Judgment :- 1. The petitioner is a citizen of India. He is of Kerala origin. He is a Catholic Missionary, who claims that he is running religious charitable institutions consistent with his priesthood. In this O.P. the challenge is against Ext.P5-order, passed by the Central Government, dated 15-1-1988. The said order (Ext.P5) was passed by the 2nd respondent in exercise of the powers conferred on him under S.5 (2) (c) of the Passports Act, 1967 (in short, the Act) read with S.6 (2) (i) and S.8 of the Act. It is stated that since the order is passed by the Central Government, no appeal shall lie against Ext.P5. 2. I heard counsel for the petitioner Mr. C.K. Sivasankara Panicker, as also Senior Counsel for the Central Government Mr. P.V. Madhavan Nambiar. The sole question argued before me was that Ext.P5 was passed arbitrarily and in violation of the principles of natural justice. It was stated that the respondent did not act fairly in passing-Ext.P5-order, without hearing the petitioner. On the other hand, counsel for the Central Government Mr. Nambiar contended that the statute does not contemplate any hearing to the petitioner before passing Ext.P5 and so, the petitioner cannot insist that he should have been heard before passing Ext.P5. Mr. Nambiar further contended that the policy implicit in the provisions of the Act shows that no hearing is contemplated in refusing to grant passport facilities to a person. 3. It is common ground that the petitioner was issued a passport by the Regional Transport Officer, Cochin, on 3-12-1976. It was endorsed in 1981.10 years have elapsed after the issue of the passport. So the petitioner in compliance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules requested for the issue of a passport. It was rejected by Ext. P5. The Government refused passport facilities to the petitioner in public interest. It is common ground that the petitioner was not heard before Ext. P5 was passed. The sole question is whether the petitioner should have been heard before rendering Ext. P5. 4. In order to resolve the controversy between the parties, it will be useful to quote S.5(2)(c), 6(2)(i), and 11 (1) & (5) of the Act. They are as follows: "5. Applications for passports, travel documents, etc. P5 was passed. The sole question is whether the petitioner should have been heard before rendering Ext. P5. 4. In order to resolve the controversy between the parties, it will be useful to quote S.5(2)(c), 6(2)(i), and 11 (1) & (5) of the Act. They are as follows: "5. Applications for passports, travel documents, etc. and orders thereon: xx xx xx xx (2) On receipt of an application under this section the passport authority, after making such enquiry, if any, as it may consider, necessary, shall, subject to the other provisions of this Act, by order in writing, (c) refuse to issue the passport or travel document or, as the case may be, refuse to make on the passport or travel document any endorsement. xx xx 6. Refusal of passports, travel documents, etc: xx xx (2) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the passport authority shall refuse to issue a passport or travel document for visiting any foreign country under Cl. (c) of the sub-s. (2) of S.5 on any one or more of the following grounds, and on no other ground, namely: (i) that in the opinion of the Central Government the issue of passport or travel document to the applicant will not be in the public interest. 8. Renewal of passports: Every passport shall, unless the passport authority for reasons to be recorded in writing otherwise documents in any case, be renewable for the same period for which the passport was originally issued and the provisions of this Act (including the provisions as to fees) shall apply to the renewal of a passport as they apply to the issue thereof. 11. Appeals:- (1) Any person aggrieved by an order of the passport authority under Cl. (b) or Cl. (c) of sub-s. (2) of S.5 or Cl. (b) of the proviso to S.7 of sub-s. (1), or sub-s. (3) of S.10 or by an order under sub-s. (6) of S.10 of the authority to whom the passport authority is subordinate, may prefer an appeal against that order to such authority (hereinafter referred to as the appellate authority) and within such period as may be prescribed: Provided that no appeal shall lie against any order made by the Central Government. (5) In disposing of an appeal, the appellate authority shall follow such procedure as may be prescribed: Provided that no appeal shall be disposed of unless the appellant has been given a reasonable opportunity of representing his case." In this case the Central Government itself has refused passport facilities to the petitioner, as evidenced by Ext. P5. So the order is not appealable under S.11 of the Act. The only question is whether the petitioner should have been heard before the refusal of passport facilities to him. 5. It is common ground that the statute does not expressly provide for a hearing before refusing passport facility. By the same token it should be stated that the statute does not, in terms, exclude prior hearing.' In such cases, where the statute is equivocal, the position in law seems to be, that if the effect of the exercise of the statutory power is to affect another person with civil consequences, that other person should be heard. It is, irrelevant to consider whether the power exercised under the statute is quasi judicial or administrative. In Smt. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (AIR 1978 SC 597) the Supreme Court has stated the law thus: (para 57) 11 .although there are no positive words in the statute requiring that the party shall be heard, yet the justice of the common law will supply the omission of the legislature". The principle of audi altrem partem which mandates that no one shall be condemned unheard, is pan of the rules of natural justice 58 Natural justice is a great humanising principle intended to invest law with fairness and to secure justice and over the years it has grown into a widely pervasive rule affecting large areas of administrative action. Thus, the soul of natural justice is 'fair play in action' and that is why it has received the widest recognition throughout the democratic world. The inquiry must, therefore, always be: does fairness in action demand that an opportunity to be heard should be given to the person affected? 59. Thus, the soul of natural justice is 'fair play in action' and that is why it has received the widest recognition throughout the democratic world. The inquiry must, therefore, always be: does fairness in action demand that an opportunity to be heard should be given to the person affected? 59. The aim of both administrative inquiry as well as quasi-judicial inquiry is to arrive at a just decision and if a rule of natural justice is calculated to secure justice, or to put it negatively, to prevent miscarriage of justice, it is difficult to see why it should be applicable to quasi-judicial inquiry and not to administrative inquiry. It must logically apply to both 61. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry. As observed by this court in Suresh Koshy George v. The University of Kerala (1969) 1 SCR 317: (AIR 1966 SC 198) the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of the case. The law must, therefore, now be taken to be well settled that even in an administrative proceeding, which involves civil consequences, the doctrine of natural justice must be held to be applicable." In Swadeshi Cotton Mills etc. v. Union of India (AIR 1981 SC 818) at page 831, after a review of the earlier decisions of the Court the Supreme Court held as follows: (para. 42) ".... v. Union of India (AIR 1981 SC 818) at page 831, after a review of the earlier decisions of the Court the Supreme Court held as follows: (para. 42) ".... if the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of a pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature, and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided, courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless, viewed pragmatically, it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. In short, this rule of fairplay "must not be jettisoned save in very exceptional/ circumstances where compulsive necessity so demands". The court must make every effort to salvage this cardinal rule to the maximum extent possible, with situational modifications. But, to recall the words of Bhagwati, J., the core of it must, however, remain, namely, that the person affected must have reasonable opportunity of being heard and the hearing must be a genuine hearing and not an empty public relations exercise." In a recent case reported in State of Haryana v. Ram Kishan (AIR 1988 SC 1301) at page 1303, the Supreme Court stated the law again as follows: (para. 8) "Since there is no suggestion in the section to deny the right of the affected persons to be heard, the provisions have to be interpreted as implying to preserve such a right. Reference may be made to the observations of this Court in Baldev Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1987)2 SCC 510: (AIR 1987 SC 1239), that where exercise of a power results in civil consequences to citizens, unless the statute specifically rules out the application of natural justice, such rules would apply." 6. It cannot admit of any doubt that Ext. P5 order visits the petitioner with civil consequences. He has been refused passport facilities. Ordinarily, a person's liberty of movement is precious. It should not be hindered or prevented except on sure and solid grounds. If it is deprived or taken away, the result is grave enough. It cannot admit of any doubt that Ext. P5 order visits the petitioner with civil consequences. He has been refused passport facilities. Ordinarily, a person's liberty of movement is precious. It should not be hindered or prevented except on sure and solid grounds. If it is deprived or taken away, the result is grave enough. In this perspective, and in the light of the principles discernible from the decisions of the Supreme Court adverted to hereinabove I have no doubt that in passing Ext. P5, without hearing the petitioner, respondents 1 and 2 have not acted fairly. It means that they have acted arbitrarily. It is relevant to note that the statute in question, does not bar or trammel, either expressly or by necessary implication, affording an opportunity, for a pre-decision hearing. In this context, it should be noticed, that if the passport is denied by a lower authority, an appeal shall lie to the Central Government under S.11 (1) of the Act, in which case, the petitioner will have a reasonable opportunity of representing his case. S.11 (1) read with S.11 (5) of the Act is the pointer, indicating that before passport facility is refused, the person likely to be affected should have an opportunity to present his case. It has not been so done in passing Ext. P5 order against the petitioner. I hold Ext. P5 is arbitrary and unfair. I quash Ext. P5. Respondents 1 and 2 shall consider the matter afresh in accordance with law. The O. P. is allowed.