ORDER S.D. Agarwala, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arising out of proceedings under the provisions of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, (hereinafter referred to as the Act.) 2. The property in dispute is premises No. 1/4, Nawabganj, Kanpur. It consists of two rooms and one chabutra, as alleged in the petition. The undisputed facts are that Laxmi Narain Gupta respondent 3, who is now dead, and his heirs have been brought on the record, came into possession of the property in dispute somewhere in the year 1968. 3. One Baikunth Narain made an application seeking allotment of the premises in dispute under S. 7(2) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the old Act). In those proceedings, the accommodation was allotted in favour of Baikunth Narain by an allotment order dated 28th Oct. 1970/2nd Nov. 1970. These allotment proceedings were contested by Laxmi Narain. His case was that the premises in dispute was post 1951 construction and, as such, the provisions of the old Act did not apply. Laxmi Narain, however, failed in those proceedings and it was held that the old Act did apply. Thereafter, Baikunth Narain allottee, took steps for eviction of Laxmi Naraii under S. 7-A of the old Act. The District Magistrate did pass an order under S. 7-A(2) of the old Act directing eviction of the petitioner. After the order was passed directing eviction of the petitioner under S. 7- A(2) of the old Act, Laxmi Narain filed a suit No. 223 of 1971 in the court of the 1st Additional Munsif, Kanpur, and obtained an ex parte order restraining Baikunth Narain from enforcing the eviction order. It may be stated here that the landlord Ram Kishore Shukla, who is the petitioner in this Court, was also a party in the said suit. This suit was dismissed on 31st March, 1975. It was held by the trial court that the property in dispute was constructed prior to 1951 and that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Kanpur, had the jurisdiction to pass an allotment order in favour of Baikunth Narain. It was further held that Laxmi Narain did not get the benefit of S. 14 of the Act (as it then stood). It was further held that Laxmi Narain did not get the benefit of S. 14 of the Act (as it then stood). Against .the judgment dated 31st March, 1975, Laxmi Narain filed an appeal. He again obtained an order restraining Baikunth Narain from evicting him from the premises in question. During the pendency of this appeal, Baikunth Narain died on 17th Aug. 1975. Laxmi Narain got the heirs of Baikunth Narain substituted and proceeded with the appeal. The appeal, was also dismissed on 12th Dec. 1977, confirming the findings recorded by the trial court. The effect was that the two findings became final; firstly, that the property in dispute was pre 1951 construction and, secondly, that as on 15th July, 1972, in terms of the original S. 14 of the Act, Laxmi Narain could not get the benefit of S. l4 of the Act. 4. In the proceedings, which were initiated under S. 7A(2) of the old Act, the mother of Baikunth Narain had applied for being substituted after his death on 17th Aug., 1975. This application was rejected by the Court. The position, which emerged consequently, was that the proceedings for eviction under S. 7A of the old Act, terminated by the death of Baikunth Narain on 17th Aug., 1975 as the substitution was not permitted by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. That order became final between the parties. 5. The real problem arose when the present Act was amended by U. P. Act No. 28 of 1976. This came into effect from 5th July, 1976. It may be stated here that, initially, the landlord petitioner made an application for release which was rejected and it was thereafter that Baikunth Narain was allotted the premises. Again, the petitioner landlord moved an application for release. In this, Laxmi Narain contested the release application and he set up a case that in view of the amendment of S. 14 of the Act by U. P. Act No. 28 of 1976, his occupation in the premises in dispute was liable to be regularised and, consequently, he became a tenant of the said building and since he became a tenant of the said building, there was no vacancy and, as such, the question of release did not arise at all. 6. 6. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer by his order dated 13th Oct., 1982, rejected the plea set up by Laxmi Narain that his occupation was regularised under S. 14 of the amended Act No.28 of 1976 and, therefore, the property was released in favour of the petitioner landlord. Aggrieved by the decision dated 13th Oct., 1982, Laxmi Narain filed a revision under S. 18 of the Act. The Additional District Judge, Kanpur, by his order dated 24th Jan., 1983, allowed the revision, set aside the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer dated 13th Oct., 1982, and remanded the matter to the Rent Control and Eviction officer for determination of the question as to whether Laxmi Narain was in occupation of the premises in question as a tenant with the consent of the landlord on 5th July, 1976. The landlord being aggrieved by the decision dated 24th Jan., 1983, has filed the present petition in this Court. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for Laxmi Narain at length. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended firstly, that no revision lay against the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer dated 13th Oct., 1982, by which Laxmi Narain was refused regularisation of his tenancy under S. 14 of the Act and, consequently, the decision of the revisional Court dated 24th Jan., 1983, is wholly without jurisdiction. The second submission of the learned counsel is that in the suit filed by Laxmi Narain, it was categorically found that Laxmi Narain was not entitled to the benefit of S. 14 of the Act. This finding was confirmed in appeal and, consequently, it operated as res judicata in the present proceedings and the revisional Court acted illegally and with material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction in directing that the benefit of S. 14 of the Act be considered by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. Lastly, it was argued that in view of S. 43(k) of the Act, the order passed under S. 7A(2) of the old Act became final and, consequently, it should be deemed to be held that the eviction proceedings were held against Laxmi Narain and, on the basis of this order, he is not entitled to the benefit of S. 14 of the Act, as amended. The view, to the contrary, taken by the revisional Court, is manifestly erroneous. 9. Section 18 of the Act provides that no appeal shall lie from any order under S. 16 or S. 19 whether made before or after the commencement of this section, but any person aggrieved by a final order under any of that said sections may, within fifteen days from the date of such order, prefer a revision to the District Judge on any one or more of the grounds, mentioned in the said section. Section 18 of the Act makes it clear that an order relating to release whether allowing the application or rejecting the same cannot be appealed against. The only remedy provided to a party is to apply for a revision before the District Judge. 