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Allahabad High Court · body

1988 DIGILAW 419 (ALL)

Ghanshyam Nishad v. Sudpt. , Central Jail

1988-04-18

G.K.MATHUR, R.K.SHUKLA

body1988
JUDGMENT R.K. Shukla, J. - Ghanshyam Nishad has filed this Habeas Corpus Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for his release after quashing the detention order dated 26th July 1987 passed under section 3 (2) of the National Security Act, hereinafter described as the Act. 2. The aforesaid detention order dated 26th July, 1987, was served on the petitioner on the same day in the Central Jail, Naini, along with the grounds of detention which reads as under: " 2- fnukad 10&7&87 dks le; 11&00 cts fnu jkt dqekj pkS/kjh iq= eqy pUnz lhes.V~h jksM ij lkbfdy ls tk jgk FkkA vius vius vU; nks lkfFk;ksa ds lkFk jkLrs ij eksVj lkbfdy yxkdj mls jksd fn;k vkSj vkius mlds mij ce ls izgkj fd;k tks mls ugha yxk ce tksjnkj vkokt ds lkFk lM+d ij QV x;kA jkt dqekj pkS/kjh viuh tku cpkus dh fu;r ls dfczLrku dh vkSj Hkkxk vkius o vkids lkfFk;ksa us mls nkSM+dj dfczLrku esa ?ksj fy;k rFkk mlds mij xksfy;ka pyk;h ftlds QyLo:i og ?kk;y gksdj ogha fxj x;k vkSj ckn esa vLirky igqWaprs igqWaprs mldh e`R;q gks xbZA 3- ce ds /kekds vkSj vkids }kjk bl Qk;fjax ds dkj.k vkl ikl Hk; o vkard O;kIr gks x;kA yksxksa esa HkxnM+ ep xbZA vkokxeu BIi gks x;kA L=h iq:"k o cPps jksus fpYykus yxs vkSj ?kjksa ds njokts /kM+k&/kM+ cUn gks x;s vkSj yksd O;oLFkk Hkax gks xbZA 4- vkids }kjk fd;s x;s mijksDr nqLlkgliw.kZ dk;Z ls vke turk esa Hk; o vkard Qsy x;k o yksd O;oLFkk ij cgqr gh izfrdwy izHkko iM+kA 5- mijksDr ?kVuk dk eqdnek Fkkok dhMxat esa vijk/k la[;k 187 o"kZ 1987 vUrxZr /kkjk 302@120 ch Hkk0n0fo0 iathd`r fd;k x;k tks foospuk/khu gSA 6- vki bl le; uSuh tsy esa fu:) gS rFkk vkids 'kh?kz gh tekur ij NwV tkus dh lEHkkouk gSA iw.kZ lEHkkouk gS fd tekur ij NwV dj vkus ds i'pkr~ vki iqu% ,sls dk;ksZa esa fyIr gksaxs th yksd O;oLFkk ij cgqr gh izfrdwy izHkko iMs+xkA 7- mijksDr vk/kkj ij esjk lek/kku gks x;k gS fd vkids }kjk ,slh fdlh Hkh jhfr ls dk;Zokgh fd;s tkus dh lEHkkouk gS tks yksd O;oLFkk cuk;s j[kus ds izfrdwy gS vkSj vkidks ,slh fdlh Hkh jhfr ls dk;Zokgh djus ls tks yksd O;oLFkk cuk;s j[kus ds izfrdwy gS jksdus ds mn~ns'; ls ;g vko'd gS fd vkidks fu:) fd;k tkosA" 3. The aforesaid impugned order was approved and confirmed by the State Government on 1.8.87 and 7.9.87 respectively. His representations dated 13.8.87 made to the State Government and the Central Government have been rejected by them on 27th August, 1987 and 6th October, 1987 respectively. 4. Sri D.S. Misra, learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that the incident dated 10.7.87 mentioned in the aforesaid grounds of detention does not make out a case of disturbance of public order. It only relates to the problem of law and order. In support of his contention he relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Subhash Bhandari v. District Magistrate Lucknow and others, 1988 (25) ACC 48 (H.C., L.B.). 5. The difference between three concepts of law and order, public order and the security of the State, have been frictionally explained by the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC. 740 : 1966 BLJR 573by drawing three concentric circles the largest representing law and order, the next representing public order and the smallest representing security of the State. The true distinction between the areas of `public order' and `law and order' lies in the nature or quality or the act, but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society. The distinction between the two concept of `law and order' and "public order" is a fine one but this does not mean that there can be no overlapping acts similar in nature but committing in different contexts and circumstances might cause different reactions. In one case it might affect specific individuals only and therefore touch the problem of law and order while in another it might affect public order. The act by itself, therefore, is not determinant of its own gravity. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of the life of the community which makes prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Every infraction of law must necessarily affect law and order, but an act affecting law and order may not necessarily also affect the public order. Public order is what the French call "Order Publique" and is some thing more than ordinary maintenance of law and order. 6. Every infraction of law must necessarily affect law and order, but an act affecting law and order may not necessarily also affect the public order. Public order is what the French call "Order Publique" and is some thing more than ordinary maintenance of law and order. 6. In the light of the aforesaid observations when we proceed to examine the facts of this case, we find that it is mentioned in the F.I.R. (Annexure 7 to the petition) that there was enmity between petitioner, Ghanshyam and deceased Raj Kumar because Raj Kumar had opposed petitioner Ghanshyam against his highhandedness of kidnapping last year one boy, Gopal. It is further alleged in the aforesaid F.I.R. that the petitioner did not like the actions of Rai Kumar and one day prior to the date of occurrence the mother of the petitioner threatened to get killed Raj Kumar. It is also alleged that there were two other persons with the deceased at the time of occurrence but they were not attacked. Only Raj Kumar was attacked and done to death. Thus, the alleged act of assault by fire-arms is confined to Raj Kumar (deceased) only and not to others. So it is an act infringing law and order and the reach and effect of the act is not so extensive as to affect the considerable members of the society. In other words, this act does not disturb public tranquility or the even-tempo of the society. This criminal act emanates from personal enmity between the petitioners and Raj Kumar deceased. Therefore, such an act cannot be the basis for the subjective satis- faction of the detaining authority to pass the impugned detention order on the ground that the impugned Act purports to affect public order. The impugned criminal act can be amply punished under our general criminal law and the Indian Penal Code and no such drastic action is required for the same under the National Security Act. Therefore, following the ratio of Subhash Bhandari's case (supra). We find that this case is more or less similar to the facts and circumstances of that case. It is also pertinent to note in this connection that we have already allowed the Habeas Corpus Writ Petition No. 3604 of 1988 filed by Laxman Nishad arising out of the same incident and on identical grounds on 12.4.88. We find that this case is more or less similar to the facts and circumstances of that case. It is also pertinent to note in this connection that we have already allowed the Habeas Corpus Writ Petition No. 3604 of 1988 filed by Laxman Nishad arising out of the same incident and on identical grounds on 12.4.88. Consequently, the impugned order dated 26.7.87 against this petitioner is also not justified and is liable to be quashed. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged several other points also, but in view of our above finding it is not necessary to discuss them here in detail. 8. In the result, this Habeas Corpus Writ Petition succeeds. The detention order dated 26.7.87 (Annexure `3') is quashed. The opposite parties are directed to set the petitioner at liberty forthwith unless he is wanted in some other case.