JUDGMENT P. D. Desai, C. J.—The petitioners have claimed the following reliefs herein : (1) they be paid the wages and allowances at the rate equivalent to the remuneration and allowances paid to the regularly appointed clerks and (2) they be given all those facilities, such as, holidays, medical leave etc. which are admissible to the regularly appointed clerks. The reliefs have been claimed on the basis that although they have been appointed as daily-rated Beldars on different dates between March, 1980 and February, 1987, they have throughout their respective period of employment performed the functions and discharged the duties of clerical nature. Para 2 of the petition gives the particulars with respect to the period of employment of each of the petitioners. Paras 3, 5 and 6 of the petition and identical paras of the affidavit-in-rejoinder contain the requisite averments concerning the nature of functions performed and duties discharged by the petitioners. The case set out therein is that the petitioners have been actually performing the duties of clerical nature, independently and satisfactorily, eversince their engagement as daily-rated Beldars, that the nature of work taken from them is similar to that performed by the regularly appointed clerks and that their working hours as well as the responsibilities shouldered, by them are the same as those of the regular employees of the corresponding category. The foundation for claiming the reliefs above-mentioned is the doctrine of "equal pay for equal work". 2. The petition is resisted on several grounds by ^nd on behalf of the respondents. Their case is set out in the affidavit-in-reply dated August 17, 1988, filed by the Director of Agriculture, Himachal Pradesh. The general ground of defence is that the nature of employment of the two categories of employees (regular and daily-rated) is basically different, that there are no sanctioned posts against which the daily-rated employees are engaged whereas the regular employees are recruited against the sanctioned posts, that the daily-rated employees are not engaged through the Employment Exchange whereas the regular employees are appointed in accordance with the Recruitment and Promotion Rules through the Himachal Pradesh Public Service Commission, that the conditions of employment/service governing both the categories of employees are dissimilar and that the nature of functions performed and duties discharged by the employees of each category are also not comparable. It is pointed out that whereas the regular employees are assigned specific duties and responsibilities and their work, conduct and performance are assessed at regular intervals on the basis of the annual confidential reports for the purposes of granting increments and allowing the crossing of the Efficiency Bar, the daily-rated employees are not subjected to any such periodical review. Moreover, whereas in case of unsatisfactory work, conduct and performance, the regular employees are liable to disciplinary action under the rules and the losses, if any, caused by them can be recovered from their gratuity, pension etc , these rules are not applicable to the daily-waged casual labourers. 3. Besides, whereas a regular employee is a whole-time Government servant who can be asked to perform any duty depending upon the exigency of work at any odd hours/holidays without the payment of any additional remuneration, a daily-rated employee is required to perform the work assigned to him only during the limited hours of his employment under the control and supervision of the regular employee(s). So far as the factual aspect of the present case and the actual work performed by the petitioners are concerned, the following averments are made in para 3 of the affidavit-in- reply: "The petitioners were not appointed as clerks by the respondent No. 3 at any stage. However, miscellaneous duties were taken from the petitioners viz. maintenance of record, preparation of Register of store articles/compilation work and typing etc. under the supervision of regular employees, which does not confer any right upon the petitioners to claim pay at par with the regular clerks." 4. The justification for the rate at which wages are paid to the petitioners is to be found in para 4 of the affidavit-in-reply as follows : "It is further submitted that the petitioners are being paid the rates of wages as fixed by the Deputy Commissioner, Mandi, under the provision of Rule 19.6 of the Himachal Pradesh Financial Rules, 1971 (Vol. I) which is in conformity with the payment of Minimum Wages Act. Before considering the rival contentions and adjudicating their merit, a birds eye view of the law on the subject would not be out of place since a large number of workmen employed in the public sector in this State are now coming forward to enforce the right of "equal pay for equal work" through the judicial process. Before considering the rival contentions and adjudicating their merit, a birds eye view of the law on the subject would not be out of place since a large number of workmen employed in the public sector in this State are now coming forward to enforce the right of "equal pay for equal work" through the judicial process. An authoritative pronouncement by this Court after an in depth review of the statutory as well as of the case Jaw on the subject will, therefore, be helpful in more than one way. 5. The Preamble of the Constitution proclaims India to be a SO VEREIGN SOCIALIST SECULAR DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC and aims to secure to all its citizens, inter alia, JUSTICE, social, economic and political, and EQUALITY of status and opportunity. Article 14 enacts that the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of laws within the territory of India. Article 16 declares that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. Articles 38 and 39 enunciate certain Principles of Policy to be followed by the State. Article 38, clause (2), provides that the State shall, in particular, strive to minimise the inequalities in income, and endeavour to eliminate inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities, not only amongst individuals but also amongst groups of people residing in different areas or engaged in different vocations. Article 39, clause (d), provides that the State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing, inter alia, that there is equal pay for equal work for both men and women. 6. The word "SOCIALIST" was introduced in the Preamble by the Constitution (Forty-Second Amendment) Act, 1976. As the Objects and Reasons for the enactment of the said Act suggest, Parliament under took such exercise "for removing the difficulties which have arisen in achieving the objective of socio-economic revolution, which would end poverty and ignorance and disease and inequality of opportunity to spell out expressly the high ideals of socialism to make the directive principles more comprehensive." The word "SOCIALIST" must be given a practical and purposeful meaning since it is introduced in the Preamble with such high aim and objective. The principal aim of a Socialist State is to eliminate inequality in income and status and standards of life. The principal aim of a Socialist State is to eliminate inequality in income and status and standards of life. The basic framework of Socialism is to provide a decent standard of life to the working class and especially provide security to them from cradle to grave. On the economic side, it envisages economic equality and equitable distribution of income. Even the less equipped person shall be assured a decent minimum standard of life and exploitation in any form shall be eschewed. There will be equitable distribution of the national cake and the worst off shall be treated in such a manner as to push them up the ladder. It is such a Socialist State which the Preamble directs the centres of power, Legislative, Executive and Judiciary, to strive to set-up (See : D. S. Nakara and others v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC )30). Even if the word "SOCIALIST" does not mean "to each according to his need", it must at least mean "equal pay for equal work". The principle of "equal pay for equal work" is expressly recognised by all Socialist systems of law (See : Randhir Singh v. Union of India and others, AIR 1982 SC 879). The Preamble of the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation recognises the principle of "equal remuneration for, work of equal value" as constituting one of the means of achieving the improvement of conditions "involving such injustice, hardship and privation to large numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world are imperilled". 