JUDGMENT Mrs. Padma Khastgir, J. This appeal arises from an order dated 3rd of March, 1987, passed by a learned Judge of this Court in a Contempt proceeding. 2. In the year 1975 Sri Pritwish Kar moved an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India Playing inter alia that the respondents be commanded by a writ of Mandamus, in not taking into consideration any of the adverse remarks made against the writ petitioner in the years 1971, 1972 and 1974 to expunge the said adverse remarks from the service records of the writ petitioner and by confirming him in the post of Director together with a prayer commanding the respondents not to affect the seniority of the petitioner in the gradation list nor to confirm any other incumbent to the post of Director in derogation to the interest of the petitioner. The learned Judge made the Rule absolute in terms of both the prayers. In an application contending that the respondents had wilfully and deliberately violated the order passed by the learned Judge on 28th June, 1984, the contempt proceedings was initiated. The said order recorded in the first paragraph that all the contemnors were personally present in court and they undertook to carry out the order to be passed by the learned Judge on that day subsequently. A serious dispute arose with regard thereto inasmuch as the appellants before this Court contended that neither they were present in Court at that time, nor did they give any undertaking to court that they would abide by the order to be passed by the learned Judge. The appellants/respondents were Sri B.K. Rao, IAS, Secretary to the Government of India, Department of Mines, Ministry of Steel Mines & Coal, Sri S.K. Mukherjee, Director General, Geological Survey of India, Sri D.P. Dhoundial, Senior Deputy Director General, Geological Survey of India, Sri N.K. Mukherjee, Senior Deputy Director General, Geological Survey of India, Sri A. Kushari, Director (Personnel) Geological Survey of India and Sri Jagdish Lal, Director, Geological Survey of India. They being highly responsible officers affirmed an affidavit to the effect that they did not give such an undertaking either personally or through the learned lawyer Sri Soumen Bose, a senior advocate who appeared on their behalf. At the instance of the parties Mr. They being highly responsible officers affirmed an affidavit to the effect that they did not give such an undertaking either personally or through the learned lawyer Sri Soumen Bose, a senior advocate who appeared on their behalf. At the instance of the parties Mr. Bose personally appeared and submitted before this Court that he did not have the instruction from his clients to give such undertaking. The learned Judge in the order itself observed that in any event there was a clear case of violation of the Court's order since the respondents had undertaken to carry out any direction given by the Court. 3. The present appellants, the alleged contemnors were not parties to the main rule. The appellant nos. 1 to 6 had assumed office long after the said order was passed, as such there was no direction on them personally to comply with the order which was passed in the main rule, 4. The appellants contended that the direction given by the learned Court below was far beyond the scope of the main writ petition. In any event there had not been any violation of the directions given by the said order on the contrary the same had been fully complied with in as much as by a notification dated 15th May, 1985 issued by the appropriate authority the writ petitioner had been confirmed with effect from 23rd April, 1973 and the adverse remarks in the confidential character roll for the years ending 31st March, 1972-73-74 had been expunged. Therefore, there had not been any contravention of the order passed by the learned Judge. The order passed by the Departmental Promotion Committee could not be quashed inasmuch as the members of the Departmental Promotion Committee had not been made parties either in the main rule or in the contempt proceedings. On a careful scrutiny of the facts indicated that the finding of the learned Judge that the Departmental Promotion Committee overlooked the fact that the petitioner was senior to five officers "graded as very good" was erroneous. Out of the said five officers three officers had already been promoted to the selection grade of Director in the Geological Survey of India in 1968, i.e. prior to the merger of the two cadres viz. the exploration wing of the Indian Bureau of Mines and the Geological Survey of India. The other two officers were already promoted to different posts. the exploration wing of the Indian Bureau of Mines and the Geological Survey of India. The other two officers were already promoted to different posts. Hence, the writ petitioner could not be placed as senior to those five officers. The writ petitioner took a patently wrong stand in contending that as the petitioner was shown against serial no. 9 in the original list prepared on 1st November, 1968 he was senior to all the five persons ignoring that such a list was the provisional gradation list consisting of officers in Indian Bureau of Mines and also the officers of Geological Survey of India before the merger of the mid two cadres were effected by a Presidential order dated 4th of June, 1969. Two parallel stream one of the officers transferred from the Indian Bureau of Mines to the Geological Survey of India and another from the officers appointed in the Geological Survey of India-were operative independently. When the Departmental Promotion Committee considered the selection post of a Director on 25th April, 1967 the writ petitioner could not have been considered for the same post of Director as he was an officer under the Indian Bureau of Mines. Such post of a Director or the post of a Deputy Director General can only be filled in accordance with the procedure laid down by the Government of India in compliance with the recommendation of the Departmental Promotion Committee which requires approval of the appointment committee of the cabinet. In accordance with the civil service regulation such promotions have been given. In fact in giving him the promotion the proper procedure had been followed. Neither the Ministry of Law nor the court by an order direct a person to be