2.20 and 2.21 was a mandatory duty of the State Government and a mandamus be issued for evaluating the tenders in terms of clause 2.22. 15. Before we deal with the points on merits we wish to note that the tenders could not ever be evaluated on account of the stay given by the High Court on April 13, 1987. Till they were not evaluated, there could be no question of award of any contract. 16. In the instant case an objection was raised by the contesting respondents to the maintainability of the writ petition on several grounds. It was urged that so long as a contract, as required by Article 299 of the Constitution, has not been executed, no right, merely by making an offer in pursuance of the tender, matures. Such a tenderer has no right, title or interest, which could be enforced by him consequently, the writ petition is misconceived and ought to be dismissed on that ground. 17. Such a tenderer has no right, title or interest, which could be enforced by him consequently, the writ petition is misconceived and ought to be dismissed on that ground. 17. Reference must also, in this context, be made to Article 299 of the Constitution, which lays down that all contracts made in exercise of the executive power of the Union or of a State shall be expressed to be made by the president or by the Governor of the State. Admittedly, herein no contract, even remotely, in conformity with Article 299 has been executed between the respondent State. There is Categoric enunciation of law on this point in AIR 1977 SC 2149 : The Bihar Eastern Gangatic Fishermen Co - operative Societies Limited v. Sipahi Singh and others. It says : "Failure to comply with these conditions nullifying the contract and renders it void and enforceable. There is no question of estoppel or rectification in a case where there is contravention of the provisions of Article 299 (1) of the Constitution". 18. In the light of the above, it seems plain that apart from the fact that the purported claim is a purely contractual one, there is not even a concluded contract as yet on the basis of which even a suit could be maintainable. Once that is so, the very foundation of a claim of mandamus is knocked off. It is well settled that a writ of mandamus can only issue for compliance with a statutory or public duty in which the petitioner has an enforceable right. 19. A Full Bench of the Patna High Court in Chetalal Sao v. State of Bihar 1986 BLJ 206 has held that the being no concluded contract, writ of mandamus could not be maintainable. 20. H. W. R. Wade on Administrative Law (Fifth Edition, p. 635) has distinguished contractual duties from statutory. He has said : "A distinction which needs to be clarified is that between public duties enforceable by mandamus, which are usually statutory, and duties arising merely from contract. Contractual duties are enforceable as matters of private law by the ordinary contractual remedies, such as damages, in junction, specified performance and declaration. They are not enforceable by mandamus, which in the first place is confined to public duties and secondly is hot granted where there are other adequate remedies." 21. Contractual duties are enforceable as matters of private law by the ordinary contractual remedies, such as damages, in junction, specified performance and declaration. They are not enforceable by mandamus, which in the first place is confined to public duties and secondly is hot granted where there are other adequate remedies." 21. The learned counsel, Sri Shanti Bhushan conceded that no right can be acquired unless the contract has been awarded to it, but he urged that if the HCC and UPSBC go out of the field, on the ground mentioned above, the only responsive tender would be that of the petitioner and on the said tender remaining in the field, the petitioner would be entitled to the award of the contract. Counsel's argument was that the State cannot act arbitrarily and accept even the non - responsive tenders. Its action has to be in conformity with the standard which is not arbitrary, irrational or irrelevant. Elaborating the contention the petitioner's learned counsel urged that while the Government has the freedom of choice in making contracts, it cannot adopt any arbitrary' or discriminative policy and take decision which is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 22. Decisions of the Supreme Court right from K.N. Guruswamy v. State of Mysore, AIR 1954 SC 592 and leading to the International Airport Authority case in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, AIR 1979 SC 628 and the latest decision in Harminder Singh Arora v. Union of India, AIR 1986 SC 1527 were relied on. It is indisputable that the Government can be lay down reasonable, rational, relevant and non - discriminatory norms and standards for entering into contract with third parties. But simply because on person is chosen in preference to another is not decisive of this controversy. The choice of the person to whom contract is to be given has to be backed by public interest and should not be unreasoned or unprincipled. Such a choice cannot be fanciful and arbitrary. If the Government Chooses to invite tenders, it has to exercise its choice in accordance with the various terms and conditions mentioned in the Tender Notice. 23. In Punnen Thomas v. State, AIR 1969 Kerala 81 (FB), Mr. Justice Mathew observed thus: "..........The Government is not and should not be as free as an individual in selecting the recipients for langness. 