JUDGMENT S.C. Mathur, J. - This appeal under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (Act No. 75 of 1971) is directed against the judgment and order dated 1st April, 1987 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court holding the appellant Baldev Singh guilty of committing civil contempt of this Court and sentencing him to pay a fine of Rs. 1,550 in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad, and also to undergo imprisonment for a period of four months in civil prison. The appeal has arisen in the circumstances hereinafter indicated. 2. The appellant, at the relevant time, was the Secretary of the Railway Service Commission (now Railway Recruitment Board), Allahabad. The Commission held a test for selection of candidates for appointment to certain class 111 posts in the Railways. The test comprised a written examination followed by interview of the candidates who qualified at the written examination. The written examination was held on 22nd February, 1981 at Paragraph and interview was held at Lucknow on 5th July, 1982. Apart from other candidates, respondents Chhabi Ram Tripathi and Abid Ali were also candidates at the selection. They had qualified at the written examination and were accordingly not reviewed. On 25th September, 1983 a list of selected candidates was published in which the name of neither of the two respondents found place. The respondents accordingly filed Writ Petition No. 5768 of 1983 in this Court on 31st October, 1983, seeking inter alia, a writ of mandamus to command the respondents in the petition to forthwith declare their result. The respondents in the writ petition were Railway Service Commission, Allahabad through its Secretary and the General Manager, Northern Railway, Baroda House, New Delhi. These two respondents in the writ petition will hereafter be referred to as the Commission. The petition was admitted the same day. The plea in the writ petition is that the result of all the candidates should have been published simultaneously and publication of the result of only a few candidates is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 3. Alongwith the writ petition, the respondents in the present appeal filed an application for interim relief (C.M.A.) No. 12290 of 1983) seeking, inter alia, direction to the Commission to declare the result of the respondents. Notice, returnable in the week commencing 28th November, 1983, was directed to be issued. On 23rd March. 3. Alongwith the writ petition, the respondents in the present appeal filed an application for interim relief (C.M.A.) No. 12290 of 1983) seeking, inter alia, direction to the Commission to declare the result of the respondents. Notice, returnable in the week commencing 28th November, 1983, was directed to be issued. On 23rd March. 1984 the respondents made another application for interim relief (C.M.A. No. 3553 of 1984) again seeking direction to declare the result immediately. In response to the notice issued on this application, counsel for the Commission appeared before a learned Single Judge of this Court on 14th May, 1984 and made statement that the result of all the candidates in respect of all categories of posts had already been declared. The Commission was required to file a short counter-affidavit by 23rd May, 1984 on which date the case was directed to be listed. The Commission filed counter-affidavit dated 22nd May, 1984 in which it asserted that result were announced on 22nd September, 1983 and 20th February, 1984 and that the respondents had not been selected. On 1st August, 1984 the respondents filed an application for summoning the record from the Commission as, according to the respondents, they were successful at the examination. On 17th December, 1984 the Commission filed supplementary counter-affidavit in which it was stated that the respondents were found to have indulged in malpractice and therefore the Chairman of the Commission had deleted the names of the respondents from the merit list. In respect of respondent Chhabi Shyam Tripathi, it was stated that two different inks had been used in the answer sheet, it was also stated that marks scored which were in different ink had been scored out and re-written in a different ink and the scoring had been initialled by the examiner in a different ink. Other irregularities in his selection have been pointed out in paragraph 6 of the affidavit. In respect of respondent Abid Ali it was stated that the vigilance inquiry revealed that the hand-writing on his answer sheet was similar to the handwriting on the answer sheet of three other candidates which showed that unfair means had been resorted to. 4. Yet another supplementary counter-affidavit was filed on behalf of the Commission which purported to be in reply to the rejoinder-affidavit of the respondents. 4. Yet another supplementary counter-affidavit was filed on behalf of the Commission which purported to be in reply to the rejoinder-affidavit of the respondents. More details were given in this affidavit regarding the malpractices indulged in by the respondents and the irregularities committed at the examination. 5. The application for interim relief came up before a learned Single Judge on 13th August, 1985 when on behalf of the Commission the relevant record was produced. On a perusal of the record the learned Single Judge found that respondent Chhabi Shyam Tripathi had scored 193 marks and respondent Abid Ali had scored 205 marks. The learned counsel for the Commission was unable to inform the Court the marks obtained by the last selected candidate and therefore he was directed to file counter-affidavit to bring on record this information. On behalf of the Commission supplementary counter-affidavit dated 5th September, 1985 was filed in which it was stated that the last selected candidate had secured 160 marks. The application for interim relief was again listed before the learned Single Judge on 29th October, 1985 when he passed the following order "List this application for further orders on November 22, 1985. In the meantime the opposite parties shall declare the result of the petitioners. For declaring the result, the opposite-parties shall not take into consideration the allegations made in the counter-affidavit by reason of which the petitioners, as alleged, have been placed out of merit list." 6. On 20th November, 1985, on behalf of the Commission an application was made which purported to be under Section 29 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. In this application it was stated that the Tribunals Act had come into force with effect from 1st November, 1985 and therefore the writ petition stands transferred to the Administrative Tribunal. The prayer in the application was that the interim order dated 29th October, 1985 may be vacated. This application has not been disposed of so far. On 23rd July, 1986, another application [C.M.A. No. 9220 (W) of 1986] was filed on behalf of the Commission for dismissal of the wiit petition as not maintainable at Lucknow Bench of this Court as no part of the cause of action accrued within the twelve districts over which the said bench exercised jurisdiction. This application is also still pending. 7. This application is also still pending. 7. From the above narration of facts it would be seen that the respondents' application for interim relief has not been disposed of finally and is still pending. Similarly Railway Administration's applications for dismissal of the writ petition as not maintainable at the Lucknow Bench and for vacation of the interim order on account of the enforcement of the Administrative Tribunals's Act are also awaiting orders. 8. On 2nd December, 1985 the respondents made an application in this Court for taking action against the appellant Baldev Singh who, at the relevant time, was posted as Secretary, Railway Recruitment Board, Allahabad for committing gross contempt of this Court by not declaring the result of the respondents as directed by Court's order dated 29th October, 1985. Contempt Notice was issued to Baldev Singh on 21st February, 1986 requiring him to show cause why he may not be punished for committing the alleged contempt. In response to the notice the appellant filed counter-affidavit dated 6th March, 1985 asserting that the result had to be declared under the orders of the Chairman of the Service Commission and he, the Secretary, had nothing to do therewith and that he had been unnecessarily impleaded. It was also pleaded that on account of the enforcement of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, with effect from 1st November, 1985, this Court lost jurisdiction to deal with the writ petition which stood transferred to the Central Administrative Tribunal in accordance with the law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in S.P. Sampat Kumar v. Union of India, 1985 (4) SCC 458 : 1985 UPLBEC (SC). The Court's interim order dated 29th October, 1985 was stated to have lapsed on the expiry of fourteen days from the enforcement of the Act, under Section 24 thereof. On this basis it was pleaded that there was no question of violating Court's interim order. The malpractices allegedly adopted by the respondents were reiterated. In the end it was stated that the appellant had highest regard for this Court and if this Court came to the conclusion that the appellant had committed contempt of the Court, he tendered unqualified apology. 9. The above counter-affidavit had been filed through Sarvasri Umesh Chandra and A.K. Gaur, Advocates. On behalf of respondents, Abid Ali filed rejoinder-affidavit dated 25th April, 1986. 9. The above counter-affidavit had been filed through Sarvasri Umesh Chandra and A.K. Gaur, Advocates. On behalf of respondents, Abid Ali filed rejoinder-affidavit dated 25th April, 1986. Hearing on the contempt application took place on 16th May, 1986 and 8th July, 1986 was fixed for pronouncement of orders when the appellant was directed to be present personally. On 8th July, 1986 an application was made the appellant through Sri B.C. Saksena Advocate seeking permission to file supplementary counter-affidavit of the same date. The respondents' counsel prayed for time to file supplementary rejoinder-affidavit. The case was ordered to be put up on 15th July, 1986. From the order-sheet it appears that judgement was ready for pronouncement but was not pronounced on account of the application filed by the appellant. Now the plea raised in the supplementary counter-affidavit may be stated. 10. The material plea raised in the supplementary counter-affidavit is that in respect of non-declaration of the respondents' result opinion of the Special Railway Counsel Sri Umesh Chandra had been obtained and he had opined that in view of the enforcement of the Administrative Tribunals Act the writ petition Stood Transferred to the Central Administrative Tribunal, Allahabad, and, therefore, it was not necessary for the Commission to comply with Court's order dated 29th October, 1985 and that non-compliance of the order will not amount to committing contempt of this Court. Copy of the appellant's letter dated 20th November, 1985 addressed to Sri Umesh Chandra seeking his opinion is Annexure SCA-1 and copy of Sri Chandra's opinion dated 21st November, 1985 is Annexure SCA-2. 11. On 8th July, 1986 when the supplementary counter-affidavit was filed, Sri Umesh Chandra, Advocate, who had been appearing for the appellant, was present in Court and he confirmed having given the aforesaid opinion. However he withdrew from the case on the plea that the application and the affidavit had been filed without consulting him. 12. On 15th July, 1986 supplementary rejoinder-affidavit was filed on behalf of the respondents. During the course of hearing the respondents offered to withdrew their contempt application if the appellant undertook to declare the result now within a specified time. The appellant's counsel did not accept the offer on the ground that the appellant w as not competent to declare the result. 13. During the course of hearing the respondents offered to withdrew their contempt application if the appellant undertook to declare the result now within a specified time. The appellant's counsel did not accept the offer on the ground that the appellant w as not competent to declare the result. 13. On 15th July, 1986 itself an application was made on behalf of the respondents for implead merit of Sri Sudhir Ranjan, Chairman, Railway Recruitment Board. This application was made obviously to meet the appellant's plea that it was for the Chairman to declare the result. 14. After hearing the learned Counsel for the parties, the learned Single Judge considered it appropriate to peruse the Constitution of the Railway Service Commission and to know the procedure obtaining in the office of the Commission regarding declaration of results. The learned Judge noted that although the appellant had stated that it was for the Chairman to declare the result, no averment had been made by him to the effect that he recommended declaration of the result but the recommendation was turned down by the Chairman. The appellant was, therefore, directed to file supplementary counter-affidavit to state specifically whether he made any such recommendation or not and if made, the effect thereof. On the application for impleadment it was ordered that the same will be considered after the material mentioned herein had been placed before the Court. The case was directed to be listened on 25th July, 1986. 15. On 25th July, 1986 supplementary counter-affidavit dated 24th July, 1986 and supplementary rejoinder-affidavit dated 25th July, 1986 were filed and the case was adjourned to 26th August, 1986, 16. In his supplementary counter-affidavit dated 24th July, 1986 the appellant stated that the procedure of the Railway Recruitment Board was contained in the publication bearing the title "Indian Railway Manual of Procedure for Railway Service Commission (Draft)" which will be produced before the Court at the time of hearing. He further stated that a perusal of the procedure prescribed in the Manual would show that at all important stages decision of the Chairman of the Railway Recruitment Board was required and the results of the selections were also required to be declared under his signatures and in his absence under the signatures of any other officer only after the Chairman had already recorded his approval of the select list in the concerned file. The appellant gave the undertaking to produce the relevant file containing notes and orders in respect of the selection in dispute and stated that a perusal thereof would show that the Chairman, after perusing the legal opinion tendered by Sri Umesh Chandra, took the decision that the result of the respondents may not be declared. It was then stated that the appellant's present counsel (Sri B.C. Saksena) had advised that the respondents writ petition was not maintainable at Lucknow Bench of the Court and accordingly an application for vacation of the interim order dated 29th October, 1985 had been filed in the writ petition. 17. On 11th September, 1986 Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 850 of 1986 was filed by the appellant for staying the proceedings in the contempt case pending disposal of the applications filed in the writ petition for vacation of the interim order. This application was rejected on 17th October, 1986 in the absence of the appellant's counsel whereupon an application for recall of the order was made by the appellant on 20th October, 1986 which was also rejected. 