BHAGAWATI PRASAD BANERJEE, J. ( 1 ) THIS revisional application has been filed by the judgment-debtor/ petitioner, against the decree-holders/opposite parties against the order dated 21st May, 1986 by which the petitioners application under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure was rejected, in which the judgment-debtor petitioner prayed for dismissal of the execution case on the ground that the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, which was affirmed by this Court in Second appeal, is a nullity. ( 2 ) THE decree-holders/opposite parties filed suit against the judgment-debtor/petitioner for eviction alleging that by a registered conveyance the decree-holders-plaintiffs purchased the property in question and that the defendant/judgment-debtor was a monthly tenant-at-will under the predecessor-in-interest of the decree-holders/ opposite parties and that the tenancy was governed originally by the provisions of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1948, but because of the subsequent amendment in the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act by the amendment of 1968, the provisions of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, having been withdrawn from the Garden Reach area, where the suit premises lies with a retrospective effect, the tenancy was governed by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. The trial Court decreed the suit for eviction by the judgment and decree dated 10th January, 1971, holding that the tenancy was governed by the Transfer of Property Act because of the changes in law. ( 3 ) BEING aggrieved by the said judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, the judgment-debtor/ petitioner preferred an appeal before the lower appellate Court and the lower appellate Court dismissed the appeal filed by the judgment and decree dated 7th October, 1974 in Title Appeal No. 296 of 1974, and affirmed the decree for eviction passed by the trial Court. Against that judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court dated 7th October, 1974 the judgment-debtor/ petitioner preferred a second appeal before this Court which was registered as Appeal from Appellate Decree No. 194 of 1977 and that the said appeal was also dismissed by Arun Kumar Janah, J. of this Court by the judgment and decree dated 13th April, 1983, inter alia, holding that the tenancy was governed by the provisions of Transfer of Property Act and there was nothing to show that the provisions of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949 automatically became applicable to the disputed land after the withdrawal of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act from the lands within the Garden Reach Municipality with retrospective effect. ( 4 ) AFTER the dismissal of the appeal by this Court the judgment-debtor-petitioner filed an objection under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the executing Court alleging that during the pendency of the appeal before the lower appellate Court, the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949 was amended by the Amending Act of 1974 whereby the provisions of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act was extended to the area in question and as such the provisions of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act should be made applicable in this case and the tenancy should be governed by the provisions of that Act and not under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. The trial Court by the order dated 21st May, 1986, passed in Misc. Case No. 3 of 1986, rejected the said objection raised by the judgment-debtor as to the maintainability of the decree. ( 5 ) MR. Saktinath Mukherjee, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner, contended in the first place that the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1948 came into force with effect from 28th February, 1949 and in view of the provisions of Section 1 (2) of the said Act the provisions of the said Act were applicable to the Garden Reach Municipality area. Saktinath Mukherjee, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner, contended in the first place that the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1948 came into force with effect from 28th February, 1949 and in view of the provisions of Section 1 (2) of the said Act the provisions of the said Act were applicable to the Garden Reach Municipality area. The relevant provision of 1949 Act was as follows:-"it extends to Calcutta as defined in Clause (ii) of Section 3 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923 and such suburbs of Calcutta as may have been or may hereafter be notified under Section 1 of the Calcutta Suburban Police Act, 1966 and are not included within Calcutta as so defined and also to the municipality of Howrah. "thereafter, the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act was amended by the Calcutta Thika Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1969. Section 2 of the said Amended Act was as follows:-"in sub-section (2) of Section 1 of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) the following words and figures shall be, and shall be deemed always to have been, omitted, namely:- such suburbs of Calcutta as may have been or may hereafter be notified under Section I of the Calcutta Suburban Police Act, 1966, and area not included within Calcutta as so defined and also. " ( 6 ) AS a result of this amendment with retrospective effect, the tenancy which was hitherto before governed under the