Judgment :- 1. This second appeal is by the legal representatives of the plaintiff. The suit was initially instituted for an injunction. It was instituted in the year 1967. Subsequently, it was amended as one for recovery of the property. The property in question is 65 cents in R S. No. 74/7. According to the appellants, they got title to this property by virtue of a partition in the tavazhi. The partition is evidenced by Ext. A1. It is dated 9-7-1958. Item 12 in E schedule is the disputed property. On the basis of this title, the plaintiffs wanted recovery of the property. 2. Another item 83 cents in R. S. No. 74/6 adjacent to the suit property also belonged to the tarwad. The tarwad assigned an item of property to the predecessor of the third defendant. This happened in 1950. The document evidencing that assignment is Ext. AT After the assignment the father of the 4th defendant got an oral lease of the suit properly and 83 cents in Sy. No. 74/6. Subsequent to the oral lease, there was a marupat executed by the 4th defendant's father in favour of the landlord. This document is evidenced by Ext. B1 . The defendant also contended that even if the plaintiff bad any title to the suit property, they lost it by adverse possession and so, the suit is liable to be dismissed. 3. The trial court after considering the evidence and circumstances in the case, held that the plaintiffs have proved their title to the property and that the defendants were notable to establish their case of adverse possession. After recording these findings, the trial court considered the question under S.7B of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act', and found that the 4th defendant is entitled to the protection under S.7B of the Act and the court held that the 4th defendant has got tenancy right over the plaint schedule property. In the result, the suit was dismissed. 4. The plaintiffs filed an appeal. In appeal, the appellate court did not agree with the finding of the trial court in respect of S.7B of the Act, but confirmed the findings regarding title and adverse possession by the trial courts. In the result, the judgment and decree of the trial court were reversed and the suit was decreed. 5. The defeated defendant filed a second appeal. In the result, the judgment and decree of the trial court were reversed and the suit was decreed. 5. The defeated defendant filed a second appeal. In second appeal, it was found that the finding of the appellate court in regard to S.7B of the Act is not correct and that a further investigation of the question relating to S.7B is required is the circumstances of the case. Holding so, this court remitted the case to the appellate court for considering the question under S.7B of the Act. 6. The appellate court on the basis of the remand order considered whether the 4th defendant can claim tenancy right under S.7B of the Act. The appellate court held that all the necessary ingredients for attracting S.7B have been proved in the case and so, the 4th defendant can claim tenancy right under S.7B of the Act. The suit was again dismissed. Now, the plaintiffs appeal. 7. From the narration of facts, I feel that the only question that has to be considered in the case is the applicability of S.7B of the Act on the basis of the facts and circumstances proved in the case. I feel that it is apposite to quote S.7B of the Act, before I begin to examine this question on facts. 7B. Certain persons occupying lands under leases granted by incompetent persons to be deemed tenants - (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law, or in any contract, custom or usage, or in any judgment, decree or order of court, any person in occupation of the land of another at the commencement of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969. on the basis of a registered deed purporting to be a lease deed, shall be deemed to be a tenant, if be or his predecessor-in-interest was in occupation of such land on the 11th day of April, 1957, on the basis of that deed, notwithstanding the fact that the lease was granted by a person who had no right over the land or who was not competent to lease the land. (2) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law, or in any contract, custom or usage, or in any judgment, decree or order of court, any person who on the 11th day of April, 1957, was in occupation of the land of another and continued to be in occupation of such land till the commencement of Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969; shall be deemed to be a tenant if the court has delivered a judgment or passed an order before the date of publication of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Bill, 1968, in the Gazette that the occupation by such person was on the basis of an oral permission or an unregistered deed purporting to be a lease deed granted by a person who bad no right over the land or who was not competent to lease the land." The person who claims protection under S.7B of the Act should be in possession of the property in question at the commencement of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1969. There should be a registered deed evidencing tenancy in favour of the person concerned or his predecessor-in-interest and that he must be in occupation from the 11th day of April, 1957 on the basis of that deed. 8. In remitting the case to the appellate court, this court made it clear that the appellate court can proceed on the basis that the property is in the possession of the 4th defendant at the time when the suit was instituted namely, 1967, and so, one element required for attracting S.7B is definitely existent in this case. The question in dispute is whether the 4th defendant or his predecessor-in-interest was in possession from 11th day of April, 1957, on the basis of the registered deed. The counsel for the appellants submitted before me that though there is a registered marupat executed in 1943 that will not be of any consequence. There should