Judgment :- 1. This is an appeal by the defendant. The suit was based on a licence. Plaintiff submitted that a licence was granted to the defendant for using the shop room for a particular purpose. Ext. Al is the deed of licence. A reading of this document would make it clear that parties intended to create a relationship of a licensor and a licensee. After issuing a notice Ext. A2, the plaintiff filed the present suit. Ext. A2 is dated 4-6-1979. The suit was instituted on 26-11-1979. The suit is framed as one for perpetual injunction restraining the defendant or his men from entering into the plaint schedule property. 2. The trial court, after considering the evidence adduced in the case, decreed the suit. The defeated defendant filed an appeal. The appellate court considered the evidence in the case and confirmed the judgment and decree of the trial court. Now, the defendant appeals. 3. The chief questions that have to be considered in this appeal are: (i) whether the transaction evidenced by Ext. Al creates a licence or lease; (ii) Assuming that Ext. Al has created a licence and that licence has been revoked by Ext. A2 notice, whether the suit as framed can be decreed?. The question whether Ext. Al has created a licence or not, is a question which has to be decided on the terms of Ext. Al document. I have read carefully the document. The counsel for the appellant also highlighted the points which are in bis favour to say that the document evidences a lease. But, I am not convinced with the points highlighted by the counsel for the appellant to say that there are trappings of a lease in the document Ext.Al. A reading of the document as a whole, would convince any court that the parties intended to create a licence and they bad no intention to create a lease. In fact, they wanted to make it clear that they never wanted to enter into a relationship of a lessor and lessee. Words clearly indicating that they never wanted to create a lease are abundant in the document. It is very clearly stated in the document that the parties should not set up a case of lease on the basis of the document. Words clearly indicating that they never wanted to create a lease are abundant in the document. It is very clearly stated in the document that the parties should not set up a case of lease on the basis of the document. Whatever safeguards that can be made to avoid a contention that the document is a lease, have been incorporated in the document itself. Inspite of all these, the parties have gone to court and contended that the document has to be treated as one creating a lease. 4. The counsel for the appellant very rightly brought to my notice the recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in Rajbir Kaur v. M/s S. Chokosiri & Co. (AIR. 1988 SC. 1845). Being a very recent decision it has got its own fascination. Almost all the decisions on the subject-matter have been referred to in this decision. Finally, the Supreme Court has said: "In the last analysis the question whether a transaction is a lease or a licence "turns on the operative intention of the parties" and that there is no single, simple litmus test to distinguish one from the other. The "solution that would seem to have been found is as one would expect, that it must depend on the intention of the parties" (See Cobb v. Lane (1952) 1 All E. R.1199." 5. What I have tried earlier is to find out the intention of the parties and to my mind, the intention of the parties is very clear that the parties wanted only to create a licence and not a lease. So, on the first point, I have to hold that the defendant has not sustained his case of lease. 6. The second question is not free from difficulty. The counsel submitted before me that the licence has been revoked at any rate on 4-6-1979 and the suit was instituted only on 26-11-1979 and in such a circumstance, the plaintiff ought to have filed a suit for recovery of possession. As a second line of defence, the counsel also submitted before roe that at any rate, the plaintiff ought to have filed a suit for mandatory Injunction and in this case, the plaintiff has chosen to file a suit for perpetual injunction and there cannot be any cause of action for the plaintiff to obtain a decree for perpetual injunction. As a second line of defence, the counsel also submitted before roe that at any rate, the plaintiff ought to have filed a suit for mandatory Injunction and in this case, the plaintiff has chosen to file a suit for perpetual injunction and there cannot be any cause of action for the plaintiff to obtain a decree for perpetual injunction. The counsel also referred me to a decision reported in Aspinwal & Co. Ltd. v. Soudamini Amma (1974 KLT. 681). In the above decision a Division Bench of this court has held thus: "The licensee will be the actual occupant but the licenser will be the person having the control or possession of the property through his licensee. Then on the termination of the licence can the licensee be treated as a trespasser? In the possession of a trespasser there cannot but be an element of animas possidendi which will not be there in the possession which a licensee is having, Even after the termination of the licence the licensee may have to continue to be In occupation of the premises for some time, because in many cases the licensee may require some reasonable time to remove materials belonging to him and quit the place. But during such time the licenser will be need to be in possession through his licensee, because the licensee cannot have any independent or separate interest in the premises. In that case a licensee cannot possibly be treated as a trespasser. But there will be cases where even after the expiry of the licence the licenser sleeps over the matter and does not take prompt action to neck the licensee out of the premises. No doubt a licensee can continue in occupation of the premises for a reasonable time after the termination of the licence. But if the licenser is not vigilant and the licensee continues in occupation of the premises beyond this reasonable time, what will he be? Will be be still a licensee or will he become a trespasser? If he continues to cling on to the premises why should be still be a licensee? No doubt it will be difficult to make a distinction in actual practice as to when a licensee becomes a trespasser and up to what time he will continue to be a licensee There can be a more definite test. If he continues to cling on to the premises why should be still be a licensee? No doubt it will be difficult to make a distinction in actual practice as to when a licensee becomes a trespasser and up to what time he will continue to be a licensee There can be a more definite test. If on the expiry of the licence an assertion of a hostile title is made by the licensee and the licenser sleeps over the matter then the occupation of the licensee can be considered to have been converted into one of possession of a trespasser. Under such circumstances the licenser will have to sue for recovery of possession and a suit for a mandatory injunction under S: 39 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 will not be the remedy." 