18. The appellant challenged the orders dated 17th October, 1986 and 25th October, 1986 before a Division Bench of this Court through Criminal Miscellaneous Appeal No. 7 of 1986 which was dismissed on 17th February, 1987 as not maintainable. Thereafter the impugned judgment was pronounced on 1st April, 1987. In the judgment, as already stated, the amount of fine was directed to be deposited in the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad. Through Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 346 of 1987 the respondents informed the Court that the appellant is no longer posted at Allahabad and that he had been transferred to Lucknow. In view of this application, through order dated 6th April, 1987, the amount of fine was directed to be deposited in the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow. 19. By a separate order dated 1st April, 1987 Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 320 of 1986, for impleadment of Sri Sudhir Ranjan, was directed to be laid before the Contempt Judge in the next week for such orders as he may deem fit to pass. 20. From the above narration it would be seen that the appellant's defence is contained in three affidavits. That defence may now be condensed. It is thus : 1. 20. From the above narration it would be seen that the appellant's defence is contained in three affidavits. That defence may now be condensed. It is thus : 1. The contempt proceedings were liable to be stayed till the disposal of the Commission's applications filed in the writ petition for vacation of the interim order in view of the enforcement of the Administrative Tribunals Act and on account of lack of jurisdiction of this Bench to entertain the writ petition ; 2. In view of the fact that this Bench had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition, the interim order dated 29th October, 1985 was void and non-compliance, of such an order will not amount to commission of contempt of this Court; 3. In view of the enforcement of the Administrative Tribunals Act only two days after the passing of the interim order dated 29th October, 1985, the said order ceased to be operative and, therefore, its non-compliance would not amount to commission of contempt of this Court; 4. The result of the selection could be declared only by the Chairman and since the Chairman had not passed any order for declaration of respondents' result, the appellant was helpless and could not be said to have deliberately flouted the orders of this Court ; 5. The result could not be declared as the malpractices committed by the respondents were still under investigation ; and 6. The notice was liable to be discharged on acceptance of unqualified apology, if the appellant was found to have committed contempt of this Court. 21. As already noticed a separate application for staying the proceedings in the contempt application was made on behalf of the appellant. That application was rejected merely on the ground of absence of the appellant's counsel. There is no observation on merits urged on behalf of the appellant for staying the proceedings. On the material defences raised on behalf of the appellant the findings recorded are thus:- "The interim order dated 29th October, 1985 was not an ex parte order and, therefore, it did not lapse on the expiry of fourteen days either under Section 24 of the Tribunals Act or under Article 226 of the Constitution. On the material defences raised on behalf of the appellant the findings recorded are thus:- "The interim order dated 29th October, 1985 was not an ex parte order and, therefore, it did not lapse on the expiry of fourteen days either under Section 24 of the Tribunals Act or under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Tribunals Act had come into force on 1st November, 1985 with effect from which date the writ petition stood transferred to the Central Administrative Tribunal but thereby this Court did not lose jurisdiction to punish for violation of the interim order dated 29th October, 1985. The material placed before the Court did not indicate that the appellant at any stage recommended declaration of the respondents' result and, therefore, the appellant could not disclaim his liability in the matter of committing contempt of this Court. The declaration of the result could not be withheld on the ground that the malpractices, which came to notice, were still under investigation as the said malpractices had been directed to be excluded from consideration in the interim order of this Court. In view of the fact that the appellant did not make any recommendation to the Chairman regarding publication of the result and further that the appellant had not been prohibited by the Chairman from declaring the result, the disobedience of Court's order was deliberate, wilful and gross and, therefore, the appellant could not be let off by acceptance of the qualified apology tendered by him. On the question of the jurisdiction of this bench to entertain the writ petition the learned Single Judge did not express final opinion as the matter was to be decided on the writ side." 22. The judgement of the learned Single Judge has been assailed on behalf of the appellant on a number of grounds. These grounds may be summarised thus : - "After 1971 contempt of court is an offence and, therefore, the procedure prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure will have to be followed in dealing with applications under the Contempt of Courts Act and this procedure not having been followed by the learned Single Judge, his judgment and the award of punishment are vitiated. The present Contempt of Courts Act does not prescribe forum for trial of a person charged with `Civil Contempt' and this forum has been prescribed through the rules framed by this Court which is impermissible under law. The appellant was not impleaded in the writ petition either by name or designation and, therefore, he cannot be charged and punished for the disobedience of the Court's order by the Railway Recruitment Board. When the power of the Court to deal with the writ petition has been taken away under the Administrative Tribunals Act, this Court cannot retain the power to punish for violation of an order passed in that writ petition ; the only option open to the Court under the circumstances was to transfer the writ petition as well as the contempt application to the Tribunal. On the enforcement of the Administrative Tribunals Act this Court lost jurisdiction to vacate or modify the interim order and in such a situation it would be inappropriate for this Court to proceed with the contempt application. Since the order was void for lack of jurisdiction, its disobedience will not amount to contempt and the learned Single Judge committed error in holding otherwise. The writ petition itself was not maintainable as it was not directed against a legal entity. The interim order of this Court was in the nature of an interim mandamus and before compliance of such an order is insisted upon, it is necessary that such an order should be personally served upon the person sought to be bound thereby and the present order was not personally served upon the appellant. Such an interim order must be communicated through the authority which has passed it and communication by a private agency is no communication in law. Under law it is only wilful disobedience of Court's order which is punishable and in the present application for contempt there was no allegation of wilful disobedience by the appellant and, therefore, the appellant could not be punished." 23. The above grounds have been traversed by the learned Counsel for the respondents. He has submitted that that the mere fact that the act is made punishable is not sufficient to constitute that act an offence. According to him, offence may be penal and otherwise too. The above grounds have been traversed by the learned Counsel for the respondents. He has submitted that that the mere fact that the act is made punishable is not sufficient to constitute that act an offence. According to him, offence may be penal and otherwise too. The learned Counsel submits that contempt is wrong against the institution and, therefore the Code of Criminal Procedure will have no application in contempt matters. On merits he submits that the appellant had deliberately flouted the orders of the court and this Court continued to have jurisdiction to punish the appellant under the Contempt of Courts Act despite the enforcement of the Administrative Tribunals Act. 24. As already noticed, one of the pleas raised on behalf of the appellant was that the interim order, of which disobedience was alleged, was non-existent in the eye of law as the Lucknow Bench had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. It was pointed out by the appellant to the learned Single Judge that this plea was pending consideration on the writ side and, therefore, the contempt proceedings were liable to be stayed. The learned Single Judge has not rejected the appellant's plea that disobedience of a void order will not amount to commission of Contempt of Court. It may, therefore, be assumed that the legal proposition was acceptable to him. The learned Single Judge was of the opinion that since the plea was pending consideration on the writ side, no opinion thereon was required to be expressed on the contempt side. Now if disobedience of a void order is not contempt and the plea of jurisdiction on the basis of which the plea of invalidity of the order is founded is not to be decided on the contempt side, what order was required to be passed on the contempt side ?. The only order which could be passed passed was to stay the proceedings on the contempt side. Instead of doing this, the learned Single Judge proceeded to examine the tenability of the plea and after such examination observed that: "The question of jurisdiction.................................. ...is a debatable question." Relying upon the decision of this Court in Kuldip Narain Lal v. M. P. Jain and another, 1984 Alld. Instead of doing this, the learned Single Judge proceeded to examine the tenability of the plea and after such examination observed that: "The question of jurisdiction.................................. ...is a debatable question." Relying upon the decision of this Court in Kuldip Narain Lal v. M. P. Jain and another, 1984 Alld. Weekly Cases 653, he held that to serve as a defence in a contempt proceedings, the order in question must appear "on the face of it to be without jurisdiction. This is certainly not the position in this case, indeed, the plea of lack of jurisdiction, raised time and again by the opposite-party, is only an ingenious device and a subterfuge to delay the implementation of the order of this Court as mentioned above". 25. In our opinion the finding of subterfuge could be recorded only after recording a positive finding to the effect that the plea was false and untenable. Such a finding has not at all been recorded and the only finding recorded is that the plea is debatable. In Kuldip Narain Lal's case (supra) the validity of the order of which disobedience alleged was not under challenge before any other court or authority and came up for consideration before the Contempt Bench which took the view that the said order was without jurisdiction and its disobedience will not result in commission of contempt of court. While laying down this proposition, the Division Bench, upholding the judgment of the learned Single Judge, added a word of caution for those who chose to ignore Court's order on the ground that the order suffered from lack of jurisdiction by observing : "An order passed by the Court is entitled to great respect and must be followed by the person against whom it is directed. The person concerned can only ignore this order upon the ground of want of jurisdiction at grave risk to himself because if the order is found to be within jurisdiction, then the contemner will have to face the consequences. The contemner would, therefore, take that risk only if he is fully confident that the order on the face of it is without jurisdiction." 26 This authority does not lay down that if the plea of jurisdiction is debatable the alleged contemner must be punished. The contemner would, therefore, take that risk only if he is fully confident that the order on the face of it is without jurisdiction." 26 This authority does not lay down that if the plea of jurisdiction is debatable the alleged contemner must be punished. If only lays down that whoever ignores Court's order on the ground of its invalidity arising from lack of jurisdiction, does so at his own risk and once it is found that the order was within jurisdiction, the contemner cannot escape action on the plea that he thought it to be without jurisdiction. 27. In our opinion once it was found that the question of jurisdiction was already awaiting consideration on the writ side and should be decided on that side, the contempt proceedings were liable to be stayed and should have been stayed. This is subject to our finding on the next question that we are now going to discuss. 28. Before passing on to the next question, we may only mention the several authorities cited by the learned counsel for the appellant in support of the plea that an order passed without jurisdiction is nullity and disobedience of such an order will not result in commission of contempt of Court. It is not necessary lo discuss all these authorities because on this question the finding of the learned Single Judge is in favour of the appellant and the same has not been shown to be wrong by the learned counsel for the respondents. Indeed the said finding has the support of a Division Bench decision of this Court in Kuldip Narain Lal's case (Supra). The authorities cited are : 1. Abdullamiyun Abdulrehman v. Government of Bombay, AIR 1942 Bombay 257 (FB). 2. Sultan Ali Nangniana son of Muhammad Ali v. Nur Hussain, AIR 1949 Lahore 131 (FB). 3. Kiran Singh and others v. Chaman Paswan and others, AIR 1954 SC 340 . 4. Sri Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir and others, 1981 (4) SCC 421 . 5. Dr. Vivekanand Atmaram Chitale and another v. Vidya Vardhanj Sabha and others, 1985 Crl.L.J 359. 29. 3. Kiran Singh and others v. Chaman Paswan and others, AIR 1954 SC 340 . 4. Sri Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir and others, 1981 (4) SCC 421 . 5. Dr. Vivekanand Atmaram Chitale and another v. Vidya Vardhanj Sabha and others, 1985 Crl.L.J 359. 