be independent evidence to show that as per the marupat, or as claimed by the 4th defendant, he got possession of the property by virtue of the oral lease. Regarding the question of possession, necessarily, I have to consider that question as a question of fact and so, I should have my own restrictions in the matter of investigating that question in second appeal. Regarding the question of possession, necessarily, I have to consider that question as a question of fact and so, I should have my own restrictions in the matter of investigating that question in second appeal. But, the counsel for the appellants with much force submitted before me that the appellate court has not considered the question of possession on a misunderstanding of the order of remand. He referred me to the following passage in the judgment of the appellate court: "The High Court already held that possession is with the 4th defendant long before 1958 the date of Ext. Al and so much so, the scope of enquiry at present is only to consider the character of the possession upheld by the High Court in favour of the 4th defendant." 9. The counsel submitted before me that from what I have quoted above, it is clear that the appellate court has abdicated its obligation to enquire into the question of possession. Prima facie, I feel the submission is correct, but on going through the judgment of the appellate court, I found that the appellate court has also considered the question of possession so as to satisfy the requirements under S.7B of the Act. Since the counsel submitted before me that the appellate court has not considered that question of possession in the manner it ought to have been considered, this court should also look into the evidence in this case, at least for the satisfaction of this court before applying S.7B to the facts of the case, I thought it only proper to consider the evidence. 10. Though normally under S.100 CPC. this court will not attempt to re-appraise the evidence and reverse the conclusion reached by the first appellate court, in certain circumstances, this court has got the obligation to examine and re-assess the important and relevant evidence on record. This obligation is an obligation rooted in the fundamental devoir of the court to do justice to the case in band. If this duty is neglected, it may result in injustice. So, this court cannot refuse to consider the crucial evidence which has got serious consequences on the disputed issue and an error on that matter would certainly involve a substantial question of law. If this duty is neglected, it may result in injustice. So, this court cannot refuse to consider the crucial evidence which has got serious consequences on the disputed issue and an error on that matter would certainly involve a substantial question of law. In Dilbagrai Punjabi v. Sharad Chandra (1988 (3) SC 308), the Supreme Court had occasion to say thus: "...the court is under a duty to examine the entire relevant evidence on record and if it refuses to consider important evidence having direct bearing on the disputed issue and the error which arises is of a magnitude that it gives birth to a substantial question of law, the High Court is fully authorised to set aside the finding." 11. In 1943, the 4th defendant's father has executed a marupat. It is Ext.1. Ext. B1 takes in the property in dispute. This document is a very important document which can be taken as the basis of the enquiry in regard to possession. There is no probability for executing Ext. B1 delineating very clearly two items of properties with survey numbers and the boundaries which takes in the property in dispute. If the lessee is not getting possession of the property, it is difficult to have such a document executed. I feel that normally the rent is fixed on the basis of the area of the property and the improvements thereon. The commissioner's report also supports this view because several improvements are seen in the disputed property. Further, it has to be noted that when the plaintiff's son Pw.1 was examined, he deposed before the court that there is only one coconut tree in the disputed property and that there are several arecanut trees. But, the commissioner's report shows that in the disputed property, there are seven coconut trees which are aged more than SS years. There are other improvements like mango trees and jack trees. It is true that the commissioner's report shows that there are several arecanut trees also in the property. Further a neighbour of the property also has deposed that the 4th defendant and his predecessor-ininterest were in possession of this property. The counsel for the appellants submitted before me that if this property was held by the 4th defendant or his predecessor-in-interest, it is difficult to include this property in the partition deed Ext. Al. Further a neighbour of the property also has deposed that the 4th defendant and his predecessor-ininterest were in possession of this property. The counsel for the appellants submitted before me that if this property was held by the 4th defendant or his predecessor-in-interest, it is difficult to include this property in the partition deed Ext. Al. It it not uncommon to include properties which are not directly in possession of the family in question in partition deeds. Normally, all properties over which title can be claimed will be included in a partition deed irrespective of the fact whether the properties are held by the family or whether the family has lost its title to the properties in question. So, considering the probabilities of the case, I feel that Ext. B1 is a more reliable document for inferring possession with the 4th defendant and I do not think that the appellate court has gone wrong in holding that the 4th defendant and bis predecessor-in-interest were in possession of the property at least from 1943 onwards. So, the second element in S.7B, namely, the person claiming tenancy under S.7B should prove that he or his predecessor-in-interest was in occupation of the said land on the 11th day of April, 1957, is satisfied. This element requires another fact to be proved, namely that the occupation should be on the basis of a registered deed. 12. Now, I have to examine whether he is/was in occupation of the land in question on the 11th day of April, 1957, on the basis of a registered deed. The counsel for the appellants submitted before me that going by the case of the 4th defendant he came into possession of the property prior to 1943, under an oral lease and so, his possession commenced not under a registered lease deed and so S.7B is not attracted. In support of his argument, the counsel referred me to two decisions of this court-1974 KLT 286 (Raliyannan v. Narasimha Iyer) and 1980 KLT 854 (Ayisomma v. Abdul Rahiman). 