7. In a series of decisions, the apex court has examined the doctrine of "equal pay for equal work" against the background of the aforesaid constitutional provisions and considered the justiciability of the claim advanced on the basis of the said doctrine and evolved certain principles and applied them against the backdrop of varied set of facts. 8. In Kishori Mohan Lal Bakshi v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 1139, the principle of "equal pay for equal work" was described by a Constitution Bench as an abstract doctrine which had nothing to do with Article 14 In State of Punjab v. Joginder Singh, AIR 1963 SC 913, another Constitution Bench held that the proposition that equal work must receive equal pay had been definitely ruled out in Kishori Mohan Lal Bakshis case. In U. S. Menon v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1968 SC 81, the holding was that it was entirely wrong to think that every one appointed to the same post is entitled to claim that he must be paid identical emoluments as any other person appointed to the same post and that no such equality was required either by Article 14 or Article 16 of the Constitution. Sustenance was drawn from the aforesaid conclusion, infer alia, from the decision in Kishori Mohan Lal Bakshis case. 9. A perceptible drift in the approach to the question manifested itself with the rendition of decision in Randhir Singh v. Union of India, wherein it was pointed out that what was truly decided in Kishori Mohan Lal Bakshis case was that there could be different scales of pay for different grades of service, since the higher qualifications for the higher grade, which may be either academic qualifications or experience based on length of service, reasonably sustained the classification of the officers in two grades with different scales of pay. It was observed that the principle of "equal pay for equal work" would be an abstract doctrine not attracting Article 14 if sought to be applied in the context of such a fact-situation. 10. Twice thereafter unsuccessful attempts were made to reagitate the issue on the strength of the observations in Kishori Mohan Lal Bakshi’s case. In P. Savita and others v. Union of India and others, AIR 1985 SC 1124, it was urged that the observations in Randhir Singhs case may perhaps run counter to those in Kishori Mohan Lal Bakshi9s case. 10. Twice thereafter unsuccessful attempts were made to reagitate the issue on the strength of the observations in Kishori Mohan Lal Bakshi’s case. In P. Savita and others v. Union of India and others, AIR 1985 SC 1124, it was urged that the observations in Randhir Singhs case may perhaps run counter to those in Kishori Mohan Lal Bakshi9s case. The apex court declined to go into the question on the ground that it was not necessary, on the facts of the case before them, to dwell at length upon the effect of the said observations on the wider canvass of service jurisprudence in the context of the doctrine of "equal pay for equal work" and proceeded to actually decide the case in hand by applying the ratio of the decision in Randhir Singhs case In Surinder Singh and another v. Engineer- in-Chief C. P, W. D. and others, 1986 (1) SCC 639, while dealing with a similar submission founded on the aforesaid observations in Kishori Mohan Lal Bakshis case, it was observed that it was not a little surprising that such an argument could have been advanced on behalf of the Central Government thirty six years after the forty second amendment proclaiming India as a Socialist Republic. It was pointed out that the relevant observations in Kishori Mohan Lal Bakshis case had been explained in Randhir Singhs case which demonstrated how the principle of "equal pay for equal work" is not an abstract doctrine and how it is a vital and vigorous doctrine accepted throughout the world, particularly by all socialist countries. It was further pointed out that the decision in Randhir Singhs case had been followed in a number of cases decided by the apex court and that it have been affirmed by a Constitution Bench in D. S. Nakams case. 11. In D. S Nakara’s case, it was held that Article 39 (d) should be understood and interpreted in the light of the judgment in Randhir Singhs case and that, therefore, where all relevant considerations are the same, persons holding identical posts may not be treated differently in the matter of their pay merely because they belong to different departments and that the doctrine of "equal pay for equal work" may be properly applied to cases of unequal pay based on no classification or irrational classification. The final word on the subject has thus been said in Randhir Singhs case which holds the field having been approved and applied by a Constitution Bench in D. S. Nakaras case. 12. In Randhir Singhs case, the importance and relevance of the principle of "equal pay for equal work" was highlighted in the context of the constitutional scheme as follows: "It is true that the principle of "equal pay for equal work" is not expressly declared by our Constitution to be a fundamental right. But it certainly is a Constitutional goal Article 39 (d) of the Constitution proclaims "equal pay for equal work for both men and women" as a Directive Principle of State Policy. Equal pay for equal work for both men and women means equal pay for equal work for everyone and as between the sexes. Directive Principles, as has been pointed out in some of the judgments of this Court, have to be read into the fundamental rights as a matter of interpretation. Article 14 of the Constitution enjoins the State not to deny any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws and Article 16 declares that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. These equality clauses of the Constitution must mean something to everyone. To the vast majority of the people the equality clauses of the Constitution would mean nothing if they are unconcerned with the work they do and the pay they get. To them the equality clauses will have some substance if equal work means equal pay…………………Questions concerning wages and the like, mundane they may be, are yet matters of vital concern to them and it is there, if at all, that the equality clauses of the Constitution have any significance to them…………………..Construing Articles 14 and 16 in the light of the Preamble and Article 39 (d), we are of the view that the principle Equal pay for Equal work is deducible from those Articles and may be properly applied to cases of unequal scales of pay based on no classification or irrational classification though those drawing the different scales of pay do identical work under the same employer." 13. In P. K. Ramchandra Iyer and others v. Union of India and others, AIR 1984 SC 541, it was reiterated that the principle of "equal pay for equal work" is deducible from Articles 14 and 16 read in the light of the Preamble and Article 39 (d) and that it may be properly applied to the cases of unequal scales of pay based on no classification or irrational classification though those drawing the different scales of pay do identical work under the same employer. In P. Savitas case, the decision in Randhir Singhs case was read as enlarging the doctrine of "equal pay for equal work" as envisaged in Article 39 (d) and as having exalted it to the position of a fundamental right by reading it alongwith Article 14. 14. In Union of India and another v. R. G. Kashikar and another, AIR 1986 SC 431, the expression "matters relating to employment" occurring in Article 16 was construed to include matters relating to salary, periodical increments, leave, gratuity, pension, age of superannuation etc. and the differential treatment in the matter of pay scales and other benefits on the basis of irrational classification between the two sets of employees was held to he per se discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 16. 