10. In the application for release, which was moved by the petitioner landlord, the tenant Laxmi Narain had filed an objection that, in fact, there was no vacancy and his tenancy was liable to be regularised under S. 14 of the Act. If there was no vacancy, the question of allowing the release application does not arise. Before deciding the release application under S. 16 of the Act, it is mandatory that the property should be vacant. In the circumstances, the question whether there has been a vacancy or not is a question of jurisdiction on which depend the consideration of the question of release. The order deciding that the benefit under S. 14 of the Act cannot be given intended that there was a vacancy and, consequently, the release is liable to be considered. The order of release is, consequential to an order granting or not granting the benefit of S. 14 of the Act. The ultimate order, however, would be an order, either rejecting or granting the release application. In the instant case also, in the order dated 13th Oct. 1982, first the benefit of S. 14 of the Act was denied to Laxmi Narain and then the release was granted in favour of the petitioner. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated 13th Oct. 1982, was a composite order holding vacancy and, thereafter, granting release. A revision, therefore, clearly, in my opinion, lay against the order dated 13th Oct. 1982, because, in effect it is an order on the release application granting it on the ground that there is a vacancy. It is, therefore, clear that the order dated 13th Oct. 1982, was a composite order holding vacancy and, thereafter, granting release. A revision, therefore, clearly, in my opinion, lay against the order dated 13th Oct. 1982, because, in effect it is an order on the release application granting it on the ground that there is a vacancy. The revisional court, therefore, while considering the order of release, can also consider the validity of the regularisation order under S. 14 of the Act. In fact, no specific order is required regularising the tenancy under S. 14 of the Act. It is only a plea in defence to be taken by a person in occupation. In view of the above, I am of the opinion that against the order dated 13th Oct. 1982, a revision clearly lay because, in effect, the prayer in the revision would be that benefit under S. 14, of the Act be given to the revisionist and the application for release be rejected. Once the benefit under S. 14 of the Act is given, the rejection of the release application is automatic. In the circumstances, so far as the first submission of the learned counsel is concerned, I do not find any substance in the same. A revision clearly lay against the order dated 13th Oct. 1982, and the impugned order cannot be said to be invalid on that ground. 11. In regard to the second submission made by the learned counsel, in Suit No. 923 of 1971 filed by Laxmi Narain, under Issue No. 4, the trial court considered the question as to whether the benefit of S. l4 of the Act is available to Laxmi Narain or not. This judgment was delivered on 31st Mar. 1975. By that date, U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976 had not come into existence. Under the original S. 14 of the Act, it was held by the trial court that Laxmi Narain was not entitled to the benefit of S. 14 of the Act. This finding was upheld by the lower appellate court. Therefore, the only finding, which became final between the parties, was that on 15th July, 1972, when the Act came into existence, and in view of S. 14 of the Act (as it then existed), Laxmi Narain could not get the benefit of S. 14 of the Act. This finding was upheld by the lower appellate court. Therefore, the only finding, which became final between the parties, was that on 15th July, 1972, when the Act came into existence, and in view of S. 14 of the Act (as it then existed), Laxmi Narain could not get the benefit of S. 14 of the Act. This finding would definitely operate as res judicata between the petitioner, who was also a party in the said suit, and Laxmi Narain. But, the question here is entirely, different. Here, S. 14 of the Act was amended by U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976 with effect from 5th July, 1976. Neither in the suit nor in the appeal, the question whether Laxmi Naraini was entitled to the benefit of the amended S. 14 of the Act was considered at all. Since neither this question was considered nor there is any decision on this question, the question of the finding operating as res judicata does not arise. There is no finding against Laxmi Narain in regard to the regularisation of the tenancy under S. 14 of the amended Act. In the circumstances, I do not find any force in the second submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 12. Learned counsel has cited many decisions in support of his submission in regard to res judicata. So far as the principles laid down in the said decisions are concerned, it is not disputed if a finding had been given or ought to have been given and it arose out of the suit, it would definitely operate as res judicata, but what Laxmi Narain seeks is the benefit of S. 14, as amended, with effect from 5th July, 1976, which matter was not in dispute in the said suit or appeal. 13. The last contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that in view of S. 43(k) of the Act, the order under S. 7-A(2) of the old Act became final. This ,contention, no doubt, is correct. The order did become final but the question, in the instant case, is that though the order under S. 7-A(2) of the old Act became final, but whether the eviction proceedings were pending on 5th July, 1976, is a question entirely different from the question as to whether the order under S. 7-A(2) of the old Act is final or not. Even after the order under S. 7-A(2) of the old Act became final under the Old Act, the proceedings for eviction have to be taken - under S. 7-A(3) of the old Act. It is at this stage of the proceedings that the question has to be determined whether the eviction proceedings were still pending on 5th July, 1976, or not. In the instant case, as observed above, Baikunth Narain, the allottee, died on 17th Aug. 1975. The proceedings for eviction taken by the allottee, consequently, came to an end on 7th Aug. 1975, and, as such, on 5th July, 1976, no proceedings were pending against Laxmi Narain. It cannot, therefore, be said that the view taken by the lower appellate court is manifestly erroneous. 14. Inviewoftheabove, Idonotfindany force in this petition. It is, accordingly, dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs. 15. Since the matter has been remanded to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Kanpur, for a fresh decision on the question referred to by the revisional court, I direct the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to dispose of the matter very expeditiously. 16. A copy of this judgment will be given to the learned counsel on payment of usual charges at an early date.