(1987) 2 Crimes 449 (Delhi) (Overruder which the impugned order was passed, the detaining authority would necessarily insist upon sufficiency of the grounds which would justify the taking of the drastic measure of preventively detaining the person. 10. Viewed from this perspective, we wish to emphasise and make it clear for the guidance of the different High Courts that a distinction must be drawn between the delay in making of an order of detention under a law relating to preventive detention like the Conservation of Foreign Exchange & Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 and the delay in complying with the procedural safeguards of Art. 22(5) of the Constitution. It has been laid down by this Court in a series of decisions that the rule as to unexplained delay in taking action is not inflexible. Quite obviously, in cases of mere delay in making of an order of detention under a law like the Conservation of Foreign Exchange & Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 enacted for the purpose of dealing effectively with persons engaged in smuggling and foreign exchange racketeering who, owing to their large resources and influence have been posing a serious threat to the economy and thereby to the security of the nation, the Courts should not merely on account of delay in making of an order of detention assume that such delay, if not satisfactorily explained, must necessarily give rise to an inference that there was no sufficient material for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority or that such subjective satisfaction was not genuinely reached. Taking of such a view would not be warranted unless the Court finds that the. grounds are stale or illusory or that there is no real nexus between the grounds and the impugned order of detention. The decisions to the contrary by the Delhi High Court in Anil Kumar Bhasin v. Union of India, (Crl. W. No. 410/86 dated 2-2-1987) (reported in 1987 Cri LJ 1632), Bhupinder Singh v. Union of India, (1985) 28 Delhi LT 493, Anwar Esmail Aibani v. Union of India (Crl. W. No. 375/86 dated 11-12-1986) (reported in (1987) 3 IJ Rep 383), Surinder Pal Singh v. M. L. Wadhawan, (Crl. W. No. 444/86 dated 9-3-1987) (1987 (2) Crimes 449) and Ramesh Lal v. Delhi Administration (Crl. W. No. 375/86 dated 11-12-1986) (reported in (1987) 3 IJ Rep 383), Surinder Pal Singh v. M. L. Wadhawan, (Crl. W. No. 444/86 dated 9-3-1987) (1987 (2) Crimes 449) and Ramesh Lal v. Delhi Administration (Crl. W. No. 43/84 dated 16-4-1984) and other cases taking the same view do not lay down good law and are accordingly overruled. 11. In the present case, the direct and proximate cause for the impugned order of detention was the importation in bulk of Indian made foreign liquor by the appellant acting as a broker from across the border on the night between 29/30th December, 1986. The District Magistrate in the counter-affidavit has averred that it was revealed from the statements of the witnesses recorded on 4th January, 1987 that the appellant was the person actually involved. Apprehending his arrest the appellant applied for anticipatory bail on 21st January, 1987. It appears that on the same day the appellant (sic) appears to have made a statement that there was no proposal at that stage to arrest the appellant. However, later it was discovered that there was no trace of the appellant. He was arrested on 2nd February, 1987 and on the same day he made a statement admitting these facts. Meanwhile, the proposal to detain the appellant was placed before the District Magistrate. It is averred by the District Magistrate that on a careful consideration of the material on record he was satisfied that it was necessary to make an order of detention of the appellant under S. 3(2) of the Act and that accordingly on 28th May, 1987 he passed the order of detention. The appellant was taken into custody on 30th May, 1987. He had forwarded the report to the State Government on the 28th and the Government accorded its approval on the 31st. 12. Even though there was no explanation for the delay between 2nd February and 28th May, 1987 it could not give rise to a legitimate inference that the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the District Magistrate was not genuine or that the grounds were stale or illusory or that there was no rational connection between the grounds and the impugned order of detention. There is a plethora of decisions of this Court as to the effect of unexplained delay in taking action. These are admirably dealt with in Durga Das Basus Shorter Constitution of India, 8th edn. There is a plethora of decisions of this Court as to the effect of unexplained delay in taking action. These are admirably dealt with in Durga Das Basus Shorter Constitution of India, 8th edn. at p. 154. We will only notice to a few salient decisions. In Olia Mallick v. State of West Bengal, (1974) 1 SCC 594 : ( AIR 1974 SC 1816 ) it was held that mere delay in making the order was not sufficient to hold that the District Magistrate must not have been satisfied about the necessity of the detention order. Since the activities of the detenu marked him out as a member of a gang indulging systematically in the cutting of aluminium electric wire, the District Magistrate could have been well satisfied, even after the lapse of five months that it was necessary to pass the detention order to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the supply of electricity. In Golam Hussain v. Commr. of Police, Calcutta, (1974) 3 SCR 613 it was held that the credible chain between the grounds of criminal activity alleged by the detaining authority and the purpose of detention, is snapped if there is too long and unexplained an interval between the offending acts and the order of detention. But no mechanical test by counting the months of the interval was sound. It all depends on the nature of the acts relied on, grave and determined or less serious and corrigible, on the length of the gap, short or long, on the reason for the delay in taking preventive action, like information of participation being available only in the course of an investigation. The Court has to investigate whether the casual connection has been broken in the circumstances of each case. In Odut Ali Miah* v. State of West Bengal, (1974) 4 SCC 127 where the decision of the detaining authority was reached after about five months, Krishna Iyer, J. repelled the contention based on the ground of delay as a mere reed of straw and it was held that the time-lag between the dates of the alleged incidents and the making of the order of detention was not so large that it could be said that no reasonable person could possibly have arrived at the satisfaction which the District Magistrate did on the basis of the alleged incidents. It follows that the test of proximity is not a rigid or mechanical test to be blindly applied by merely counting the number of months between the offending acts and the order of detention. In Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar, (1984) 3 SCC 14 one of us, Sen, J. observed : * or Malwa Shaw v. State of Bengal.........Ed. "On merits the impugned order cannot be said to be vitiated because of some of the grounds of detention being non-existent or irrelevant or too remote in point of time to furnish a rational nexus for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. It is usually from prior events showing tendencies or inclinations of a man that an inference can be drawn whether he is likely, in the future, to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order." See also : Gora v. State of West Bengal, (1975) 2 SCR 996 Raj Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, (1986) 4 SCC 407 and Hemlata Kantilal Shah v. State of Maharashtra, (1981) 4 SCC 647 . 