29. The appellant's plea before the learned Single Judge was that on the enforcement of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 the respondent's writ petition stood transferred to the Administrative Tribunal at Allahabad with effect from 1st November, 1985 and the interim order of this Court lapsed on the transfer of the writ petition and accordingly there was no order of this Court which was required to be followed by the Commission or the appellant and, therefore the appellant could not be held guilty of disobedience of this Court's interim order dated 29th October, 1985. The learned Single Judge has accepted the appellant's plea that with effect from 1st November, 1985 the Writ Petition stands transferred to the said Tribunal. He has, however, held that by transfer of the writ petition the interim order did not automatically lapse and continued to be operative. With this view we respectfully agree. The learned Single Judge, however, further held that in view of the fact that the interim order did not lapse and continued to be operative this Court continued to have jurisdiction to punish for the disobedience of the said order. With utmost respect to the learned Single Judge we are unable to subscribe to this view. 30. The provision for transfer of a pending case on the enforcement of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 is contained in Section 29 of the said Act. Sub-section (1) of this section uses the word "shall stand transferred on that date to such Tribunal". The use of the words "shall stand" shows that the transfer is automatic and no specific order is required therefor. The transfer of the case is not deferred on account of retention of the paper book or file of the Court in which the proceedings were instituted by that Court. The consequences of transfer are mentioned in sub-section (4) clause (a) of which requires the Court or authority where the proceeding is pending to forward the record to the Tribunal. Clause (b), which is material for the purposes of the present controversy bears reproduction. The consequences of transfer are mentioned in sub-section (4) clause (a) of which requires the Court or authority where the proceeding is pending to forward the record to the Tribunal. Clause (b), which is material for the purposes of the present controversy bears reproduction. It reads as follows "(b) The Tribunal may, on receipt of such records, proceed to deal with the suit, appeal or other proceeding, so far as may be, in the same manner as in the case of an application under Section 19 from the stage which was reached before such transfer or from an earlier stage or de nevo as the Tribunal may deem fit." 31. Under the above provision the Tribunal has three options in respect of a transferred case. The first is to keep the proceedings prior to transfer intact; the second is to keep the proceedings intact only partially ; and the third is to nullify all earlier proceedings and start afresh or de nevo. These three options were open to the Tribunal in respect of Court's interim order dated 29th October, 1985 also. The Tribunal will, of course, be able to exercise the option only after it receives the record from the Court where the proceedings had been instituted. The record of the writ petition filed by the respondents continues to be in this Court and the Tribunal, therefore, had no opportunity so far to exercise its option. One thing, however, is certain and it is that once the case stand transferred to the Tribunal, this Court ceases to have jurisdiction to confirm, vacate or modify the interim order. 32. In view of the above legal position, in question that arises for consideration and which was canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellant is whether this court would be justified in proceeding with the contempt application even when it has lost jurisdiction to confirm, vacate or modify the interim order ? In this connection the learned counsel invites our attention to the purpose of making disobedience of Court's order "civil contempt". According to him the purpose of civil contempt is to obtain compliance of the Court's order and the compliance may not be insisted upon once the order, of which compliance is sought, is itself vacated or modified. 33. We find substance in the submission of the learned counsel. According to him the purpose of civil contempt is to obtain compliance of the Court's order and the compliance may not be insisted upon once the order, of which compliance is sought, is itself vacated or modified. 33. We find substance in the submission of the learned counsel. Civil contempt, as is apparent from the definition of the term in Section 2 (b), comprises wilful disobedience of Court's judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process or wilful breach of an undertaking given to Court. Once the judgment, decree, direction, order of writ is obeyed and complied with or the undertaking is honoured, the cause for grievance will disappear. This will be so even when the order of the Court fixes a time limit for compliance of the order and the compliance is not made within that time but subsequently, with delay. It is for this reason that a notice issued on an application for civil contempt is invariably discharged when the Court is informed of compliance of the order, even though the compliance has taken place after the institution of the contempt proceedings and after issue of notice. The present contempt application was also made for obtaining compliance of the Court's order dated 29th October, 1985 as is apparent from the offer made on behalf of the respondents at the appellate stage to withdraw their contempt application if the appellant gave the undertaking to comply with the said order even at this stage. This offer is recorded in Court's proceeding dated 4th May, 1987. The offer was, of course, not accepted by the appellant's counsel on the ground that the appellant was no longer posted in the Railway Recruitment Board and that he himself was not holding brief for the said Board. 34. We may now examine the probable fact of the present contempt application if the writ petition had not stood transferred to the Tribunal and this Court had itself at a subsequent stage vacated the interim order dated 29th October, 1985. On 29th October, 1985 the respondents' application for interim relief was not disposed of finally. It was only directed to be listed again on 22nd November, 1985. If on this date the interim order dated 29th October, 1985 was vacated, there could have been no occasion to punish the appellant for contempt of court. On 29th October, 1985 the respondents' application for interim relief was not disposed of finally. It was only directed to be listed again on 22nd November, 1985. If on this date the interim order dated 29th October, 1985 was vacated, there could have been no occasion to punish the appellant for contempt of court. According to the findings of the learned Single Judge the writ petition stood transferred to the Tribunal on 1st November, 1985. From this date in view of the same finding, this Court lost jurisdiction to tinkle with the interim order dated 29th October, 1985 it could neither confirm the order non vacate it nor modify it. In such a situation the appellant's position becomes precarious. He cannot approach this Court for vacating or modifying the interim order because this Court has ceased to have jurisdiction to deal with the writ, petition, including the interim order passed therein. He cannot get relief from the Tribunal because the record of the writ petition has not yet been transmitted to the Tribunal. If the result is this, then in our opinion, it will not be appropriate to exercise power to punish for contempt either under the Contempt of Courts Act or under Article 215 of the Constitution. 35. We have recorded the above opinion on the basis of the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge that with effect from 1st November, 1985 the writ petition stood transferred to the Tribunal we should not be understood as holding that the respondents' writ petition is covered by the Administrative Tribunals Act and is liable to be transferred to the Tribunal. From the judgment of the learned Single Judge it does not appear that there was any dispute between the parties on the applicability of the said Act. Before us also the dispute raised was with regard to actual date of enforcement of the Act and not regarding the applicability of the Act to the subject-matter of the dispute. However, if there is any dispute between the parties on the applicability of the Act itself, that too will have to be decided on the writ side. 36. It has been seen here-in-above that the transfer of a proceeding from Court to Tribunal does not result in automatic lapse or nullification of the orders passed by the Court prior to transfer. Thus the orders survive even after transfer. 36. It has been seen here-in-above that the transfer of a proceeding from Court to Tribunal does not result in automatic lapse or nullification of the orders passed by the Court prior to transfer. Thus the orders survive even after transfer. The question, however, is - They survive as whose orders - As Court's order or as Tribunal's order? If they survive as Court's order, the jurisdiction to punish for contempt will vest in the Court but if they survive as Tribunal's order, the jurisdiction will vest in the Tribunal. Let us examine the consequences of taking the view either way. 37. If we take the view that the order survives as Court's Order, it will result in the anomalous position of the case pending before the Tribunal and the interim order pending before this Court without this Court having jurisdiction to confirm, vacate or modify it. If, on the other hand, it is held that the order survives as the Tribunal's order, no such anomaly will arise ; the entire matter will go to the Tribunal - The main case as well as the-intermit order, with the Tribunal having full jurisdiction to vacate, confirm or modify the order. It will, therefore, be reasonable to hold that after transfer of the case from the Court to the Tribunal, the orders passed by the Court prior to transfer survive as orders of the Tribunal and not as orders of the Court. With effect from the date of transfer the Court's orders become orders of the Tribunal. This consequence follows also from the fact that under Section 29 the jurisdiction to confirm, vacate of modify the interim order, after transfer of the case to the Tribunal, has been conferred upon the Tribunal and not upon the Court. 38. This leads to the question as to which authority will be competent to deal with contempt arising from disobedience of such order. This will depend upon the time at which the alleged disobedience lakes place. If the disobedience take place prior to the transfer the authority competent to take action will be the Court and if the disobedience takes place after the transfer, the authority competent would be the Tribunal. In this backdrop we have to consider as to when, accepting the respondent's allegations, the alleged disobedience took place. If the disobedience take place prior to the transfer the authority competent to take action will be the Court and if the disobedience takes place after the transfer, the authority competent would be the Tribunal. In this backdrop we have to consider as to when, accepting the respondent's allegations, the alleged disobedience took place. The interim order dated 29th October, 1985 does not fix any time limit for its compliance. The direction to declare the result in the "meantime" follows the fixation of the next date of hearing, 22nd November, 1985. From this it may be inferred that the result could be declared any time from 29th October, 1985 to 21st November, 1985. If the Commission had latitude upto 21st November, 1985, it cannot be held guilty of contempt till 1st November, 1985. Therefore, the disobedience and consequent content will take place only after 21st November, 1985 and not earlier. Much prior to this date on 1st November, 1985, to be precise, the writ petition stood transferred to the Tribunal. As such the appellant cannot be said to have committed contempt of this court. At the most he may be said to have committed contempt of the Tribunal. Accordingly this Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the contempt application filed by the respondents against the appellant. The Tribunals Act has its own provision in Section 17 to deal with contempt of the Tribunal. For the discussion herein, in view of the finding that the writ petition stood transferred to the Tribunal with effect from 1st November, 1985, the contempt application filed on 2nd December, 1985 was liable to be dismissed. With utmost respect to the learned Single Judge we are unable to subscribe to his view that the contempt was committed of this Court and not of the Tribunal. 39. On behalf of the appellant it was urged that the respondent's contempt application was liable to be transferred to the Tribunal. This plea has been negatived by the learned Single Judge on the ground that the contempt application was not pending on 1st November, 1985 and under Section 19 (1) of the Tribunals Act only those cases were required to be transferred which were pending before the Court on that date. Contempt proceedings are independent proceedings and, therefore, they cannot be transferred alongwith the writ petition unless the proceedings fall within the mischief of Section 29 (1). Contempt proceedings are independent proceedings and, therefore, they cannot be transferred alongwith the writ petition unless the proceedings fall within the mischief of Section 29 (1). Under this provision only those proceedings are required to be transferred which were "pending ................... immediately before the establishment of the Tribunal." Since the present proceeding was not pending on the date of establishment of the Tribunal (1-11-1985), it could not be transferred to the Tribunal. To this extent we respectfully agree with the learned Single Judge. But as already indicated, the contempt application was not filed before the appropriate forum and, therefore the same was liable to be rejected on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. 40. The learned counsel for the appellant tried to argue that the order dated 29th October, 1985 was without jurisdiction as it was passed after the writ petition stood transferred to the Tribunal. He does not admit that the writ petition stood transferred to the Tribunal with effect from 1st November, 1985. According to him it stood transferred earlier to 29th October, 1985. The date of transfer according to him, is 2nd September, 1985. For making this submission he has referred us to several notifications issued regarding enforcement of the Tribunals Act, establishment of the Tribunal and fixation of the appointed day mentioned in Section 3 (c) of the Tribunals Act. Before considering the notifications we may examine some provisions of the Tribunals Act. 41. Under sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 1 of the Act the Central Government is empowered to issue notifications fixing the date from which the provisions of the Act will come into force in relation to the Central Administrative Tribunal and the Administrative Tribunal for a State. Section 3 (c) defines the term "appointed day" as the day with effect from which the Tribunal is established by notification under Section 4. Section 4 confers power on the Central Government to establish a Tribunal. Under this provision a Tribunal is established by publishing notification in the official gazette. Section 5 deals with composition of the Tribunal and Benches thereof. Sections 14 and 15 specify matters over which the Tribunal is competent to exercises jurisdiction, powers and authority. The jurisdiction, power and authority become exercisable "on and from the appointed day". Section 18 deals with the situation where Benches of a Tribunal have been constituted. Section 5 deals with composition of the Tribunal and Benches thereof. Sections 14 and 15 specify matters over which the Tribunal is competent to exercises jurisdiction, powers and authority. The jurisdiction, power and authority become exercisable "on and from the appointed day". Section 18 deals with the situation where Benches of a Tribunal have been constituted. In such a situation Section 18 empowers the appropriate Government to make provisions as to distribution of the business of the tribunal amongst the Benches and to specify matters which may be dealt with by each Bench. This is required to be done though notification and the power may be exercised from time to time. Section 24 deals with the conditions as to making of interim orders. Section 35 confers power upon the Central Government to frame rules. We may now examine the notifications issued under various provisions of the Act. 42. On 1st July, 1985 the Central Government in the Ministry of Personnel and Training, Administrative Reforms and Public Grievances and pension (Department of personnel and Training) issued notification No. GRS 527 (E) appointing 1st July, 1985 as the date on which the provisions of the Act, in so far as they late to the Central Administrative Tribunal' would come into force. This notification was issued under Section 3 (1) of the Act. 43. Thereafter four notifications were issued on 26th July, 1985. These notifications have been issued under different provisions of the Act. Except one notification, all the rest were issued from the Ministry mentioned here-in-above. Only GSR No. 713 was issued from the Ministry of Home Affairs. Under this notification the Central Government published Rules under Section 35 of the Act. The Rules were enforced with effect from 2nd September, 1985. 