Judgment A grocery shop owner was prosecuted for violations of the provisions of Sec.7 (i) and (iii) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and Rule 50 (1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules punishable under Sec.16(1) (a) (i) and (ii) of the Act. Sample involved is cumin. Ext.P9 report of analysis showed that it does not conform to the standard and is therefore adulterated. The further accusation is that he had no licence. The Magistrate acquitted the accused. Complainant, Food Inspector, has come up in appeal. 2. As P.W.1, the appellant has spoken to the various formalities observed by him in the matter of purchase, sampling and forwarding. The necessary documents were also produced and proved. Hie peon, examined as P.W.2, was also present when action was taken. He supported P.W.1, P.W.3 is the present Executive Officer of the Panchayat. He was not the officer at the time when action was taken. He proved Exts.P11 and P12 produced from his office to show that the respondent had no licence at the time when action was taken. Action was taken at 11 A.M. on 4-111981. Ext.P12 is the carbon copy of the licence issued to the respondent. It was valid only upto 31-3-1981. Ext.P11 is the next application filed by the respondent for renewal of licence. It was only on 5-11-1981 which is after P.W.1 has taken action. Respondent has not produced any record to show that he had licence on 4-11-1981. P.W.4 is the District Food Inspector who is also the Local Health Authority. He also proved that the required formalities were complied with. 3. It appears that before the learned Magistrate the contentions raised on behalf of the respondent were: a) Sec.11 (3) of the Act was not properly complied with in the sense that there was a delay of 14 days in the sample reaching the Public Analyst; b) The appellant did not take a representative sample of cumin from the respondent for analysis; c) Ext.P9 report of analysis is silent regarding the tests conducted for analysis and therefore the report cannot be accepted; and d) The evidence of P.W.3 cannot be accepted to find that there was no licence. 4. Objection (b) was rightly found against by the Magistrate and the same was not pursued before me. This is not a case of the Food Inspector taking the sample. 4. Objection (b) was rightly found against by the Magistrate and the same was not pursued before me. This is not a case of the Food Inspector taking the sample. Respondent sold the sample to the Food Inspector. If it was the usual practice to do anything to make the sample representative before sale, the respondent ought to have done it before selling to the Food Inspector also. He cannot blame anybody and raise it as a technical defence to escape liability. 5. The responsibility of the Food Inspector under Sec.11(3) is only to send the sample not later than the immediately succeeding working day to the Publuc Analyst. The method in which he has to send it is not specified therein. No time limit is prescribed within which the sample should reach the Public Analyst. That may be because of the possible delay in transit. Whenever and wherever the legislature wanted to see that something has to reach a particular authority within a particular time limit it made appropriate provisions. The absence of such a provision in Sec.11 (3) must be considered conscious. In this case, the sample was sent to the Public Analyst by parcel in the K.T.C. Parcel Service on 5-11-1981 itself. It is true that it reached the Public Analyst only after 14 days. P.W.1 produced and proved Ext.P7 receipt to show that he forwarded the sample on 5-11-1981 and said that the delay may be in transit. The sample was in perfect condition and the Public Analyst was able to analyse it. Respondent never wanted a second opinion from the Director of Central Food Laboratory. Even without any statutory provision or allegation and proof of prejudice, the learned Magistrate considered the delay as fatal to the prosecution. That approach to the prosecution is not legal. 6. The learned Magistrate also went under the wrong impression that the Public Analyst is bound to mention in his report all the details of analysis conducted by him and otherwise it is the duty of the prosecution to cite and examine the Public Analyst to prove what all tests were conducted by him to analyse the sample when the accused disputes. The decision in Jagdish Chandra v. State of U.P. Jagdish Chandra v. State of U.P. A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1233:1981 Crl.L.J. 739 was relied on by the Magistrate. The decision in Jagdish Chandra v. State of U.P. Jagdish Chandra v. State of U.P. A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1233:1981 Crl.L.J. 739 was relied on by the Magistrate. Before me, the respondent also relied on the decision in Food Inspector v. Vidhyadharan Food Inspector v. Vidhyadharan (1987)1 K.L.T. 414 Those are two cases in which the analysis could have been done only by conducting some chemical tests. In the first case the Public Analyst was examined. He admitted that microscopic examination alone was conducted and his laboratory did not have the facility of any other test. The Supreme Court said that such a report cannot be accepted. In the second case, a single Bench of this Court found on the evidence in that case that microscopic examination alone was conducted and it was insufficient. Those principles may hold good only in cases like that where on the available materials the court can decide that the report is unacceptable because the essentially required tests were not conducted to form the opinion. So also, in a case where the court feels that further elucidation of facts is necessary for a proper decision of the case the Court can summon and examine the Public Analyst. 