provisions of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act would not be governed by the provisions of that Act and consequently the same was to be governed by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. ( 7 ) IN this case the suit was filed in July, 1971 during the pendency of the appeal before the lower appellate Court, the provisions of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949 were amended by the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1974. Section 2 of the said Amended Act provides as follows:-"in Section 1 of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act), for sub-section (2), the following sub-section shall be substituted, namely:- ' (2) It extends to the whole of West Bengal except the area to which the provisions of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949 applies. '" ( 8 ) AS a consequence of this amendment the position was that in respect of the Garden Reach area, the West Bengal Non-Agriculrural tenancy Act, 1949 was extended. This amendment took place during the pendency of the appeal and according to Mr. Mukherjee, the West Bengal Act VIII of 1974 by which the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949 was extended to Garden Reach area should govern the tenancy of the petitioner and as such the decree which was passed in accordance with the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act could not be sustained unless such a decree conforms with the requirements of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Tenancy Act, 1949. ( 9 ) MR. Mukherjee also relies on the provisions of Sections 7 and 9 of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949 which lays down the incidence of tenancy under the provisions of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act were given overriding effects by the use of the expression:-"notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or any contract. . . . . "the Sections 7 and 9 of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act puts an embargo an the right of the landlord to file suit for eviction except on the grounds mentioned therein. ( 10 ) MR. Mukherjee submitted that because of the restrictions imposed upon the right of the landlord to file suit for eviction in Sections 7 and 9 of the said Act, the suit filed by the plaintiff/ opposite parties for eviction of the defendant/petitioner was not maintainable, and submitted that in the instant case because of the change of law during the pendency of the first appeal, the decree that was passed in the suit should be treated to be a nullity inasmuch as the rights of the landlord to file suit under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, as well as under the provisions of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act are quite different. In substance, according to Mr. In substance, according to Mr. Mukherjee the bone of contention is whether the rights of the parties would be governed by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act as was done by the trial Court and affirmed in appeal, or whether the same would be governed by the provisions of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act because of its extension to this area by virtue of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1974 with effect from 26th March, 1984. Admittedly the first appeal was pending before the lower appellate Court on the date when the area of operation of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949 was extended to Garden Reach. ( 11 ) MR. Mukherjee, in support of his contention that change of law in the pending appeal should be taken into account while disposing of the appeal which is pending before the appellate Court, relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Lakshmi Narayan Guin v. Niranjan Modak, reported in AIR 1985 SC 111 . The Supreme Court considered the effect of extension of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 to a particular area during the pendency of the appeal filed in connection with an eviction case. In that case, during the pendency of a suit for evidence the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 were extended by the State Legislature in respect of the area where the suit property situated. In that case the suit was decreed by the trial Court which found that the respondent was a tenant under appellants and the appellants were entitled to possession and to recover arrears of rent. The tenancy was governed at the time of filing of the suit by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and that in that case, during the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act were extended to Memari by sub-section (1) of section 13 of the said Act which provides:-"notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other law, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any Court in favour of the landlord against a tenant except on one or more of the grounds. . . . . . . "the question arose for consideration before the Supreme Court in this case whether the decree that was passed by the trial Court in a suit under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act was maintainable or not in view of the fact that during the pendency of the first appeal, the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, were extended and whether the suit would be governed by the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. The Supreme Court held in paragraph 8 of the judgment:"the next point is whether sub-s. (1) of S. 13 can be