15. In Dhirendra Chamoli and another v. State of U. P., (1986) 1 SGC 637, it was held that implicit in the mandate of equality enshrined in Article 14 is the further principle that there must be equal pay for work of equal value. 16. In Daily Rated Casual Labour employed under P. & T. Department, through Bhartiya Dak Tar Mazdoor Munch v. Union of India and others, AIR 1987 SC 2342, the provisions of Articles 14, 16 and 38 (2) of the Constitution were invoked in aid to invalidate the classification of employees into regularly recruited employees and casual employees for the purpose of paying less than the minimum pay payable to employees in the corresponding regular cadres. It was observed also that such discrimination was opposed to the spirit of Article 7 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966, which exhorts all States parties to ensure fair wages and equal wages for equal work. It was observed also that such discrimination was opposed to the spirit of Article 7 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966, which exhorts all States parties to ensure fair wages and equal wages for equal work. In U. P. Income-tax Department Contingent Paid Staff Welfare Association v. Union of India and others, AIR 1988 SC 517, the decision in Daily Rated Casual Labours case was followed in the case of the contingent paid staff rendering service as Class IV employees. In Delhi Municipal Karamchari Ekta Union (Regd.) v. P. L. Singh and others, AIR 1988 SC 519, which was a case of daily waged employees, the ratio of the decisions in Daily Rated Casual Labours and U.P. Income- tax Department Contingent Paid Staffs case was applied and followed. In Federation of All India Customs and Central Excise Stenographers (Recognised) and others v. Union of India and others, AIR 1988 SC 1291, it was held that the "equal pay for equal work" is a fundamental right but the problem about equal pay cannot always be translated into a mathematical formula and that the principle can be applied properly in the cases of unequal scales of pay based on no classification or irrational classification. In Jaipal and others v. State of Haryana and others, AIR 1988 SC 1704, it was held that the State is under a constitutional obligation to ensure that equal pay is paid for equal work. It was observed that though Article 39 (d) is included in the chapter on Directive Principles of State Policy, but it is fundamental in nature and that the purpose of the article is to fix certain social and economic goals for avoiding any discrimination amongst the people doing similar work in matters relating to pay. 17. The aforesaid comprehensive survey of the case law on the subject discloses that within a period of a quarter of a century the doctrine of "equal pay for equal work" has passed through a conscious process of reformation and refinement as a result of the gradually forward looking posture of the apex court. 17. The aforesaid comprehensive survey of the case law on the subject discloses that within a period of a quarter of a century the doctrine of "equal pay for equal work" has passed through a conscious process of reformation and refinement as a result of the gradually forward looking posture of the apex court. What was regarded once as a mere golden thread running through the Preamble and the Directive Principles of State Policy, and probably believed to be a sheer rhetoric or demagogic slogan and not a right enforceable as such, has now been woven into the fabric of Fundamental Rights guaranteed by Articles 14 and 16 and hence a constitutional goal attainable by resort to the constitutional remedies provided by Articles 32 and 226, the former being a Fundamental Right in its own turn. The right can be invoked and enforced through the judicial process in cases of unequal pay or scales of pay based on no classification or irrational classification, though those drawing the different wages or different scales of pay do the same or broadly similar work. 18. The cases in which the question of the practical applicability of the principle of "equal pay for equal work" arose against the backdrop of different fact-situations may be referred to now. In Kishori Mohan Lal Bakshi’s case, apart from holding that the doctrine of "equal pay for equal work" was abstract in nature, the challenge to the different pay scales for employees doing the same kind of work was rejected on the ground that different grades in service justified the difference in pay scales. In Joginder Singhs case, the challenge to the constitution of a regular Service consisting of employees doing the same work but with different scales of pay or subject to different conditions of service was rejected following the principle enunciated in Kishori Mohan Lal Bakshl’s case. In U.S. Menon’s case, the question was whether identical emoluments were required to be paid to the members of two distinct State Services for which different methods of recruitment and different eligibility qualifications etc, were prescribed on their appointment to the same post and the holding was that everyone appointed to the same post was not entitled to be paid identical emoluments as any other person appointed to the same post disregarding the method of recruitment or the source from which the appointee was drawn. It was held that in such a situation the equality clause was not violated. 19. In Purshotam Lal v. Union of India, AIR 1973 SC 1088, it was held that the implementation of the revised pay scale in case of a particular category of servants, from a date later than that recommended by the Pay Commission and the non-implementation of its report in that manner in respect only of those persons, amounted to violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. In Lal ji Dubey v. Union of India, AIR 1974 SC 254, this principle was reiterated. 20. The petitioners in Randhir Singhs case, were driver-constables in the Delhi Police Force under the Delhi Administration. Their pay scale was lower than that of the drivers in the Railway Protection Force, Non- Secretariat and Secretariat Offices in Delhi, Language Commission and also that of the drivers of heavy vehicles in the Fire Brigade and the Department of Light House. Their demand for better scale of pay having failed at the administrative level, they sought enforcement of their claim through the judicial process. The stand of the respondents during the course of the judicial proceedings was that the circumstance that the petitioners belonged to different Departments of the Government was itself sufficient to justify different scales of pay irrespective of the identity of their powers, duties and responsibilities. The said plea was found unacceptable and untenable and the following pertinent observations made in that context, expound the scope pf judicial review in such matters: "We concede that equation of posts and equation of pay are matters primarily for the Executive Government and experts bodies like the Pay Commission and not for Courts but we must hasten to say that if all things are equal, where all relevant considerations are the same, persons holding identical posts may not be treated differentially in the matter of their pay, merely because they belong to different departments." 21. In State of Gujarat and another v. Raman Lai Keshav Lal Soni, AIR 1984 SC 161, the benefits of the recommendations of the two Pay Commissions were extended only to those employees working under various panchayat institutions who were Government servants to start with but not to a microscopic number who were formerly employed in Municipalities. In State of Gujarat and another v. Raman Lai Keshav Lal Soni, AIR 1984 SC 161, the benefits of the recommendations of the two Pay Commissions were extended only to those employees working under various panchayat institutions who were Government servants to start with but not to a microscopic number who were formerly employed in Municipalities. Both the classes of employees were found to be Members of the Panchayat Service, which was held to be a civil service of the State and its Members Government servants. The discriminatory treatment was held violative of Articles 14 and 16. 