JUDGMENT S.D. Agarwala, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, arising out of the proceedings under Sections 21(1)(a) and (b) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. The property in dispute is premises No. 13/321, Mamu Bhanja, Aligarh. The petitioner is occupying a portion of the said building consisting of two rooms, kitchen, bath-room, latrine and store etc. on the ground floor. Chandra Prakash, the petitioner, is a tenant of the premises. Dr. Himanshu Garg and Dr. Sudhanshu Garg, respondent Nos. 3 and 4, are the landlords. 3. An application was made for release both under Section 21(1)(a) as well as under Section 21(1)(b) of the Act. It was alleged in the application that the building originally belonged to one Smt. Angoori Devi, who was the grandmother of the landlords. A Will dated 17th May, 1975, was executed by her in their favour. Smt. Angoori Devi died on 16th May, 1979, and consequently, the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 became the owners and landlords of the premises in question after her death. 4. When the application was moved Dr. Himanshu Garg had passed his M.B.B.S. Examination and had completed his internship period and was doing a house job in the Jawaharlal Nehru Hospital of the Aligarh University. The second landlord, Dr. Sudhanshu Garg, is the younger brother was a student of third year in the M.B.B.S. in the same Medical College. Both of them were not married at that time. It is now not disputed that both have completed their medical education and both are married. The wives of both the landlords are also doctors. 5. The need, which was set up, was in regard to a nursing home, partly for residential purposes and partly for starting and running the medical profession and establishing a nursing home, X-ray plant and other necessary equipments. The further allegation was that the entire building, which consists of two floors; the ground floor, and the first floor are in a very dilapidated condition. Consequently, the further case set up was that the building required demolition and re-construction. 6. It is not disputed that besides the portion occupied by the petitioner there is one another shop occupied by one Lakshman and the rest of the building is in the possession of the landlords. Consequently, the further case set up was that the building required demolition and re-construction. 6. It is not disputed that besides the portion occupied by the petitioner there is one another shop occupied by one Lakshman and the rest of the building is in the possession of the landlords. In effect, consequently, the case, which was set up, was that the portion in occupation of the petitioner is required in order that the landlords may demolish the entire building and re-construct the same so that they may have a Nursing Home as well as residence in the said building, which was genuinely required by both the landlords as well as their wives who are doctors. 7. The application was contested by the petitioner on the ground that the need of the landlords was not bonafide and genuine. It was also urged that the Will was got executed by Smt. Angoori Devi in order to get the ejectment of the petitioner. It was further stated that the accommodation in occupation of the landlords, besides the accommodation in dispute, was sufficient enough wherein they could open their Nursing Home. In particular it was stated that the landlords were living with their father, who is also residing in a house in Vishnupuri and, consequently, that was sufficient for their requirement. The case, in effect, was that the landlords' need was not bonafide and genuine. 8. The prescribed Authority, after examining the evidence on the record, came to the conclusion that the need of the landlords was bonafide and genuine and, consequently, the application for release was allowed under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act, but the application for release was allowed under Section 21(1)(b) of the Act was dismissed. Against the said judgment two appeals were filed under Section 22 of the Act. Appeal No. 49 of 1983 was filed by the landlords and appeal No. 55 of 1983 was filed by the tenant Chandra Prakash. Both these appeals were disposed of by the Appellate Authority on 7th May, 1984. This judgment has been impugned in the present petition by the tenant. 9. I have heard Sri K.M. Dayal, Senior Advocate, on behalf of the petitioner and Sri V.K. Gupta, Advocate on behalf of the respondents. 10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has raised many submissions. Both these appeals were disposed of by the Appellate Authority on 7th May, 1984. This judgment has been impugned in the present petition by the tenant. 9. I have heard Sri K.M. Dayal, Senior Advocate, on behalf of the petitioner and Sri V.K. Gupta, Advocate on behalf of the respondents. 10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has raised many submissions. The first submission raised is that it was the case of the petitioner that the landlords have got an open land just in front of the house in dispute where the landlords could construct their Nursing Home. The Appellate Court acted illegally and with material irregularity in exercise or its jurisdiction in not considering this material aspect and, the finding in regard to bonafide need is vitiated in law. 11. The second submission is that according to Clause (ii) of third proviso to Section 21(1) of the Act, since the building in occupation of the petitioner was a residential building, release cannot be sought for occupation for business purposes and, consequently, the release application is not maintainable in law. 12. The third submission raised by the learned counsel is that, admittedly, one Lakshman is a tenant in one shop. The landlords require the portion in occupation of the petitioner for demolition and re-construction. Since a portion of the shop is in occupation of a tenant, the building could be not demolished and re-constructed and, consequently, the granting of the release application is clearly illegal. 13. The forth submission of the learned counsel is that the accommodation already in occupation of the landlords was sufficient enough for carrying on the object for the release application has been filed and as such, the finding in regard to bonafide need is vitiated in law. 14. The last submission raised by the learned counsel is that the finding in regard to the comparison of the hardship of the parties is also vitiated, as the Court below has based its finding on irrelevant consideration. 