promoted to a post unless he satisfies all the conditions and the procedure prescribed is complied with. Such promotion can be given only when the D.P.C. has recommended the name of the person who is entitled to the promotion. In the case of the writ petitioner such recommendation was only made on 6th of May, 1969, hence, the question of giving promotion to the writ petitioner prior thereto did not arise, nor the petitioner as per the direction of the learned Court below be given a pay scale from a date earlier to the creation of the said post. In the case of the writ petitioner such recommendation was only made on 6th of May, 1969, hence, the question of giving promotion to the writ petitioner prior thereto did not arise, nor the petitioner as per the direction of the learned Court below be given a pay scale from a date earlier to the creation of the said post. Such selection post was created only on 10th December, 1980, hence the direction given to give him the pay scale from October, 1980 was erroneous. Even the suggestion of giving the writ petitioner a notional promotion to the post of Superintending Mining Geologist/ Director with effect from 9th December, 1967 was not approved of by the Union Public Service Commission which request was turned down by them. The learned lawyer Dr. Debi Pal appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that no court could pass a mandatory order directing the authority concerned to give promotion to a higher post in favour of the writ petitioner as a matter of right. 5. In the case reported in AIR 1987 SC 1889 , at para 5, State Bank of India v. Mohd. Mynuddin where it was observed :- “Whenever promotion to a higher post is to be made on the basis of merit no officer can claim promotion to the higher post as a matter of right by virtue of seniority alone with effect from the date on which his juniors are promoted. It is not sufficient that in his confidential reports it is recorded that his services are 'Satisfactory'. An officer may be capable of discharging the duties of the post held by him satisfactorily but he may not be fit for the higher post. Before any such promotion can be effected it is the duty of the management to consider the case of the officer concerned on the basis of the relevant materials. If promotion has been denied arbitrarily or without any reason ordinarily the Court can issue a direction to the management to consider the case of the officer concerned for promotion but it cannot issue a direction to promote the officer concerned to the higher post without giving an opportunity to the management to consider the question of promotion. There is good reason for taking this view. There is good reason for taking this view. The Court is not by its very nature competent to appreciate the abilities, qualities or attributes necessary for the task, office or duty of every kind of post in the modern world and it would be hazardous for it to undertake the responsibility of assessing whether a person is fit for being promoted to a higher post which is to be filled up by selection. The duties of such posts may need skills of different kinds scientific, technical, financial, industrial, commercial, administrative, educational etc. The methods of evaluation of the abilities or the competence of persons to be selected for such posts have also become now-a-days very much refined and sophisticated and such evaluation should, therefore, in the public interest ordinarily be left to be done by the individual or a committee consisting of persons who have the knowledge of the requirements of a given post to be nominated by the employer. Of course, the process of selection adopted by them should always be honest and fair. It is only when the process or selection is vitiated on the ground of bias, mala fides or any other similar vitiating circumstances other considerations will arise. The nature of the writ that can be issued in cases like the one before us has been considered by this court in the State of Mysore v. Syed Mahamood (1968) 3 SCR 363 : (AIR 1968 SC 113). In that case Rule 43(b) of the Mysore State Civil Services General Recruitment Rules, 1957 required promotion to be made by selection on the basis of seniority-cum-merit, that is seniority subject to the fitness of the candidate to discharge the duties of the post from among persons eligible for promotion. While making selections for promotions to the posts of senior statistical assistants, from the cadre of junior statistical assistants, the State Government did not consider the case of the respondents therein who were junior statistical assistants, and published a list promoting persons ranking below them in point of seniority. The respondents therein filed writ petition before the High Court. The High Court while refusing to quash the seniority list directed the appellant-State to promote the respondents as from the dates on which their juniors were promoted and treat their promotion as effective from that date. The respondents therein filed writ petition before the High Court. The High Court while refusing to quash the seniority list directed the appellant-State to promote the respondents as from the dates on which their juniors were promoted and treat their promotion as effective from that date. In the appeal filed against the judgment of the High Court this Court observed that while making selections for promotion to the post of senior statistical assistants from the cadre of junior statistical assistants in 1959, the State Government was under a duty to consider whether having regard to their seniority and fitness they should be promoted. Since the promotions were irregularly made the respondents therein were entitled to ask the State Government to reconsider their case. In the circumstances, this Court observed, that the High Court could only issue a writ to the State Government compelling it to perform its duty and to consider whether having regard to their seniority and fitness, the respondents should have been promoted on the relevant dates when officers junior to them were promoted and that instead of issuing such a writ the High Court had wrongly issued a writ directing the State Government to promote them with retrospective effect. This Court further observed that the High Court ought not to have issued such a writ without giving the State Government an opportunity in the first instance to consider their fitness for promotion in 1959. The ratio of the above decision is that where the State Government or a statutory authority is under an obligation to promote an employee to a higher post which has to be filled up by selection the State Government or the statutory authority alone should be directed to consider the question whether the employee is entitled to be so promoted and that the Court should not ordinarily issue a writ to the Government or the statutory authority to promote an officer straightway.” 