invoked where the suit was instituted before the Act came into force. In the instant case, the suit was instituted long before the Act was extended to Memari. Subs. (I) of S. 13 directs the Court not to make any order or decree for possession subject, of course, to the statutory exceptions. The legislative command in effect deprives the Court of its unqualified jurisdiction to make such order or decree. It is true that when the suit was instituted the Court possessed such jurisdiction and could pass a decree for possession. But it was divested of that jurisdiction when the Act was brought into force. The language of the sub-section makes that abundantly clear, and regard must be had to its object. "at paragraph 9 the Supreme Court observed:-"that a change in the law during the pendency of an appeal has to be taken into account and will govern the rights of the parties was laid down by this Court in Ram Sarup v. Munshi, (1963) 3 SCR 858 which was followed by this Court in Mula v. Godhu, (1970) 2 SCR 129 . We may point out that in Dayawati v. Inderjit, (1966) 3 SCR 275 this Court observed :- "if the new law speaks in language which, expressly or by clear intendment, taken in even pending matters, this Court of trial as well as the Court of appeal must have regard to an intention so expressed, and the Court of appeal may give effect to such a law even after the judgment of the Court of first instance. "mr. "mr. Mukherjee contended that the decree in this particular case should be declared as a nullity in view of the fact that when the first appeal was pending, the provisions of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act were made applicable to that area and as such the appeal should be decided on the basis of the said amended Act and it was further; contended that the decree passed by the trial court merges with the decree passed by the lower appellate Court and in case the second appeal is taken out, in that event the decree of the trial Court shall merge with the decree passed in the second appeal on the principle of merger. ( 12 ) MR. Mukherjee drew the attention of this Court that on 4th November, 1986 the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949 was further amended with retrospective effect by the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1986. Sections 2, 3 and 4 of the said amending Act which are relevant for the purpose of this case are as follows:-"2. In Section 1 of the West Bengal Nonagricultural Tenancy Act, 1949, for subsection (2), the following sub-section shall be substituted and shall be deemed always to have been substituted:- ` (2) It extends to the whole of West Bengal except the area to which the provisions of Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949 apply but not excepting the area to which such provisions may have ceased or may hereafter cease to apply by virtue of any law for the time being in force. 3. The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law for the time being in force or in any rule, order or notification or in any contract, express or implied, and notwithstanding any decision, decree or order of any Court, tribunal or other authority to the contrary. 4. 3. The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law for the time being in force or in any rule, order or notification or in any contract, express or implied, and notwithstanding any decision, decree or order of any Court, tribunal or other authority to the contrary. 4. The provisions of this Act shall apply to all suits, appeals and other proceedings (including proceedings in execution), pending at the commencement of this Act, in respect of any area to which the provisions of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949 ceased to apply upon the commencement of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy (Amendment) Ordinance, 1987 and shall also apply to all suits, appeals and other proceedings in execution in respect of any area to which the provisions of that Act may, by virtue of any law for the time being in force, hereafter cease to apply. "accordingly, Mr. Mukherjee contended that the provisions of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1986 should apply to Garden Reach area with retrospective effect, in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of H. Shiva Rao v. Cecilia Pereira, reported in AIR 1987 SC 248 , wherein the Supreme Court considered the effect of the amendment of this nature, as provided in Section 4 of the said amending Act in a pending matter, the Supreme Court held that in view of the similar provisions to that of sub-section (4) of the said amending Act, the decree was not executable because subsequent to the decree the Act had been made applicable to the area in question when possession was not taken over. In paragraph 5 of the said judgment the Supreme Court observed:"it has to be borne in mind that Rent Control legislations are beneficial to the tenant and restrictive of the rights of the landlords - these legislations were passed to meet the problem of shortage of accommodation in cities and towns. Whether that is the best way to meet the problem of finding habitats for growing number of people is another issue. Whether or not the problem could not be met by another way is also another question. Courts must find out the literal meaning of the expression in the task of construction. Whether that is the best way to meet the problem of finding habitats for growing number of people is another issue. Whether or not the problem could not be met by another