JUDGMENT S. N. Jha. J.-This application has been directed against the order dated 14.11.1983 passed in a case under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code'), whereby the learned Magistrate has ordered for payment of monthly maintenance of Rs. 100/- (one hundred) to opposite party (the wife) and Rs. 75/- (seventy five) each for the maintenance of her son and daughter i. e. the learned Magistrate has directed for a monthly payment of Rs. 250/-(two hundred and fifty only) as maintenance to the opposite party and her children. 2. It appears that opposite party had filed a petition under Section 125 of the Code in the year 1976 and on the said petition an order was passed on 30.11.1976 giving Rs.50/- each to the wife and the two children i. e. a total of Rs. 150/- (one hundred and fifty only). Thereafter there was a compromise between the parties and a compromise petition "as filed on 11.1.1978 and the learned Magistrate accepting the compromise passed an order on 12.1.1978 in terms of the said compromise. 3. It further appears that again the opposite party filed a petition on 13.1.1978 alleging that the terms of compromise have not been implemented and on the said petition the learned Magistrate passed an ex-parte order for paying the maintenance at the same rate of Rs. 50/- (fifty) to each, as indicated above. When the petitioner learnt about the said order, he filed a petition on 28.2.1979 to recall the exparte order, but on the same day the learned Magistrate rejected the petition. Thereafter the petitioner moved this Court in Cr. Revision No. 501 of 1979, which was disposed of on 9.12.1979. This Court set aside the ex-parte order dated 13.1.1978 and directed the learned Magistrate to consider the application of the wife (opposite party) afresh after giving opportunities to the parties concerned. It was further ordered that both the parties would be entitled to adduce evidence in support of their respective cases. 4. Thereafter, the record was received in the, court of the learned Magistrate and opposite party examined three witnesses including herself Petitioner also examined two witnesses including himself and after considering the evidence on the record, the learned Magistrate passed the impugned order. 5. 4. Thereafter, the record was received in the, court of the learned Magistrate and opposite party examined three witnesses including herself Petitioner also examined two witnesses including himself and after considering the evidence on the record, the learned Magistrate passed the impugned order. 5. A supplementary affidavit has also been filed on behalf of the petitioner in which it has been stated that Naseema, the daughter of the opposite party has attained the age of majority and got married with Izaz Khan, son of Jabbar Khan @ Bhakola, of village Ranisagar, within the police station of Shahpur in the district of Bhojpur on 17.6.1984. Similarly, it has been stated that Firoz Khan, the son of the opposite party, who is elder to Naseema, has also attained majority. These facts have not been controverted by the opposite party in her counter affidavit. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has assailed the impugned order mainly on two grounds; firstly, that since the children have attained majority; they are not entitled for any maintenance, from the date of their attaining majority; and secondly, that the trial court was not right 'in making the order for payment of maintenance to the opposite party for the period prior to 1978 when the compromise was entered into between the parties. 7. In order to appreciate the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner, it is essential to examine the provision of Section 125 of the Code. Section 125 of the Code has laid down that if any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain his wife unable to maintain herself, or his legitimate or illegetimate minor child whether married or not, unable to maintain themselves, the Magistrate upon proof of such neglect or refusal can order such person to make monthly allowance for the maintenance of such wife or children. From a bare reading of the provision of Section 125 of the Code, it is clear that any person who has got sufficient means, if he neglects to maintain his wife, who is unable to maintain herself, or to maintain his legitimate or illegitimate minor children, the Magistrate upon proof of such neglect or refusal, can order such person to make monthly allowance for the maintenance of such wife or children or both. 8. 