Judgment BINOD KUMAR ROY, J. 1. This is a petition by the defendants-first party against an order of transfer of suit for partition in which till 25th November, 1988 seventy-four witnesses were examined by the petitioners, after the plaintiff (opposite party herein) had led here evidence. On that day the plaintiff filed an application before the District Judge, East Champaran, Motihari (who retired on 30th November, 1988) alleging certain allegations against the trial court and claiming hereself to a helpless lady, but without serving its copy on the petitioners or intimating the court that she has filed such an application. On 26-11-1988 the learned District Judge, without, issuing any notice to the petitioners, even though, they were impleaded as opposite party to the transfer application and/or calling for any explanation from the trial court, taking into account that the petitioner is a lady transferred the suit to the court of Subordinate Judge, IV, Motihari for its disposal. On 28-11-1988 three other witnesses, namely D. Ws. 75, 76 and 77, were also examined by the petitioners before the Subordinate Judge I, and on that also the opposite party did not inform the court or the petitioner, of the transfer order. 2. The defendants first party moved this Court on 14-12-1988 challenging the validity, legality, and propriety of the ex-parte order of transfer of the suit from the court of Subordinate Judge I, to Subordinate Judge VI, Motihari. 3. The opposite party filed a caveat and on 19-12-1988 desired to be heard before passing any order in this civil revision application. 4. Both parties expressed that the civil revision application is such which can be disposed of finally at this stage and accordingly they were heard. 5. Mr. Tarakant Jha, learned Counsel submitted that despite a Division Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of Baijnath Prasad Singh V/s. Dasrath Prasad Singh and Ors. -- that the provision as to notice of application under Sec. 24 is imperative and an order for transfer without notice is an order which even if not without jurisdiction is tainted with material irregularity and must be set aside. Mr. Jha also emphasised that even though opposite party had filed a transfer application on 25th of November, 1988 she made no grievance before the Subordinate Judge I, when the petitioners were examining their seventy-fourth witness and that even though the impugned order was passed on 26-11-1988. Mr. Jha also emphasised that even though opposite party had filed a transfer application on 25th of November, 1988 she made no grievance before the Subordinate Judge I, when the petitioners were examining their seventy-fourth witness and that even though the impugned order was passed on 26-11-1988. She again maintained complete silence as a result of which the Subordinate Judge had proceeded to examine three further witnesses namely D. Ws. 75, 76 and 77 on behalf of the petitioners on 28-11-1988 i.e. two days after the passing of the transfer order. He further submitted that the learned District Judge was not oblivious of the fact that out of the defendants, two of them were also ladies and that simply because one of the party is a lady that cannot be a ground for transfer. 6. Mr. Yogesh Chandra Verma, learned Counsel for the opposite party could not satisfy me as to how the opposite party lost faith in court merely by saying of the petitioners that they will win the case and that they are close to the Subordinate Judge who had decided one or two cases in favour of Syed Abdul Gaffar-father of petitioner No. 1 even assuming them to be correct. He also could not satisfy me as to how an order of transfer could be passed on a ground that the applicant is a lady specially when her husband is alive and it is not her case that she is having any strained relation with her. Mr. Verma also failed to point out to me as to when the opposite party learnt of the alleged saying or declaration of the opposite party as asserted by her in paragraph-3 of her transfer petition. He also miserably failed to defend the conduct of the opposite party when despite order of transfer passed on 26-11-1988, she did nothing to communicate the trial court of the same and allowed examination of further three witnesses on 28-11-1988 which is apparent from Annexure-1 to this revision application which is an order sheet containing orders passed in the suit from 16-9-1988 to 29-11-1988. 7. 7. It has been held by Honble Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. V/s. Mohammad Nooh AIR 1958 SC 86 (paragraph 11) and, following that decision, by this Court in 1979 B.L.J.R. 94 to the effect that an order which has been passed violating principles of natural justice is an ex-facie nullity. 8. While dealing with a transfer matter under the Code of Criminal Procedure the Hon ble Supreme Court in Mrs. Maneka Sanjay Gandhi V/s. Mrs. Rani Jethmalani -- observed thus: Assurance of a fair trial is the first imperative of the dispensation of justice and the central criterion for the Court to consider when a motion for transfer is made is not the hypersensiticity or relative convenience of a party or easy availability of legal services or the like mini grievances. Something more substantial, more compelling, more imperilling from the point of view of public justice and its attendant environment is necessitous, if the Court is to exercise its power of transfer. This is the cardinal principle although the circumstances may be myrid and vary from case to case. I am of the view that these guidelines also apply to transfer of civil cases as well even though there may be hardly any case involving public justice in its wider sense, Mr. Verma could not bring to my notice any compelling circumstance or substantial material to justify the transfer of the suit even by me. 9. For the reasons aforementioned, I set aside the impunged order and reject the petition of transfer filed by the opposite party. In the circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs. Since the suit in question is an old one I further direct the trial Court (Subordinate Judge I, Motihari) to dispose it of expeditiously taking up day to day hearing without giving opportunity to the parties to have adjournments on their asking and to take into account changed provisions in Order XVII of the Code of Civil Procedure.