way is also another question. Courts must find out the literal meaning of the expression in the task of construction. In doing so if the expressions are ambiguous then the construction that fulfils the object of the legislation must provide the key to meaning. Courts must not make a mockery of legislation and should take a constructive approach to fulfil the purpose and for the purpose, if necessary, iron out the creases. "at paragraph 7 the Supreme Court observed :-"where in a society of acute shortage of accommodation adjustment of rights between the parties is the purpose, we must ask ourselves two questions does the argument of the appellant on the construction of the section further the purpose of the legislation, and secondly, whether the construction canvassed by the appellant does violence to the language or is contrary to the literal meaning. In our opinion the answer to the first question is in the affirmative and to the second in the negative. If so, in our opinion, it must be so read, and the appeal must succeed. "the Supreme Court ultimately held that an order or decree for eviction of a tenant passed prior to the date when the Rent Act was made applicable to the area in question, action taken against the tenant after the Act was made applicable to the area in question. ( 13 ) MR. Mukherjee contended that in view of the decision of the Supreme court, it must be held that the decree for eviction must conform with the statutory requirements of the provisions of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949 and admittedly in this case that was not done so, inasmuch as on the date when the suit was filed, the provisions of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act were not extended to that area and that Mr. Mukherjee submitted that now at the execution stage the judgment-debtor can take the point that the decree could not be executed inasmuch as the decree was a nullity and in this case reference was made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Nai Bahu v. Lala Ramnarayan, AIR 1978 SC 22 , wherein the suit for eviction was compromised between the landlord and tenant where the tenant agreed to vacate the suit premises. The tenant failed to vacate the suit premises in terms of the compromise decree. The decree was put into execution and at execution stage, the tenant raised an objection that the compromise decree wasa nullity. In that connection, the Supreme Court observed that a decree for eviction of a tenant cannot be passed solely on the basis of the compromise between the parties as the Court was to be satisfied whether a statutory ground for eviction which has been pleaded which the tenant had admitted by the compromise and that when a compromise decree is challenged as a nullity in the course of its execution, the executing Court can examine relevant materials to find whether statutory grounds of eviction existed in law. If the pleadings and other materials on the record make out a prima facie case about the existence of statutory grounds for eviction, a compromise decree cannot be held to be invalid and the executing Court will have to give effect to it. On the contrary if it was found that the statutory grounds for eviction do not exist and in that event the said compromise decree was a nullity and not binding upon the parties. ( 14 ) SIMILAR view was taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Roshan Lal v. Madan Lal, AIR 1975 SC 2130 . Mr. Mukherjee also relied upon a passage from Craies on Statute Law, Seventh Edition at page 396 where it is observed :-"if a statute is passed for protecting the public against some evil of abuse, it may be allowed to operate retrospectively although by such operation it will deprive some person or persons of vested right. " ( 15 ) IT was submitted by Mr. Mukherjee that as the provisions of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act was extended to Garden Reach, during the pendency of the first appeal. " ( 15 ) IT was submitted by Mr. Mukherjee that as the provisions of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act was extended to Garden Reach, during the pendency of the first appeal. The decree has to be passed strictly in accordance with the provisions of West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act and the decree passed in accordance with Mr. Mukherjee submitted that because of the amendment in the Act by the amending Act of 1986 by which the provisions of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949 were applicable to the area in question with retrospective effect the case had to be governed by those provisions. Mr. Mukherjee in this connection also referred to the Statements of Objects and Reasons in the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1974 which are as follows:-"in between September, 1967 and the year 1974, neither the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949 or the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949 was applicable to the area of Garden Reach Municipality, as notified under Section 1 of the Calcutta Suburban Police Act, 1966. As such, these areas came to be governed by the general law, namely, the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Taking advantage of this position, the landlords of the area filed eviction suits against the thika tenants and obtained ejectment decrees on the basis of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The Calcutta Thika Tenancy (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 1981 is not also applicable to these