JUDGMENT Nainar Sundaram, J. 1. The matter arises under the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act 43 of 1981 hereinafter referred to as the Act. The appellant is the owner of the lands in respect of which proceedings under the Act got initiated and they culminated in the publication of the final statement under Section 12 of the Act on 30.7.1980. As against the final statement, the appellant preferred a revision to the first respondent under Section 82 of the Act. The final statement was served on the appellant on 29.8.1980. The revision to the first respondent was preferred on 16.12.1980. As per Rule 62(i) along with the proviso of the rules framed under the Act, the time limit for preferring a revision under Section 82 of the Act would be sixty days from the date of service of the final statement, namely, 29.8.1980 and the first respondent would have the power to condone the delay of thirty days, if sufficient cause therefor is made out. The admitted position is the preferring of the revision by the appellant on 16.12.1980 was beyond this period of ninety days. However, the revision was entertained by the first respondent and stay was granted pending the final disposal of the revision. According to the appellant, his counsel, who preferred the revision, was waiting for an intimation with regard to a date for submitting arguments on the revision, but his counsel got on 19.5.81 the order dated 14.5.1981 of the first respondent dismissing the revision as time barred. Complaining that this is against the principles of natural justice and further putting forth a plea that under Rule 62(ii) of the Rules, the first respondent ought to have exercised suo motu powers of revision, the appellant came to this Court by way of W.P. No. 3177 of 1981, impugning the order of the first respondent dated 14-5-1981. Balasubramanyan, J. who heard the writ petition for admission, found that the revision preferred by the appellant was beyond time, even taking note of the power of condonation available to the first respondent under the proviso to Rule 62(i) of the Rules, and hence did not find a warrant to interfere in writ jurisdiction and the learned single Judge dismissed the writ petition. The writ appeal is directed against the order of the learned single Judge. 2. Mr. The writ appeal is directed against the order of the learned single Judge. 2. Mr. Mohan Parasaran, learned Counsel for the appellant, would submit that valuable rights of property are involved in the matter and the points taken in the revision are substantive in nature, requiring investigation into and adjudication over them on merits; and the appellant was never given to understand and had no notice that the revision, which was entertained earlier, would be thrown out subsequently, on the technical ground of bar of limitation and if the appellant had an inkling about the attitude of the first respondent on this question, he would have certainly pleaded for the exercise of suo motu power of revision, and the pronouncements of this Court, in matters involving arguable points, always favoured a decision on merits rather than throwing out the revision on the technical plea of bar of limitation. 3. In Sri Muthu Ganapadigal Veda Patasala, Thiruvayaru, rep. by its Trustee Mahalakshmiammal, v. Land Commissioner, Board of Revenue, Madras and Ors. W.P.5842 of 1979 order dated 13-11-1981, one of us, finding that substantive rights of parties were involved and the points raised were arguable, while dismissing the writ petition preferred against the rejection of a revision filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation, suggested that the suo motu power of revision under Rule 62(ii) of the Rules could be exercised, and observed as follows: Since there is a possibility that the petitioner would come within the category of Section 2(1)(ii) of the Act, as per the pronouncement of this Court referred to above, in my view, this is a fit case where the first respondent could consider the exercise of suo motu powers of revision under Rule 62(ii) of the Rules framed under the Act. This order was taken in appeal in The Land Commissioner, Board of Revenue, Madras and Anr. v. Sri Muthu Ganapadigal Veda Patasala, Thiruvayaru, rep. This order was taken in appeal in The Land Commissioner, Board of Revenue, Madras and Anr. v. Sri Muthu Ganapadigal Veda Patasala, Thiruvayaru, rep. by the trustee Mahalakshmiammal 100 L.W.441:1986 T.L.N.J. 145, pronouncement concisely reported in 1986 T.L.N.J. 146, and a Bench of this Court consisting of Chandurkar, C.J., and Srinivasan, J., stressed the significance and the importance of rendering a decision on merits in matters involving substantive rights and arguable points in the following terms: Now it is difficult to see how the Land Commissioner who was functioning under the provisions of the Act could find any fault with the directions given by the learned Judge. The power of the authorities under the Act is to determine the surplus lands in accordance with the provisions of the Act. In other words, it is the bounden duty of the authorities to determine the surplus lands only in the case of owners who are covered by the provisions of the Act. If the Act itself does not apply in the case of any particular land, the orders determining the surplus land in the case of such lands would amount to acting without jurisdiction. The