CHANDRAKANTARAJ, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner has suffered an exparte order of disqualification passed by the 2nd respondent Deputy Registrar for Co-Operative societies Dharwar in appropriate proceedings under Section 29-C of the Karnataka Co-Operative Societies Act. In appeal filed under Section 106 of the said Act, the first-respondent Joint Regi strar has declined to allow an application filed by the petitioner for interim stay of the order appealed against. Against that order the present Revision Petition is directed inter alia contending, having admitted the appeal, the first respondent could not have declined to grant the interim relief prayed for. For that proposition the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of moolchand Yadav and Another v. Raza buland Sugar Company Ltd Rampur and others ( 1982 (3) SCC. 484 ). ( 2 ) WHAT fell for consideration by the supreme Court in the aforementioned case was the order of the High Court that had declined to grant the stay of the operation of the judgment and decree under appeal after having admitted the same. On those facts, the Supreme Court found fault with the High Court for not exercising its discretion properly under said Rule 5 having regard to the fact that the appeal having been admitted and decree if not stayed would visit the appellant with serious civil consequences such as ejection from the house which would in turn frustrate the very appeal itself and give room for multiplicity of proceedings for restitution etc. That cannot be of any assistance to the petitioner here where he is prosecuting statutory appeal not before a Court but a quasi judicial authority who is not bound by the Rules of Procedure which Civil Courts are required to follow. It is well settled principle of law when an authority or a court or a tribunal is to exercise its discretion and grant relief interim or otherwise, the mere fact that superior authority or a Court would have granted the relief had it been the authority exercising discretion is not a ground to interfere with the discretion already exercised by the subordinate authority or Court. That the appellate Court or the appellate authority would have entertained the interim prayer, is no reason, in other Words to compel in every case that stay must follow as a matter of course. That the appellate Court or the appellate authority would have entertained the interim prayer, is no reason, in other Words to compel in every case that stay must follow as a matter of course. If such an interpretatation is given to the decision of the supreme Court consequences would be that no discretion need be exercised when application for interim relief be made. All authorities are bound to grant it. Such is not the intention of the aforementioned decision. ( 3 ) THIS Court under Articles 226 as a rule will not interfere with interim orders unless exceptional case is made out for interference. In the instant case no such exceptional circumstances exist calling for this Court's interference. ( 4 ) HOWEVER on the submission made by Mr. Ranga Raju, learned Counsel for the petitioner that the term of office of the petitioner in the concerned committee of management of the Co-operative Societies is only upto December end of this year, an observation is made that the first respondent shall dispose of the appeal itself within one month from the date of production of the certified copy of this order before him. ( 5 ) SUBJECT to the above observation this writ petition is dismissed. --- *** --- .