44. Through notification No. GSR-608 (E) the Central Government established the Central Administrative Tribunal under Section 4(1) with effect from 2nd September, 1985 which was stated to be the "appointed day" also within the meaning of Section 3 (c). Through notification No. GRS-609 (E), under Section 5 (3) Delhi was notified as the place at which the Principal Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal shall ordinarily sit and Allahabad, Bangalore, Bombay, Calcutta. Gauhati, Madras and Nagpur were specified as the places where the additional Benches shall ordinarily sit. Through notification No. GRS-609 (E), under Section 5 (3) Delhi was notified as the place at which the Principal Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal shall ordinarily sit and Allahabad, Bangalore, Bombay, Calcutta. Gauhati, Madras and Nagpur were specified as the places where the additional Benches shall ordinarily sit. The 4th notification No. 610 (E) was issued under Section 18 (1) and it fixed the territorial jurisdiction of the Principal Bench at Delhi and of the different Additional benches. 45. On 20th August, 1985 the Central Government issued notification No. GSR-667 (E) superseding the notification No. GSR-608 (E) mentioned above and establishing Central Administrative Tribunal with effect from 2nd October, 1985, which was stated to be the "appointed day" within the meaning of clause (c) of Section 3. Yet another notification was issued on 28th September, 1985 on the same subject and the date of establishment of the Tribunals and the appointed day were altered to 1st November, 1985. The earlier notification dated 20th August, 1985 was superseded. It is because of the Notification dated 28th September, 1985 read with Section 20 that the learned Single Judge held that with effect from 1st November, 1985 the writ petition stood transferred to the Tribunal. 46. From a survey of the above notifications it appears that the Central Government initially intended to establish the Tribunals with effect from 2nd September, 1985. For some reason or the other, the Tribunals could not be established on the said date and accordingly the date of establishment of the Tribunal was shifted from 2nd September, 185 to 2nd October, 1985. Even by 2nd October, 1985 the Tribunal could not be established and, therefore, thought the last notification dated 28td September, 1985 the date of establishment of the Tribunal was altered to 1st November, 1985. The appointed day was also altered with the alteration in the date of the establishment of the Tribunal. 47. Even by 2nd October, 1985 the Tribunal could not be established and, therefore, thought the last notification dated 28td September, 1985 the date of establishment of the Tribunal was altered to 1st November, 1985. The appointed day was also altered with the alteration in the date of the establishment of the Tribunal. 47. Now the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that Section 4, under which the notifications dated 26th July, 1985, 20th August, 1985 and 28th September, 1985 were issued, confers power upon the Central Government to establish Administrative Tribunals but it does not confer power to dissolve the Tribunal already created, nor any such power has been reserved under any other provision of the Act and, therefore, the Tribunal created by the earliest of the three notifications will continue to exist and since that Tribunal came into existence on 2nd September, 1985, the respondents' writ petition will stand transferred with effect from that date and not from 1st November, 1985 as held by the learned Single Judge. It is also the submission of the learned counsel that the power conferred under Section 4 could be exercised only once and not from time to time, and once it had been exercised, it exhausted itself and could not be exercised again subsequently. For making this submission he has relied upon Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal AIR 1976 Supreme Court 331, 48. Section 21 of the General Clause Act, 1897 (X of 1897) provides that power to issue notification includes the power to add, to same and, vary or rescind any notification. The notification dated 20th August, 1985 expressly supersedes notification dated 26th July, 1985 which amounts to recession of the earlier notification by the latter notification. Even if the latter notification is treated as amending or varying the earlier notification, that power is also available under Section 21. When the notification dated 26th July, 1985 is superseded by notification dated 20th August, 1985, the appointed day (2nd September, 1985) mentioned in the earlier notification also becomes irrelevant. Similarly the date 2nd October, 1985 mentioned in the notification dated 2nd August, 1985 also becomes irrelevant after the issue of the notification dated 28th September, 1985. The subsisting notification is the one issued on 28th September, 1985 which establishes the Tribunal with effect from 1st) November, 1985 and fixes that date as the appointed day. Similarly the date 2nd October, 1985 mentioned in the notification dated 2nd August, 1985 also becomes irrelevant after the issue of the notification dated 28th September, 1985. The subsisting notification is the one issued on 28th September, 1985 which establishes the Tribunal with effect from 1st) November, 1985 and fixes that date as the appointed day. This date will survive and the earlier dates will stand obliterated. 49. In view of Section 14 of the aforesaid General Clauses Act it cannot be said that after issuing notification dated 26th July, 1985 the Central Government lost power to issue the subsequent notifications dated 20th August, 1985 and 28th September, 1985. This section provides that where a Central Act or Regulation confers any power, may be exercised from time to time as occasion arises, unless a different intention is exhibited. The Tribunals Act does not exhibit a contrary intention. Accordingly the Central Government retained power to issue notifications under Section 4 of the Tribunal Act from time to time. 50. It is true that the notification No. GSR-610 (E) dated 26th July, 1985 mentions that the principal Bench and the Additional Benches have been constituted but the learned counsel for the respondents rightly points out that mere constitution of Benches is not enough to make the Tribunals functional. According to him in order to make them functional staff and other things also had to be provided obviously this could not be done before 1st November, 1985 and therefore, the notification dated 26th July, 1985 was superseded by notification dated 20th August, 1985 which itself was superseded by - Notification dated 28th September, 1985 and an entirely new date was fixed for establishment of the Tribunal and that date was also stated to be the "appointed day". 51. In Nasiruddin's case (supra) their Lordships have not held that in all cases once the power has been exercised it cannot be exercised subsequently. In this case their Lordships were interpreting the first proviso to paragraph 14 of the United Provinces High Courts (Amalgamation) Order, 1948 and the question before their Lordships was whether the power to determine the areas in Oudh for the exercises of jurisdiction by Judges at Lucknow Bench could be exercised only once or it could be exercised from time to time. Their Lordships held that the provision exhibited an intention that the power shall be exercised only once and not from time to time. Their Lordships justified the conclusion by observing that: "The areas once determined should hold good on account of certainly and to dispel problems being created from time to time by increase or decrease of areas." Reference to intention in the Order has been made in paragraph 35 of the judgment thus : "The second part of the 1st proviso to paragraph 14 shows that such areas in Oudh as the Chief Justice may direct are areas in respect of which once such direction is given, there is no intention in the Order to exercises such power or direction from time to time." (emphasis supplied). Section 14 of the General Clauses Act itself says that the General Principle prescribed there in is subject to contrary intention appearing from the statute. We are of the opinion that the reliance placed by the learned counsel on Nasiruddin's case is misconceived. 52. It was also the submission of the appellant's learned counsel that between 26th July, 1985 and 28th September, 1985 the notification dated 26th July, 1985 was operative and the appointed day 2nd September, 1985 was reached and the writ petition automatically stood transferred to the Tribunal. This argument overlooks the notification dated 20th August, 1985 whereby the appointed day way altered to 2nd October, 1985. The second and third notifications were issued before the appointed day mentioned in the earlier notification was reached. 53. In view of the above we reject the submission of the learned counsel that the writ petition stood transferred to the Tribunal on 2nd September, 1985 and that the Court's interim order dated 29th October, 1985 was without jurisdiction. 54. The invalidity of the Court's interim order dated 29th October. 1985 is pleaded also on the ground that the writ petition is not maintainable as it has not been filed against legal entities. According to the learned counsel Railway Service Commission, Allahabad and the General Manager, Northern Railway, Baroda House, New Delhi are not legal entitles and, therefore, the writ petition against them is not maintainable. For making this submission he has invited our attention to Sections 79, 80 81 and 82 and Order 27 of the Civil Procedure Code and Article 226 of the Constitution. For making this submission he has invited our attention to Sections 79, 80 81 and 82 and Order 27 of the Civil Procedure Code and Article 226 of the Constitution. In our opinion this plea should be raised on the writ side. Therefore we express no opinion on the plea. 55. It is next submitted that since the appellant had not been impleaded in the writ petition, he could not be visited writ any punishment. The argument is that the contempt, if any, has been committed by the opposite parties to the writ petition and the appellant at the most is an abettor therein, but in the contempt application he alone has been impleaded. According to the learned counsel on account of the non-impleadment of the opposite parties of the writ petition in the contempt application the said opposite parties, who may be the main contemners, cannot be punished and if the main contemners cannot be punished, the appellant who is at the most an abettor too cannot be punished. In support of the plea the learned counsel has relied upon S.N. Banerjee and another v. Kuchwar Lime and Stone Company Ltd. and others, AIR 1938 Privy Council 298. In this case the applicant in the contempt application had obtained an injunction against the Secretary of State for India in Council but in the contempt application two more persons, apart from the Secretary, were impleaded and these persons were not Government servants but were executives of a Company. There was no injunction against the Company and therefore, it was held that executives of the Company could not be punished for the alleged contempt by the Secretary of the State. However, on facts it was found that even the Secretary of State had not committed contempt. It appears from the passage at page 299 (column 2) that it was urged on behalf of the applicant in the contempt application that the said officials of the Company were liable as they aided and abetted the Secretary of State in committing breach of the injunction. It appears from the passage at page 299 (column 2) that it was urged on behalf of the applicant in the contempt application that the said officials of the Company were liable as they aided and abetted the Secretary of State in committing breach of the injunction. The argument was repelled by observing : - "Where, as here, that party (the inducted party) has not broken the injunction it is impossible to hold that any one has aided or abetted them in breaking it," This judgment is not authority for the proposition that where the party injuncted is a Corporation or Government, then officers whose duty it is to obey the injunction cannot be punished for contempt if they were not personally party to the proceeding in which the in junction order was passed or if the Government or the Corporation is not impleaded in the contempt application. This authority, is therefore, of no assistance in resolving the controversy raised by the learned counsel. 56. In our opinion where an injunction is issued against the Government it is the duty of its servants to obey it, specially those servants who are directly concerned with the implementation of that order. Although the duty arises by reason of their employment in Government service, its discharge is personal. Of course the duty attaches to those only who are in a position to implement or comply with the Court's order. If such a person refuses to comply with the Court's order, he commits the contempt himself and it cannot be said that he has merely abetted the commission of the contempt, Since he himself commits the contempt, the principles governing the liability of servant vis-a-vis the master, of agent vis-a-vis the principal and abettor vis-a vis the main contemner will not apply in proceedings for contempt taken against a Government servant on account of disobedience of Court's order. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the appellant cannot disclaim his liability on the ground that he was not personally impleaded in the writ petition or on the ground that the Railway Administration or the Railway Recruitment Board had not been impleaded in the contempt application. 57. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the appellant cannot disclaim his liability on the ground that he was not personally impleaded in the writ petition or on the ground that the Railway Administration or the Railway Recruitment Board had not been impleaded in the contempt application. 