JUDGMENT S.D. Agarwala 1. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arising out of proceedings under Section 21 (1) (a) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Reg. of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. The property in dispute is the house situated in Etah. The same was purchased by Smt. Savitri Devi, the landlady on 3rd of April, 1972 from one Girja Shanker. Though the actual sale deed was executed on 3rd April, 1972, it was actually registered on 16-11-1972. On 13th July, 1972, an application was filed under section 3 of U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the old Act) for permission to file a suit for eviction of the petitioners on the ground of personal need. After coming into force of the present Act, the application was amended and it was to be considered an application under section 21 (1) (a) of the Act. The Prescribed Authority by an order dated 23rd August, 1980, allowed the release application holding that the need of the landlady was bonafide and genuine and further holding that comparative hardship of the landlady would be greater than the petitioners-tenant. Aggrieved by the decision of the Prescribed Authority dated 23rd August, 1980, an appeal was filed under section 22 of the Act. The appeal was dismissed by the IVth Additional District Judge, Etah on 24th March, 1983. The petitioners have now challenged the orders dated 23rd August, 1980 and 24th March, 1983 by means of the present petition. I have heard Sri V. K. Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri Dhurva Narain, learned counsel for the landlady-respondent no. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the application made under section 21 (1) (a) of the Act was not maintainable as the application had been made before the expiry of three years from the date of purchase of the house in dispute by the landlady. He has further urged that the findings in regard to the bonaflde need and hardship were based on irrelevant considerations and consequently, the findings are vitiated in law. 3. In regard to the first submission, it is not disputed that actually the sale deed was executed in favour of the landlady on 3rd April, 1972. He has further urged that the findings in regard to the bonaflde need and hardship were based on irrelevant considerations and consequently, the findings are vitiated in law. 3. In regard to the first submission, it is not disputed that actually the sale deed was executed in favour of the landlady on 3rd April, 1972. It is also not disputed that the sale deed was registered on 16th of November, 1972. The question, therefore, arises as to which date is to be taken as the date of purchase of the property, namely, the date of actual execution of the sale deed or the date of the registration of the sale deed. 4. Section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908 specifically provides that a registered document shall operate from the time from which it would have commenced to operate if no registration thereof had been required or made and not from the time of its registration. This section is, therefore, specific. In view of this specific Section of the Registration Act, it is clear that the date on which the document was executed, has to be taken as the date from which it shall operate, though it might have been registered subsequently. This view of mine finds support from the decision by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Nand Ballabh Gurnani v. Maqbool Begum, 1980 AWC 329. In the instant case, it is clear that the date of the execution of the sale deed is 3rd April, 1972. The sale deed would take into effect, therefore, from 3rd April, 1972, and, consequently, when the application under section 3 of the old Act was converted into an application under section 21 (1) (a) of the Act, three years had already elapsed. The view taken by the lower appellate authority in this regard, consequently, is in accordance with law. The submission made by learned counsel for the petitioners, is, therefore not substantiated. 5. There is one other aspect to be considered in respect of this submission. The view taken by the lower appellate authority in this regard, consequently, is in accordance with law. The submission made by learned counsel for the petitioners, is, therefore not substantiated. 5. There is one other aspect to be considered in respect of this submission. Section 21 (1) (b), First Proviso is as follows :- " Provided that where the building was in occupation of a tenant since before its purchase by the landlord, such purchase being made after the commencement of this Act, no application shall be entertained on the grounds, mentioned in clause (a), unless the period of three years has elapsed since the date of such purchase and the landlord is given a notice in that behalf to the tenant not less than six months before such application, and as such notice may be given even before the expiration of the aforesaid period of three years. " In this proviso, it is clearly stated that the purchase should have been made after the commencement of this Act. The Act commenced on 15th July, 1972. I have already held that the date of purchase in the instant case should be taken as 3rd April, 1972. In this view of the matter, the proviso is not at all applicable in the instant case. Consequently, it cannot be said that the application for release was not maintainable because of the Proviso. 6. In regard to the second submission made by learned counsel for the petitioners challenging the finding recorded by the Prescribed Authority as well as the Appellate Authority, I have gone through the findings. I do not find any legal infirmity in the said findings. The Prescribed Authority as well as the appellate court have found that the landlady herself is living in the rented house. It has also been found that the landlady has six members in her family and that the rented accommodation in occupation of the landlady is not sufficient. It has been further found that the accommodation is even not sufficient for the children who are studying in higher classes. IN view of these facts, it cannot be said that the need of the landlady is not bonafide. The finding in regard to the hardship also, in my view, does not suffer from any legal infirmity. It has been further found that the accommodation is even not sufficient for the children who are studying in higher classes. IN view of these facts, it cannot be said that the need of the landlady is not bonafide. The finding in regard to the hardship also, in my view, does not suffer from any legal infirmity. The findings recorded by the courts below are findings of fact and no case has been made out for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel for the petitioners, however, has urged that since the petitioners are staying in this property from a very long time, sufficient time may be granted to them to vacate the premises. This prayer, in my opinion, is justified. Learned counsel for the petitioners has further stated that his clients are prepared to give an undertaking that they shall vacate the premises immediately after six months and handover vacant possession to the landlady-respondent no. 3. 7. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed. The parties are directed to bear their own costs. The petitioners are granted six months to vacate the premises and handover vacant possession to the respondent no. 3- landlady, provided they give an undertaking to the effect within a month from today before the authority concerned that immediately after expiry of six months from today they shall vacate the premises and handover vacant possession of the premises to the respondent no 3 landlady. IN case no undertaking is given, the release order would be enforced forthwith. Petition dismissed.