13. Before considering the ratio of the above two decisions, I shall examine the contention raised by the counsel in the light of a plain reading of the provision-S. 7B of the Act. S.7B does not say that the person referred therein who can claim tenancy right should commence his occupation under a registered deed. 13. Before considering the ratio of the above two decisions, I shall examine the contention raised by the counsel in the light of a plain reading of the provision-S. 7B of the Act. S.7B does not say that the person referred therein who can claim tenancy right should commence his occupation under a registered deed. What is stated in the section is that he should be in occupation at the commencement of the Act on the basis of the registered deed. It does not mean that his initial possession should commence under a registered deed purporting to be a lease deed. Further, the section mandates that he shall be deemed to be a tenant if he or his predecessor-in-interest was in occupation of the land on the 11th day of April, 1957, on the basis of that deed. In a case where occupation commenced without a registered deed prior to 11th day of April, 1957, and thereafter the occupation continued under a registered deed, can it be said that S.7B is not attracted, so long as the section does not manifestly mandate that the occupation commenced without registered deed, but continued under registered deed on 11th day of April, 1957, is outside the parameter of S.7B of the Act. I do not think so. A meaningful interpretation permissible by the language of section that is what necessary in this case. 14. Of course, the court is bound to keep in mind the rules of construction, but recourse to rules of construction will not prevent altogether the judge exercising it with discretion. Beyond doubt, the prime devoir of the judge is to find out the intention of the legislature. In making an investigation to ascertain the intention of the legislature, the judge, of course, starts with the words used in the statute, but not ends with them. "Whenever a statute comes up for consideration, it must be remembered that it is not within human powers to foresee the manifold sets of facts which may arise, and, even if it were, it is not possible to provide for them in terms free from all ambiguity. The English Language is not an instrument of mathematical precision. Our Literature would be much the poorer if it were. This is where the draftsmen of Acts of Parliament have often been unfairly criticised. The English Language is not an instrument of mathematical precision. Our Literature would be much the poorer if it were. This is where the draftsmen of Acts of Parliament have often been unfairly criticised. A judge, believing himself to be fettered by the supposed rule that he must look to the language and nothing else, laments that the draftsmen have not provided for this or that, or have been guilty of some or other ambiguity. It would certainly save the judges trouble if Acts of Parliament were drafted with divine prescience and perfect clarity. In the absence of it, when a defect appears, a judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of the Parliament, and be must do this not only from the language of the statute; but also from a consideration of the social conditions which gave rise to it, and of the mischief which it was passed to remedy and he must supplement the written words so as to give force and life to the intention of the legislature." The above quote from (1949) 2 K. B. 48! clearly lays down what the judges in Heydon's case has said as the safest guide we can have today in the matter of construction of a provision in the statute. The practical advice on the subject was given by Plowden: "A judge should ask himself the question: if the makers of the Act bad themselves come across this ruck in the texture of it, how would they have straightened it out? He must then do as they would have done. A judge must not alter the material of which it is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases." 15. Approaching this case on the basis of the above quote, I cannot help feeling that the Legislature had not specifically in mind a situation where a person comes into possession of a property of another long prior to 11th day of April, 1967, as an oral lessee and thereafter executes a registered lease deed on or prior to 11th day of April 1957 and continues in possession. If it bad, would it have put it on the same footing as a person who commences his tenancy on or prior to 11th day of April 1957 under a registered deed. If it bad, would it have put it on the same footing as a person who commences his tenancy on or prior to 11th day of April 1957 under a registered deed. I think it would. It should be remembered that if a person obtains possession of the property under an oral agreement of lease and thereafter a lease deed has been executed on or prior to 11th day of April, 1957, and continues in possession, the possession of such a person is certainly legally referable to the registered deed, then why he should be disallowed the operation of the beneficial and liberal provision made by the legislature to save people in actual occupation on the basis of a registered lease deed. I find it difficult to comprehend a contrary intention on the language of the section. 