22. In Delhi Veterinary Association v. Union of India and others, AIR 1984 SC 1221, which was a case dealing with the Veterinary Assistant Surgeons working under the Development Commissioner of the Delhi Administration, the claim of the petitioners was that their pay scales should be equal to that of the Veterinary Assistant Surgeons employed by the Union Territory or the Central Government in the ITBP and BSF. No relief was granted in that case since the Fourth Pay Commission had been set up and the matter was left to be decided by the Government on the basis of its recommendations. While enumerating the considerations and factors which should weigh in fixing the scales of pay of Government employees, it was observed that in addition to the principle of "equal pay for equal work", the pay structure should also reflect many other social values. The need for evolution and implementation of a scientific national policy of incomes, wages and prices was also emphasised. 23. In P. K. Rawachandra Iyer v. Union of India, while implementing the recommendations of the University Grants Commission for the revised scales of pay for the posts of Professor, the revised scale was sanctioned in respect of six newly created posts of Professor in different disciplines but not in respect of the holders of the three existing posts in three other disciplines. The discriminatory treatment was found to be violative of the equality clause since the classification of existing incumbents as distinct and separate from the newly recruited hands with flimsy change in essential qualifications was held to be wholly irrational and arbitrary. 24. In P. Savita v. Union of India, the petitioners were Senior Draughtsmen employed in the Ordinance Factories under the Ministry of Defence. 24. In P. Savita v. Union of India, the petitioners were Senior Draughtsmen employed in the Ordinance Factories under the Ministry of Defence. The Third Pay Commission classified Senior Draughtsmen into two groups on the basis of seniority-cum-fitness although all of them were doing the same work and were discharging similar functions and duties and recommended higher pay scale for one group. The classification was held to be discriminatory since the group of Draughtsmen entitled to the higher pay scale was not selected by any process nor the grouping was made on merit-cum-seniority basis and it was not a case of different grades created on the ground of higher qualifications, either academic or otherwise, or an entitlement by any other criterion. 25. The petitioner in Union of India v. R. G. Kashikar, was appointed as Instructor Grade II under the National Discipline Scheme (NDS), sub sequently redesiguated as National Fitness Corps. (NF3), in the year 1963. Both these organisations were under the Ministry of Education, Government of India Although a proposal for the transfer of the establishment of the NFC to the administrative control of the State Governments was made in the year 1965, the actual transfer of the services of the petitioner and other Instructors took place only on August 1, 1976. During this period two revisions of pay scales were made in respect of the employees of the Central Government but not in the case of the Instructors on the establishment of the NFC. Be it stated that the Third Pay Commission in the course of its report found that since the transfer of these Instructors to the State Government was in the process of implementation and the Organisation was in a transitional state, it was not necessary to recommend any revised pay scale for them. This recommendation was accepted by the Central Government and the benefit of the revision of pay scale was denied to them. The petitioner challenged the denial of the benefit of the revised pay scale by way of a writ petition. The matter ultimately reached the apex court which found that the proposal to transfer the establishment of the NFC to the State Governments did not have the effect of decentralising the NDS or making them surplus at the Centre. The petitioner challenged the denial of the benefit of the revised pay scale by way of a writ petition. The matter ultimately reached the apex court which found that the proposal to transfer the establishment of the NFC to the State Governments did not have the effect of decentralising the NDS or making them surplus at the Centre. The classification between the Central Government employees who work on the Central Government projects and those who work on the State Government activities, for the purposes of treating the latter on a different basis in the matter of their pay scales and other benefits, could cot be regarded as reasonable, especially when they continued to be the employees of the Central Government till the absorption was completed. The classification or differentiation sought to be drawn between these two classes of the Central Government employees was found to be without any rational basis and hence violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 26. In M. P. Singh and others v. Union of India and others, (1987) 1 SCC 592, there were two classes of officers amongst the Sub-Inspectors, Inspectors and Deputy Superintendents of Police in the Central Investigating Units of the Central Bureau of Investigation. One class consisted of direct recruits (non-deputationists) and the other of persons who had been drawn from various State cadres (deputationists). The dispute related to the differential treatment brought about as a result of the higher rate at which Special Pay was paid to the deputationists. It was not in dispute that the officers belonging to both the groups discharged the same functions, duties and responsibilities. It was found that the Special Pay had nothing to do with any compensation to which the deputationist might be entitled either on the ground of their richer experience or on the ground of their displacement from their parent departments in the various States and that it related only to the arduous nature of the duties that was being performed by all of them, whether deputationists or non-deputationists. Under the circumstances, the classification of the officers into two groups, namely, deputationists and non-deputationists, for paying different rates of Special Pay, was held not to pass the test of classification permissible under Articles 14, and 16 of the Constitution. 27. Under the circumstances, the classification of the officers into two groups, namely, deputationists and non-deputationists, for paying different rates of Special Pay, was held not to pass the test of classification permissible under Articles 14, and 16 of the Constitution. 27. In Dhirendra Chamoli and another v. State of U. P., the question was whether a number of persons, who were engaged as casual workers on daily wage basis and who were doing the same work as was being performed by the regular employees, were entitled to the same salary and allowances as were being paid to those regular employees. The plea of the casual workmen to that effect, which was based on the principle of "equal pay for equal work", was being resisted by the Central Government on the ground that since they were employed in temporary organisations located at different places in the country and that since there were no sanctioned posts to which regular appointments could be made, those casual employees could not claim to receive the same salary and perquisites as regular employees. However, the fact that the casual workmen were performing the same duties as were being performed by the regular employees was not in dispute. The plea in defence was rejected and it was held that even if the employees accepted the employment with full knowledge that they would be paid only daily wages and that they would not get the same salary and other conditions of service as other similarly situate employees could not absolve the Central Government to abide by the principle of "equal pay for equal work" which was implicitly enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. The casual workmen were directed to be paid with retrospective effect the same salary as was being received by the regular employees and they were also held entitled to the benefit of the same conditions of service. 