57. It is also contended that the Court's order dated 29th October, 1985 was not prohibitory in nature but mandatory and therefore, it was required to be personally served upon the appellant before he could be held guilty of contempt for its disobedience. In any court proceeding service is effected upon the party or parties impleaded as defendants, opposite party or respondents. Admittedly the appellant was not impleaded in the writ petition and, therefore, there was no question of service being effect on him. The respondents grievance in the wilt petition was not directed against the appellant personally but was directed against an institution of which he was an important functionary, a senior executive. It is the duty of the senior executives of the Government to see that the orders of the court directed against the Government or against the concerned department of the Government are obeyed. Such officers cannot take shelter behind the plea that Court's order was not served upon them personally. There is perhaps no department of the Government where Dak is received personally by the senior officers. If the argument of the learned counsel is accepted, then the senior officers of the Government will always escape liability arising from disobedience of Court's order. Offence Forum and Procedure i 58. As already noticed the argument of the appellant's learned counsel is that under the present Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 contempt of court is an offence and therefore the alleged contemner will have to be tried according to the procedure prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, for short Cr. P. C , and this trial will have to be before a forum prescribed by the statute itself and it is not permissible to prescribe the forum through rules. The prescription of the from of the single judge through Rules of Court, 1952 framed by this Court under Article 255 of the Constitution is, according to the learned counsel, impermissible. P. C , and this trial will have to be before a forum prescribed by the statute itself and it is not permissible to prescribe the forum through rules. The prescription of the from of the single judge through Rules of Court, 1952 framed by this Court under Article 255 of the Constitution is, according to the learned counsel, impermissible. The basis of the argument is that prior to 1971 `contempt of court' had not been defined and for the first time it has been defined under the Act of 1971. For submitting that after the definition of `contempt of court' it becomes offence, the learned counsel relied upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in Nurul Huda and others v. Amitabh Bachchan and others, 1984 Allahabad Law Journal, 1254. 59. Sri R.N. Trivedi, learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand submits that definition of the term 'contempt of court' does not bring about any change in the legal position obtaining prior to the enforcement of 1971 Act. According to him contempt of court was not an offence prior to 1971 and it has not become an offence even after the enforcement of 1971 Act. It is, he submits wrong against the institution, namely the judiciary, and it remains so despite definition of the term under the 1971 Act. There he goes on to submit, a fundamental difference between a penal offence and contempt of court, in the former punishment following despite expression of regret or tender of apology by the offender once the offence is established, while in the latter punishment may not follow despite establishment of charge, if the conferring expresses regret or tenders apology. It is contended that since contempt of court is not a penal offence, Cr.P.C. will have no application to proceedings for contempt and therefore there is no question of following the procedure prescribed therein which, in fact, is not practicable to follow. The learned counsel explained that the purpose of defining contempt of court was to classify and to reduce the discretion of the Court and to bring about uniformity in law. 60. Regarding the procedure, Sri Trivedi submits that since Cr.P.C. is not applicable the court is competent to evolve its own procedure. The only limitation bring that the procedure is fair, reasonable and ensures compliance of principles of natural justice. 60. Regarding the procedure, Sri Trivedi submits that since Cr.P.C. is not applicable the court is competent to evolve its own procedure. The only limitation bring that the procedure is fair, reasonable and ensures compliance of principles of natural justice. As points out that over the years summary procedure of deciding contempt proceedings on affidavits has been followed and the said procedure is reasonable and fair and does not infringe any principle of natural justice. 61. Both the learned counsel have cited large number of authorises in support of their respective contentions. 62. For submitting that the contempt of court is an offence punishable in accordance with the procedure laid down in Criminal Procedure Code of learned counsel for the appellant invites our attention to Section 2 (n) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which defines the term "offence" as follows : - "Offence means an act or omissions made punishable by law for the time being in force and includes any act in respect of which a complaint may be made under Section 20 of the Cattle Trespass Act, 1971" (emphasis supplied). The important words in the above definition are "made punishable by any law". In State v. Padma Kant Malviya and another it was held by a Full Bench of this Court that the term "Law" means written law (see paragraph 57). Therefore, in order to attract the above definition the act or omission must be punishable under a written law to constitute it an offence. If the act or omission is punishable otherwise than under a written law, it is not offence under the above definition. We have, therefore, to see whether the power to punish for contempt flows from written law or it flows from the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by courts of record which this court admittedly is. 63. In very early times the power to punish for contempt was treated to be a necessary incident to every court of justice, whether or record or not. 63. In very early times the power to punish for contempt was treated to be a necessary incident to every court of justice, whether or record or not. In the English and Empire Digest Volume 16 the following statement finds place at page 6 : "The power which the Courts in West minister Hall have of vindicating their own authority is coal with their first foundation and institution ; it is a necessary incident to every court of justice, whether of record or not to fine or imprison for a contempt of the court acted in the face of it." In India there have been statutory enactments dealing with the contempt of court and the Constitution of India also makes reference to it. We may now proceed to consider whether in India the power to punish for contempt of court flows from statute or it flows from the very nature of the institution. In other words we have to see whether the power has been conferred by statute or it exists apart from the statute. 64. Prior to 1926 there was no statute in India dealing with contempt of court. The High Courts were recognised, under their respective Chapters, as courts of record with power to punish for contempt of themselves. The High Court of Judicature at Allahabad was created under Letters Patent of Her Majesty Queen Victoria dated 17-3-1866 paragraph 1 of which describes the court to be a Court of record. Apart from saying that the High Court will be court of record, the Letters Patent do not say anything regarding the power of the Court to punish for contempt. Therefore, the power to punish for contempt was exercised as a necessary incident of the institution as a court of record and not under a written law or statute. 65. The Chief Court of Oudh was created under the Oudh Courts Act, 1925 (United Provinces Act No. IV of 1925). It does not contain any provision relating to contempt of Court. The Court is not described as a court of record. Therefore, the Chief Court exercised the power to punish for contempt not under any written law but as a necessary incident of its jurisdiction. 66. It does not contain any provision relating to contempt of Court. The Court is not described as a court of record. Therefore, the Chief Court exercised the power to punish for contempt not under any written law but as a necessary incident of its jurisdiction. 66. The High Court in Allahabad and the Chief Court in Oudh were amalgamated through the United Provinces High Courts (Amalgamation) Order, 1948 the amalgamated Court being designated as the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. This order does not describe the High Court as a court of record nor does it say anything in respect of contempt of court but by clause 9 the law in force immediately before the appointed day with respect to practice, and procedure in the High Court in Allahabad has been preserved with necessary modification. Thus the practice and procedure of punishing for contempt has been continued under a written law. This is recognition of power and jurisdiction not conferment thereof. 67. Then comes the Constitution of India, Article 215 of which declares every High Court to be a Court of record having "the power of such a Court including the power to punish for contempt of itself." This is not creation of a power to punish for contempt but recognition of that power. Power to punish for contempt of itself is a necessary incident of a court of record as is apparent from the following passage in Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, volume 10, page 319 paragraph 709 "Another manner of division is into courts of record and courts not of record. Certain courts are expressly declared by statute to be courts of record. In the case of courts not expressly declared by Statute to be court of record, the answer to the question whether a court is a court of record seems to depend in general upon whether it has power to line or imprison, by statute or otherwise, for contempt of itself of other substantive offences if it has such power, it seems that it is a court of record." The language of Article 215 of the Constitution also shows that the power to punish for contempt was reserved to the High Courts its a necessary incident of their being courts of record. The Article reads thus:- "Every High Court shall be a court of record and shall have the powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself." In view of this constitutional provision the High Courts in India exercise the power to punish for contempt as courts of record. 68. Prior to the enforcement of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926 (XII of 1926), for short 1926 Act, the High Courts in India in respect of their own contempt exercised absolute discretion in the fields of - (i) identification of contempt i.e. what constitutes contempt; (ii) the punishment, i.e. what punishment should be awarded to the contemner ; and (iii) the procedure i.e. what procedure should be followed in imposing the punishment. 1926 Act was the first fruitful legislative attempt to interfere with the absolute discretion so far exercised by the High Courts. The powers of the High Court were curtailed only in the second field i.e. in the field of punishment. Section 3 prescribes the maximum punishment imposable upon the contemner, the same being six months simple imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2000/-. In view of this provision the contemner could not be awarded a sentence of more than six months simple imprisonment or a fine which exceeded the sum of Rs. 2000/-. This Act does not make the act of contempt punishable; it only regulates the punishment imposable against the contemner. Therefore, by reference to this Act the act of contempt does not become "offence" within the meaning of Section 2 (n) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 69. 1926 Act comprises just three sections. Section 1 deals with the title of the Act, extent of its application and date of enforcement. Section 2 (1) says that the High Courts established by the Letters Patent shall have the same power to punish for contempt of courts subordinate to them as they have in respect of contempt of themselves. It also provides that the power may be exercised in accordance with the same procedure and practice as is adopted for punishing for contempt of the High Court. Sub-section (3) debars the High Court from taking cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a subordinate court where such contempt is an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code, for short Indian Penal Code. Sub-section (3) debars the High Court from taking cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a subordinate court where such contempt is an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code, for short Indian Penal Code. Then comes Section 3 which prescribes the maximum punishment imposable upon a contemner. There is a proviso to this section which says that the accused may be discharged or the punishment awarded may be remitted on apology being made to the satisfaction of the Court. By the second proviso it is made clear that the restriction on the quantum of punishment applies whether the contemner is convicted of contempt of High Court or of contempt of subordinate courts. The second proviso was added by Amending Act 1937. 70. 1926 Act was not intended to create a new right or confer any fresh power upon the High Courts. The purpose of the Act was to bring about uniformity in law and reduce the discretion in the field of punishment as is apparent from the statement of object and reasons. The statement notes the conflicting views expressed by different High Courts in India on the competence of the High Courts to punish for contempt of the subordinate courts, the Madras and Bombay High Courts holding that they were competent and the Calcutta High Court taking a different view. Relevant portion from the Statement read as follows:- "The several High Courts of Judicature established by Letters Patent are Superior Courts of Record and as such they have power to attach and commit for acts amounting to contempt of their own proceedings as contempt of Court and without reference to whether the acts alleged constitute an offence under the Indian Penal Code. Different views have, however, been held by the various High Courts in regard to their power to punish for such contempt's ommitted in regard to proceedings in court which are subordinate to them. The Madras High Court in the case of In re : Venkata Rao, 10 MLJ 209 and the Bombay High Court in King V.B. G. Kulkarni, 36 Bom 592, have held that they possess the power to protect their subordinate courts against such contempts. The Madras High Court in the case of In re : Venkata Rao, 10 MLJ 209 and the Bombay High Court in King V.B. G. Kulkarni, 36 Bom 592, have held that they possess the power to protect their subordinate courts against such contempts. The Calcutta High Court on the other hand in King-Emperor v. Girindra Mohan Dass and others, 17 CWN 1285 and the Legal Remembrancer v. Motilal Ghose and others, 49 Cal 173 has taken a contrary view................. The condition of law in India as summarised above has been regarded as unsatisfactory and in 1914a Bill was introduced in the Indian Legislative Council which would have increased the classes of cases of contempt of court punishable as offence under the Indian Penal Code but it was not proceeded "with owing to the war. The present Bill proposes to declare and amend the law on other lines. Instead of increasing the classes of cases punishable as Contempts of Court after trail by Magistrates the Bill restricts the power to protect subordinate Courts against contempts which are not already provided for in the Indian Penal Code to the High Courts themselves. The Bill resolves any doubts as to the powers of the High Courts of Judicature in regard to the protection of their subordinate Courts from such contempts. It will show that the Courts of Judicial Commissioners of the Central Provinces, Oudh and Sind will have the same powers of punishing for contempts committed in regard to their own proceedings, or of the proceedings of Court subordinate to them. In lieu of the existing unrestricted powers of the High Courts of Judicature, it will define the nature of the offence of contempt of court and the extent of the punishment which may be awarded. Finally, it bars inherent powers of the High Court to deal with such offences." 