Judgment Satyeshwar Roy, J. 1. Daluram Agrawal filed the suit. He having died during the pendency of the suit, his legal represntatives were substituted in his place. The suit was filed for eviction of the respondents, respondent No.1-From the decision dated 23-6-1979 of Sri A N. K. N. Sinha, 2nd Additional District judge, Sighbhurn at Jamshedpur in Title Appeal No.10 of 1978 reversing the judgment and decree dated 11-3-1978 passed by Sri B. Z. Ansari, additional Munsif,. Jamesbedpur in T. S. No.30/385 of 1975/77. (defendant No.1) being the tenant and respondent No.2 (defendant No.2)being the person inducted by respondent No.1 the grounds on which the eviction of the respondents was prayed were that respondent No, 1 has not paid monthly rent from 10-4-1973 to 9-9-1974, and he sublet the building to respondent No.2. The decree for arrears of rent was included in the relief. 2. In the written statement, inter alia, it was stated that defendant No.2 was the son of defendant No.1 and there was no question of sub-letting. The rent each month was tendered to the plaintiff and as he refused to accept it, it was remitted by money order. There was no question of default. 3. The trial court accepted the case of default pleaded by the plaintiff and decreed the suit for eviction as well as arrears of rent. The lower appellate court reversed the finding of default, The plaintiff, therefore, succeeded in part. 4. The decree of the court below refusing to give relief for eviction of the defendants has been challenged in this appeal. 5. The substantial question of law involved in this appeal is whether the remittance of rent by respondent No.1 can be said to be valid in the eyes of law so as to save him from the mischief of Section ll (l) (d)of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction)Control Act, 1947 (the Act for short ). 6. At the outset it may be mentioned that month of teaacy was not according to the English Calendar month, but from the 10th of a month to the 9th of the next following month. The relevant periods which are required to be noticed to record a finding whether the claim of the appellant that respondent No.1 was defaulter in paying the two months rent are from 10-4-1973 to 9-6-1973 and 10-8-1974 to 9-9-1974. The relevant periods which are required to be noticed to record a finding whether the claim of the appellant that respondent No.1 was defaulter in paying the two months rent are from 10-4-1973 to 9-6-1973 and 10-8-1974 to 9-9-1974. It has been found as fact by the court below that the rent for the months of 10-4-1973 to 9-6-1973, i. e. , 10-4-1973 to 9-5-1973 and 10-5-1973 to 9-6-1973 was sent by money order on 11-6-1973 and the same was tendered by postal peon to the plaintiff on 13-6-1973. For the month of 10-8-1974 to 9-9-1974. rent was sent by money order on 17-9-1 74 and the same was tendered by the postal peon on 11-10-1974. It was conceded, and rightly by Mr. Prasad. learned counsel for the respondents, that respondent No.1 had defaulted within the meaning of law in paying the rent for the month 10-4-1973 to 9-5-1973, but default of one month would not entitle the appellant for a decree for eviction of the respondents. Therefore, as contended by Mr. Ghose, learned Counsel for the appellant, we are to see whether respondent No.1 also defaulted in paying the rent for the month 10-8-1974 to 9-9-1974. 7. The defence, as noticed above, was that the respondent No.1 always tendered the rent for each month to the appellant and as the later refused to accept it, the former had been sending the same regularly by post money order. The trial court held that although the rent for the period 10-8-1974 to 9-9-1974 was sent by money order on 17-9-1974, but as it was tendered to the appellant on 11-10-1974, i. e. , beyond 9-10-1974, i. e. , end of the month of tenancy ; respondent no.1 had defaulted in paying the rent for this period also. It relied on the bench decision of this Court in Madho Lal V/s. M. M. Agarwalla. AIR 1975 Pat 154 , and held that the tender of rent by postal peon, the agent of defendant no.1, ought to have been made latest by 9-10-1974. The lower appellate court held that respondent No.1-defendant No.1 has stated in bis evidence that he paid rent regularly to the appellant, but as he refused to accept the same he started remitting it by money order. The lower appellate court held that respondent No.1-defendant No.1 has stated in bis evidence that he paid rent regularly to the appellant, but as he refused to accept the same he started remitting it by money order. It further held that since the rent was remitted on 17-9-1974, i. e. , before the expiry of the month of the tenancy, notwithstnding the fact that it was tendered on 11-10-1974, the remittance was valid. It negatived the finding of the trial court and held that as the respondent no.1 had defaulted in paying the rent of one month only, no decree for eviction could be passed. 8. A number of Division Beach decisions and also a Full Bench decision of this Court on the question in issue are there, yet this question repeatedly comes up for consideration in some form or the other. 