6. Hence, in the absence of any allegation of bias mala fides and/or any other similar allegation vitiating the circumstances the Court in the instant case could not also direct the respondents to give promotion to the writ petitioner. However, in the instant case which calls for consideration is whether the respondents have violated wilfully and contumaciously the order passed by the Court below. 7. However, in the instant case which calls for consideration is whether the respondents have violated wilfully and contumaciously the order passed by the Court below. 7. The post of a Director or Deputy Director General is a promotional post and such promotion could only be given on the recommendation of the Departmental Promotion Committee and thereafter after obtaining the approval from the Appointment Committee of the Cabinet and ultimately the final order is passed by the President of India. It was not within the competence and jurisdiction of the appellants to carry out and/or comply with such direction of Court jettisoning the procedure laid down for giving such promotions. The respondents had placed cases of the writ petitioner before the Departmental Promotion Committee for their consideration of promoting the writ petitioner which passed an order on 24th February, 1986. 8. The appellants case was that the order directing the respondents to promote notionally to various posts with effect from the dates indicated in the order was contrary to the provisions of law, norms and rules, hence, it was not only beyond tile scope in violation of such rules but beyond the scope of the writ petition. Implementation of such order would cause incalculable difficulties to the administration and open out floodgate of litigations. 9. The direction given by the learned Court below in the judgment appealed from, directing the respondents to give notional promotion to the writ petitioner in the grade of Superintending Mining Geologist/Director in the scale of Rs. 1300-1600/- on and from 9th of December, 1967 cannot be complied with inasmuch as DPC has recommended from May, 1969 only. The post of Director (Selection Grade) on 31st of July, 1982 and the post was created on and from 10th of December, 1980, hence such calculation could not be made from 1st of November, 1980. Similarly, the post of Deputy Director General and Senior Deputy Director General in the scale of Rs. 2250-2500/- and 2500-2700/- respectively can only be given on the recommendation of the D.P.C. and ultimately sanctioned by the Cabinet Committee presided over by the Prime Minister himself. Hence, it would become impossible for the respondents to comply with the said direction given in the impugned order. 2250-2500/- and 2500-2700/- respectively can only be given on the recommendation of the D.P.C. and ultimately sanctioned by the Cabinet Committee presided over by the Prime Minister himself. Hence, it would become impossible for the respondents to comply with the said direction given in the impugned order. As there was no direction in the original Order passed in the writ petition on 28th of June, 1984, any observation made by the learned Court below regarding setting tip of the Departmental Promotion Committee in alleged violation of the said order was erroneous. Further the learned Judge's observation that if any board had to be set up to re-consider the case of the petitioner that board should comprise of the persons who would have in the board for consideration of the case of the petitioner originally was physically impossible to comply inasmuch as the persons who would have in the board during that period have long retired and were not there to constitute the board. In any event the decision of the Departmental Promotion Committee held on 24th of February, 1986 had not been challenged by the writ petitioner and that could not be the subject of challenge in the writ application taken out by the writ petitioner and which had been made absolute by the Court below. The learned Judge in the ultimate paragraph of the order had recorded that the learned Judge has passed the order on the assurance given in court on behalf of the contemnors by Mr. S.C. Bose, a senior advocate of this High Court. As indicated earlier, a serious dispute has been raised with regard thereto by the respondents. Mr. S.C. Bose himself in court admitted that he had no authority on behalf of his clients to give such assurance and/or undertaking. Hence, the respondents cannot be compelled to carry out the said direction given by the learned Court below faithfully and expeditiously when the facts and circumstances of the case indicated that the respondents had no authority and/or jurisdiction to comply with the same. 10. Hence, the respondents cannot be compelled to carry out the said direction given by the learned Court below faithfully and expeditiously when the facts and circumstances of the case indicated that the respondents had no authority and/or jurisdiction to comply with the same. 10. The writ petitioners plea that the principles of estoppel should be applied when such an undertaking had been given by the respondents to comply with the said order but in view of the factual dispute as to the undertaking given by the alleged contemnors the question of applying the principles of estoppel and the rules analogous thereto is not called for. 11. Under those circumstances, this court is of the view that the impugned order be set aside and appeal is allowed. The matter be sent back to the Trial Court for re-considering the assurance and/or the undertaking given by Mr. S.C. Bose when admittedly he did not have such instruction from his clients. A.C. Sengupta, J. : I agree. Appeal allowed; matter sent back to Trial Court,