8. First of all, I will deal with the first contention of the learned counsel regarding the majority of the children. A definite statement on oath has been made in the supplementary affidavit that both the children i. e. son and daughter of opposite party have attained majority, therefore, in that view of the statement, so far as the maintenance awarded to the children after the date of their attainment of majority is concerned; that cannot be sustained in law, because the provision is quite clear. The position has now been made clear in the new Code. Clause (B) of Section 125 (1) of the Code provides for maintenance of legitimate or illegitimate minor child whether married or not. As the expression 'child' was not defined in the old Code some controversy existed as to whether the expression 'child' means a minor or includes any son or daughter unable to maintain himself or herself, but now the new Code has made it clear that a person is a child till that person attains the age of majority. It has been held in some of the cases that a 'child' of 18 years is not minor and as such not entitled to maintenance. In that view of the matter that part of the impugned order awarding Rs. 75/-each for the maintenance of the son and daughter after the date of their attainment of majority is hereby quashed. Of course, they would be entitled for their earlier maintenance before the date of their majority. 9. Now coming to the second contention, the learned counsel submitted that the order of the learned Magistrate directing for the payment of the arrears from the date of the original order is not in accordance with law as subsequent to that the parties entered into a compromise and in that view of the matter, no order can be passed for the payment of arrears of maintenance prior to the date of compromise after recalling the order made in the terms of the compromise. In support of his contention, the learned counsel has relied upon a decision in the case of Bulakan Mahton vs. Sonama Devi. 1976 B. B. C. J. page 208 : 1976 PLJR 504 . In the aforesaid case a petition for realisation of maintenance was filed. In support of his contention, the learned counsel has relied upon a decision in the case of Bulakan Mahton vs. Sonama Devi. 1976 B. B. C. J. page 208 : 1976 PLJR 504 . In the aforesaid case a petition for realisation of maintenance was filed. During the pendency of the said application, an application was filed by both the parties to the effect that they had settled the matter subject to certain conditions. The petition of compromise was allowed but after some time an application was filed by the opposite party to the effect that the petitioner has violated the conditions mentioned in the compromise petition and a prayer was made that the order be recalled. The learned Magistrate recorded the evidence of the opposite party (wife) and after hearing the parties passed the impugned order, which gave rise to the said case. The said order was assailed on the ground that the order for maintenance having been cancelled by the impugned order and the parties having compromised among themselves and lived amicably for some time, the initial order for maintenance passed earlier stood cancelled. Therefore, the order for realisation of maintenance by the process of distress warrant was illegal and without jurisdiction. It was held in the aforesaid case that the maintenance sub sequent to the compromise can be realized but not the arrears accrued before it. " 10. In the instant case, the opposite party filed an application for realisation of maintenance and during the pendency of that application a compromise petition was filed and an order in the terms of compromise was passed but subsequently it appears that on the next date the opposite party filed an application for recalling the consent order, which was passed ex-parte. That order was challenged in this Court, as indicated above, which was set aside and the matter was remitted back to the court below and the court below after hearing the parties passed the impugned order. 11. The whole question is as to whether maintenance for the period prior to the compromise can be passed by the learned magistrate or not. In view of the decision [Bulakan Mahton vs. Sonama Devi, 1976 BBCJ page 208 : 1976 PLJR 504 (supra)], in my view the maintenance subsequent to the compromise can be reatised but not the arrears accrued before it. In view of the decision [Bulakan Mahton vs. Sonama Devi, 1976 BBCJ page 208 : 1976 PLJR 504 (supra)], in my view the maintenance subsequent to the compromise can be reatised but not the arrears accrued before it. Relying on the aforesaid decision, I find substance in the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner, so far as this point is concerned. 12. However, I do not find any cogent ground for interference, so far as the quantum of maintenance is concerned. The opposite party would be entitled for the amount of Rs. 100/- (one hundred) as maintenance from the petitioner. 13. For the reasons stated above, the order passed by the learned Magistrate regarding the payment of monthly allowance of Rs. 100/(one hundred) for maintenance of Bibi Taibunnissa is hereby confirmed. The petitioner shall pay the said amount to the opposite party in accordance with the order passed by the learned Magistrate. So far as the maintenance awarded to the children after the date of their attaining the age of majority is concerned, the same is hereby quashed. 14. With the above modification, the application is dismissed.