23. In Punnen Thomas v. State, AIR 1969 Kerala 81 (FB), Mr. Justice Mathew observed thus: "..........The Government is not and should not be as free as an individual in selecting the recipients for langness. Whatever its activity the Government is still the Government and will be subject to restraints, inherent in its position in a democratic society. A democratic Government cannot lay down arbitrary and capricious standards for the choice of persons with whom alone it will deal " 24. This was expressly approved in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, AIR 1979 SC 1628 at 1637 : (1979) 3 SCC 489 at 505, Bhagwati J. (as his Lordship then was) proceeded to state: "The State cannot therefore act arbitrarily in entering into relationship, contractual or otherwise with a third party, but its action must conform to some standard or norms which is rational and non - discriminatory." 25. It cannot be disputed that the Government has the right to change its policy from the time to time, according to the demands of the time and situation and in the public interest. If the Government has the power to accept or not to accept the highest bid and if the Government has also the power to change its policy from time to time, it must follow that a change or revision of policy subsequent to the provisional acceptance of the bid but before its final acceptance is a sound enough reason for the Government's refusal to accept the highest bid at an auction. 26. And in the latest decision in Harminder Singh Arora (supra), Justice R.B. Misra speaking for three member Bench, referred to all the relevant decisions and held thus: "In the instant case, the instrumentalities of the State invited tenders for the supply of fresh buffalo's and Cow's milk and, therefore, this case has to be decided on the basis of bid by the tenderers. There was no question of any policy in this case. It is open to the State to adopt a policy different from the one in question. But if the authority or the State Government chooses to invite tenders then it must abide by the result of the tender and cannot arbitrarily and capriciously accept the bid of respondent 4 although it was much higher and to the detriment of the State. But if the authority or the State Government chooses to invite tenders then it must abide by the result of the tender and cannot arbitrarily and capriciously accept the bid of respondent 4 although it was much higher and to the detriment of the State. The High Court, in our opinion, was not justified in dismissing the writ petition in limine by saying that the question relates the contractual obligation and the policy decision cannot be termed as unfair or arbitrary. There was no question of any policy division in the instant case. The contract of supply of milk was to be given to the lowest bidder under the terms of the tender notice and the appellant being the lowest bidder he should have been granted the contract to supply especially, when he has been doing so far the last so many years." 27. All these cases are distinguishable. No body doubts the proposition of law laid down therein, but the question is as to whether they are applicable to the facts of the present case. In all the cases relied on contracts had been awarded. In the facts of those cases the Supreme Court gave the decisions extracted above. But in the. instant case the position is much different. The State Government has not yet taken a final decision as to which of die three tenderers the work has to be awarded. Till a decision is taken, there will be no cause of action to sue. Condemnation of the action of the v. State Government, which has yet to take a shape, would be a futile exercise. 28. Lord. Helsbury L.C. in Ouinn v. Lethem, 1901 Appeal Cases 459 held that a decision is only a authority for what it actually decides, and the quintessence thereof is its ratio and not any observation found therein nor that logically follows from the various observations made in it. In approving that view the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Sudhansti Shekhar Misra and others, AIR 1968 SC 647 , warned that it would not be a profitable task to extract a sentence here and there from a judgment and to build upon it. In Ouinn v. Lethem (supra) what was further said was that a free judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved. 29. In Ouinn v. Lethem (supra) what was further said was that a free judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved. 29. After having considered the decisions, referred to above, the Supreme Court in Shri Sachidan and Pandey v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1987 SC 1109 , held that: "The action of the Government must be arrived at after taking into account all relevant considerations eschewing irrelevant considerations." What was further said by the Supreme Court may be extracted as follows: "..........We have referred to these considerations only illustrative, for there may be an infinite variety of considerations which may have to be taken into account by the Government in formulating its policies and it is on a total evaluation of various considerations which have weighed with the Government in taking a particular action, that the court would have to decide whether the action of the Government is reasonable and in public interest. But one basic principle which must guide the court in arriving at its determination on this question the Governmental action is reasonable and public interest and it is for the party challenging its validity to show that it is wanting in reasonableness or is not informed with public interest." 30. From the above decision, it follows that the action of the Government can be struck down if it is unreasonable or not in public interest and is based on irrelevant consideration. 31. The above proposition of the Supreme Court helps us in taking the view that no mandamus of the type prayed for can be issued by the Court till a decision has cot been taken. 