28. The case of Surinder Singh and another v. Engineer-in-Chief\ CPWD, and others, dealt with the claim of daily-rated employees of the Central Government Public Works Department, who had been so working for several years, to be paid the same wages as permanent employees employed to do identical work. 28. The case of Surinder Singh and another v. Engineer-in-Chief\ CPWD, and others, dealt with the claim of daily-rated employees of the Central Government Public Works Department, who had been so working for several years, to be paid the same wages as permanent employees employed to do identical work. Following the decision in Dhirendra Chamoli’s case, the respondents were directed to pay to the petitioners and all other daily rated employees the same salary and allowances as were being paid to the regular and permanent employees with effect from the date they were respectively employed. 29. Three more cases relating to daily rated casual workmen, who sought payment of salary and allowances at the same rate at which they were being paid to the regular employees in the corresponding cadres, may also be considered together at this stage. Those cases are : Daily Rated Casual Labour employed under P and T Department, through Bhartiya Dak Tar Mazdoor Manch v. Union of India and others ; U. P. income-tax Department Contingent Paid Staff Welfare Association v; Union of India and others and Delhi Municipal Karamchari Ekta Union (Regd. v. P. L. Singh and others. The principal complaint of the petitioners in all these cases was substantially similar, namely, that even though they had been working for a period of time as casual labourers, the wages paid to them were far less than the salary and allowances which the regular employees belonging to the corresponding cadres were drawing. The plea of the respondents in each case was that since the petitioners belonged to the category of casual labour and were not regularly employed, they were not entitled to the same privileges which the regular employees were enjoining. It was found in each case that the petitioners were rendering the same kind of service which was being rendered by the regular employees doing the same kind of work. The defence plea was turned down on the ground that Government cannot take advantages of its dominant position and compel any worker to work even as a casual labourer on starvation wages. The defence plea was turned down on the ground that Government cannot take advantages of its dominant position and compel any worker to work even as a casual labourer on starvation wages. The classification of employees into regularly recruited employees and casual employees for the purpose of paying less than the minimum pay payable to employees in the corresponding regular cadres, particularly in the lowest rungs of the department where the pay scales are the lowest, was held to be not justified and was held violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. A direction was given in each case to the respondents to pay to the petitioners wages at the rate equivalent to the minimum pay in the pay scale of the regularly employed workers in the corresponding cadres but without any increments on and with effect from the date of the institution of the writ petitions. Corresponding Dearness Allowance and Additional Dearness Allowance, if any, payable thereon was also ordered to be paid. Other benefits which were being enjoyed by the casual labourers were directed to be continued to be extended to them. 30. In Federation of All India Customs and Central Excise Stenographers (Recognised) and others v. Union of India and others, the petitioners were Stenographers (Grade-I) attached to the Heads of Departments in the Customs and Central Excise Departments of the Ministry of Finance. They complained that they had been and were being discriminated against vis-a-vis Personal Assistants and Stenographers attached to the Joint Secretaries and Officers above them in the Secretariat (Ministry) in the matter of pay scales and that the classification between the two categories of employees for the said purpose was violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The petitioners asserted that both the classes of employees were Members of the same Central Civil Service and that their basic qualifications, method, manner and source of recruitment and grades of promotion were the same as those of their counter-parts attached to the Joint Secretaries/Secretaries and the other officers in the Secretariat (Ministry). Between these two classes of employees, according to the petitioners, all things were equal, since they held identical posts and discharged the same functions and, indeed, sometimes more onerous duties and responsibilities than their counterparts. Between these two classes of employees, according to the petitioners, all things were equal, since they held identical posts and discharged the same functions and, indeed, sometimes more onerous duties and responsibilities than their counterparts. The petition was resisted on behalf of the Central Government substantially on the ground that the criterion of status/rank of the Officer with whom the stenographer were attached was the determining factor for the fixation of their pay scale. According to the respondents, the Secretariat of the Ministries of the Central Government occupied a key position in the administration since the task of formulation of policies and preparation of programmes and the supervision of their effective execution were their main functions. Although the duties and works performed by the petitioners and their counterparts in the Secretariat were identical, the latter class of stenographers had to assist the Officers in the Ministries who were required to discharge the functions and duties of higher responsibility than those performed by the Heads of Department with whom the petitioners were attached. The difference in the pay scales of the two categories of stenographers was, therefore, devised and the Third Pay Commission had found it justified and had itself recommended a different and lower scale of pay for the stenographers of the non-participating attached officers in comparison with those in the Central Secretariat on the basis of different functional requirements. 31. While dealing with the controversy, it was observed that though the claim for equal pay for equal work is a fundamental right, equal pay must depend upon the nature of the work done, which cannot be judged by the mere volume of work. There may be qualitative difference as regards reliability and responsibility. Functions may be the same but the responsibilities may make a difference. The same amount of physical work may entail different quality of work, some more sensitive, some requiring more tact, some less, varying from the nature and culture of employment. The problem about equal pay was not capable of being translated into a mathematical formula. Often the difference may be a matter of degree and there may be an element of value judgment by those who are charged with the responsibility of fixing the scales of pay and other conditions of service. The problem about equal pay was not capable of being translated into a mathematical formula. Often the difference may be a matter of degree and there may be an element of value judgment by those who are charged with the responsibility of fixing the scales of pay and other conditions of service. So long as such value judgment is made honafide9 reasonably and on an intelligible criterion, which has a rational nexus with the object of differentiation, such differentiation will not amount to discrimination. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case it was found that although there was similarity of the functional work, there was also dissimilarity in the matter of responsibility, confidentiality and relationship with public etc. Writ petition was, therefore, dismissed on the ground that the differentiation did not amount to discrimination. 