7. Under Sec.13(5) the report of analysis is evidence of the facts stated therein and it can be accepted without examining the Analyst. The Public Analyst is a statutory functionary and is an expert in his field. When he gives his opinion it must be taken that the opinion was duly formed after doing whatever is necessary to form that opinion. He is not expected to say what all things were done by him. When he gives the percentage of ash insoluble in hydrochloric acid it is not necessary for him to say that a particular chemical test was conducted. That is understood. Otherwise the percentage cannot be given. Position may be different in a case where the report of analysis gives intrinsic evidence or from other materials it is clearly establishing beyond doubt that the required tests were not conducted. Otherwise it is the duty of the person who challenges the report to cite and examine the Analyst to show the results were arrived at without proper analysis. Position may be different in a case where the report of analysis gives intrinsic evidence or from other materials it is clearly establishing beyond doubt that the required tests were not conducted. Otherwise it is the duty of the person who challenges the report to cite and examine the Analyst to show the results were arrived at without proper analysis. It may be illegal to insist that whenever the accused challenges the correctness of the findings in the report the prosecution will have to examine the Analyst and clear the doubt. 8. For the analysis of a given sample various tests may have to be conducted to arrive at various results. In order to find out the general ingredients of the sample a microscopic examination may be sufficient. In the first line of results in the report the Public Analyst may have stated it to be the result of microscopic examination which is sufficient for noting the general ingredients. He may not have stated in the succeeding lines the tests conducted for arriving at other results. That does not mean that he conducted only microscopic examination for all the results. He might have given percentage of moisture, percentage of total ash, percentage of ash insoluble in dilute HCI or percentage of volatile oil. These results could be arrived at only by conducting the required tests. The persumption in the absence of proof to the contrary, even in cases where the tests are not specified in the report and the only test mentioned therein is microscopic examination, is that all the required tests were conducted. That is the effect of Sec.13(5). If anybody wants to challenge it he will have to prove so by the examination of the Public Analyst or otherwise. The above two decisions did not lay down any law to the contrary. Instances have arisen where in such cases either the accused are acquitted on the ground that microscopic examination, which by itself is insufficient, alone was conducted or the prosecution directed to cite and examine the Public Analyst. That practice is not correct. The trial court went wrong in casting the burden on the prosecution to dispel the doubt of the accused in this respect and acquitting him. 9. The standard prescribed in Appendix B Item A.05.09 for cumin is that the proportion of edible seeds other than cumin seeds shall not exceed 5% by weight. That practice is not correct. The trial court went wrong in casting the burden on the prosecution to dispel the doubt of the accused in this respect and acquitting him. 9. The standard prescribed in Appendix B Item A.05.09 for cumin is that the proportion of edible seeds other than cumin seeds shall not exceed 5% by weight. The Public Analyst found the sample to contain 10.8% by weight of foreign seeds. This is far in excess of the permissible limit and the sample is evidently adulterated. There is absolutely no justification for rejecting the report and acquitting the accused. 10. On the question of licence also, the stand taken by the Magistrate is not correct. It is true that the burden is on the prosecution to prove the guilt. By proving want of licence the prosecution is discharging a negative burden instead of asking the accused to show that he had a valid licence. That burden was discharged by examining P. W.3 and proving Exts.P11 and P12. The learned Magistrate says that his evidence is not so cogent as to warrant a conviction of the accused. By such a sweeping remark any evidence could be rejected without going into it. That is not what is wanted in a judicial pronouncement. Judicial pronouncements are justiciable and cogent and sound reasons will have to be assigned for rejecting evidence. It may be an unpleasant job to convict an accused for an offence involving compulsory imprisonment. But that will not relieve the judicial officers from their responsibility to have a judicial approach to the evidence. P.W.3 was giving evidence not on the basis of personal informations. He was only proving official records sufficient enough to discharge the burden of the prosecution. If these records are not genuine and the accused was having a licence he could have produced it specifically when prosecution discharged its burden to the extent possible. 