9. The relevant portion of Section ll (l) (d) of the Act reads as follows "where the amount of two months rent lawfully payable by the tenant due from him is in arrears by not having been paid within the time fixed by contract or, in the absence of such contract, by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable or by not having been validly remitted or deposited in accordance with Sec.13. " section 13 (1) of the Act reads as follows : "when a landlord refused to accept any rent lawfully payable to him by tenant in respect of any building the tenant may, remit such rent and continue to remit any subsequent rent which becomes due in respect of such building, by postal money order to the landlord. " 10. Mr. Ghose relying particularly on Madholal (supra) and also on Veena rani V/s. Ishrati Amanullah, AIR 1985 Pat 205 : 1985 BLJ 123 and Ram Tahal modi V/s. Ratan Lal, 1988 PLJ R 950, submitted that in this case remittance of rent by money order cannot be said to have been made in terms of Sec.13 (1 ). He urged that not only the rent ought to have been sent by post office before the expiry of 9-10-1974 but it was required to be tendered by the postal peon on or before 9-10-1974. He urged that not only the rent ought to have been sent by post office before the expiry of 9-10-1974 but it was required to be tendered by the postal peon on or before 9-10-1974. He submitted that although the rent might have been sent for the period 10-8-1974 to 9-9-1974 on 17-9-1974, but as it was tendered on 11-10-1974, i. e. after the expiry of the last date of the month of tenancy next following, Sec.13 (1) was not complied. Mr. Prasad urged that that all the law required was that the tenant must remit the rent by the last date of the month of tenancy next following. According to him as the rent had been sent by money order on 17-9-1974, there has been valid compliance of section 13 (1 ). 11. The two Division Bench decision, namely, Madholal (supra) and mahavir Prasad V/s. Bibhuti Mohan, AIR 1973 Pat 83 , came up for consideration before a Full Bench of this Court in Raj Kumar V/s. Uchit Narain, AIR 1980 pat 242 : 1980 BLJ 616 (FB ). Those cases were placed before the Full bench because a Division Bench was of the opinion that there was conflict between madho Lal and Mahavir Prasad. The Full Bench held that: "as I have already indicated, at the out set, the learned Judges of the division Bench thought that there was an apparent conflict between two Bench decisions of this Court in the cases of Mahabir Prasad, air 1973 Pat 83 (supra) and Madho Lal (supra ). In my view, in substance there is no conflict between the two decisions. In the case of Mababir Prasad (supra) it has been held that rent could initially be tendered through postal money order and it cannot be contended that only if the landlord refuses to accept the rent hand to hand, the tenant may remit it by postal money order. And even assuming that the tender of rent is a condition precedent for remittance by postal money order, tender by postal money order is valid tender and if it is refused by the landlord, the tenant becomes entitled to remit such rent and continue to remit any subsequent rent, which becomes due, by postal money order. . . . . . . . . . . " ***** "it will be seen from the provisions of Section ll (l) (d) that where there is no contract fixing the time within which the payment of rent should be made, the rent is legally payable by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable or by not having been validly remitted or deposited in accordance with section 13. On the findings of the courts below, there was no contract fixing the time within which the rent must be paid. In the absence of such a contract the law enjoins that rent for any month must be paid by the last day of the month next following or by being validly remitted or deposited in accordance with the provisions of Sec.13. And, Sec.13, as quoted above, entitles the tenant, in case of refusal by the landlord to accept any rent lawfully payable to him, to remit such rent and to continue to remit any subsequent rent which became due in respect of the building let out, by postal money order to the landlord. If the law, as in the cases under the Rent Act, gives the liberty to the tenant under section ll (l) (d) to make the payment in the absence of a contract by the last day of the month next following then can it be said that if on such last day the landlord refused to accept the rent and subsequently a date later than the last day of the month next following the tenant remits such rent by postal money order, he can yet be called a defaulter The answer, in ray view must be in the negative. When Sec.13 (a) speaks of the remittance of rent by postal money order to the landlord on refusal on the part of the landlord to accept such rent, the law clearly envisages two possibilities. If the tenant apprehends that some ulterior motive the landlord could refuse to accept rent for the purpose of making the tenant a defaulter within