32. In Bhagwan Dass and others v. State of Haryana and others, (1987) 4 SCC 634, 102 petitioners, who were appointed as Supervisors by a competent Selection Committee constituted by the Education Department of the State of Haryana, instituted a petition complaining, inter alia, that though they performed their duties as Supervisors in the Education Department and were discharging the same functions and duties as were being done by their counter-parts, who were also Supervisors in the Education Department and who were absorbed as regular Government servants, the remuneration paid to them was less than that paid to their such counter-parts. The petition was resisted on the grounds, inter alia, that the mode of recruitment of the petitioners was different from the mode of recruitment of their counter-parts and that their appointment was made on six monthly basis in posts which were sanctioned from year to year in view of the temporary nature of the scheme. The precise submission was that the Supervisors appointed in regular posts were whole-time employees selected by the Subordinate Services Selection Board after competing with candidates from any part of the country whereas, in the case of the petitioners, the selection was at best limited normally to the candidates from the cluster of a few villages only. The precise submission was that the Supervisors appointed in regular posts were whole-time employees selected by the Subordinate Services Selection Board after competing with candidates from any part of the country whereas, in the case of the petitioners, the selection was at best limited normally to the candidates from the cluster of a few villages only. This contention was repelled in the following words: "Assuming that the selection of petitioners has been limited to the cluster of a few villages, whereas Respondents 2 to 6 were selected by another mode wherein they had faced competition from candidates from all over the country, we need not examine the merits of these modes for the very good reason that once the nature of functions and the work are not shown to be dissimilar the fact that the recruitment was made in one way or the other would hardly be relevant from the point of view of equal pay for equal work doctrine………………Whether equal work is put in by a candidate, selected by a process whereat candidates from all parts of the country could have competed, or whether they are selected by a process where candidates from only a cluster of a few villages could have competed, is altogether irrelevant and immaterial for the purposes of the applicability Equal work for equal pay doctrine. A typist doing similar work as another typist cannot be denied equal pay on the ground that the process of selection was different inasmuch as ultimately the work done is similar and there is no rational ground to refuse equal pay for equal work……………But once he is selected, whether he is selected by one process or the other, he cannot be denied equal pay for equal work without violating the said doctrine." 33. The other submission as to the temporary nature of the scheme was also found unacceptable for the following reason: "We are unable to comprehend how this factor can be invoked for violating Equal pay for equal work doctrine, Whether appointments are for temporary periods and the Schemes are temporary in nature is irrelevant once it is shown that the nature of the duties and functions discharged and the work done is similar and the doctrine of Equal pay for equal work is attracted." 34. In Jaipal Singh and others v. State of Haryana and others, the petitioners were Instructors under the Adult and Non-formal Education Scheme under the Education Department of the State of Haryana. They were appointed on the basis of selection held by a Selection Committee. They were drawing a fixed salary which was increased once during the period of their employment. Under another Scheme known as Social Education Scheme in the State of Haryana, certain teachers known as squad teachers were employed to run the social education centres. The head squad teachers and squad teachers were regularised as head teachers and teachers and granted the benefit of pay scale applicable to regular headmasters and teachers of primary schools run by the State Government. The grievance of the petitioners was that although they were performing the same functions and duties as performed by the squad teachers, they were denied the same scale of pay and instead were being paid a fixed salary. The defence was that the petitioners did not perform the same or similar duties as performed by the squad teachers. It was emphasised in this connection that the squad teachers had to move from one village to another after completing their job in a village, whereas in the case of Instructors they were employed from the same village or from the nearby villages and were required to work there. Besides, the Instructors were appointed on part-time basis while squad teachers were in full time employment and the latter were transferable but the former were not nor were their teaching hours the same. Moreover, the squad teachers were working under a Scheme which was permanent, whereas the Instructors were working under temporary Scheme. i he Court found that both the categories of employees were working under the same employer and that the nature of duties and functions performed by them were similar. It was observed in this connection as follows: — "The doctrine of equal work equal pay would apply on the premise of similar work, but it does not mean that there should be complete identity in all respects. If the two classes of persons do same work under the same employer, with similar responsibility, under similar working conditions, the doctrine of equal work equal pay would apply and it would not be open to the State to discriminate one class from the other in paying salary. If the two classes of persons do same work under the same employer, with similar responsibility, under similar working conditions, the doctrine of equal work equal pay would apply and it would not be open to the State to discriminate one class from the other in paying salary. The State is under a constitutional obligation to ensure that equal pay is paid for equal work." 35. The contention that the scheme under which the Instructors were working was of a temporary nature and the scheme under which the squad teachers were employed was of a permanent nature and that, therefore, the claim for equating wages was not well-founded was rejected. In terms it was held that "it is too late in the day to disregard the doctrine of equal pay for equal work on the ground of one employment being temporary and the other being permanent in nature" and that "a temporary of casual employee performing the same duties and functions is entitled to the same pay as paid to a permanent employee". It was further found that the difference in the method and mode of selection also would not affect the application of the doctrine of "equal pay for equal work", if both the classes of persons perform similar functions and duties under the same employer. The circumstance that the Instructors were not transferable and were part-time employees who worked only for four hours was also not regarded as relevant and as affecting the doctrine of equal pay for equal work. Even the difference in qualification was not regarded as affecting the applicability of the said doctrine. The petitioners were directed to be fixed in the same pay scale as that of the squad teachers. 36. Two more cases involving the applicability of the doctrine of equal pay for equal work, although in a somewhat different context, may also be noticed before ending the survey of the case law on the subject. 37. The petitioners were directed to be fixed in the same pay scale as that of the squad teachers. 36. Two more cases involving the applicability of the doctrine of equal pay for equal work, although in a somewhat different context, may also be noticed before ending the survey of the case law on the subject. 