Order This is an application filed under Sec. 482, Cr.P.C., to quash the proceedings in C.C.No.455 of 1986 on the file of the Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Ponneri. 2. The Food Inspector, Thiruvottiyur Municipality, respondent herein, on 7.8.1986 at about 9.45 a.m. inspected the canteen of Carborandum Universal Ltd., situate in T.H. Road, Thiruvottiyur, Madras. He took a sample of 900 ml. of buffalo milk. He sent the same for analysis in accordance with the rules. The Food Inspector, on receipt of the report of the Public Analyst, that the sample as taken was not conforming to the standard prescribed under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), launched the prosecution against the petitioners 1 to 4/accused 1 to 4. The first petitioner is the Carborandum Universal Ltd., the second petitioner is the Special Director of the Company. The third petitioner is the manufacturing Manager. The further petitioner is the Employee-relations Manager. The fifth accused is the contractor running the canteen. The sixth accused is the vendor and agent of the canteen. Nothing had been specifically stated by way of averments in the Complaint as regards the person in charge of and responsible to the Company for the conduct of its business of canteen and all these petitioners and two other accused - accused 5 and 6, had been impleaded as accused in their personal capacity and the respective positions, they occupy. 3. As a matter of fact, the second petitioner in this case, had filed an affidavit specifically mentioning that the petitioners were not in charge of and responsible to the conduct of the business of the canteen. Despite such an affidavit having been filed, the other side has not at all disputed the averment made in the affidavit by filing a counter. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would contend with all vehemence and force that the launching of the prosecution by the Food Inspector before the Court below against the petitioners, and two others for violation of the provisions of the Act without specifically stating the person in charge of and responsible to the conduct of the business of the canteen is not maintainable and that the proceedings before the Court below are liable to be quashed on this ground alone. The edifice of factual foundation for the construction of such an argument is traceable to the absence of averments made in the Complaint. Learned counsel for the petitioners took me in detail to the averments made in the Complaint. The averments made in the Complaint, in fact, did not at all reveal anything as all or any of the petitioners being incharge of and responsible to the conduct of the business of the canteen. The absence of such an allegation gets reinforced by the filing of an affidavit of the second petitioner in this regard, specifically stating that none of the petitioners was in charge of and responsible to the conduct of the business of the canteen. On such a foundation, the question which now resolves for consideration is as to whether the petitioners, by virtue of their position in the Company, can be held liable, in the absence of specific averments in the Complaint as to all or any of them being incharge of and responsible to the conduct of the business of the canteen. 5. Learned counsel at this juncture would draw my attention to the decision in V.B. Sivalinga Chettiar v. Labour Officer, Nellore V.B. Sivalinga Chettiar v. Labour Officer, Nellore (1986) 59 Comp. Cas. 701. The observations made at page 705, herein are as follows: “I have gone through the Complaint. Under Sec. 29, in addition to the Company, every person who at the time of offence was committed, was incharge of and was responsible to the Company, for the conduct of the business of the Company, can be prosecuted. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the Complainant to allege that the person against whom the Complaint was lodged was incharge of and was responsible to the Company for the conduct of the business. If that allegation is there in the Complaint, later on it is a matter of proof whether that allegation is correct or not. But even without an allegation that the person was incharge of and was responsible for the conduct of business of the Company, the Complaint cannot be maintained. These are all criminal proceedings and every technical violation should go in favour of the accused. I am unable to accept the contention of the learned Public Prosecutor that this is a matter which has to be considered at the time of trial having regard to the evidence to be adduced. These are all criminal proceedings and every technical violation should go in favour of the accused. I am unable to accept the contention of the learned Public Prosecutor that this is a matter which has to be considered at the time of trial having regard to the evidence to be adduced. That is so, if an allegation is there to that effect in the Complaint. But, without there being a foundation and without there being a pleading, there cannot be a proof. In the case of offences by Companies, in order to fasten a liability on a director, it must be clearly alleged in the Complaint that the said person was incharge of and was responsible for the conduct of the business. This omission on the part of the prosecution is fatal to the case.” 6. This section, though does not construe the meaning of the phraseology of ‘person incharge of and responsible to the conduct of the business’ under the provisions of the Act, yet a similar provision in Sec. 29 of the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 came to be considered. Sec. 29 of the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 is in pari materia with the provisions of Sec. 17 of the Art. As such the interpretation given by the learned Judge therein on the aforesaid phraseology is applicable to the consideration of the case like the present one under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. As adverted to earlier, there is no factual foundation of pleading in the Complaint pointing out that all or any of the petitioners is incharge of and responsible to the conduct of the business of the canteen. In the absence of such pleading, it is not possible to come to any definite conclusion that all or any of them was in charge of and responsible to the conduct of the business of the canteen on the relevant date in question. But, the learned Public Prosecutor would however intrude and state that though there is no specific pleading in the Complaint, yet, it is permissible for the prosecuting agency to let in evidence during the course of trial as to the person actually incharge of and responsible, for the conduct of the business of the canteen. But, the learned Public Prosecutor would however intrude and state that though there is no specific pleading in the Complaint, yet, it is permissible for the prosecuting agency to let in evidence during the course of trial as to the person actually incharge of and responsible, for the conduct of the business of the canteen. This sort of an argument, as raised by the learned Public Prosecutor, in this case, was in fact raised in the decision referred to above and the same had been rejected. The reasoning given there was that without there being a foundation and without there being a pleading, there cannot be any proof. The same reason holds good here. Therefore, the argument of the learned Public Prosecutor or on this aspect of the matter cannot at all be countenanced. The omission on the part of the prosecution on this aspect of the matter is fatal to the case of the prosecution. 7. My attention is also invited to the decision in Smt. Manibai and another v. State of Maharashtra Smt. Manibai and another v. State of Maharashtra A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 434 wherein it is held as follows: “For the sale of adulterated coconut oil by P, a co-licensee of the shop, his mother M, who was not in charge of nor was she actually conducting the business at the shop, cannot be held liable merely because she was the licensee of the shop. Even assuming that the business was owned by a firm or an association of individuals and M was a partner of the firm or a member of the association, M could not be liable for the sale under Sec. 17(1) as she was not incharge of, and responsible for the conduct of the business.” 8. In view of what has been stated above, I am of opinion that it is not possible to fasten or mulct criminal liability for violation or refraction of any of the provisions of the Act on any of the petitioners in the absence of specific pleading in the Complaint pointing out that they were the persons incharge of and responsible to the conduct of the business of the canteen and in such circumstances, it goes without saying that the prosecution so launched against the petitioners is not maintainable and the proceedings are liable to be quashed. 9. In the circumstances, the petition deserves to be allowed. 10. 9. In the circumstances, the petition deserves to be allowed. 10. In the result, the petition is allowed, quashing the proceedings in C.C. No. 455 of 1986 on the file of the Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Ponneri, in so far as it relates to the petitioners, that is, accused 1 to 4. B.S. ----- Petition allowed.