71. From the above it is clear that 1926 Act merely regulates the power that was already available to the High Court which was constituted as court of record. It is not a statute which makes an act or omission contempt and, therefore, punishable. 72. 1926 Act was followed by the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 (Act XXXII of 1982). This has six sections. Sections 1 to 4 do not provide anything new. It is not a statute which makes an act or omission contempt and, therefore, punishable. 72. 1926 Act was followed by the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 (Act XXXII of 1982). This has six sections. Sections 1 to 4 do not provide anything new. New provision is contained in Section 5 which clarifies that a High Court is competent to take cognizance of contempt of itself or of a court subordinate to it even though the contempt may have been committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of that High Court and the alleged contemner may be outside such limits. This Act is classificatory in nature as is apparent from the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Act. The concerned Statement reads as follows; - "The Constitution recognises the power of the High Courts to punish for contempt's of them, but there is no specific provision of law which enables a High Court to exercises this power in respect of contempt committed beyond its territorial jurisdiction. It is desirable that a High Court as a Court of Record should be able to punish-for contempt of itself and of courts subordinate to it irrespective of whether the contempt is committed within or outside its territorial jurisdiction and irrespective of whether the alleged contemner is for the time being at a place within or outside such jurisdiction. The Bill seeks mainly to achieve this object......................." 73. 1952 Act was replaced by the present Act No. 70 of 1971. It has 24 Sections. Since contempt of court is alleged to have become offence under this Act, its provisions will require clear scrutiny. 74. Section 2 defines certain terms. The term, "contempt of court" has been defined to mean civil contempt or criminal contempt. Civil contempt to mean wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court of wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court. 74. Section 2 defines certain terms. The term, "contempt of court" has been defined to mean civil contempt or criminal contempt. Civil contempt to mean wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court of wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court. Criminal contempt is defined to mean the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any court; or prejudices or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding ; or interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner. This section provides definitions of three important terms, namely, "contempt of court", "civil contempt" and "criminal contempt". It is mainly on the basis of incorporation of the these definitions that the learned counsel for the appellant submits that contempt of court has become an offence. 75. Section 3 says that indecent publication and distribution of matter shall not be contempt. Under Section 4 fair and accurate report of judicial proceeding is also not contempt. Section 5 prescribes that fair criticism of judicial act is not contempt. Section 6 specifies when a person shall not be contempt of court in respect of any statement made by him in good faith concerning the procedure of any subordinate court. Section motions when publication of information relating to proceedings in chambers or in camera will be contempt. In a way Sections 3 to 7 indicate the defences available to an alleged contemner. In view of what has been stated in Section 8 the defences mentioned in Sections 3 to 7 are not exhaustive of the defences available to a person charged with contempt of court. Section 9 declares that nothing contained in the Act shall be construed as implying that any disobedience, breach, publication or other act is punishable as contempt of court which would not be so punishable apart from this Act. Section 9 declares that nothing contained in the Act shall be construed as implying that any disobedience, breach, publication or other act is punishable as contempt of court which would not be so punishable apart from this Act. The marginal heading of this section is "Act not to imply enlargement of scope of contempt" Section 10 provides that every High Court shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority, in accordance with the same procedure and practice in respect of contempt's of courts subordinate to it as it has and exercises in respect of itself. This is similar to the power available under 1926 and 1952 Acts. Section 11 refers to the jurisdiction of the High Court to try for contempt's committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court. This is similar to Section 5 of 1952 Act. Section 12 is regarding the maximum punishment imposable on conviction for contempt of court. The maximum limits are the same as prescribed in 1926 and 1952 Acts. Section 13 imposes restriction on the power of the court to punish for contempt, the restriction being that sentence shall not be imposed unless the Court is satisfied that the contempt is of such a nature that it substantially interferes, or tends substantially interfere with the due course of justice. Section 14 is indicative of the power which may be exercised by court when the contempt is committed in the face of the court. Section 15 prescribes the manner in which court may take cognizance of a criminal contempt. Under this section the court may take action for criminal contempt on its own motion or on a motion made by the Advocate-General, or any other person with the consent in writing of the Advocate-General. In view of this provision it is not open to any one to make an application to the court for taking action against a person who has allegedly committed criminal contempt. If a person desires to make such an application he will have to approach the Advocate-General and it is only when the Advocate-General has granted consent in writing that he can make an application to court. Section 16 deals with contempt by judge, magistrate or other acting judicially. Section 17 refers to the procedure that may be followed in case of criminal contempt. Section 16 deals with contempt by judge, magistrate or other acting judicially. Section 17 refers to the procedure that may be followed in case of criminal contempt. Under sub-section (1) of Section 18 a case of criminal contempt cannot be heard by a Bench of less than two Judges. Section 19 provides for appeal against the decision of a Single Judge. Section 20 prescribes limitation for actions for contempt. It lays down that no court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt either on its own motion or otherwise after the expiry of the period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. The period of limitation prescribed in this section is applied whether the action is initiated by the court on its own or it is initiated at the instance of any other person. Under Section 21 of the provisions of the Act not apply to contempt of Nyaya Panchayats or other village courts. Section 22 declares that the Act is in addition to and not in derogation of other laws relating to contempt. Under Section 23 the Supreme Court and the High Court are competent to frame rules not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act ; providing for any matter relating to its procedure. Section 24 repeals the Contempt of Courts Act 1952 (32 of 1952). 76. The learned Counsel for the respondents has submitted that by defining the terms "contempt of court", "civil contempt" and criminal contempt" the legislature has not made any act or omission punishable as contempt; it has merely codified the existing law of contempt as interpreted by courts. According to him the new Act does not create a new head of contempt; it merely divides the existing contempts into two categories, civil contempts and criminal contempts. This division of bifurcation became necessary as certain provisions have been made which are applicable only to one class of contempts and are not applicable to the other class. It is pointed out that under clauses (b) and (c) of Section 15 consent of the functionaries mentioned therein is required for making a motion for criminal contempt. This division of bifurcation became necessary as certain provisions have been made which are applicable only to one class of contempts and are not applicable to the other class. It is pointed out that under clauses (b) and (c) of Section 15 consent of the functionaries mentioned therein is required for making a motion for criminal contempt. No such consent is required for making motion for civil contempt Again, under Section 18 (1) a case of criminal contempt can be heard only by a Bench of not less than two Judges ; that is, it cannot be heard by a Single Judge. 77. In our opinion, nothing turns on the definition of the aforesaid three terms. After defining the Act does not go on to say that civil contempt shall be punishable with this punishment and criminal contempt shall be punishable with that punishment. Under Section 12 the punishment is prescribed for `Contempt of Court" and not for "Civil Contempt" or "Criminal Contempt". The language of Section 3 of 1926 Act, Section 4 of 1952 Act and Section 12 of 1971 Act is substantially same, though not identical : The marginal headings of Sections 3 and 4 of 1926 and 1952 Acts respectively are identical, the same being "Limit of punishment for Contempt of Court". From this it is apparent that the provision is restrictive in nature. The language of the marginal heading of Section 12 of 1971 Act is, of course, different the same being "Punishment for Contempt of Court". Apparently this heading would go to show that this section is prescribing punishment for contempt. But when we compare the language of the three sections in the three Acts, we find that there is no substantial difference. Therefore, from the mere change in the language of the marginal heading it cannot be inferred that the act of contempt has been made punishable by "the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. In order to bring home our point we may reproduce the material portions of Sections 3, 4 and 12 of three enactments. Therefore, from the mere change in the language of the marginal heading it cannot be inferred that the act of contempt has been made punishable by "the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. In order to bring home our point we may reproduce the material portions of Sections 3, 4 and 12 of three enactments. Section 3 of 1926 Act reads as follows : - "Save as otherwise expressly provided by any law for the time being in force, a contempt may be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, which may extend to two thousand rupees, or with both", (emphasised) Section 4 of 1952 Act reads thus "Save as otherwise provided by any law for the time being in force, a contempt of court may be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, or with both." The above two provisions are in identical language, except that Section 3 uses an extra word "expressly". The dropping of the word "expressly" does not bring about any material change. Section 12 of 1971 Act reads as follows :- "Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act or in any other law, a contempt of court may be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to rupees two thousand, or with both." (emphasised) The word "expressly" which had been dropped in 1952 Act has been restored. The additional words used in the section are "in this Act or" and "other". By the restoration and addition of those words, the nature of the power and jurisdiction is not changed. Therefore, if contempt was not an offence under 1926 and 1952 Acts, in the sense that it had not been "made punishable" by those laws, it cannot be said to have become punishable by the law contained in 1971 Act. We may emphasise that the whole argument of the appellant's learned Counsel is that contempt has become offence under the Act of 1971, although it was not so under the previous two Acts. 78. There is another fallacy in the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant. We may emphasise that the whole argument of the appellant's learned Counsel is that contempt has become offence under the Act of 1971, although it was not so under the previous two Acts. 78. There is another fallacy in the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant. If his argument is accepted that the contempt has been made punishable under Act of 1971, power will have to be conceded to Parliament to deprive High Courts of the power to punish for contempt. If Parliament has power to do a thing, it will also have to have the power to undo that thing. The power to punish for contempt has been expressly reserved to the High Courts under Article 215 of the Constitution and this power cannot be abrogated by the ordinary legislature. It cannot, therefore, be said that by enacting 1971 Act the Parliament has made available to the High Court the power to punish for contempt. The Parliament has merely regulated the exercise of that power. 1971 Act is, therefore, merely regulatory in nature, like the two earlier Acts. It regulates the exercise of power in the fields of Civil Contempt and Criminal Contempt. That is the main purpose of defining the three terms mentioned above. 79. Under entry 77 of List I to VII Schedule to the Constitution, Parliament is competent to frame law pertaining to contempt of the Supreme Court. Similarly under entry 14 of List III, it is competent to frame law pertaining to contempt of other courts. This power will have to be exercised by the legislature with the limitation that it cannot abrogate, nullify or transfer to some other authority the power of the Supreme Court and the High Court to take action for contempt. 80. Section 10 of 1971 Act says that every High Court shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, power and authority in accordance with the same procedure and practice in respect of contempt of courts subordinate to it as it has and exercises in respect of contempt's of itself. This is merely preservation of jurisdiction already existing. 