37. In Frank Anthony Public School Employees’ v. Union of India and others, 1986 (4) SCC 707, the grievance of the petitioner-association was that the scales of pay and other conditions of service of teachers and other employees of the Frank Anthony Public School compared unfavourably with those of their counter-parts of the Delhi Administration Schools and the relief sought was for equalisation of pay scales and conditions of service with those of the teachers and employees of Government schools. Sections 8 to 11 of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973, dealt with the terms and conditions of service of employees of the recognised Schools. If those Sections applied to the teachers and other employees of the Frank Anthony Public School, they would have at least been as well off as teachers and other employees of Government Schools. However, section 12 of the said Act provided that those Sections shall not apply to an unaided minority school (such as the Frank Anthony Public School). The petitioner, therefore, sought a declaration that Sec. 12 was unconstitutional as being violative of Articles 14, 21 and 23 of the Constitution and a direction was also sought against the Union of India and the Delhi Administration to fix the pay, allowances and other benefits etc. of the persons employed in the unaided minority schools at par with the persons employed in the other schools. The Court granted the declaration prayed for and directed the authorities to enforce the aforesaid provisions (except section 8 (2) in the case of the Frank Anthony Public School overruling the objection based on Article 30 (1) of the Constitution which guarantees the fundamental right to establish and to administer educational institutions of their choice to religious and linguistic minorities. 38. 38. The fear expressed on behalf of the respondent-School to the effect that the institution may have to close down if they had to pay higher scales of salary and allowances to the members of the staff was found to have "the same ring as the fear expressed invariably by the management of every industry that disastrous results would follow which may even lead to the closing down of the industry if wage scales are revised", and a hope was expressed that "the management will do nothing to the nose to spite the face, merely to put the teachers in their proper place"., 39. In M/s. Mackinnon Mackenzie and Co, Ltd. v. Audrey Dcosta and another, 1987 (2) SCC 469, the respondent was employed by the petitioner- company as a Confidential Lady Stenographer attached to the Senior Executives working in the company. The male stenographers employed by the company belonged to the general pool and were getting higher salary than the female stenographers under a settlement. She, therefore, instituted a petition before the authority appointed under Equal Remuneration Act, 1976, complaining that she was being paid remuneration at the rates less favourable than those at which wages were being paid to the stenographers of the male sex for performing the same or similar work and claimed that she was entitled to recover from the petitioner-company the amount equivalent to the difference between the remuneration which she was paid and the remuneration which was being paid to the male stenographers during the period of operation of the said Act. Section 4 of the said Act enacts that no employer shall pay to any worker employed by him the remuneration, whether payable in cash or kind, at rates less favourable than those at which remuneration is paid by him to the workers of the opposite sex for performing the same work or work of a similar nature. The matter ultimately reached the apex court. In the course of its decision, the Court made reference to Article 39 (d) of the Constitution and the Convention Concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value, which was adopted by the General Conference of the International Labour Organisation on June 29, 1951, and to which India was one of the parties. In the course of its decision, the Court made reference to Article 39 (d) of the Constitution and the Convention Concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value, which was adopted by the General Conference of the International Labour Organisation on June 29, 1951, and to which India was one of the parties. It was found that the Equal Remuneration Ordinance, 1975, which was replaced by the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976, was enacted in order to implement Article 39 (d) as well as the Equal Remuneration Convention. Construing the expression "the same work or work of a similar nature", it was observed as follows: "In deciding whether the work is the same or broadly similar, the Authority should take a broad view; next, in ascertaining whether any differences are of practical importance, the Authority should take an equally broad approach for the very concept of similar work implies differences in details, but these should not defeat a claim for equality on trivial grounds. It should look at the duties actually performed, not those theoretically possible. In making comparison the Authority should look at the duties generally performed by men and women Discrimination arises only where men and women doing the same or similar kind of work are paid differently. Wherever sex discrimination is alleged, there should be a proper job evaluation before any further enquiry is made. If the two jobs in an establishment are accorded an equal value by the application of those criteria which are themselves non-discriminatory (/. e. those criteria which look directly to the nature and extent of the demands made by the job) as distinct from criteria which set off different values for men and women on the same demand and if it is found that a man and a woman employed on these two jobs are paid differently, then sex discrimination clearly arises." 40. In the facts of the case it was found that there was practically no difference between the work which the Confidential Lady Stenographers were doing and the work of their male counterparts and that they should not suffer for their loyalty, integrity, sincerity and punctuality and receive less pay for performing duties as confidential stenographers since they were doing the same kind of work as men. Once it was established that the Lady Stenographers were doing practically the same kind of work which male stenographers were discharging, the employer was held bound to pay the same remuneration to both of them irrespective of the place where they were working. It was further held that the management could not deliberately create conditions of work only with the object of driving away women from a particular type of work which they can otherwise perform with the end in view of paying them less remuneration elsewhere in the establishment. The argument similar to that which was advanced in the case of Frank Anthony Public School Employees Association, namely, that the management would not be able to pay equal remuneration to both male stenographers and female stenographers having regard to the financial position was summarily rejected in the following words : "The Act does not permit the management to pay to a section of its employees doing the same work or a work of similar nature lesser pay contrary to section 4 (1) of the Act only because it is not able to pay equal remuneration to all. The applicability of the Act does not depend upon the financial ability of the management to pay equal remuneration as provided by it." 41. The principles which emerge upon a review of this catena of cases decided against the backdrop of varied set of facts may be briefly summarised as follows: When the employer is the State, if all things are equal, where all relevant considerations are the same, persons holding identical posts or doing the same or similar work cannot be treated differentially in the matter of their pay or pay scales. The fact that they belong to different departments or work under different agencies or organisations is a matter of no consequence. In deciding whether the work is the same or similar, a broad view must be taken, since the very concept of similar work implies difference in details. A claim for equal pay cannot and should not be defeated on trivial grounds. The duties actually performed should be considered not those theoretically possible. In deciding whether the work is the same or similar, a broad view must be taken, since the very concept of similar work implies difference in details. A claim for equal pay cannot and should not be defeated on trivial grounds. The duties actually performed should be considered not those theoretically possible. If the two jobs are regarded as of equal value by the application of the criteria which are themselves