JUDGMENT S.D.Agarwala 1. These are two writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arising out of proceedings under section 16 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. The property in dispute is flat no. 2, Rajendra Building, Shanti Nagar, Railway Road, Meerut. On 24th August, 1980, Dr. M. L. Nigam purchased this flat for a consideration of Rs. 50,000/-. When this flat was purchased, it was lying vacant and proceedings for allotment were going on in respect of the same. Consequently, Dr. Nigam moved an application for release of the said accommodation under section 10 of the Act. There were many applicants for allotment of the said flat. Ultimately by an order dated 1st November, 1980, the release application moved by Dr. Nigam was rejected and the flat was released in favour of Shiv Kumar Sharma. The order dated 1st November, 1980 rejecting the release application and also the order allotting the premises in favour of Shiv Kumar Sharma was challenged in revisions by Dr. Nigam as well as by one Ashok Kumar, who was one of the applicant for allotment of the said flat. Both the revisions being revision no. 432 of 1980 and 458 of 1980 were filed under section 18 of the Act, which were allowed by the revisional court i.e. VIIIth Additional District Judge, Meerut by separate orders dated 3rd August, 1985. Writ Petition No. 12123 of 1985 has been filed by the petitioner challenging the revisional order allowing the release application and writ petition no. 12124 of 1985 has been filed against the order of the revisional authority setting aside the allotment order made in favour of Shiv Kumar Sharma. Since both these petitions raise a common question of fact and law and relate to the same property, they are being decided by a common judgment. 3. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner Shiv Kumar Sharma in both the petitions and learned counsel for the respondent no. 4, Dr. M. L. Nigam. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the finding to the effect that the need of the landlord was not bonafide, given by the Additional District Magistrate, was a finding of fact and the revisional authority in exercise of the powers under section 18 of the Act, cannot set aside the said finding. 4, Dr. M. L. Nigam. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the finding to the effect that the need of the landlord was not bonafide, given by the Additional District Magistrate, was a finding of fact and the revisional authority in exercise of the powers under section 18 of the Act, cannot set aside the said finding. It was further urged that in case the finding in regard to the bonafide need could not be reversed, the application for release should have been rejected. If the application for release was rejected, then automatically the allotment order made in favour of the petitioner would stand. 4. I have examined the judgment of the Additional District Magistrate dated 1st November, 1980, by which it was held that the need was not bonafide. The said need was held not to be bonafide mainly on three grounds firstly, on the ground that the tenanted accommodation in occupation of the landlord was already sufficient and consequently, he does not need the accommodation in dispute, secondly, on the ground that the release application was not sufficiently stamped and the third ground for rejecting the release application was that the sale deed was not bonafide and the landlord had sold the disputed accommodation at a throw away price and as such, the need was not bonafide. In Naubat Ram Sharma v. Additional District Judge IX, Moradabad, 1987 AWC 1168 . I have taken the view that the District Magistrate while considering an application for release under section 16 of the Act, has to consider only whether the building sought to be released is bonafide required by the landlord or not. He has not to consider as to whether the accommodation already in occupation of the landlord is sufficient for his needs or not. Every owner of a building has a right to occupy his own building and as such the legislature contemplated that when the building is vacant or is likely to fall vacant and the landlord requires the said building for his bonafide need. then the said building should be released in favour of the landlord. It was further observed by me that this is a sole consideration which has to weigh with the District Magistrate when he takes up the release application under section 16 of the Act for consideration. 5. then the said building should be released in favour of the landlord. It was further observed by me that this is a sole consideration which has to weigh with the District Magistrate when he takes up the release application under section 16 of the Act for consideration. 5. In the instant case, the Additional District Magistrate held that since the landlord is occupying a rented accommodation consisting of two small rooms, one verandah, kitchen, bath, latrine and open courtyard, and as such, he has sufficient accommodation with him and consequently, his need was not bonafide. The Additional District Magistrate could not have gone into the extent of the accommodation available with the landlord. He had only to consider whether the building sought to be released is bonafide required by the landlord or not as observed by me in the case of Naubat Ram (supra). The entire approach of the Additional District Magistrate was, consequently erroneous and perverse. 6. It is necessary to mention at this stage that the provisions of Section 12, sub-clause (3) of the Act are very relevant. Section 12, sub-clause (3) clearly provides that in case of a residential building, if a tenant or a member of his family builds or otherwise acquires in a vacant state or gets vacated a residential building in the same city, municipality, notified area or town area in which the building under tenancy is situate, he shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building under his tenancy. In view of this provision once Dr. M L. Nigam purchased the property in dispute, the rented accommodation in which he was residing, would be deemed to be vacant and he was liable to be evicted from the said accommodation. This was a very relevant circumstance which had to be considered by the Additional District Magistrate and the same was ignored. In fact, in the instant case, the landlord of the rented accommodation has obtained a release order against Dr. M. L. Nigam and he is liable to be evicted from the said accommodation. The second consideration by which the Additional District Magistrate rejected the release application was that the release application was not sufficiently stamped. In fact, in the instant case, the landlord of the rented accommodation has obtained a release order against Dr. M. L. Nigam and he is liable to be evicted from the said accommodation. The second consideration by which the Additional District Magistrate rejected the release application was that the release application was not sufficiently stamped. An application was moved before the Additional District Magistrate paying the deficient stamp yet he dismissed the application on the ground of being unsufficiently stamped The Additional District Magistrate clearly acted illegally and with material irregularity in exercise of his jurisdiction in rejecting the release on this ground. 