areas. It is, therefore, felt necessary that to save the interest of thika tenants, sub-section (2) of section 1 of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949 should be amended suitably so that the provisions of the Act may apply retrospectively to the areas of Garden Reach Municipality as noticed under Section 1 of the Calcutta Suburban Police Act, 1966. " ( 16 ) MR. " ( 16 ) MR. Mukherjee also relied on a passage from the case of East End Dwelling Company Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council reported in (I95i) 2 All ER 587 at 599 wherein it was observed that"if one is bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, one must surely, unless prohibited from doing so also imagine as real the consequence and incidents which if the putative state of affairs had in fact existed must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it one of these in this case is emancipation from 939 level of rents. The statute says that one must imagine a certain state of affairs. It does not say that having done so, one must cause or permit one's imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs. " ( 17 ) MR. Mukherjee also relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of National Coal Development Corporation Ltd. v. Monmohan Mathur, reported in AIR 1970 SC 1223 at page 1226 wherein the Supreme Court held that "it was within the competence of Parliament to create the fictions it has created in the original Act XX of 1957 (by the amending 51 of 1957) and again by the amending Act XXIII of 1969. Learned Counsel, however, said that we must take a humane view of the position of a person like the respondent who would lose his all by the acquisition and that too through legislation which make the provisions fictional rather than real. As to the first part we can only say that if the law allows it, the Court must award it and as to the second part we say that kind of legislation by making obligatory notifications fictional does not accord with our sense of propriety but we cannot say anything against it since Parliament undoubtedly possesses the power to make such fictions. "when statute enacts that something shall be deemed to have been done which in fact and truth was not done, the Court is entitled and bound to ascertain for what purpose and for what person this statute fiction is to be resorted and full effect must be given to the statutory fiction and it should be carried to its logical conclusion. " ( 18 ) RELYING on the aforesaid decisions, Mr. " ( 18 ) RELYING on the aforesaid decisions, Mr. Mukherjee contended that the provisions of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act should be made applicable in this case and that in the instant case by the amending Act 1974, the provision of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act was extended to the area in question and further such amendment came into force at a point of time when the first appeal was pending before the Lower Appellate Court. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that the Lower Appellate Court was bound to decide the appeal on the basis of the fact that the said Act had come into force into that area and should have considered whether decree of eviction that was passed conforms with this statutory requirement under the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act and further the doubts and disputes as to the applicability of the provisions of the said Act in this particular case have been set at naught by the legislature by the amending Act 1986 whereby the provision of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949 was extended to that area with retrospective effect and the legislature made it also specifically clear that the provisions of the said Act should apply also to the proceeding pending in execution and that the said Act should apply notwithstanding contained in any decision or decree by any Court. ( 19 ) MR. Mukherjee submitted that from the reasons and objects for which the 1986 amendment Act was made the legislature make it clear that the legislature in order to remove all doubts and disputes in the matter enforced the said Act with retrospective effect, so as to fill up the gaps left by the legislature whereby the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949 was withdrawn from that area with retrospective effect. According to Mr. According to Mr. Mukherjee, when the legislative intent is clear and when a statute has been enforced to a particular area with retrospective effect and when the statute made it clear that the cases of eviction which were pending in execution should conform with the requirement of the said statute, in that event, there, is no escape from the position that in the instant case if the decree does not conform with the statutory restriction and condition, in that event, the said decree has to be declared as a nullity and consequently, the judgment and decree passed on first appeal as well as in second appeal is also null and void. According to Mr. Mukherjee, if a decree was a nullity by this legal fiction in that event, there could not be any valid proceeding for execution of that decree which cannot be recognised under the law. The decree which is a nullity, could not be executed and possession could not be taken on the basis of such a decree which is nullity. ( 20 ) MR. Sudhir Dasgupta, learned Advocate, appearing with Mr. S. P. Roychoudhury, learned Advocate on behalf of the respondents submitted that, in this particular case, the relationship between the parties