13. Point No. (2) : Quite recently, we had occasion to deal with this aspect in Bal Chand Bansal v. Union of India, (1988) 2 JT 65 In repelling a contention raised on the dictum in Ramesh Yadav v. District Magistrate, Etah, (1985) 4 SCC 232 , one of us (Sharma, J.) drew attention to the observations of Mukharji, J. in Suraj Pal Sahu v. State of Maharashtra, (1986) 4 SCC 378 that the prejudicial activities of the person detained were so interlinked and continuous in character and are of such nature that they fully justified the detention order. Here the grounds of detention clearly advert to two earlier incidents, one of 21st July, 1982 for which the detenu was being prosecuted in Criminal Case No. 303/82 relating to the recovery and seizure of 142 bottles of foreign liquor from his residential house which ended in an acquittal because the prosecution witnesses turned hostile, and the other of 30th May, 1986 for which Criminal Case No. 150/86 relating to recovery and seizure of 24 bottles of foreign liquor from his house was then still pending, and go on to recite that the launching of the prosecution had no effect inasmuch as he had not stopped his activities and was continuing the importation of foreign liquor from across the border. The earlier two incidents are not really the grounds for detention but they along with the transaction in question of importation of foreign liquor in bulk show that his activities in this transaction afforded sufficient ground for the prognosis that he would indulge in such anti-social activities again, if not detained. The District Magistrate in his counter-affidavit has stated that he was aware of the fact that the detenu had on 21st January, 1987 applied for anticipatory bail but no orders were passed inasmuch as the police made a statement that there was no proposal at that stage to place him under arrest. It however appears that he was arrested on 2nd February, 1987 and on his own made a statement admitting the facts. Thereafter, he seems to have disappeared from Godhra. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that there was lack of awareness on the part of the District Magistrate on 28th May, 1987 in passing the order of detention as he did. There is a mention in the grounds of the two criminal cases pending against the detenu and also a recital of the fact that he was continuing his business surreptitiously and he could not be caught easily and therefore there was compelling necessity to detain him. 14. Point No. (3) : The contention regarding lack of certainty and precision on the part of detaining authority as to the real purpose of detention and that they were all rolled up into one at first blush appears to be attractive but on deeper reflection seems to be of little or no consequence. The purpose of the detention is with a view to preventing the appellant from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. It was not seriously disputed before us that the prejudicial activities carried on by the appellant answer the description of a bootlegger as defined in S. 2(b) and therefore he comes within the purview of sub-s. (1) of S. 3 of the Act, by reason of sub-s. (4) thereof. It was not seriously disputed before us that the prejudicial activities carried on by the appellant answer the description of a bootlegger as defined in S. 2(b) and therefore he comes within the purview of sub-s. (1) of S. 3 of the Act, by reason of sub-s. (4) thereof. Sub-s. (4) of S. 3 with the Explanation appended thereto gives an enlarged meaning to the words acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and reads : "(4) For the purpose of this section, a person shall be deemed to be acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order when such person is engaged in or is making preparation for engaging in any activities, whether as a bootlegger or dangerous person or drug offender or immoral traffic offender or property grabber, which affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. Explanation : For the purpose of this subsection, public order shall be deemed to have been affected adversely or shall be deemed likely to be affected adversely inter alia, if any of the activities of any person referred to in this sub-section directly or indirectly, is causing or is likely to cause any harm, danger or alarm or feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section thereof or a grave or widespread danger to life, property or public health." The District Magistrate in passing the impugned order has recorded his subjective satisfaction with respect to the appellant that with a vew to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is necessary to make an order that he be detained. In the accompanying grounds for detention this is the basis for the formation of his subjective satisfaction. They go on to state that unless the order of detention was made he would not stop his illicit liquor traffic on brokerage and therefore it was necessary to detain him under S. 3(2) of the Act, and recite : "In order to safeguard the health of the people of Gujarat, for public peace and in the interest of the nation, with a view to stop such anti-national activities..........for the purpose of public order and public peace and in the interest of the State .........". In our opinion, these words added by way of superscription were wholly unnecessary. In our opinion, these words added by way of superscription were wholly unnecessary. They were set out by the District Magistrate presumably because of total prohibition in the State. In future, it would be better for the detaining authorities acting under Ss. 3(1) and 3(2) of the Act, to avoid such unnecessary verbiage which are of little or no consequence and give rise to unnecessary debate at the Bar. 15. Point No. (4) : The contention that there was unexplained delay in disposal of the representation made by the appellant to the State Government appears to be wholly misconceived. Admittedly, the appellant made his representations to the State Government as well as to the Advisory Board on 8th June, 1987. The State Government acted with promptitude and after due consideration rejected the same on 12th June, 1987. There was no delay much less inordinate delay in consideration of the representation. 16. The result therefore is that the appeal as well as the writ petition fail and are dismissed. Order accordingly. For Citation : AIR 1988 SC 1255