15. 14. The last submission raised by the learned counsel is that the finding in regard to the comparison of the hardship of the parties is also vitiated, as the Court below has based its finding on irrelevant consideration. 15. In regard to the first submission made by the learned counsel, at the very outset, it may be stated that this question was not argued, in particular, by the petitioner's counsel before the Appellate Authority, though this fact was stated in the written statement, it was specifically stated that the landlords possessed a piece of land in front of the Hamirganj, just in front of the accommodation in dispute, which is situated on the road side and will be most suitable for the proposed clinic and residence. 16. Annexure CA XI" to the counter-affidavit of Dr. Himanshu Garg, filed in this Court is an affidavit of Dr. Himanshu Garg, who is one of the landlords. In Paragraph 11, it has been stated that the landlords do not own or possess any piece of land in front of the accommodation in dispute. It has been further stated that, originally, the alleged piece of land belonged to the great maternal a grandfather of Dr. Himanshu Garg's father Sri Ganpat Lal, maternal grandfather was the owner of one third share therein and the remaining two third share therein belonged to the brother of Ganpat Lal. The landlords have no share in the aforesaid piece of land at all and, as such they have no right to make any construction on that plot of land. This fact was not controverted before the authorities below. In this Court also, in Paragraph 15 of the counter affidavit, it has been stated that the land lying in front of the house in dispute is not available to the landlords. Their father is only a co-sharer to the extent of one-third, the total area of the land is about 200 sq. yards and if at all the share of the landlord's father would be only about 70 sq. yards. No partition has taken place and, as such, even the 70 sq. yards of lands, which, if at all his father has not been demarcated and, as such, it is not available for construction. yards and if at all the share of the landlord's father would be only about 70 sq. yards. No partition has taken place and, as such, even the 70 sq. yards of lands, which, if at all his father has not been demarcated and, as such, it is not available for construction. It does appear that because of the facts alleged above, since the land alleged to be in front of the house in dispute was not available to the landlords, this was the reason why this question was not urged before the Appellate Authority. I have examined the submission on merits, I do not find any land with a clear title owned by the landlords is available in front of the house in dispute where the Nursing Home can be constructed. In the circumstances, I do not find any force in the first submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 17. The second submission relates to the bar created by the provisions of Section 21 of the Act itself. Clause (ii) of the third proviso to Section 21(1)(a) of the Act provides that no application under Clause (a) shall be entertained in the case of a residential building for occupation of business purposes. This clause came up for interpretation in this Court in the case of Smt. Ramkali v. IVth Additional District and Sessions Judge Kanpur and others, 1985(2) ARC 385. It was held in this case that the expression occupation for business purposes, could not include in it a case where a person requires a house for residence as well as for his office and, consequently, in such a case, the application cannot be thrown out as one for occupation for solely business purposes. I respectfully agree with the decision given by Hon'ble R.M. Sahai, J. In the instant case, the application was made for the purpose of residential as well as of establishing & Nursing Home. It cannot be said, therefore, that the application was made for occupation for business purposes only. In this petition, the respondent landlord have filed a true copy of the plan, which they have got sanctioned for construction of a Nursing Home. I examined that plan. In the portion in occupation of the petitioner, therefore, which is sought to be released, the respondent landlords proposed to make living room of the doctors. It is basically for residential purposes. I examined that plan. In the portion in occupation of the petitioner, therefore, which is sought to be released, the respondent landlords proposed to make living room of the doctors. It is basically for residential purposes. The rest of the building, which is in possession of the landlords, is proposed to be used for the purposes of a Nursing Home. 18. It is urged by the learned counsel that in the map, the portion in dispute is shown as living rooms for the doctors but, actually, it is a part of the Nursing Home for those doctors who wait for the call of the patients, but, in any case, they are allocated for the residence of the doctors and for no other purposes. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the application for release was made for occupation for business purposes. Release is sought for residential cum-Nursing Home. The release application is, therefore, maintainable in law. 19. In regard to the third submission made by the learned counsel, reliance has been placed on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gautam Chand Jain and others v. Sushila Kumari Jain and others, AIR 1986 Supreme Court 513. In the said case, two adjacent shop rooms were given on rent to two shopkeepers. The landlady sought the release in respect of both shop rooms on the ground that the shop rooms will be rebuilt into a convenient place for housing the clinic of her son. The Prescribed Authority granted release of both the shops, but the Appellate Authority released only one room. The result was that only one shop was released and the other was occupied by the tenant and, consequently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court took the view that the claim made by the landlady stood completely destroyed by the fact that one shop was not released in her favour. 