32. True it is that the HCC has submitted that the tender of the UPSBC was not responsive and that it materially deviated from that of the Tender Notice. But that allegation of competing contractor which is equally desirous of getting the contract is of little consequence. That charge would require to be examined and judged by the State of Uttar Pradesh. Similarly, charges have been levelled against the HCC by the UPSBC and the petitioner. 33. Lenorthy arguments were addressed by the learned counsel for the parties in support of their rival contentions. One side accused the other for the tender being not responsive whereas the other claimed that its lender was fully and wholly responsive. 34. Similarly, charges have been levelled against the HCC by the UPSBC and the petitioner. 33. Lenorthy arguments were addressed by the learned counsel for the parties in support of their rival contentions. One side accused the other for the tender being not responsive whereas the other claimed that its lender was fully and wholly responsive. 34. Counsel for the petitioner urged that no two opinions are possible on what was being argued by the petitioner against the tenders of the UPSBC and HCC. This Court could itself decide the controversy instead of leaving the same for the State Government to do so. It may not be out of place to mention that the two respondents, HCC and UPSBC, had joined hands together' in finding out of laws in the tender submitted by the petitioner and urged on that basis that the petitioner's tender itself was not responsive. The petitioner could not be heard levelling charges against its lender. It is not possible for a court to arrive at any decision on this controversy. The matter being highly technical and complex it will not be a prudent exercise for this court to make a foray into that field and arrogate to itself the task of experts. It will be for the Employer, that is the State Government, to take a decision as to which of the lenders submitted is not responsive and suitable to the need for which the bridge is to be constructed. Not only that there is a presumption that the State will act on relevant considerations and, after taking then into account, take a decision which would be in public interest. The Engineer Incharge, on choosing the best out of the three tenderers, will perform his work efficiently and correctly. Interference by the court in the matter, like the present, can lead to the sorry consequences. 35. In paragraph 20 (i) the petitioner has alleged that clause 5.5 .2 required that for the main bridge, length of any individual span could not be less than 120 metres. But the UPSBC's tender did not conform to the said clause. The span length between peirs at points P3 and P4 is 75 metres, that is, less than 120 metres. In paragraph 20 (i) the petitioner has alleged that clause 5.5 .2 required that for the main bridge, length of any individual span could not be less than 120 metres. But the UPSBC's tender did not conform to the said clause. The span length between peirs at points P3 and P4 is 75 metres, that is, less than 120 metres. It has been stated in sub - paragraph (iv) of paragraph 20 by the petitioner that the requirement of span length of 120 metres was a mandatory requirement and any deviation from the same was not possible. HCC also has pointed out the same defect in the tender of the UPSBC. In paragraph 5 (i) of the supplementary counter - affidavit of the said respondent it has been alleged that the tender submitted by the UPSBC violated one of the important conditions of span arrangement in Zone - I. The minimum span length should be 120 metres as per corrigendum issued by the Department where as UPSBC has provided only 75 metres in Zone No. I. 36. In its counter affidavit the UPSBC has refuted the charge of the petitioner by asserting in paragraphs 27,28 and 29 that: "........ Pier locations P4 to P8 lie in Scour Zone - where the answering respondents have provided a span length of 150M which is more than 120M and thus again meets the tender requirements. The tender is absolutely silent about the position of the span length at dividing line between the two zones i.e. over lapping point." 37. The UPSBC has gone to the extent of claiming that the allegations of the petitioner about the span length was incorrect, false, mischievous and misguided. According to it, by adopting spans of more than the limits of 120M it did not affect the design and the performance of the construction. The petitioner has reiterated the stand taken by it in the writ petition against the UPSBC. Another important disqualification which the petitioner has alleged is the construction made by the petitioner by engaging M/s Stup Consultant Ltd. The petitioner's claim that as M/s Stup Consultant Ltd. helped the State of U.P. in preparing the design and map, Volume prohibited any tenderer from engaging M/s Stup Consultant Ltd. The prohibition being mandatory, the UPSBC had incurred a disqualification and as such the tender submitted by it is to be thrown out on that basis. In the counter - affidavit the UPSBC had denied the charge of having consulted M/s Stup Consultant Ltd. in preparing its tender. The denial has been dealt with exhaustively in several paragraphs of the counter affidavit by the UPSBC. In paragraph 40 of the counter - affidavit the allegation is that it is submitted that the answering respondents have not ingested M/s Stup Consultant Ltd. or any one of their associates or any of their employees for any purpose whatsoever. 