Judgment :- 1. The petitioner is a temple governed by the provisions of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 (for short 'the Act'). The temple is governed by Ext. R1 (a) scheme framed by the Sub-Court, Mangalore, in O.S. 37 of 1920 as amended by this Court in M.F.A. Nos. 511 and 548 of 1980. The first respondent was appointed as a Helke-vrithidar on 4-10-1977. Before that, he was a Watchman in the Mukhyaprana Matt attached to the temple. The Council of Trustees, in the meeting held on 28-11-1979. decided to abolish the post of Helke-vrithidar with effect from 31-1-1980. The President of the council issued Ext. P1 order dated 1-2-1980 terminating the service of the first respondent. He filed an appeal under S.49 (2) of the Act before the Deputy Commissioner. That appeal was dismissed for non-prosecution by Ext. P2 order dated 1-11-1980. Before the Deputy Commissioner, the petitioner had filed an affidavit indicating that the Council of Trustees decided to abolish the post to get rid of the first respondent, since be began to show carelessness in the discharge of temple duties inspite of warnings and complaints from the devotees. Ext. P1 order of termination was also sought to be justified on the basis of unauthorised absence of the petitioner from September, 1979. The Deputy Commissioner passed Ext. P2 order, apparently because the first respondent did not appear before him at Trivandrum. The first respondent had requested the Deputy Commissioner to hear the appeal at Manjeswar. But the Deputy Commissioner was not prepared to oblige him and dismissed the appeal by Ext. P2 order. The first respondent filed a further appeal under S.49 (3) of the Act before the Commissioner. That was dismissed in Ext. P3 order dated 2-12-1982 as not maintainable in law. The first respondent then filed O.P. 10073/82. My learned brother M. P. Menon, J. disposed of that petition in Ext. P4 judgment holding that the appeal filed by the first respondent before the Deputy Commissioner, being a statutory appeal, ought to have been considered on merits and should not have been dismissed for alleged non-prosecution. The Deputy Commissioner thereafter heard the appeal and passed Ext. P5 order dated 7-12-1985. P4 judgment holding that the appeal filed by the first respondent before the Deputy Commissioner, being a statutory appeal, ought to have been considered on merits and should not have been dismissed for alleged non-prosecution. The Deputy Commissioner thereafter heard the appeal and passed Ext. P5 order dated 7-12-1985. He held that the appeal was competent, the termination of service of the first respondent was a measure of punishment, that the Board of Trustees should have obtained prior sanction of the Commissioner, according to Ext. R1 (a) scheme, for such abolition and that the schedule of employees should not have been altered without departmental permission. The petitioner filed a revision petition before the Commissioner under S.18 of the Act. He dismissed that revision petition by Ext. P6 order dated 23-11-1987. Petitioner challenges Exts.P5 and P6 orders as devoid of jurisdiction and for error of law apparent on the face of the records. 2. The main contentions which the petitioner raises are that the 2nd respondent had no jurisdiction to pass Ext. P5 order nor the 3rd respondent to affirm that in Ext. P6 since S.49 (2) of the Act was not contracted. He submits that there was no disciplinary action involved in the termination of the service of the first respondent as a consequence of the abolition of the post. He submits further that the respondent erred in assuming that the scheme enjoined that the trustees should have obtained permission of the Commissioner for abolishing the post. His last submission is that R.10 of the rules framed under S.100 (2) of the Act confines only to pay and emoluments of existing officers and does not preclude the trustees from abolishing posts which are redundant in the changed circumstances. 3. I do not propose to go into the controversy as to whether the post of Helke-vrithidar bad become redundant in view of the practice of sending out invitations to the devotees for participation in religious functions by post instead of deputing the Helke-vrithidar in person for conveying the invitation. The Statutory Appellate Authority has gone into this question. Those findings are supported by some evidence. The sufficiency of that evidence to sustain the findings is not a matter for consideration in these proceedings. Nor do I find any perversity in the findings which may perhaps be an extra-ordinary circumstances justifying interference by this Court. 4. The Statutory Appellate Authority has gone into this question. Those findings are supported by some evidence. The sufficiency of that evidence to sustain the findings is not a matter for consideration in these proceedings. Nor do I find any perversity in the findings which may perhaps be an extra-ordinary circumstances justifying interference by this Court. 4. Yet another submission which counsel urged before me is that respondents 2 and 3 ought to have found that the first respondent was appointed only temporarily for a period of three months each time. Termination of service of such a temporary employee should not. according to the petitioner, have been interfered with in an appeal under S.49 (2) of the Act. I am not inclined to agree. Termination of service even of a provisional employee as a penalty seems to fall within the purview of the jurisdiction of the 2nd respondent under S.49 (2) of the Act. It may be that on expiry of the term of appointment, the employee may have no right to insist upon continuance in service. But a premature termination of service on allegations of misconduct, inefficiency, and like reasons can definitely be the subject matter of an appeal before the 2nd respondent. 