80. Section 10 of 1971 Act says that every High Court shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, power and authority in accordance with the same procedure and practice in respect of contempt of courts subordinate to it as it has and exercises in respect of contempt's of itself. This is merely preservation of jurisdiction already existing. Section 12 says that "save as otherwise expressly provided in the Act or in any other law a contempt of court may be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with a fine which may extend to two thousand rupees or both." This language is entirely different from the language employed in the Indian Penal Code whereby various acts of commission and omission have been described to be offences and they are punishable in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Cr.P.C. In various sections of the Penal Code the language employed is `shall be punished with imprisonment of either description' ; the language is peremptory. The language of Section 12 of 1971 Act is permissive. This is another reason for holding that the `Contempt of Courts Act' does not, by itself, make the Act of contempt an offence in the sense that term has been used in Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure. Further, the proviso to Section 12 specifically mentions that the accused may be discharged or the punishment awarded may be remitted on apology being made to the satisfaction of the court. Under this provision even after recording the finding of guilt the court may not impose punishment if the contemner tenders apology. Under the Indian Penal Code or Code of Criminal Procedure there is no such option available. Once the accused is found guilty, he has to be punished. The court's discretion is only in the field of quantum of punishment. 81. Section 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 also shows that Criminal Procedure Code will not be applicable to contempt of court proceedings taken by this Court. This section reads as follows "5. Nothing contained in this Code shall, in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary, effect any special or local law for the time being in force, or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed, by any other law for time being in force." (emphasis supplied). 82. This section reads as follows "5. Nothing contained in this Code shall, in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary, effect any special or local law for the time being in force, or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed, by any other law for time being in force." (emphasis supplied). 82. In our opinion contempt of court is special law, the jurisdiction of the High Courts to punish for contempt is special and the form of procedure is also special. These triple `Specials' take away contempt of Court from the purview of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the own terms of Section 5. If Code of Criminal Procedure is not applicable to contempt proceedings, there is no question of identifying contempt with reference to any provision thereof including Section 2(n). 83. Section 2(1) of 1926 Act, while authorising the High Courts to punish for contempt of courts subordinate to them, mentions that the punishment may be accorded `in accordance with the same procedure and practice'. This is recognition of the procedure and practice already evolved by the courts for punishing contemners. Section 3 (1) of the 1952 Act also uses the same language. Thus the same procedure and practice is recognised under the 1952 Act also. Section 10 of 1971 Act reads as follows : - "Every High Court shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority, in accordance with the same procedure and practice, in respect of contempts of courts subordinate to it as it was and exercises in respect of contempts of itself........." (emphasised). This also is confirmation of the existing procedure and practice. The provision of course refers to the procedure to be followed for punishing contempt of courts subordinate to the High Court, but that does not make any difference because what is preserved is the practice and procedure by which the High Court punishes contempt of itself. Section 15 prescribes the manner in which proceedings for criminal contempt may be initiated. To that extent the procedure may be said to have been varied. Section 17 also refers to procedure after cognizance of Criminal Contempt. These sections have no application to `Civil Contempt." Accordingly with respect to `Civil Contempt, the legislature neither intended to bring about any change nor any change has in fact been brought about. 84. To that extent the procedure may be said to have been varied. Section 17 also refers to procedure after cognizance of Criminal Contempt. These sections have no application to `Civil Contempt." Accordingly with respect to `Civil Contempt, the legislature neither intended to bring about any change nor any change has in fact been brought about. 84. The mere fact that an act amounts to offence is not enough to make the procedure prescribed in the Criminal Procedure Code applicable to the trial of the so-called offence. Criminal Procedure Code divides offences into two categories `cognizable offence' and `non-conizable offence'. Cognizable offence is defined in Section 2 (c) as one in which a police officer may in accordance with the first schedule or under any other law for the time being in force, arrest without a warrant. Non-cognizable offence is defined in Section 2 (1) as one in which a police officer has no authority to arrest without warrant. There is no such provision in the Contempt of Courts Act. Therefore, the so-called offence of contempt cannot be brought under the category of either type offences. In the first schedule to Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 forum of court is prescribed with reference to the, category of offence and the punishment prescribed therefor. Since contempt is neither a cognizable offence nor non-cognizable offence, there is no forum prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure for the trial of the so-called offence of civil contempt. The courts which may try offence are either Magistrate's courts or sessions courts. Under Sections 10, 14 and 15 of 1971 Act the forum prescribed is the Supreme Court and the High Court and not the Court of Magistrate or Sessions: the High Court would become contempt only by application of Section 26 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 85. Further, if the Code of Criminal Procedure is applied to contempt proceedings the constituent power conferred upon the High Court under Article 215 will become subordinate to the discretion of the State Government when the contempt has been committed by a public servant, as in view of Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, sanction of the State Government will be required for prosecuting such a public servant. If the State Government refuses to give sanction, the High Court will be powerless. This situation will be contrary to the intention enshrined under Article 215 of the Constitution. If the State Government refuses to give sanction, the High Court will be powerless. This situation will be contrary to the intention enshrined under Article 215 of the Constitution. 86. We have already made observations regarding the procedure to be followed in cases of `Civil Contempt'. Now we way turn to the forum about which the grievance of the appellant's learned Counsel is that it can be prescribed only by statute law and not by Rules of the Court. According to the learned Counsel the forum of Single Judge has been prescribed by the Rules of the Court and this is impermissible. The argument is misconceived. The forum has been prescribed primarily by the Constitution and it is recognised in the Contempt of Courts Act. Under Article 215 of the Constitution the forum is the High Court. The same forum is referred to in Sections 10, 11,14 and 15 of 1971 Act. In Sections 14 and 15 there is reference to the Supreme Court also. Whether it is High Court or the Supreme Court the forum has been prescribed by written law or statute law. Rules of the Court merely deal with the allocation of work amongst the Judges of the High Court. The Single Judge decides a case as a representative or as a constituent of the High Court. His judgment is as much the judgment of the High Court, as that of all the Judges sitting together. Therefore, by reference to the Rules of the Court it cannot be said that the forum for trial of contemners has been created by the Rules of the Court and not by statute itself. 87. In our opinion 1971 Act has not brought about any change in the nature of jurisdiction and power exercised by the Courts of Record for punishing contempt of themselves.. The position of law settled by the decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court and of this Court as well as of other High Courts is that contempt of court is not an offence attracting applicability of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that position continues till date. 88. In Nurul Huda's case (supra), a Division Bench of this Court has, of course, held that under 1971 Act, contempt of court is offence. The Bench has taken the view that after the commencement of 1971 Act, contempt of court has been made punishable under the Act. 88. In Nurul Huda's case (supra), a Division Bench of this Court has, of course, held that under 1971 Act, contempt of court is offence. The Bench has taken the view that after the commencement of 1971 Act, contempt of court has been made punishable under the Act. This observation has been made despite the court's observation made earlier that `it is only regulated by the Act' once it is held that 1971 Act merely regulates the power to punish for contempt, it is difficult to hold that it is the Contempt of Courts Act which has made contempt punishable. 89. In our opinion the view taken in the above case conflicts with the dicta laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court and by a Full Bench of this Court which are binding on us. The Supreme Court decisions to which reference be made are : - (1) AIR 1952 SC 149 - Bathina Ramakrishtia Reddy v. State of Madras. (2) AIR 1954 SC 186 - Sukhdev Singh v. Hon'ble Chief Justice S. Teja Singh. (3) AIR 1971 SC 1132 - Sri O.K. Daphtary and others v. O.P. Gupta. (4) AIR 1972 SC 858 -72. L. Kapur v. State of Tamil Nadu ; and (5) AIR 1981 SC 723 - S.K. Sarkar v. Vinay Chandra Misra ; and the Full Bench decision is AIR 1954 All 52 - State v. Padma Kant Malviya and another. 90. In the first case (Reddy's) their Lordships have observed as follows :- "It is well known that the aim of the contempt proceeding is to deter man from offering any indignities to a court of justice and an essential feature of the proceeding is to exercise of a summary power by the Court itself in regard to the delinquent." (emphasised). According to this authority there are two essential features of contempt proceedings ; the first is that the power is exercisable by the High Court itself and the second is that the power may be exercised in a summary manner. In other words the jurisdiction is special and the procedure for exercise of the jurisdiction is also special. 91. According to this authority there are two essential features of contempt proceedings ; the first is that the power is exercisable by the High Court itself and the second is that the power may be exercised in a summary manner. In other words the jurisdiction is special and the procedure for exercise of the jurisdiction is also special. 91. In the second case (Sukhdev Singh's) the following observations find place :- "3............-.....In our opinion the power of a High Court to institute proceedings for contempt and punish where necessary is a special jurisdiction which is inherent in all Courts of Record and Section 1(2) of the Code expressly excludes special jurisdiction from its scope... "4 Contempt is a special subject and the jurisdiction is conferred by special set of laws peculiar to Courts of Records." "24. We hold, therefore, that the Code of Criminal Procedure does not apply in matters of contempt triable by the High Court. The High Court can deal with it summarily and adopt its own procedure. All that is necessary is that the procedure should be fair and that the contemner is made aware of the charge made against him and given a fair and reasonable opportunity to defend himself...................." (emphasis supplied). 92. The reference in paragraph 3 above to Section 1 (2) is of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The equivalent provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is Section 5 which has been reproduced herein above. According to this authority Code of Criminal Procedure is not applicable because Section 1(2) (Section 5 of the present Act) expressly excludes from the purview of the Code cases of Special laws, Special Jurisdiction and Special Procedures. 93. In the third case (O.K. Daphtary's), their Lordships reproduced the above passage from paragraph 24 of the report in Sukhdev Singh's case and observed in paragraph 84 thus "In our view that is still the law. It is in accordance with the practice of this Court that a notice was issued to the respondents and opportunity given to him to file affidavits stating facts and their contentions....................." This judgment re-affirms the law laid down in Sukhdev Singh's case. 94. It is in accordance with the practice of this Court that a notice was issued to the respondents and opportunity given to him to file affidavits stating facts and their contentions....................." This judgment re-affirms the law laid down in Sukhdev Singh's case. 94. In the lourth case (R.L. Kapur's), the following observation finds place at page 859 "Article 215 declares that every High Court shall be a Court of record and shall have all powers of such a Court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. Whether Article 215 declares the power of the High Court already existing in it by reason of its being a court of record, or whether the Article confers the power as inherent in a Court of record, the jurisdiction is special one, not arising from the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952, and therefore, not within the purview of either the Penal Code or the Code of Criminal Procedure...................In any case, so far as the contempt of the High Court itself is concerned, as distinguished from that of a court subordinate to it, the Constitution vests these rights is every High Court and so no Act of a legislature could take away that jurisdiction and confer it afresh by virtue of its own authority " (emphasis supplied). 