38. In the rejoinder - affidavit the petitioner has reiterated the charges made by it against the UPSBC. Paragraph 72 of the rejoinder - affidavit states : performance of the construction. The petitioner has reiterated the stand taken by it in the writ petition against the UPSBC. Another important disqualification which the petitioner has alleged is the construction made by the petitioner by engaging M/s Stup Consultant Ltd. The petitioner's claim that as M/s Stup Consultant Ltd. helped the State of U.P. in preparing the design and map, Volume prohibited any tenderer from engaging M/s Stup Consultant Ltd. The prohibition being mandatory, the UPSBC had incurred a disqualification and as such the tender submitted by it is to be thrown out on that basis. In the counter affidavit die UPSBC had denied the charge of having consulted M/s Stup Consultant Ltd. in preparing its tender. The denial has ben dealt with exhaustively in several paragraphs of the counter - affidavit by the UPSBC. In paragraph 40 of the counter - affidavit the allegation is that it is submitted that the answering respondents have not ingested M/s Stup Consultant Ltd. or any one of their associates or any of their employees for any purpose whatsoever. 39. In the rejoinder-affidavit the petitioner has reiterated the charges made by it against the UPSBC. Paragraph 72 of the rejoinder affidavit states : "It is submitted that the requirement of span length being not less than 120 metres was a mandatory requirement and it was independent of the requirement of intermediate pier of navigational zone at change 15.820. In further reply it is submitted that the peir in the design of the petitioner is in conformity with the requirement of intermediate peir of navigational zone in the tender documents." 40. In further reply it is submitted that the peir in the design of the petitioner is in conformity with the requirement of intermediate peir of navigational zone in the tender documents." 40. Similarly, about not consulting M/s Stup Consultant Ltd. the petitioner has stated that non - disclosure of the details of the consultant had serious bearing on the credibility of the proposal of the UPSBC. From the above, we find conflicting versions of the parties on the ground on which the UPSBC has been alleged by the petitioner to have incurred a disqualification and also that its tender was not responsive. In paragraph 5 (vii) the HCC has made similar charge against the UPSBC that it consulted Mr. M. Xercaviws (proprietor of M/s Stup Consultant Ltd.), which has been associated with M/s Stup Consultant Ltd.), for the last many years. By 'consulting P. X. Consultant, HCC alleged that UPSBC violated clause 2.7.6 of volume I of NIT rendering its tender non - responsive and in violation of NIT conditions. The allegations of the HCC have been denied by the UPSBC. 41. We have stated the charges against the UPSBC made by the petitioner as veil as the HCC in order to consider as to what is their nature and who is competent 10look into them and decide whether the tender submitted by the UPSBC deserved to be rejected on that ground. 42. Under the tender Notice the State of U.P. or the Employer alone is competent to do so. The State, if it finds that the tender submitted was not responsive or that it violated clause 2.6 Volume I, Section 2 Sheet No. 11 or any other provisions, it may reject their tender. 43. We cannot ourselves judge and decide whether the tender of the UPSBC was non - responsive. A proper and just decision on the controversy arising from the charge would require consideration of all the evidence circumstantial and documentary, may be correct that principles of natural justice have no place in such a matter. But without considering every pros and cons of the matter and also tenders of the others, decision can be reached as to which of the clauses alleged to have been flouted by like UPSBC were directory or mandatory is a controversy which cannot be decided in the vacuum. This can be safely entrusted to the experts, well acquainted with the technical aspects. This can be safely entrusted to the experts, well acquainted with the technical aspects. 44. While construing the invitation calling for tenders and all connected natters the authority would have to find the intention of the parties behind the same. It will have to had regard to the usage or custom in order to discover the meaning and intention of the parties. As to how were the tenders were submitted in pursuance to :he invitation is a question first to be taken into account by the Employer. The Employer would be bound to take into consideration the surrounding circumstances, which must have been present and the minds of the parties at the time of entering into the contract. All this has to be done by the Employer. There is no occasion for the court to construe the tenders and to arrive at a finding on the same. As already observed above, the rejection or acceptance of the tender would require highly sophisticated and technical knowledge and that it is not upto this court to usurp that power and to decide the controversy raised by the petitioner's counsel. We did not ear the parties on the ground on which the petitioners' tender has been branded by them as a be non - responsive. When occasion to consider it arises before the Employer, it will have to apply its mind to all the tenders for finding out as to which one is to be accepted. 