JUDGMENT - PATEL H.D., J.:---The ultimate fate of this criminal application depends upon the true and correct interpretation of the first proviso to sub-section (3) of section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 2. The petitioner Gunwant is the minor son of the respondent Kawadoo. The petitioner obtained an order for payment of maintenance allowance at the rate of Rs. 100/- per month against the respondent father under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in Criminal Application No. 62 of 1983 on 24th July, 1984. The respondent, his father, challenged the said order vide Criminal Revision No. 45 of 1984 before the Court of Session. After hearing the parties the Court of Session confirmed the order of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate granting maintenance allowance to the petitioner. The respondent not satisfied with the concurrent findings of the two courts below filed Criminal Application No. 620 of 1985 before this Court, but without any success. This Court vide an order dated 14-10-1986 rejected the said criminal application. It is not in dispute that till the decision of this Court neither the respondent paid any amount towards the maintenance allowance of the petitioner, nor the petitioner moved for recovery of the amount under sub-section (3) of section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 3. By Application No. 35 of 1987 the petitioner claimed the arrears of maintenance for a period of 32 months. The said application was filed on 18th February, 1987. The respondent deposited a sum of Rs. 1100/- only on 12-8-1987 being the arrears of maintenance allowance for eleven months preceding the date on which the application was filed and contended that the arrears prior to twelve months preceding the date on which the application was filed is not recoverable in these proceedings. 4. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate after hearing the parties passed an order also granting the balance arrears of maintenance allowance amounting to Rs. 2100/- to the petitioner. The respondent was also directed to pay the said amount within 15 days from the date of order, failing which further steps as contemplated by sub-section (3) of section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were directed to be taken. 2100/- to the petitioner. The respondent was also directed to pay the said amount within 15 days from the date of order, failing which further steps as contemplated by sub-section (3) of section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were directed to be taken. Naturally those steps were (i) issue of warrant for levying the amount due in the manner provided for levying fine, and (ii) may sentence such person for the whole or any party of each month's allowance remaining unpaid after execution of the warrant to imprisonment for a term, which may extend to one month or until payment, if sooner made. 5. Feeling dissatisfied with the aforesaid order the respondent filed a revision application before the Court of Session. The said revision application registered as Criminal Revision No. 88 of 1987 came to be allowed and the order passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate was quashed. It was held that the petitioner was entitled to receive only that amount, which becomes due within one year next before 18-2-1988 i.e. Rs. 1200/- only. The petitioner feeling aggrieved by the said order of the Court of Session has now filed this revision application. 6. It was vehemently sought to be contended on behalf of the petitioner that the respondent avoided to make the payment right from the date the order was passed on 24th July, 1984 in the first instance by filing revision application in the Court of Session and then by filing criminal application in this Court. Since the litigation was continuing, the petitioner who is still minor did not apply for recovery under the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In other words, it was sought to be contended that the amount became due only after it was finally decided by this Court. It was also submitted that the first proviso to sub-section (3) of section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure needs to be construed very liberally. In other words, it was sought to be contended that the amount became due only after it was finally decided by this Court. It was also submitted that the first proviso to sub-section (3) of section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure needs to be construed very liberally. 6-A. There cannot be any doubt that the provision as contained in section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is a beneficial provision intended to help those who are neglected or refused to be maintained and are also unable to maintain themselves, and hence the liberal interpretation is a must, but the interpretation must not be at the cost of violence to the express language used in that section. The natural meaning will have to be given to the first proviso to sub-section (3) of section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure considering the scheme of that section. 7. The first proviso to sub-section (3) of section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that no warrant shall be issued for recovery of any amount due under this section, unless an application is made to the Court to levy such amount within a period of one year from the date on which it became due. The said proviso hence makes it abundantly clear that an application under the said sub-section has to be made within a period of one year from the date on which the amount became due. Necessarily in clear terms the first proviso to sub-section (3) of section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure puts an embargo on the power of the Magistrate to issue any warrant for recovery of the amount due, unless the application is made within one year from the date of the amount became due. In such a situation it is incumbent on the Magistrate to first ascertain as to when the amount has become due. The order granting maintenance was admittedly passed on 24th July, 1984 and the amount became due to the petitioner every month thereafter. Merely because the respondent disputed the said order and challenged it in the Court of Session, and then also in this Court, it cannot be said that the amount was not due during that period. The order granting maintenance was admittedly passed on 24th July, 1984 and the amount became due to the petitioner every month thereafter. Merely because the respondent disputed the said order and challenged it in the Court of Session, and then also in this Court, it cannot be said that the amount was not due during that period. It may be relevant to mention here that neither the Court of Session, nor this Court had stayed the operation of the order dated 24th July, 1984 granting maintenance to the petitioner. In these circumstances, it is difficult to hold that the amount of maintenance allowance had become due only after this Court had finally rejected the criminal application. A similar view was also taken in (Bimla Dei v. Karna Mulia)1, 1986 Criminal Law Journal 521. 8. It was next contended that section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is specifically made applicable by virtue of sub-section (2) of section 29 of the said Act and it can be availed of for the purposes of extending the period prescribed by the special or local laws, if sufficient cause is shown for not presenting the application in time. In this respect reliance can be placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in (Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi)2, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 195 where it is laid down that unless the special or local law specifically excludes the applicability of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, then alone it would stand displaced. Merely making a provision of a period of limitation in howsoever peremptory or imperative language it might be, is not sufficient to displace the applicability of section 5. In the Supreme Court case, section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 was made available to the applicant for not preferring the application within the time limit of sixty days prescribed in sub-section (4) of section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. In the present case, it is not necessary for this Court to go into this question, because no application under section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation was moved by the petitioner before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, while moving the application under sub-section (3) of section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The point is hence left undecided. 9. The point is hence left undecided. 9. In the result, I am of the opinion that the impugned order of the learned Sessions Judge dated 18th February, 1988 does not suffer from any infirmity and accordingly this criminal application is rejected. Revision application dismissed. -----