16. Though the rule of merger is not applicable here, I feel that the principle behind that rule has to be extended in this situation. Of course, the term merger means that where a lesser and a greater estate in the same land come together and vest, without any intermediate estate, in the same person and in the same right, the lesser is immediately annihilated by operation of law. It is said to be merged, i. e. sunk or drowned, in greater estate (Blackstone Vol. II page 177). The view of equity in the matter of merger is more significant At common law, merger results automatically from the union of two estates in the circumstances above referred to and intention does not affect the result. But equity looks to the intention and to the duties of the parties. If an intention is expressly declared to the effect that the lesser estate shall be kept alive, there is no difficulty, but even in the absence of such an express declaration equity will presume an intention against merger if it is clearly advantageous to the person in whom the estates are united, or if it is consistent with his duty, that the lesser interest shall not be destroyed. As I said earlier, the rule of merger is not applicable here, but only the principle has to be imported to the situation in question. 17. Further it has to be doted that under S.111 (e) of the T P. Act, a lease is determined by implied surrender. As I said earlier, the rule of merger is not applicable here, but only the principle has to be imported to the situation in question. 17. Further it has to be doted that under S.111 (e) of the T P. Act, a lease is determined by implied surrender. Implied surrender occurs by creation of a new relationship and it can be inferred from unequivocal conduct of both the parties. If two sets of relationship cannot co-exist as being incompatible, that is to say, if the latter can come into effect only on the termination of the earlier, that will be deemed to have been terminated in order to enable the latter to operate. Illustration to clause (f)-"implied surrender" makes the position very clear. The illustration is-a lessee accepts from his lessor a new lease of the property leased, to take effect during the continuance of the existing lease. This is an implied surrender of the former lease and such lease is determined thereupon. Hence it is obvious that by the execution of a registered lease deed, the old lease is determined by implied surrender. When a registered tease deed is executed in regard to the property, the earlier oral lease is sunk or drowned and thereafter the party's intention is to bold the land under the registered lease deed or on the basis of the registered deed and if this registered deed is on or prior to 11th day of April, 1957, I do not see anything that prevents a court to say that the section has application. It has to be remembered that S.7B is a provision in a stature, which wanted to remedy certain mischiefs found in the social order particularly to grant liberal rights to persons in occupation of the lands. The Protean face of justice is capable of change, readily assuming different shapes and endowed with highly variable features. If we examine this face and try to unravel the secrets bidden behind its outward appearance, perhaps, bewilderment may be the result. On the theoretical level of philosophy many unacceptable and discrepant views of true justice often claiming absolute validity have been set forth by thinkers and jurists in the course of the centuries. But on the practical and pragmatic level of social orders, many different approaches have been taken towards solving the problem of the good society. On the theoretical level of philosophy many unacceptable and discrepant views of true justice often claiming absolute validity have been set forth by thinkers and jurists in the course of the centuries. But on the practical and pragmatic level of social orders, many different approaches have been taken towards solving the problem of the good society. This may be perhaps the foundation for the justification of the KLR. Act and a provision like S.7B. On a careful reading of the section, I am of the view that the situations emerged in the case plainly and clearly attract the provisions contained in S.7B of the Act. 18. Now, I shall consider the precedents cited before me. The counsel for the appellant has cited two decisions of this court-1974 KLT. 286 and 1980 KLT. 854. He submits before me that these two decisions will support his case that if the commencement of the possession is not on the basis of a registered deed, S.7B of the Act has no application. The counsel for the respondents reminded me that the consistent operation of a precedential decision procedure is so patently incompatible with all conceptions of progress, enlightenment and self-correction I should innovate a method of my own to distinguish these cases and render justice to the case at hand. Of course, I am bound by the decisions of this court and it is not proper on my part to speculate upon the decisions of this court, but I must remember that every case has got its own peculiarities and the ratio of a decision has to be understood in the background of the peculiarities of the case in which the ratio has been laid down. Lord Denning has said if lawyers hold to their precedents too closely, forgetful of the fundamental principles of truth and justice which they should serve, they may find the whole edifice conies tumbling down about them. They will be lost in that codeless myriad of precedent that wilderness of single instances. The common law will cease to grow. It will become a structure of fossils. If it is to avoid this fate, the law cannot afford to be a lawless science but should be a science of law. Just as scientists seek for truth, the lawyer should seek for justice. The common law will cease to grow. It will become a structure of fossils. If it is to avoid this fate, the law cannot afford to be a lawless science but should be a science of law. Just as scientists seek for truth, the lawyer should seek for justice. I should remember that although a severe adherence to precedent may produce undesirable effects, it is clearly essential to a state of affairs in which the law will be certain. Law exists to ensure the order which the forces in control of a society desire to impose. Its object is uniformity of action so that one member of society may know how, in certain circumstances another is likely to behave, this being the essence of security (See Wade The Concept of Legal Certainty Page 185). 