45. What has to be seen in such cases is whether the tenders have been treated fairly and honestly and no arbitrarily or capriciously. In M/s Amarchand Sharma v. Union of India, AIR 1988 AP 45 , the observations, which have a bearing on the controversy on hand were : "What all has to be examined in the case is whether the party, whose tender has been rejected, has been treated fairly and honestly." In the instant case we have to keep in mind that the tenders are still under inside ration of the Employer and, therefore, the petitioner could have no grievance to may that it has not been treated fairly and honestly. True, what was emphasised by the petitioner's counsel that on principle and authority in the Administrative Law itself sill establish that an executive authority must be rigorously held to the standard by which it professes its action to be jadged and it must scrupulously observe these standards. The State cannot, therefore, act arbitrarily in entering into relationship. contractual or otherwise, with a third party, but its action must conform to some standard or form which is rational and non - discriminatory. The principle that state must exercise its powers reasonably goes with the doctrine that the court must not usurp the discretion vested in the public authority. A public authority invested with the discretion to take decision, has to keep itself within the bound of legal reasonableness, the Court is also expected to adopt an objective standard which may leave to the deciding authority the full range of choices". Broadly speaking, "the decision is unlawful if it is one to which no reasonable authority could have come' (See Wade on Administrative Law, Fifth Edition pp. 362, 363). 46. In this regard Wade in this book on Administrative Law at page 364, Fifth Edition, has stated : "Important statements about the legal standard of reasonableness were made in the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords in the case of the Tame side Schools,' discussed below. Lord Denning M.R. Pointed out the error of confusing differences of opinion, however strong, with unreasonableness on the part of one side or the other. One party may call the other quite unreasonable when he is well within the legal bounds of reasonableness. To exceed them, he must be so wrong that no reasonable person could sensibly take that view. This was the distinction which the secretary of Stale had failed to make, as the House of Lords emphatically confirmed. Lord Diplock saide : The very concept of administrative discretion involves a right to choose between more than one possible course of action upon which there is room for reasonable people to hold differing opinions as to which is to be preferred. In the same vein Lord Hailsham L.C. has said that not every reasonable exercise of judgement is right, and not every mistaken exercised judgement is unreasonable." 47. In the same vein Lord Hailsham L.C. has said that not every reasonable exercise of judgement is right, and not every mistaken exercised judgement is unreasonable." 47. We have already quoted the relevant observations of the Supreme Court made in Shri Sachidanand Pandey (supra) in regard to the matters which the authority must have taken into consideration at the lime of making an order. 48. Just as the petitioner has made allegations against the UPSBC for the rejection of the tenders submitted by it, it has also made allegations against the HCC. We do not consider worthwhile to mention them in our judgment and, therefore, we refraim from doing so. Suffice it to say that those allegations have been denied in the counter - affidavit by the HCC. Under Article 226 of the Constitution the Court cannot examine those charges and counter charges and arrive at a finding either in favour of the petitioner or against it. The proper forum for that purpose, is already staled, is the Employer or the State of Uttar Pradesh. The Court cannot assume the function of the Employer and take upon itself the job of examining the tenders and to arrive at 2 conclusion as to which tender would be liable to be rejected an which one to be accepted. Sri Shanti Bhusan relied on a decision of the House of Lords given is, Baldwin and Prancis v. Patents Appeals Tribunal, (1959) 2 All England Reports 433. for the submission that the court could take the advice of an expert or of any other person competent to give opinion on the controversy arising in the present case for the purpose of solving the controversy. Neither it is feasible nor practicable or adviceable to do so. This decision in fact has no bearing on the controversy before us. Other decisions Cited by the learned counsel do not require any detailed discussion, they were given on their peculiar facts and have no bearing on the point requiring adjudication by us. 49. For what we have said above, the writ petition must be dismissed. We wish also to mention that entertainment of a petition, like the present one, would open flood gate for in flood of anticipatory writ petitions. Forum of the Court cannot be used by the affluent few for doing gymnastics in law or uncalled for or fruitless research. 49. For what we have said above, the writ petition must be dismissed. We wish also to mention that entertainment of a petition, like the present one, would open flood gate for in flood of anticipatory writ petitions. Forum of the Court cannot be used by the affluent few for doing gymnastics in law or uncalled for or fruitless research. An overburdened court can ill afford to permit its forum to the speculators in business do use it as a chessboard to put up their prospects or out do a rival claimant. Ill will be too heavy a burden on its docket; more so when it has to dispense social justice to the needy segments of the society whose problems cry for ingent solutions. Entertainment of such anticipatory petitions would be counter productive. The process of justicing which is already tardy, will become more tedious. The Court will therefore, be loath in entertaining such petitions. It may result swelling of applications for certiorari beyond all comprehendible number. There is some felling within and without the Court that the opportunity for unhurried deliberation, full consultation and scholarly opinion non writing is inadequate. The court has to keep - trolling the volume of cases to be argued and decided on merits. 50. In the result, we dismiss the writ petition with Posts. Interim stay order dated April 13, 1987 which was subsequently modified, is vacated.