7. On the third ground also, I am of the opinion that the Additional District Magistrate acted illegally and with material irregularity in observing that merely because that the property was purchased for Rs.50,000/-, it was the property purchased at a throw away price. What price is charged by a owner of a property is not a matter of consideration by the authorities concerned. There was no challenge to the validity of the sale deed and as such, rejecting the release application on the supposed ground of its being purchased at a throw away price, was a ground which was not available for being considered when the question of release was under consideration by the Additional District Magistrate. The fact that this question weighed with the Additional District Magistrate itself made the order illegal. 8. In view of the above, I am of the opinion that the revisional court was right in holding that the Additional District Magistrate acted illegally and with material irregularity in exercise of his jurisdiction in holding that the need of the applicant-landlord was not bonafide. It cannot, therefore be said that the revisional court has set aside the pure finding of fact arrived at by the Additional District Magistrate. In a very recent case in Smt. Padmawati Misra v. District Magistrate, 1988 ARC Volume I, 307 it has been held by Hon'ble S. C. Mathur, J. as, follows :- "it is true that under Section 18 (1) of the Act the District Judge can interfere with the order of the District Magistrate only when there is jurisdictional error in his order. Non-consideration of the points raised in the application does amount to commission of a jurisdictional error. Non-consideration of the points raised in the application does amount to commission of a jurisdictional error. This ground alone was sufficient to set aside the order of the Additional District Magistrate and the learned Additional District Judge committed manifest error in rejecting the revision of the petitioner. The learned Additional District Judge refused to consider the petitioner's plea that the Additional District Magistrate had not passed the order in exercise of his independent discretion but on account of the influence exercised by Sri Gauri Shanker with the observation that it did not amount to jurisdictional error. Here again the learned Additional District Judge committed manifest error. Judicial or quasi-judicial authority is required to decide disputes impartially and without being influenced by extraneous consideration. Once extraneous considerations entered into his decision, then the said decision will suffer from jurisdictional error. Accordingly the plea raised on behalf of the petitioner deserved consideration but it did not receive consideration from the learned Additional District Judge ". I agree with the reasoning given by Hon'ble S. C. Mathur, J. in the above case. 9. In the instant case, on perusal of the order of allotment dated 1st November, 1980, passed by the Additional District Magistrate, it is clear that the same has been based on extraneous considerations. The Additional District Magistrate held that one K. K. Chand who was a Government servant and had come on transfer had a claim most deserving yet he allotted the accommodation in favour of the petitioner, who was a member of the Youth Congress and he held his need to be deserving because of political activities. It cannot be comprehened that once the need of K. K. Chand was held to be deserving, the property, in fact, was allotted in favour of Shiv Kumar Sharma, who was the member of Youth Congress, which is clearly an extraneous consideration that weighed with the Additional District Magistrate while passing the allotment order. The revisional court, has, consequently, rightly observed that the order of the Additional District Magistrate was liable to be set aside, in view of the fact that he had rejected the release application simply to allot the property in favour of Shiv Kumar Sharma, who was the member of the Youth Congress. 10. In view of the above, I do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned order passed by the revisional authority. 10. In view of the above, I do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned order passed by the revisional authority. The Additional District Magistrate had acted illegally and with material irregularity in exercise of his jurisdiction in rejecting the release application as well as allotting the property in favour of the petitioner. The revisional court has further found as a fact that the landlord's application in respect of the rented accommodation has been allowed and Dr. M. L. Nigam is liable to be evicted from the said property. Consequently, in view also of this particular circumstance, I do not think it a fit case for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 11. In the result, both these petitions fail and are dismissed. IN the circumstances of the case, parties are directed to bear their own costs. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner prays for three month's time to vacate the premises. This prayer, in my opinion, is justified in the interest of justice. He further states that the petitioner is prepared to give an undertaking that he would vacate the accommodation in dispute after three months and hand over vacant possession to Dr. M. L. Nigam respondent no. 4. In the circumstances, I direct that the release order shall not be enforced for a period of three months from today provided the petitioner gives an undertaking before the authority concerned that he would vacate the premises immediately after expiry of three months from today and hand over vacant possession of the premises to the respondent no. 4, Dr. M L. Nigam. In case of default, the release order shall be enforced forthwith. Petitions dismissed.