non-discriminatory, that is to say, those which look directly to the nature and extent of the demands made by the jobs, there should be no denial of equal remuneration. The classification of employees performing the same or similar functions and duties, in distinct and separate groups, for fixing wages or pay scales at different rates on grounds, such as, difference in the mode, method or process of selection or the area or zone of selection, flimsy difference in essential qualifications, difference in the conditions of service in matters such as non-transferability, temporary or ad hoc nature of employment or appointment to tenure post and the like, the employment being of a part-time nature or working hours in office being less, although additional duties are assigned and performed beyond the prescribed hours of duty, length of service along being the determining factor without there being any requirement of possessing higher qualifications or acquiring entitlement by any other criterion, engagement in projects or activities under different agencies although there is a common employer, employment in temporary organisations or schemes or projects in which there are no sanctioned posts to which regular appointments could be made, tantamounts to impermissible discrimination since such differentiation is unreasonable or irrational and has no nexus with the object sought to be achieved. The fact that the employment is made only on casual or daily-rated basis for a period of time, especially when the end in view is to pay less than the minimum pay payable to the employees in the corresponding regular cadres and/or avoid regularisation, is again not a relevant factor in deciding the claim for equal pay. The factor that the employees knew well in advance that they would get only daily wages does not absolve the State from the liability to pay equal remuneration. The factor that the employees knew well in advance that they would get only daily wages does not absolve the State from the liability to pay equal remuneration. The inability to pay equal pay on the ground of financial difficulties is also not a permissible consideration since the applicability of the doctrine of equal pay for equal work does not depend upon the financial ability of the employer to pay equal remuneration. The problem of equal pay is, however, not capable of being translated into a mathematical formula. There should ordinarily be a proper job evaluation whenever discrimination is alleged, especially when the person claiming the benefit of equal pay does not belong to the lowest rungs but occupies a position of reliability and responsibility. In such cases, the adjudgment of the claim for equal pay must depend upon the nature and quality of the work done which cannot be judged by the mere volume of output. Functions may be the same but there may be qualitative difference in the work which is a factor which cannot be disregarded. There may be apparent similarity of the functional work but at the same time there may be dissimilarity in the matter of responsibility, confidentiality, reliability etc. Although the equation of posts and equation of pay or pay scales are matters primarily for the Executive Government and experts bodies like the Pay Commission, the . Court will not keep its hands off in cases of unequal pay or scales of pay based on no classification or irrational classification, though those drawing the different wages or different scales of pay are doing the same or broadly similar work. Questions concerning wages and the like, mundane they may be, are yet matters of vital concern to the vast majority of people to whom the equality clause of the Constitution would have any significance provided the remedy by way of judicial review can be invoked by them in cases of provable discrimination based on no valid classification. 42. Coming now to the facts of the present case, the petitioners have been working as daily-rated Beldars over a period of time. 42. Coming now to the facts of the present case, the petitioners have been working as daily-rated Beldars over a period of time. Their case briefly stated is that since the commencement of their employment they have been actually performing the duties of clerical nature, independently and satisfactorily, and that their working hours as well as the responsibilities shouldered by them are similar to those of the regular employees of the corresponding cadre. The respondents dispute this claim on several grounds, none of which is capable of being accepted, having regard to the principles referred to hereinabove. So far as the actual work performed by the petitioners is concerned, while asserting that they were not actually appointed as clerks, it is conceded that they are required to perform miscellaneous duties, such as, the maintenance of record, preparation of registers of store articles, compilation work, typing etc. It is incapable of being disputed, therefore, that the actual work taken from the petitioners is that of a clerical nature and that they have been performing the same independently, albeit subject to usual supervision. In other words, they are performing the same or similar duties as regular clerks. The fact that they are not subjected to any periodical review so far as their work, conduct and performance are concerned, whereas the regular employees are, is not a matter of any consequence, since the formula evolved and followed by this Court thus far, while granting the benefit due under the doctrine of "equal pay for equal work", does not contemplate the granting of any increments in the regular pay scale. The distinction sought to be made on the basis that the conditions of service relating to disciplinary action and pensionary benefits are dissimilar in the case of daily-rated and regular employees is again irrelevant for the purposes of making any differentiation in the matter of grant of pay since what has to be seen for the applicability of the doctrine of "equal pay for equal work" is the actual functions and duties performed by both the categories of employees which, in the present case, are the same or similar. The consideration that a regular employee is a whole-time government servant who can be asked to perform any duty at any odd hours whereas the daily-rated employee is required to perform the work assigned to him only during the limited hours of his employment has again no bearing upon the controversy inasmuch as what is to be considered is the duties actually performed and not those theoretically possible. What is to be seen is the precise nature and actual extent of the demands made by the jobs and since they are not shown to be dissimilar or involving higher responsibility there is no valid ground to deny the claim for equal remuneration. The payment of minimum wages as fixed by the authority under the Minimum Wages Act is no answer to the plea based on the doctrine of "equal pay for equal work", once it is shown that all material things are equal and the relevant considerations are the same and the work done is the same or similar to that performed by the regular employees of the corresponding cadre. 43. As a result of the foregoing discussion and in view of the foregoing reasons, the Court holds that the petitioners have established their claim based on the doctrine of "equal pay for equal work". The writ petition, therefore, succeeds and it is allowed. The respondents are directed to pay to the petitioners remuneration at the rate equivalent to the minimum pay in the pay scale of regularly employed clerks but without any increments on and with effect from June 3, 1988, that is, the date on which the present writ petition was instituted. The petitioners will be entitled to the corresponding Dearness Allowance and Additional Dearness Allowance, if any, payable thereon. Whatever other benefits which are being enjoyed by them as of today shall be continued to be extended to them. No displeasure shall be shown against them because they have approached the Court to seek a just relief and their employment shall not be terminated under any circumstances except in accordance with law and strictly in accordance with the principle of last come first go. Rule made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs.