Judgment S. H. S. Abidi, J. 1. Petitioners-ganga Bishun Sah and others have filed this revision against the order, dated 4-9-1985 passed by the learned Sessions judge, Madhubani, in Sessions Trial No.86 of 1980, by which he has refused the prayer of the Public Prosecutor to withdraw the case under Sec.321 of the code of Criminal Procedure. 2. A first information report dated 13-9-1974 in P. S. Case No.4 was lodged saying that in the night between 12th/13th September, 1974 when the informant Anantlal Sah was sleeping in his room with his wife Gauri Devi, the accused entered in his room and out of whom Ganga Bishun Sah poured acid on his body which caused injuries on the person of Gauri Devi as well. The informant was in great agony on account of throwing of the said acid and came out of the room. This occurrence was seen by his wife and his neighbour Ramphal mahto, Kishan Lal Sah son of the informant when picked up the informant has come in contact with him and he also received injuries. The informant was thereafter taken to the police station where his fardbeyan was recorded which formed the basis of the first information report. Later on the victim-informant succumbed to the injuries. The police after investigation submitted charge-sheet and thereafter the case was committed to the Court of Session for trial being Session Trial No.86 of 1980. 3. It is said that during the course of police investigation an enquiry was made by the C. I. D. There was a proposal for withdrawal of the case and lodging of first information report against Saied Mian and others, A first information had been lodged. It is also said that Gauri Devi, Bishunlal Sah and Ramphal Mahto had also sworn affidavits to the effect that the accused were innocent and have been falsely implicated. 4. On 27th May, 1977 the Public Prosecutor filed an application for withdrawal of the case against the petitioners under Sec.321, Cr. P. C. , but the said application was dismissed by the learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, jhanjhapur by an order, dated 24th December, 1978. 4. On 27th May, 1977 the Public Prosecutor filed an application for withdrawal of the case against the petitioners under Sec.321, Cr. P. C. , but the said application was dismissed by the learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, jhanjhapur by an order, dated 24th December, 1978. Against the said order a criminal Revision was filed before the learned Sessions Judge Madhubani, who by his order dated 5th May, 1979 upheld the order of the Sub-divisional Judicial magistrate and directed that the Public Prosecutor would be at liberty to file a fresh application for withdrawal before the learned Magistrate who would consider the same on merit. The Public Prosecutor again filed an application for withdrawal under Sec.321 Cr. P. C. This application too was disposed of by the learned Magistrate on 11th February, 1980. Being aggrieved by the said order the petitioners filed Cr. Rev. No.567 of 1980 in this Hon ble Court which was allowed by an order dated 7th March, 1981 setting aside the order dated 11th February, 1980 and remitting the matter to the trial Judge for a fresh hearing of the application of the Public Prosecutor for withdrawal. 5. Accused-petitioners filed a petition, dated 18-8-1982 giving out the details about the earlier applications as said above and said that the High Court by order dated 7-3-1981 in Cr. Rev. No.567 of 1980 had directed the trial Judge to hear the matter again. It was also said that the matter was still pending for hearing and so they prayed that the matter may be heard and necessary orders be passed. This application was disposed of by the learned Sessions Judge by order dated 4-9-1985 against which the present revision has been filed. 6. Learned Sessions Judge in the impugned order has considered the application of the Public Prosecutor on merits and also considered the case and has come to the conclusion that the accused persons had been identified by the three witnesses as well as the informant and that the names were mentioned in the first information report which was lodged immediately after the occurrence and after thorough investigation a prima facie case was made out and so learned Session judge did not think it proper to permit the Public Prosecutor to withdraw the case and so dismissed the application for withdrawal. 7. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners had challenged the said order of the learned Sessions Judge saying that the learned Sessions Judge ought to have passed order for witdrawal after considering only the question that the application has been made by the Public Prosecutor and that too after application of mind and that the learned Sessions Judge had no jurisdiction to decide the application on the merits of the case. Learned counsel has in support of his contention placed reliance upon the decisions the case of State of Bihar V/s. Ram Naresh pandey and others, air 1957 SC 389 , Shivanandan Paswn V/s. State of Bihar, AIR 1983 SC 194 , and the second one in Review in 1987 SC 887. He also referred to the case of Md. Mumtaz V/s. Smt. Nandani Satpati, AIR 1987 SC 863 . 8. Section 321, Cr. P. C. is in similar terms as the old Sec.494, Cr. P. C. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar V/s. Ram Naresh Pd. (supra) after quoting Sec.494 has observed at page 392 (para 3): "this section is an enabling one and vests in the Public Prosecutor the discretion to apply to the Court for its consent to withdraw from the prosecution of any person. . . . . . The function of the Court, therefore in granting its consent may well be taken to be a judicial function. It follows that in granting the consent the Court must exercise a judicial discretion. But it does not follow that the discretion is to be exercised only with reference to material gathered by the judicial method. Otherwise the apparently wide language of Section 494, Cr. P. C. , would become considerably narrowed down in its application. In understanding and applying the section, two main features thereof have to be kept in mind. The initiative is that of the Public Prosecutor and what the Court has to do is only to give its consent and not to determine any matter judicially. As the Privy council has pointed out in Paqir Singh V/s. Emperor, AIR 1938 PC 226 at p.269 (A ). It (Section 494 Cr. P. C.) gives a general executive descretion (to the Public Prosecutor) to withdraw from the prosecution subject to the consent of the Court, which may be determined on many possible grounds. As the Privy council has pointed out in Paqir Singh V/s. Emperor, AIR 1938 PC 226 at p.269 (A ). It (Section 494 Cr. P. C.) gives a general executive descretion (to the Public Prosecutor) to withdraw from the prosecution subject to the consent of the Court, which may be determined on many possible grounds. " The judicial function, therefore, implicit in the exercise of the judicial discretion for granting the consent would normally mean that the court has to satisfy itself that the executive function of the Public prosecutor has not been improperly exercised, or that it is not and attempt to interfere with the normal course of justice for illegitimate reasons or purposes. In this context it is right to remember that the public Prosecutor (though an executive officer as stated by the Privy council in AIR 1938 PC 266 (A), is, in a larger sense, also an officer of the Court and that he is bound to assist the Court with his fairly considered view and the Court is entitled to have the benefit of the fair exercise of his function. . . . . . . . . . . . Sec.494 Cr. P. C. , requiring the consent of the Court for withdrawal by the Public Prosecutor is more in line with this scheme, than with the provisions of the code relating to inquiries and trials by Court. It cannot be taken to place on the Court the responsibility for prima facie determination of a triable issue. For instance the discharge that results therefrom need not always conform to the standard of "no prima facie case" under Sections 209 (1) and 253 (1), Cr. P. C. , or of "groundlessness" under Sections 209 (2) and 253 (2), Cr. P. C. This is not to say that a consent is to be lightly given on the application of the Public prosecutor, without a careful and proper scrutiny of the grounds on which the application for consent is made. " in the case of M. N. Sankaranarayanan Nair V/s. P. V. Balakrishnan and others, AIR 1972 SC 496 at p.499, (para 4) the Supreme Court observed : "the section does not, however, indicate the reasons which should weigh with the Public Prosecutor to move the Court for permission nor the grounds on which the Court will grant or refuse permission. Though the section is in general terms and does not circumscribe the powers of the Public Prosecutor to seek permission to withdraw from the prosecution the essential consideration which is implicit in the grant of the power is that it should be in the interest of administration of justice which may be either that it will be able to produce sufficient evidence to sustain the charge or that subsequent information before prosecuting agency would falsify the prosecution evidence or any other similar circumstances which it is difficult to predicate as they are dependent entirely on the facts and circumstance of each case. Nonetheless it is the duty of the Court also to see in furtherance of justice that the permission is not sought on grounds extraneous to interest of justice or that offences which are offences against the State go unpunished merely because the Government as a matter of general policy or expediency unconnected with its duty to prosecute offenders under the law, directs the public prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution and the Public Prosecutor merely does so at its behest. " In another decision reported in State of Orissa V/s. Chandrika Mohapatra and others, AIR 1977 SC 903 , Court observed at p.906 para 6 : "the ultimate guiding consideration must always be the interest of administration of justice and that is the touch-stone on which the question must be determined whether the prosecution should be allowed to be withdrawn. " Later at page 907 in para 19 the Supreme Court further observed : "no hard and fast rule can be laid down nor can any categories of cases be defined in which consent should be granted or refused. It must ultimately depend on the facts and circumstances of each case in light of what is necessary in order to promote the ends of justice, because the objective of every judicial process must be the attainment of justice. . . . . . We cannot forget that ultimately every offence has a social or economic cause behind it and if the State feels that the elimination or eradication of the social or economic cause of the crime would be better served by not proceeding with the prosecution, the State should clearly be at liberty to withdraw from the prosecution. " In a later decision of Rajender Kumar Jain V/s. State through Spl. " In a later decision of Rajender Kumar Jain V/s. State through Spl. Police establishment and others, AIR 1980 SC 1510 , the Supreme Court observed at page 1516 para 13 : ". . . . . . The Court performs a supervisory function in granting its consent to the withdrawal. The Courts duty is not to reappreciate the grounds which led the Public Prosecutor to request withdrawal from the prosecution but to consider whether the Public Prosecutor applied his mind as a free agent, uninfluenced by irrelevant and extraneous consideration. The Court has a special duty in this regard as it is the ultimate repository of legislative confidence in granting or withholding its consent to withdrawal from the prosecution. " Later at page 1517 para 15 it was held : "if the policy-makers themselves move in the matter in the first instance, as indeed it is proper that they should where matters of momentous public policy are involved, and if they advise the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution, it is not for the Court to say that the initiative came from the Government and therefore the Public prosecutor cannot be said to have exercised a free mind. Nor can there be any quibbling over words. If ill-informed but well meaning bureaucrates choose to use expressions like "the Public Prosecutor is directed" or "the Public Prosecutor is instructed", the Court will not on that ground alone stultify the larger issue of public policy by refusing its consent on the ground that the Public Prosecutor did not act as a free agent when he sought withdrawal from the prosecution. What is at stake is not the language of the letter or the prestige of the Public Prosecutor but a wider question ot Policy. The court, in such a situation is to make an effort to elicit the reasons for withdrawal and satisfy itself, that the Public Prosecutor too was satisfied that he should withdraw from the prosecution for good and relevant reasons. " Lastly at page 1522 para 25 the Supreme Court said : ". . . . . . So we insist that Courts when moved for permission for withdrawal from prosecution must be vigilant and inform themselves fully before granting consent. " Lastly at page 1522 para 25 the Supreme Court said : ". . . . . . So we insist that Courts when moved for permission for withdrawal from prosecution must be vigilant and inform themselves fully before granting consent. While it would be obnoxious and objectionable for a Public Prosecutor to allow himself to be ordered about, he should apprise himself from the Government and thereafter apprise the Court the host of factors relevant to the question of withdrawal from the cases, but under no circumstances should he allow himself to become any ones stooge. " In the case of Sheonandan Paswan V/s. State of Bihar and others, AIR 1983 sc 194 , the Supreme Court having referred to some of the decisions, as said above, observed at page 203, para 11 : "in the first place, though it is an executive function of the Public Prosecutor for which statutory discretion is vested in him, the discretion is neither absolute nor unreviewable but it is subject to the Courts supervisory function. In fact being an executive function it would be subject to a judicial review on certain limited grounds like any other executive action ; the authority with whom the discretion is vested "must genuinely address itself to the matter before it, must not act under the dictates of another body, must not do what it has been forbidden to do, must act in goodfaith, must have regard to all relevant considerations, and must not be swayed by irrelevant considerations, must not seek to promote purposes alien to the letter or to the spirit of the legislation that gives it power to act, and must not act arbitrarily or capriciously. . . . . . " Later on at page 222 (Para 52) enumerating the position of the Public Prosecutor the, supreme Court said : ". . Sec.321 of the Code does not lay any bar on the Public Prosecutor to receive any instruction from the Government before he files an application under that section If the Public Prosecutor receives such instruction, he cannot be said to act under extraneous influence On the contrary, the Public Prosecutor cannot file an application for withdrawal of a case on his own without instruction from the Government. " At page 233 (para 87) the Supreme Court observed : "the Court while according the consent to the withdrawal has only to see that the Public Prosecutor has acted properly and has not been actuated by oblique or extraneous considerations. It is not the function of the Court to make a fresh appraisal of the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the question whether there is a triable issue to be investigated by the Court. " In the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sheonandan paswan V/s. State of Bihar and others, AIR 1987 SC 877 , while dealing with the review application filed in the earlier case reported in AIR 1983 SC 194 (supra), the Supreme Court observed at page 915 ( AIR 1987 SC 877 , paras 70, 71 and 72): "the section gives no indication as to the grounds on which the Public prosecutor may make the application, or the considerations on which the Court is to grant its consent. The initiative is that of the Public prosecutor and what the Court has to do is only to give its consent and not to determine any matter judicially. The judicial function implicit in the exercise of the judicial discretion for granting the consent would normally mean that the Court has to satisfy itself that the executive function of the Public Prosecutor has not been improperly exercised, or that it is not an attempt to interfere with the normal course of justice for illegitimate reasons or purposes. (Para 70 ). The Courts function is to give consent. This section does not obligate the Court to record reasons before consent is given. However, I should not to be taken to hold that consent of the Court is a matter of course. When the Public Prosecutor makes the application for withdrawal after taking into consideration all the materials before him, the Court exercises its judicial discretion by considering such materials and on such considerations, either gives consent or declines consent. The section should not be construed to mean that the court has to give a detailed reasoned order when it gives consent. If on a reading of the order giving consent, a higher Court is satisfied that such consent was given on an overall consideration of the materials available, the order giving consent has necessarily to be upheld. (Para 17 ). . . If on a reading of the order giving consent, a higher Court is satisfied that such consent was given on an overall consideration of the materials available, the order giving consent has necessarily to be upheld. (Para 17 ). . . . . . . All that is necessary to satisfy the section is to see that the public prosecutor acts in goodfaith and that the Magistrate is satisfied that the exercise of discretion by the Public Prosecutor is proper. (Para 72 ). " In another decision in the case of Md. Mumtaz V/s. Smt. Nandini Satpathy and others, AIR 1987 SC 863 , the Supreme Court referring to the decision of Sheonadan Paswan (supra) observed at page 868, para 18 : ". . . . It is true that ordinarily when the exercise of considering the material on record for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient material to sustain the prosecution can be performed by the Court under Sec.239 of the Cr. P. C.1973 the Court should not allow the prosecution to be withdrawn under Sec.321 as held by us in the judgment in Dr. Jagannath Misras case, which has been delivered today. " 9. Thus following the catena of decisions of the appex Court it appears that the exercise of power under Sec.321 of the Cr. P. C. by the Public Prosecutor can be on the basis of instruction from its client, as there is relation of counsel and client between the Public Prosecutor and the State which is the prosecuting agency. But this exercise of power is to be in the interest of justice and not on extraneous consideration. Further the power is not to be abused or misused by the executive authority to allow the culprits to go scot free. It is to be in the interest of the State based on social, economic and welfare consideration and the like considerations. There should be proper exercise of mind by the Public Prosecutor also and he should also feel satisfied that the grounds that have been taken are in the interest of justice and not to throttle the cause of justice. If the Public prosecutor after application of his mind makes an application to the Court, then the Court is also to see that cause of justice is advanced if the permission is granted. If the Public prosecutor after application of his mind makes an application to the Court, then the Court is also to see that cause of justice is advanced if the permission is granted. But while examining the matter the Court is not to consider the case on merit for acquittal or conviction. The Court is to give its consent and not to determine the matter judicially. If the Court feels satisfied that the function exercised bv the Public Prosecutor is not improper or not an attempt to interfere with the normal course of justice or that there is no illegitimate reasons or purpose behind the withdrawal and that appropriate social, economic and public purposes are served on account of withdrawal in maintaining peace, then the Court may grant permission for withdrawal. The Court is not required to give its detail reasons when it gives the consent. The Court is not to reappreciate the grounds which led to the Public Prosecutor to pray for the withdrawal. It is to see whether he is applying his mind as free agent uninfluenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations. The Court is not to make reappraisal of the evidence and come to the conclusion where the trial issue to be investigated by the Court. 10. In the present case, the Public Prosecutor has moved application, copy of which has been annexed with this petition, and has categorically said that after perusal of the relevant papers he was satisfied that the accused persons had not committed any offence or they were innocent. It means that the Public Prosecutor though getting the instruction has applied his mind to the facts and circumstances of this case and that is why he has given statement as mentioned above. The learned trial court has considered the case on merits and has refused permission because according to it after perusal of the evidence the case may end in conviction. This was not expected of it. If it was satisfied thai the learned Public prosecutor has applied his mind then it ought to have accorded permission. The court should not have reappraised the evidence and it should not have come to its own conclusion. This was not expected of it. If it was satisfied thai the learned Public prosecutor has applied his mind then it ought to have accorded permission. The court should not have reappraised the evidence and it should not have come to its own conclusion. The State is the prosecutor and the Public Prosecutor on the instruction of his client has withdrawn the prosecution and there does not appear to be anything to show that this application has been made to throttle the cause of justice or on any irrelevant or on extraneous material or to jeopardise the interest of justice. As such the order of the Court below is liable to be quashed. Permission should have been accorded by the court below for withdrawal of the case. 11. In the result, this application is allowed and the order of the court below is set aside and the court below is directed to allow the application under section 321, Cr. P. C. filed by the Public Prosecutor. Let the records of the case be sent immediately to the court below. Application allowed.