the meaning of the Rent Act, he may well remit such rent by postal money order by the tast day of the month next following. That would make the remittance a valid payment within the meaning of Section ll (l) (d ). That would make the remittance a valid payment within the meaning of Section ll (l) (d ). The other option given to the tenant is to pay hand to hand or tender the rent lawfully payable by the last day of succeeding month and in the case of refusal on the part of the landlord to make a remittance by a postal money order on a date subsequent thereto, i. e. , the last day of the succeeding month. That, in my considered views, is the cumulative effect of the provisions of Sec.11 (1) (d) read with section 13 (1) of the Rent Act and that justifies the Bench decision in the case of Mahabir Prasad (supra ). The question then arises as to whether the Bench decision in the case of Madho Lal, AIR 1975 Pat 145, (supra)-can in any way be said to militare against the principle laid down in the earlier case. Having given the matter my anxious consideration. I do not think that the ratio of the two Bench decisions is in any way inconsistent. In the case of Madho Lal (supra) the Bench of which was also a member, merely lays down that the tender to the landlord can be made on the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable and on the refusal by the landlord to accept, the tenant may remit such rent and that means the rent for that month by postal money order as well as the remittance of any subsequent rent which becomes due in respect of the building. It further goes on to hold that in order to escape the liability of being evicted on the ground of non-payment of rent, as expressly provided in Section ll (l) (d) rent must be validly remitted or deposited in accordance with Sec.13. In that case, it has been emphasised that if there is a tender and refusal by the last date of the month then it goes without saysing that remittance by postal money order has got to be within a reasonable period after the refusal on the last date. That brings out a distinction between the tender through money order under the general principles of law and remittance by money order under Sec.13 (1) of the Rent Act. That brings out a distinction between the tender through money order under the general principles of law and remittance by money order under Sec.13 (1) of the Rent Act. The tender under the former must be before the expiry of the last day following that month for which the rent is payable. Under the latter the remittance may be made within a reasonable time after the expiry of that date. This case, therefore, visualises both the possibilities and has consequently laid down that remittance by postal money order on refusal can be made subsequent to the last day of the succeeding month on refusal of acceptance by the landlord when the tenant tenders the rent lawfully payable. But in such an event such a remittance by postal money order must be within a reasonable time after the exipry of the period contemplated by Sec.11 (1) (d ). Therefore, I do not find any inconsistency, much less any contradiction in terms, between the two Bench decisions on any of the grounds for which a reference to this has been necessitated. " 12. In Veena Rani (supra) this legal position was reiterated. It was so done again on the facts of Ram Tahal Modi (supra ). The legal position that boils down, therefore, is that if the tenant takes recourse to send rent by money order without tendering it by any other mode that would be under the general law and the tender of the money order to the landlord must be, in absence of any contract, made within the last date of the month following that for which the rent was sent. If there has been tender, whatever may be the mode, within the last date of the following month that for which rent was payable and the landlord refused to accept it, the remittance must be within a reasonable time. Each case, therefore, shall have to be decided on proven facts. 13. In this case, the final court of fact in paragraph 11 of the judgment acccepted of the evidence of D. W.10 (defendant No 1) who had stated that he remitted the rent by postal money order as the appellant refused to accept the rent when tendered. Applying the law as laid down in Raj Kumars case to this case, the sending of rent by money order was not under the general law but under Sec.13 (1 ). Applying the law as laid down in Raj Kumars case to this case, the sending of rent by money order was not under the general law but under Sec.13 (1 ). In view of the fact that the rent for the period 10-8-1974 to 9-9-1974 was refused when tendered, the remittance by money order on 17-9-1974 must be held to be under and in terms of Sec.13 (1 ). It was, therefore, immaterial whether the postal peon tendered the rent within 9-10-1974 or thereafter. The finding recorded by the court below that respondent No.1 has defaulted in paying the rent of one month only cannot be interfered with. 14. In the result, this appeal is dismissed but without costs. Appeal dismissed.