19. I may also quote that if a judge finds a decision which is a precedent for the case before him and add which would also fail to do justice between the parties, his first duty is to examine and see whether, on their facts, the earlier cases are like the one in band and should it be impossible to draw a real distinction, his next duty is, not blindly to accept the prior rulings, but before adopting them as controlling precedents, to satisfy himself as to their binding character and correctness in law (Vide Von Mosclizisker Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort). I may also refer to what Lord Eldon has said: "It is better that the law should be certain than that every judge should speculate upon improvements in it". Lord Diplock warns in clear terms the necessity for accepting a precedent to maintain judicial discipline thus: "It is inevitable in a hierarchical system of Courts that there are decisions of the Supreme Appellate Tribunal which do not attract the unanimous approval of members of the judiciary. When I sat in the Court of Appeal I sometimes thought the House of Lords was wrong in overruling me. Ever since that time there have been occasions, when alone or in company T have dissented from a decision of the majority of this House. But the judicial system only works if someone is allowed to have the last word and if that last word, once spoken, is loyally accepted." (See Cassell & Co. Ltd. v. Broome (1972) 1 All ER 801 at 874). 20. But the judicial system only works if someone is allowed to have the last word and if that last word, once spoken, is loyally accepted." (See Cassell & Co. Ltd. v. Broome (1972) 1 All ER 801 at 874). 20. Now, I shall consider the decisions. I feel that I am not bound to rely on the decision reported in 1974 KLT. 286 on the facts of this case. The facts dealt with in 1974 KLT. 286 are so dissimilar with the facts of the present case. I do not want to repeat that special features of the case are mainly responsible for the final ratio of the decision. So it is portent with great danger to follow a decision without referring to the facts of the decision cited. In the case cited, a suit was instituted on 9-2-1951 and an oral lease dated 6-2-1951 was set up first and then a registered lease deed dated 20-6-1951 was pressed into service It has to be noted that the lease deed itself was registered only after the institution of the suit. From these crucial facts, it is plain to note that the circumstances emerged in the case are totally dissimilar with the facts of the case at hand. 21. In 1980 KLT. 854, Subramonian Poti, as be then was, observed thus: "It would not be right to say that only when a person who executes lease is able to put the other in possession that the lessee could be said to be in possession under the lease. The simplest instance one can think of is the case of an owner of property executing a lease directing the lessee to obtain possession from the earlier lessee or to obtain possession from a trespasser or from a person who holds under some arrangement. In such a case if the lessee, on the basis of the right obtained by him, gets possession be is thereafter a lessee in possession under the lease deed. It does not matter that when the lease was granted be was not put in possession Of course, the case would be different where he comes into possession independent of that lease. It does not matter that when the lease was granted be was not put in possession Of course, the case would be different where he comes into possession independent of that lease. In such an event he would have come into possession even without the lease and therefore his possession cannot be said to be under the lease For the purpose of S.7B the words 'on the basis of indicate that he comes into possession by virtue of the document of lease obtained by him and on the authority of such lease. " The counsel for the appellants relied on the above quote. A careful reading of the principles laid down in the above quote did not certainly postulate a case where there is a registered lease deed prior to 11th day of April, 1957 and a claim that the person in question came into possession of the property under an oral lease which got itself merged into a registered lease deed executed prior to 11th day of April, 1957. His Lordship Justice Poti had no occasion to consider the situation presented before me in this case. The only requirement with regard to this aspect of the matter in S.7B of the Act is that the person concerned should be in occupation of the land on 11th day of April, 1957 on the basis of a registered lease deed. It only indicates that he should be in occupation of the property in question on the basis of a registered lease deed and that lease deed should have been executed on or before 11th day of April, 1957. I do not think that the decision reported in 1980 KLT. 854 will also support the contention raised by the counsel for the appellants. 22. I feel that the facts disclosed in the case fully satisfied the requirement under S.7B of the Act and so, the 4th defendant is entitled to the protection under S.7B. This is what has been done by the appellate court and the trial court. I do not see any merit in this second appeal. The appeal is only to be dismissed. I do so.