7. Of course, from what I have quoted above, it is clear that a licensee will not be a trespasser instantaneously on the revocation of the licence. If the licensee would not claim the right of a trespasser immediately on the revocation of the licence, at what point of time, he will become a trespasser, is a matter depending upon the facts of each case. In Sant Lal Jain v. Avtar Singh (AIR 1985 SC 857) the Supreme Court bad occasion to consider this position a little elaborately. In that case, the defendant-respondent took from the appellant on licence for one year under a deed dated 10-12-1969 the suit shed for carrying our certain work. But. since be did not vacate the shed after the expiry of the period, the licensor terminated the licence and filed the suit on 15-2-1973 for a mandatory injunction directing him to vacate the premises. In this case, a decree was granted Apparently, the time taken for filing the suit is substantial in duration. Referring to a decision of Fazal Ali. J, as be then was, in Milka Singh v. Diana (AIR. 1964 J. & K. 99), the Supreme Court quoted with approval certain observations in that judgment which read thus: "After the termination of the licence, the licensee is under a clear obligation to surrender his possession to the owner and if he fails to do so we do not see any reason why the licensee cannot be compelled to discharge this obligation by way of a mandatory injunction under S 55 of the Specific Relief Act. We might further mention that even under English law a suit for injunction to evict a licensee has always been held to be maintainable". Where a licensor approaches the court for au injunction within a reasonable time after the licence is terminated, be is entitled to the injunction. On the other hand, if the licensor causes huge delay the court may refuse the discretion to grant an injunction on the ground that the licensor had not been diligent, and in that case the licensor will have to bring a suit for possession which will be governed by S.7(v) of the Court-fees Act." 8. This court has to answer two questions. (1) Since the plaintiff has framed his suit for permanent injunction, whether on that ground alone, the suit has to be dismissed. When I say that the plaintiff has framed a suit for a permanent injunction, the emphasis is that he has not framed the suit for a mandatory injunction. The second question is whether there is huge delay in filing the suit. In regard to the second question whether there is huge delay or not, it is a matter for this court's substantive decision and this court will decide that question taking into account the approach made by the courts below in this regard. Both the courts have found that there is no huge delay in filing the suit. In this context, exercising my jurisdiction under S.100 C.P.C. I do not want to differ from the findings of the courts below. I bold that there is no huge delay in filing the suit. 9. In this case, the plaintiff has filed a suit for permanent injunction, thereby asserting that he is in possession of the property and that the defendant cannot enter into bis shop room. In the licence it is made clear that the possession continues with the licensor; perhaps, on that basis, the plaintiff thought that be can file a suit for permanent injunction, since if there is no permission to enter into the shop room, the act of entry by the defendant will be unlawful and such an unlawful act will be prevented by a decree for injunction. Now, I shall quote a passage from AIR. 1985 SC. Now, I shall quote a passage from AIR. 1985 SC. 857: "The suit is in effect one for possession though couched in the form of a suit for mandatory injunction as what would be given to the plaintiff in case he succeeds is possession on of the property to which he may be found to be entitled. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the appellant should not be denied relief merely because be had couched the plaint in the form of a suit for mandatory injunction". 10. This proposition is applicable in the case of a suit for permanent injunction, if the court has found that the defendant was holding the property as a licensee and that the licence has been revoked by the plaintiff. In the same decision, the Supreme Court further observed:- "The respondent was a licencee, and he must be deemed to be always a licensee. It is not open to him, during the subsistence of the licence or in the suit for recovery of possession of the property instituted after the revocation of the licence to set up title to the property in himself or anyone else It is bis plain duty to surrender possession of the property as a licensee and seek his remedy separately in case he has acquired title to the property subsequently through some other person". 11. Considering the whole aspect in a practical and pragmatic way it is easy to understand the respective obligation of the parties concerned. The defendant's plain and honest obligation is to surrender the property. When once the licence is revoked, he has no permission to use the premises and when once that permission is withdrawn in law, he is bound to surrender the property. In effect, the plaintiff is seeking a remedy through court to compel the defendant to discharge his plain obligation to surrender the property. It is the prime devoir of the court to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. After holding that the defendant was holding the property under a licence and that licence has been revoked, and that the defendant has got a duty to surrender the shop room in question to the plaintiff, it is not just and proper to direct the plaintiff to file another suit for the same relief, if the court can grant the relief in this proceedings itself. A just solution for the particular case is the crucial factor in the decision process. I try to remember that equitable rule of decision that considerations of justice are directly relevant to the justification of any decision. 12. This question also has been considered by the Supreme Court in the same decision. The Supreme Court has said: "In the present case it has not been shown to us that the appellant had come to the court with the suit for mandatory injunction after any considerable delay which will disentitle him to the discretionary relief. Even if there was some delay, we think that in a case of this kind attempt should be made to avoid multiplicity of suits and the licensor should not be driven to file another round of suit with all the attendant delay, trouble and expense." 12. In the result, I see no merit in this appeal. It is only to be dismissed. I do so. No order as to costs. 13. Counsel for the appellant requested a little time to remove his articles from the shop room and he wanted four months, time for the same. Considering the overall circumstances involved in the case, I think the appellant should be given a little time, if he files an undertaking in the form of an affidavit before this court that be will remove the articles in the shop room within two months from today. The undertaking has to be filed before this court on or before 24th October, 1988. If the undertaking is filed as stipulated above, the judgment will not be given effect to for the said period.