Land Commissioner as the highest officer in the hierarchy of officers under the Act must, therefore, consider it his duty to see that the Act is properly implemented. A proper implementation of the Act will also take in the fact that it is being made applicable only to such cases as fall within the four corners of the Act. If the Land Commissioner comes across instances or where instances are brought to his notice that the Act is being made appealable to lands which are not covered by the provisions of the Act, it becomes his duty to exercise his revisional jurisdiction suo motu and to remedy the situation which is brought about by the subordinate officers ignoring the express mandate of the Act that it is not applicable in respect of certain lands.... As we have pointed out above, since the authorities under the Act are entitled to deal with only those lands which fall within the purview of the Act, the learned Judge was, in our view, right when he expressed the view that the Land Commissioner could consider the question of exercise of his revisional jurisdiction under Section 82 read with Rule 62(ii) of the Rules. The Bench opined that the direction given in the writ petition should have been in good course accepted by the Land Commissioner and the Bench thought it fit to give a positive directions as follows: However, we are giving a positive direction to the Land Commissioner to apply his mind to the question whether the lands belonging to the Trust in question are not liable to be declared surplus under the Act. This he shall do after giving sufficient opportunity to the respondent to put forth the case of the trust. It will be open to the Land Commissioner to direct this enquiry to be made by the authorised Officer in case he thinks it necessary. 4. Coming to the facts of the present case, the appellant has pleaded that his counsel was only awaiting an intimation for a date to submit his arguments in support of the revision, which earlier got entertained and pending which stay was also granted, and the appellant had no notice about the attitude of the respondent to dismiss the revision as time barred, and the appellant was not even called upon to make his say on this question. We have no reason to disbelieve the said statement especially even at this appellate stage no counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents, the possibility of the appellant pleading for the exercise of suo motu power of revision on the part of the first respondent, putting forth a justification therefor on the facts of the case, cannot be ruled out. The appellant has in his revision put forth substantive and arguable points. He would contend that four items of lands shown in paragraph 3 of the revision petition belong exclusively to his major son and they should not be included in the holdings of the appellant. The appellant would contend that the said items do not belong to a joint family and no notice had gone to the major son of the appellant with regard to the proceedings under the Act in respect of those items. The appellant would further contend that seven items of lands shown in paragraph 4 of the revision petition belonged to his late wife and they had devolved on his married daughter and they should not be included in the holdings of the appellant. The appellant would further contend that seven items of lands shown in paragraph 4 of the revision petition belonged to his late wife and they had devolved on his married daughter and they should not be included in the holdings of the appellant. The appellant would put forth an alternative plea that if these seven items should be counted as coming within the holding of the appellant, only one-third of them should be included as done with regard to other items. The appellant would also say that there was no indication in the draft statement of the lands to be included within the ceiling area and the lands to be acquired as excess. The appellant also wants an opportunity to point out the lands to be retained by him. We are not in a position to brush aside the above points as lacking in substance. They require investigation into and adjudication upon merits. This is a fit case warranting the exercise of suo motu powers of revision by the respondent. It would be inappropriate to throw out a revision of the present nature on a technical plea of bar of limitation, applying the rigour of Rule 62(i). In our view, there should be a consideration of the revision on merits by the first respondent and there ought not to have been a throwing out of the revision on the technical plea of the bar of limitation under Rule 62(i). The first respondent ought to have exercised the suo motu power of revision under Rule 62(ii) of the Rules admittedly had not lapsed at the time when the revision was preferred and when the impugned order of the first respondent was passed. The period during which the proceedings got prosecuted before this Court naturally should stand excluded. Accordingly, we allow this writ appeal; set aside the order of the learned single Judge; allow the writ petition; quash the impugned order of the respondent and remit the matter back to the file of the first respondent for him to consider the revision on merits after affording an opportunity to the appellant to make his say in the matter. We make no order as to costs both in the writ petition and in, this writ appeal.