20. In the instant case, from the plan, which has been filed in this case it is clear that the shop, which is in occupation of Lakshman, is in corner of the building. The other portion of the building where the Nursing Home is to be built can be built without any construction. Even the residential portion of the doctors can be built on the said land. The other portion of the building where the Nursing Home is to be built can be built without any construction. Even the residential portion of the doctors can be built on the said land. In view of the facts of this case, in my opinion, the purpose for which the landlords have sought release would not be defeated even if Lakshman remains as a tenant in one of the shops. In any case, in Paragraph 30 of the counter affidavit of Dr. Himanshu Garg, one of the landlords, it has been categorically stated that so far as the portion of Lakshman is concerned, it is in the corner and he has assured the landlords that he will vacate the accommodation as soon as the landlords start their work of construction after getting possession from the petitioner. It has been further stated that even without the eviction of Lakshman, the building can be demolished and re-constructed. Even if for the sake of arguments, it is taken that Lakshman does not vacate the accommodation, as promised, then it is open to the landlords to move a release application so far as Lakshman is concerned. There is yet no order to the effect that the portion in occupation of Lakshman cannot be released. In view of the distinguishing facts of this case, the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Gautam Chand Jain and others v. Smt. Sushila Kumari and others, (supra) does not apply to the facts of the present case. I, consequently, do not find substance in the third submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 21. In regard to the fourth submission, it was pleaded by the petitioner in Paragraph 11 of the written statement that the landlords are admittedly, living with their father Sri Shiv Kumar Garg in Mohalla Vishnupuri, Aligarh, in a most beautiful and suitable kothi, having a piece of land and, in fact, if they needed to start their clinic or residence, they could easily construct the same on the said piece of land. This fact was emphatically denied by the landlords. It was stated in paragraph 21 of his affidavit dated 29th July, 1981, that the open land alleged to be available in Vishnupuri is the lawn of the said house and according to the lease-deed, no construction could be raised over it. This fact was emphatically denied by the landlords. It was stated in paragraph 21 of his affidavit dated 29th July, 1981, that the open land alleged to be available in Vishnupuri is the lawn of the said house and according to the lease-deed, no construction could be raised over it. The lease-deed of the Vishnupuri house is also on the record as Annexure 'CA-XII'. From the conditions in the lease-deed, it is apparent that the said house cannot be used for any other purpose except the residential purpose. In the circumstance, it cannot be said that the open piece of land in Vishnupuri, which was only 70' x 47' and is only a lawn, can be used for construction, which the landlords require. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the finding on this question has been recorded by the lower Appellate Court is, in any manner vitiated in law. The fourth submission, therefore, made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, in my opinion is not well founded. 22. In regard to the fifth and the last submission made by the learned counsel I have gone through the finding in regard to comparative hardship. I do not find any illegality in the same. It is based on relevant considerations. Learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to point out a specific illegality in the said finding. In the circumstances, the last submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner also, in my opinion, does not have any substance. 23. On the date of hearing of this petition, an application was filed by the petitioner stating therein that Dr. Himanshu Garg Respondent No. 3, alongwith his wife, Dr. Bindu Garg, has opened a Clinic-cum-Nursing Home in the name and style of City Clinic Maternity Nursing Home at B.S. College, G.T. Road Aligarh, on 10th November, 1985, and consequently, the need set up in the release application, has ceased to exist. In reply to this application, a counter-affidavit has been filed by Dr. Sudhanshu Garg, wherein it has been stated that since Dr. Sudhanshu Garg had completed his M.D. in the year 1984 and was without a job, he was advised to make a temporary arrangement for starting a clinic. In reply to this application, a counter-affidavit has been filed by Dr. Sudhanshu Garg, wherein it has been stated that since Dr. Sudhanshu Garg had completed his M.D. in the year 1984 and was without a job, he was advised to make a temporary arrangement for starting a clinic. It has been further stated that he alongwith his wife, who is also a doctor, took on rent a small premises measuring 30' x 20' as a temporary measure for starting a small clinic. The said premises has been taken on an exorbitant rent of Rs. 900/- per month and that this arrangement is only a make shift arrangement. In fact, this subsequent event itself proves the bonafide need of the landlord. This circumstance goes against the petitioner. His case, that the landlords do not require the accommodation, is believed by this action on the part of the respondent landlords. It is further clear consequently that, infact, the landlord respondents, are doctors and are without job, consequently they require the accommodation in question. In the circumstances, the subsequent event, in fact, has no effect on the release application. On the other hand, it establishes more clearly the bonafide need of the respondent landlords. 24. In the result, the petition fails. It is accordingly, dismissed. The parties are directed to bear their own costs. 25. Learned Counsel for the petitioner prays for three month's time to vacate the premises. He further states that his client undertakes to vacate the said premises after the expiry of three months and to handover vacant possession of the said premises to the respondent-landlords. The petitioner is granted three month's time to vacate the premises in dispute, provided he gives an undertaking before the Prescribed Authority within a month from today that he will vacate the premises immediately after three months and will handover vacant possession of the premises in dispute to the respondent landlords. In case no such undertaking is given the release order shall be enforced forthwith.