5. The submission of counsel for the petitioner that the 2nd respondent had no jurisdiction to pass Ext. P5, nor the 3rd respondent to affirm the same in Ext. P6, is made on the basis that Ext. P1 was a simple order of termination of service consequent on the abolition of the post and such an order will not be appealable under S.49 (2) of the Act. S.49 (I) enables a trustee to fine, suspend, remove or dismiss an employee for breach of trust, incapacity, disobedience of orders, neglect of duty, misconduct or other sufficient cause, after following the prescribed procedure. Sub-section (2) confers the right of appeal on an office-holder or servant punished by the trustee. The procedure is prescribed in R.1 of the rules framed under S.49(1) of the Act. That rule enjoins that no order imposing a punishment other than fine under S.49(1) shall be made against any office-holder or servant unless be was informed of the grounds in writing and was afforded an opportunity of defending himself. The details of the procedure are stated in the above rules. That rule enjoins that no order imposing a punishment other than fine under S.49(1) shall be made against any office-holder or servant unless be was informed of the grounds in writing and was afforded an opportunity of defending himself. The details of the procedure are stated in the above rules. The counter affidavit which the petitioner filed before the 2nd respondent on 8-549SO made it abundantly clear that he was terminating the service of the first respondent due to his incapacity, disobedience of orders, neglect of duties, misconduct, etc. It was stated in that affidavit that after his appointment as Helke-vrithidar on 4-10-1973, the first respondent accepted employment as Night Watchman in a Co-operative Bank, and as Sweeper in the local branch of the State Bank of Travancore with the result that he became careless in the discharge of the temple duties. There were specific averments to the effect that the first respondent refused to distribute 'Santhayani Prasadam' to the bouses of Gouda Saraswatha Brahmin devotees according to custom and that he stayed away from duty without permission of the Management thereafter. It was asserted in that counter affidavit that Ext. PI order was issued only after being satisfied of his misconduct and the non-requirement of Helke-vrithidar. 6. It may be that the misconduct of the first respondent and the decision to abolish the post due to its redundancy coincided. In that event, it may perhaps be possible to sustain the contentions of the petitioner that Ext. PI order was only a simple termination of service. The 2nd respondent however, accepted the possible alternative view that the termination of service was a punishment imposed by the petitioner and it was so done in violation of the rules under S.49(1) of the Act. The acceptance of one of the two equally plausible interpretations of a provision of law with reference to the factual situations cannot be held to result in an error of law vitiating the order of the statutory authority. I am, therefore, not inclined to accept the submission that the 2nd respondent bad no jurisdiction since Ext. P1 order was only simple termination of service and not an order imposing punishment. It was the petitioner who sought to explain the order as imposing punishment and it was he who sought to justify that in his counter affidavit before the 2nd respondent. P1 order was only simple termination of service and not an order imposing punishment. It was the petitioner who sought to explain the order as imposing punishment and it was he who sought to justify that in his counter affidavit before the 2nd respondent. He cannot now be heard to say that the 2nd respondent clutched at jurisdiction in entertaining the appeal on the basis of the averments contained in bis counter affidavit. 7. Clause.19 of Ext. R1 (a) scheme provides that the staff of the temple including Vrithidars shall work under the orders of the Manager. The first respondent was appointed as a Helke-vrithidar apparently in terms of the provisions contained in the scheme. The 2nd respondent has found on a perusal of the Scheme that the post of Helke-Vrithidar was a customary post. He bad found further that for abolition of that post, the trustees ought to have taken the previous permission of the Court in the light of the specific mention of the post of Vrithidar in the scheme. I am not inclined to interfere with these findings. Admittedly, the schedule of employees did include the post of Helke-vrithidar. R.10 of the Rules framed under S.100(2) (y) of the Act contain a provision that the trustee shall not alter the schedule without the previous permission of the Area Committee or the Commissioner, as the case may be. The abolition of a post included in the schedule is necessarily an alteration of the schedule. It is obvious that such alteration of the schedule shall be with the previous permission of the Area Committee or the Commissioner. The petitioner had no case that any such permission was sought or obtained. His only case is that such permission is not necessary. His further submission is that such alteration as is prohibited is only in relation to the pay and emoluments of the scheduled employees and not the posts. I do not find any justification in confining the provisions enjoining the trustee to obtain permission for alternations in the schedule only to the pay and emoluments and not to alterations of the schedule in respect of posts. The position taken by the 2nd respondent in Ext. P5 order seems to me to be at least a possible view. I do not find any justification in confining the provisions enjoining the trustee to obtain permission for alternations in the schedule only to the pay and emoluments and not to alterations of the schedule in respect of posts. The position taken by the 2nd respondent in Ext. P5 order seems to me to be at least a possible view. If that be so, I cannot hold that the 2nd respondent committed an error of law or exceeded his jurisdiction in holding that Ext. P1 order was bad for lack of permission as provided in the scheme or under R.10 of the Rules framed under S.100 (2) (u) of the Act. 8. As far as Ext. P6 is concerned, the case of the petitioner is that the 3rd respondent failed to exercise his jurisdiction under S.18 of the Act "in not interfering with Ext. P5 order. The Commissioner agreed that the 2nd respondent was right in assuming jurisdiction, because he confirmed the finding that Ext. P1 order amounted to a punishment under S.49 (1) of the Act and that was imposed without following the prescribed procedure. He also agreed that the previous permission of the Commissioner ought to have been taken for abolition of the post, since the post of Helke-vrithidar was a customary post necessary in the temple. I am not persuaded to hold that the 3rd respondent erred in law or refused to exercise jurisdiction in affirming Ext. P5 order. In this view, the Original Petition deserves to be, and is hereby dismissed. The parties will suffer their respective costs. Issue photo copies of this judgment to counsel on both sides on usual terms.