as landlord and tenant was terminated at a point of time when the area was governed by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. This was because of the fact that the provisions of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act was withdrawn with effect from 30th October, 1969. The suit for eviction of the petitioner was filed by the opposite party on 28th July, 1971 by serving a notice to quit whereby the tenancy was terminated and that the trial Court decreed the suit on the basis of law as existing not only on the date of filing of the suit but also on the basis of the law as existing on the date of the passing of the decree on 10th January, 1974. The West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act was amended on 26th March, 1974 whereby the said area which was governed by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act was brought under the purview of the West, Bengal Non-Agricultural tenancy Act, as indicated above and that against the judgment and decree passed by both the courts below the matter came up for consideration in second appeal before this court which was filed on 1st February 1975 and that the judgment and decree passed by the lower courts was affirmed by this Court onthe 13th April 1983. Thereafter the matter was pending for execution. When the matter was pending for execution, at that point of time the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1986 came into force on 4th November, 1986 whereby the provision of the said Act was extended to the area in question with retrospective effect and that S. 4 of the said Act provides that the provisions of the said amendment Act should also apply to all suits, appeal and other proceedings (including proceedings in execution), pending at the commencement of the said Act. ( 21 ) MR. Dasgupta contended that the decree was passed by the trial Court on the basis of the law as was existing at the relevant time and further submitted that after the new Act comes into operation during the pendency of the suit or the appeal, the new Act was riot applicable to the case. This was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Jai Narain v. Kishan Chand, reported in AIR 1969 SC 1165 . ( 22 ) THE next case that was relied upon this point was the case of Merwanji Nanabhby Merchant v. Union of India, AIR 1979 SC 1309 . In paragraph 9 of the said judgment it was held by the Supreme Court:-"it is an admitted fact that prior to the filing of the suit the respondents tenancy had been duly terminated by a proper notice to quit - a fact which has been averred in the plaint and not put in issue by the respondents and the plea raised is that the suit property being situate in the Cantonment Area of Kirkee the Bombay Rent Act, 1947 did not apply to the tenancy in question and as such the respondents enjoyed no protection of the said Act. This, latter aspect has to be deduced from the legal position obtaining in the matter at the relevant time. It is not disputed before us that the suit property is situated in the Cantonment Area of Kirkee, Poona. It is also no disputed that the suit property had bees appropriated by the Central Government orlease after issuance of an order dated December 16, 1929 under the Cantonment (House Accommodation) Act, 1923. . . . . On these admitted facts, in our view, the legal position clearly emerges that the respondents did not enjoy the protection of Bombay Rent Act, 1947 and the suit would have to be decided without reference to the provisions of the said Act. This would be so for two reasons: (i) suit had been filed on September 17, 1962 when the Bombay Rent Act, 1947 had not been extended to Kirkee Cantonment and even after the application of the said Act S. 50 of the Act XLVI of 1947 the suit property being appropriated accommodation under Cantonment (House Accommodation) Act, 1924 the tenancy thereof was exempt from the operation of the Bombay Rent Act, 1947. "in this connection reference was made to the judgment of this Court in the case of Dcbala Mukherjee v. Sujit alias Surjit Singh, (1977) 81 Cal WN 1007, wherein it was held by S. K. Datta, J. that in the case of a decree or order based on the exposition of law of a binding authority (in the present case, the ruling of the Supreme Court), the position is that such a decree or order was not contrary to law on the day the decree or the order was passed or made. Such a decree or order may on account of the subsequent exposition of law in a different manner by such binding authority, becomes contrary to law and this contains an error on the face of the record. Even so, such a decree or orders reaches finality in the course of the proceedings in so far as the court passing the decree or making the order is concerned and is valid, effective and binding on the parties. Even so, such a decree or orders reaches finality in the course of the proceedings in so far as the court passing the decree or making the order is concerned and is valid, effective and binding on the parties. As such decree or order attains finality in so far as the court gassing or making it is concerned, there will be no scope for its review under Order 47 of the Civil Procedure Code by reason of any subsequent exposition of else law in a different manner by the binding authority. ( 23 ) MR. Dasgupta next relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of h. Shiva Rao v. Cecilia Pereira, reported in AIR 1987 SC 248 . Mr. Dasgupta contended that the ratio of that judgment was wholly inapplicable in the facts and circumstances