95. The dicta laid down so far as High Courts are concerned is - (1) the jurisdiction is special (2) it does not arise from the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 (3) the jurisdiction has been vested by the Constitution and therefore (4) it is not open to the ordinary legislature to take away that jurisdiction and confer it afresh by its own authority. The bench in Nurul Huda's ease has reproduced the above passage for the purpose of drawing the following conclusion. "It was thus settled law that contempt of court was not punishable under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926 and 1952. Contempt of Court was not defined in those Acts and the offence of contempt of Court was not created by them. Those Acts only limited the punishment that could be awarded by the High Court for contempt of court. Contempt of Court was punishable under the inherent powers of the High Court as a Court of Record This was a special jurisdiction to which neither the Indian Penal Code nor the Code of Criminal Procedure was applicable." (see paragraph 7). Those Acts only limited the punishment that could be awarded by the High Court for contempt of court. Contempt of Court was punishable under the inherent powers of the High Court as a Court of Record This was a special jurisdiction to which neither the Indian Penal Code nor the Code of Criminal Procedure was applicable." (see paragraph 7). Proceeding further the Bench observes in paragraph 8 as follows .............It is thus evident that contempt of Court has been defined for the first time in the Act. The Act also provides the punishment for Contempt of Court. Thus both the definitions of contempt and punishment for contempt are provided in the Act. This is similar to the provision of the Indian Penal Code which defines offences and provides punishment for them. It, therefore, follows that contempt of court has now been made punishable under the Act and is, therefore, an offence..............." So far as punishment is concerned, it is provided in 1971 Act in the same terms as it was provided in 1926 and 1952 Acts. Therefore, according to the Division Bench the entire difference arises from the definitions of the term "Contempt of Court". In other words what was lacking in 1926 and 1952 Acts was the definition of the term. Let us for a moment assume that the 1971 Act has defined the term "Contempt of Court" for the first time, but that will not be enough to make it an offence under Section 2 (n) of the Code of Criminal Procedure because according to their Lordships contempt jurisdiction of the High Court is a special jurisdiction and special jurisdictions have been expressly excepted from the purview of the Criminal Procedure Code by Section 5 thereof. Further the Bench has not considered the import of the dictum "no act of legislature could take away that jurisdiction and confer it afresh by virtue of its own authority." To hold that contempt has been made punishable under the 1971 Act would be to concede to the Parliament the right "to take away that jurisdiction and confer it afresh by virtue of its own authority." Such a concession is not permissible in view of the dictum laid down by their Lordships. 96. The cases hereinabove discussed arose prior to the enforcement of 1971 Act. Let us now examine the dictum laid down by their Lordships after the enforcement of 1971 Act. 96. The cases hereinabove discussed arose prior to the enforcement of 1971 Act. Let us now examine the dictum laid down by their Lordships after the enforcement of 1971 Act. The dictum is available in the fifth case (S.K. Sarkar's). The Division Bench has adverted to this case also. Their Lordships observe:- "Articles 129 and 215 presume all the powers of the Supreme Court and the High Court respectively, as a court of Record which include the power to punish the contempt of itself. As pointed out by this Court in Mohd. Ikram Hussain v. The State of U.P., AIR 1964 SC 1625 , there are no curbs on the power of the High Court to punish for contempt `of itself except those contained in the Contempt of Courts Act. Articles 129 and 215 do not define as to what constitutes contempt of Court. Parliament has, by virtue of the aforesaid entries in List I and List II of the Seventh Schedule, power to define and limit the power of the Courts in punishing contempt of court and to regulate their procedure in relation thereto. Indeed, this is what is stated in the preamble of the Act of 1971." (emphasis supplied). Their Lordships confirm the view expressed in 1964 that there are no curbs on the powers of the High Court to punish for contempt of itself except those contained in the Contempt of Courts Act. Their Lordships have indeed observed that the term "Contempt of Court" has not been defined in Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution, but it has no where been observed that once the term is defined by the ordinary legislature, the nature of the jurisdiction will charge. By the observations reproduced hereinabove the force of the doctrine laid down in R.L. Kapur case (supra), that it is not open to an ordinary legislature to take away the jurisdiction and confer it afresh by its own authority, is not diluted. By the observations reproduced hereinabove the force of the doctrine laid down in R.L. Kapur case (supra), that it is not open to an ordinary legislature to take away the jurisdiction and confer it afresh by its own authority, is not diluted. In Nurul Huda's case the above passage from S.K. Sarkar's case has been reproduced in paragraph 8 and immediately after reproduction the following conclusion is stated :- "It must, therefore, be held that Contempt of Court is made punishable under the Act and is an offence within the meaning of Section 79, I.P.C." The conclusion appears to have been drawn from the observation that Parliament has power to define and limit the power of the Court in punishing contempt of court and to regulate their procedure in relation thereto. The term "define" has been used by their Lordships in the sense of "prescribe". That is, it is permissible to Parliament to prescribe and limit the power of the Court. Sections 3 to 7 of 1971 Act prescribe limitations on the exercise of the power. But that is regulation of power as distinguished from conferment of power. There is no section in 1971 Act which says that contemner shall be punished with such and such punishment. All the authorities consistently held that Section 12 merely puts a curb on the quantum of punishment. 97. In view of the above Supreme Court decision, it is not possible to hold that on account of the definition contained in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 2 of 1971 Act, the set of contempt has become punishable under the said Act. 98. The Full Bench decision of this Court in Padma Kant Malviya's case (supra) is in accord with the dictum laid down by their Lordships. Therefore, the dictum laid down by the Full Bench also remains valid. The Full Bench has held that contempt is not offence within the meaning of Section 5 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 which is equivalent to Section 4 (2) Criminal Procedure Code 1973 and the alleged contemner is not an accused. Therefore, the dictum laid down by the Full Bench also remains valid. The Full Bench has held that contempt is not offence within the meaning of Section 5 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 which is equivalent to Section 4 (2) Criminal Procedure Code 1973 and the alleged contemner is not an accused. Act page 54 Mukerjee, J., has observed - "A contemner was looked upon by the law not an accused in the sense in which a breaker of law is looked upon, but he was looked upon as an offender who stood more or less in a class by himself." In paragraph 63 the same learned Judge observes:- "The jurisdiction under which this Court acts when it punishes for contempt is a `special jurisdiction which has been conferred on it or is inherent in it as a Court of record, and the procedure which the Court has followed and follows is a `special procedure' with in the meaning of Section 1 (2) Criminal Procedure Code' (1898 Cr.P.C. : Section 5 of Cr.P.C. 1973)." According to this decision not only the jurisdiction is special but the procedure is also special. In both the situations, in view of Section 5, Criminal Procedure Code is inapplicable. In paragraph 36 at page 529 of the report Malik O.J., observes - "What the Constitution (Article 215) and the Contempt of Courts Act of 1926 and 1952 have does is simply to recongnise that contempts are punishable, and punishable by high courts under their inherent and supervisory powers, and to regulate those powers It was expressly stated in the preamble of the Act of 1926 that it was enacted to define and limit the powers exercisable by High Courts in punishing contempts. In the face of this statement in the preamble it cannot be argued that the Act was enacted to create the powers or that contempt is made punishable under law since 1926. The Act of 1926 not only did not define contempt of Court but also did not contain any provision making it punishable. Contempt was not defined in the Act, now because it was difficult, or not necessary to define it but because the legislature had no power to define it, a Court of record having the exclusive power to define and determine what amounts to contempt.............. Contempt was not defined in the Act, now because it was difficult, or not necessary to define it but because the legislature had no power to define it, a Court of record having the exclusive power to define and determine what amounts to contempt.............. "Section 3 by itself did not make contempt punishable : it assumed that it was punishable and only fixed limits to the punishment that could be imposed......................" 99. According to this judgment power to punish is inherent. Even Article 215 does not create the power ; it only recognises and regulates the same. The legislature has no power to define contempt, as the jurisdiction to identify contempt vests only in the Court of Record. If the legislature has no jurisdiction to define the term, two consequences follow : First that the definition is invalid, and second, that it does not effect the pre-existing jurisdiction. If complete effect is to be given to the dictum laid down by the Full Bench, it will have to be held that the definition does not alter the nature of the pre-existing jurisdiction but merely regulates the same. It is not the case of either side that the definitions of the three terms mentioned above in 1971 Act are invalid. The definitions also, therefore, do no more than regulate the exercise of contempt jurisdiction. 100. The passage from the judgment of the Full Bench reproduced above has been extracted in the judgment of the Division Bench also but after extraction the Bench did not proceed to examine the significance of the observation "legislature had no power to define it." The dictum laid down by the Full Bench does not conflict with the law propounded by their Lordships and therefore, remains valid law and we are bound by it. Even otherwise we are in respectful agreement with the view taken by the Full Bench. The judgment in Nurul Huda's case runs counter to the dictum laid down by the Full Bench and cannot therefore, be followed. 101 The terms "Civil Contempt" and "Criminal Contempt" were not used in 1926 and 1952 Acts but have been used only in 1971 Act, but thereby also the nature of the jurisdiction does not change. These terms were known to Indian courts prior to 1971 also and were freely used in their judgments. 101 The terms "Civil Contempt" and "Criminal Contempt" were not used in 1926 and 1952 Acts but have been used only in 1971 Act, but thereby also the nature of the jurisdiction does not change. These terms were known to Indian courts prior to 1971 also and were freely used in their judgments. In Governor of Bengal v. Moti Lal Ghosh, AIR 1914 Cal 69, the distinction between "Civil Contempt" and "Criminal Contempt' has been pointed out as follows:- `A Criminal Contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the Court. A Civil Contempt is failure to do something ordered to be done by a court in a civil action for the benefit of the opposing party therein." After referring to the above distinction Milk C. J., in the Full Bench case observes in paragraph 25 at page 527 as follows: "To my mind even criminal contempt cannot be said to be a crime made punishable by law and it, therefore, does not come under the definition of the term "offence" in the General Clauses Act though by ancient practice it has been made punishable by Courts of Record..............." Our purpose in reproducing the above observation is to show that even prior to 1971 the Courts had recognised the distinction between Criminal Contempt and Civil Contempt and the distinction recognised is on the same lines as contained in clauses (b) and (c) of Section 2 of 1971 Act. Sri Trivedi is, therefore, right in submitting that 1971 Act does nothing but codify the existing law when it defines the terms Contempt of Court, Civil Contempt and Criminal Contempt. If nothing new has been done by 1971 Act, the law propounded prior to it remains valid. 102. Now Sri Bhatnagar submits that if Criminal Procedure Code is not applicable the punishment of imprisonment cannot be imposed. For this submission he invokes Article 21 of the Constitution which declares that no person shall be derived of his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by Law. His stress is on the word "law" which according to him should be written law or statute law and not the precedents of the Courts. The procedure evolved by the Courts has, in India, received constitutional and statutory recognition. His stress is on the word "law" which according to him should be written law or statute law and not the precedents of the Courts. The procedure evolved by the Courts has, in India, received constitutional and statutory recognition. The constitutional recognition is contained in Article 255 and the statutory recognition is contained in Section 10 of the 1971 Act. The procedure, therefore has crossed the field of precedents and has entered the field of written law. Accordingly Article 21 is not violated when a contemner is sentenced to a term of imprisonment by taking evidence on affidavits in accordance with the established and recognised procedure. 103. The above findings are enough to dispose of the appeal finally. Certain other minor points were raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant, which have been noticed hereinabove, but in view of the fact that the appeal is being allowed on other points, it is not necessary to increase the bulk of this judgment by discussing the said points. 104. Even after rejecting the argument of the appellant's learned Counsel in respect of offence, forum and procedure, the appeal will have to be allowed in view of our finding recorded earlier that the appellant has not committed any contempt of this Court. 105. In an earlier portion of the judgment we have extracted an observation from the English and Empire Digest according to which the power to punish for contempt is available to all Courts, whether of record or not. We should not be understood as confirming that observation. So far as our country is concerned, the power is regulated by statutory provisions also. There are certain contempts referred to in the Indian Penal Code (Sections 175, 178, 179, 180 and 228) and in Criminal Procedure Code (Section 480). These are offences and are punishable by the subordinate Courts in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Criminal Procedure Code. The Act of disobeying an injunction Issued under order XXXIX of the Civil Procedure Code 1908, for short C.P.C. is Civil Contempt and the procedure for punishment therefor has been prescribed in C.P.C. itself under which the subordinate court is competent to punish for such contempt. The subordinate courts are competent to punish for contempt only to the extent power is available to them under statutory provisions. In respect of other contempts, they can only make reference to the High Court. 106. The subordinate courts are competent to punish for contempt only to the extent power is available to them under statutory provisions. In respect of other contempts, they can only make reference to the High Court. 106. In view of the above the appeal is allowed the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge and the conviction and sentence recorded by him are set aside and the application for contempt is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.