11. The Magistrate says that the accused is appearing before Court from 15-5-1982 onwards and that itself is a punishment for him. That may be the reason why he thought of acquitting the accused giving him the benefit of doubt ignoring the penal provisions intended to prevent a social menace. If such a principle is adopted, no accused could be convicted if the trial prolonged for some time. That may be the reason why he thought of acquitting the accused giving him the benefit of doubt ignoring the penal provisions intended to prevent a social menace. If such a principle is adopted, no accused could be convicted if the trial prolonged for some time. The Magistrate also doubled whether P.W.1 has tendered evidence before Court in respect of the sample sent by him. It is not clear from where such a doubt came to him. The doubts and suspicions entertained by the Magistrate are not of a judicial mind and they are not reasonable also. 12. The learned counsel for the respondent attempted to justify the acquittal on another ground which was not raised before the trial court. Surely he is entitled to support the acquittal on other grounds also. He said that Rule 18 of the Food Adulteration Rules was not properly complied with and therefore the acquittal should not be interfered. Rule 18, as it now stands, provides that a copy of the memorandum and the specimen impression of the seal used to seal the packet shall be sent in a sealed packet separately to the Public Analyst by any suitable means immediately but not later than the succeeding working day. This provision was inserted by amendment only on 24-9-1985. Before that, Rule 18 only provided that a copy of the memorandum and specimen impression of the seal used to seal the packet shall be sent to the Public Analyst separately by registered post or delivered to him or to any person authorised by him. 13. As P.W.1, the Food Inspector has spoken to the fact that the said formality was specifically compelled with. Exts.P5 and P6 were also produced and proved by him in that connection. There was not even a challenge in cross examination. There was not even an argument in that respect before the trial court. Now when all other grounds failed, a new field was hunted after. I do not think that such a contention could be countenanced at this stage. 14. The decision of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Rajkaran State of Maharashtra v. Rajkaran 1987 S.C.C. (Supp.) 183 relied on by the respondent has absolutely no application for our purpose. That case was considering the mode of despatch to the Public Analyst. The prosecution case was that it was sent by registered post. 14. The decision of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Rajkaran State of Maharashtra v. Rajkaran 1987 S.C.C. (Supp.) 183 relied on by the respondent has absolutely no application for our purpose. That case was considering the mode of despatch to the Public Analyst. The prosecution case was that it was sent by registered post. No material was placed before court to prove that the despatch was by registered post. The decision was laid in the context. 15. So far as the present case is concerned, the despatch was by parcel service and the receipt for that purpose was produced and proved. Compliance of Rule 18 was specifically spoken to by P.W.1 supported by Exts.P5 and P6 also. Till the argument was put forward before this Court, there was no contention that Rule 18 was violated. In these circumstances, I fail to appreciate the contention. 16. It is true that this is an appeal against acquittal. Interference with an order of acquittal is having certain restrictions self imposed by courts. But when the acquittal is found to be against the weight of the evidence and even against the provisions of law and by a misreading of the evidence it is not only the right of this Court, by its duty also to interfere and bring an offender to justice especially in an anti-social crime. This is a fit case for interference in which the prosecution succeeded in establishing beyond doubt that the respondent is guilty of both the offences. 17. The criminal appeal is, therefore, allowed and the order of acquittal is set aside. The respondent is found guilty and convicted under Sec.l6(1) (a) (i) and (ii) for having violated Secs.7 (i) and 7 (iii) of the Act and Rule 50 (1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules. For the furst item of offence he is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a term of six months and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000 with a default sentence of simple imprisonment for three months. In view of the sentence awarded above, I do not propose to award a separate sentence for violation of Rule 50(1). 18. The trial court will see that steps are taken for the execution of the sentence. B.S. ----- Appeal Allowed.