P. K. Bahri ( 1 ) SHRI A. N. Pareekh, tenant, has brought this petitionunder Section 25-B (8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter REFERRED TO toas the Act ) challenging the eviction order dated 2/04/1987, of Shri Premkumar, Additional Rent Controller, passed against him on the ground ofeviction covered by clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act inrespect of the southern unit of house No. Z-7, Hauz Khas, New Delhi, asshown in red colour in the plan Ex. AW1/1. ( 2 ) THE petitioner has challenged the order of eviction on two grounds,firstly that the finding of the Additional Rent Controller that the premises inquestion had been let out to the petitioner-tenant only for residential purposesis perverse and wrong and secondly, that the Additional Rent Controller haswrongly come to the conclusion that the respondent-landlord is not in possession of alternate reasonably suitable accommodation. ( 3 ) THE facts, in brief, are that the respondent has been holdinghigh official positions in the Government as he held the post of Secretary,central Board of Revenue, later on Commissioner of Income-Tax, Directorof Inspection, Income-Tax Investigation, a job equivalent to the post of Jointsecretary, Ministry of Finance and he retired as permanent Commissioner ofincome Tax in the year 1964. He was occupying house No. C-1/7, Hardingavenue, New Delhi, which was quite a palatial house comprising of three bedrooms, dining, drawing rooms, office rooms verandah; garage, servant quartersand lawns. He purchased the plot of the property in question in the year1959 vide sale deed, certified copy of which is Ex. AW 10/1 and he completed theconstruction on the said plot in July 1966, which comprises of two units, namely,southern unit and northern unit, each having the accommodation comprisingof drawing room, dining room, kitchen, bath room on the ground floor, threebed rooms, two bath rooms and covered verandah on the first floor and aservant quarter with lavatory-cum-bath room over the garage and the northernportion also has a barsati floor comprising of one big room converted intotwo rooms and facility of toilet. Since the completion of the house, the respondent lived in that house with his wife upto April 1969. Respondent hasno issue of his own, his wife has a daughter from her previous marriage andaw1 Shahida Latif is the grand daughter of respondent s wife from thatdaughter. Since the completion of the house, the respondent lived in that house with his wife upto April 1969. Respondent hasno issue of his own, his wife has a daughter from her previous marriage andaw1 Shahida Latif is the grand daughter of respondent s wife from thatdaughter. It is undisputed before me that from her very birth, Shahida Latif (since about 1939) has been brought up by the respondent as his daughteralthough according to the tenets of Personal Mohammedan Law applicableto the respondent he could not legality adopt any daughter yet he has beentreating AWI as his daughter for all these years. It is the respondent whogot her married. From the wedlock two daughters have been born in the year1967 and 1969. Shahida Lalif was married in the year 1964. Respondenthad got assignment as Additional General Manager in M/s. Geep Flash Lightindustries Limited, Allahabad and he joined that post with effect from 1/05/1969. His wife also joined him at Allahabad in July or August 1969. Respondent s adopted daughter and her family were allowed to live in thenorthern portion of the house for residential purposes but after the respondent swife also shifted to Allahabad, the entire house was given in the use andoccupation of AWI and her family members and the respondent had taken allhis luggage from the said house to Allahabad in August 1969. It is thecase of the respondent that after about a year and a half Shahid Latif in oneof her letters apprised him about some theft having taken place in theneighbourhood and on account of security reasons and also that southren halfof the portion was kept neat and clean that respondent decided to let out thesouthern portion of the house for residential purposes for short durations sothat the same could become available to the respondent and his wife whenresdondent s assignment at Allahabad was to come to an end. Initially thesaid portion was let out to one Bhajan Lal Sajjan Kumar with effect from 15/08/1970, for a period of 11 months at the rental of Rs. 500-/ permensem for the accommodation and Rs. 300. Initially thesaid portion was let out to one Bhajan Lal Sajjan Kumar with effect from 15/08/1970, for a period of 11 months at the rental of Rs. 500-/ permensem for the accommodation and Rs. 300. 00 p. m. hire charges forelectrical equipments and furnishings and fittings, but the said tenant vacatedthe premises after three months and the same premises including garagebut excluding the barsati floor came to be let out to M/s. Alok Udyoglimited on the same rent and hire charges with effect from 1/01/1971,for a period of one year vide letter of tenancy Ex. AW6/1 for residentialpurposes only and that tenant came to vacate the premises on 20/11/1971. The respondent has, in his testimony which remained, unchallengedmentioned that he had received two offers for renting out the said accommodation for better rent with more security but in view of the recommendationof Mr. Ahsan Rizvi, a common friend of the parties, respondent agreed to letout the said premises to the petitioner for residential purposes for a limitedperiod of 11 months and in view of the fact that the petitioner was a veryclose friend of Mr. Rizvi, who in turn was close friend of the respondent, thepetitioner was required to give only one month s rent as security depositinstead of six month s rent which was offerred by other prospective tenants. Before the lease was finalised with the petitioner, on 6/11/1971, therespondent had written a letter to Mr. Kalbe Ali Khan, who was negotiatingthe tenancies of the said portion with different persons on behalf of therespondent. It was made clear by the respondent that the premises are to belet out to the petitioner on the same terms and conditions on which thepremises were let out to the tenants earlier. Ex. AW10/3 is the copy of thesaid letter which was also endorsed to the petitioner vide covering letterex. AW10/4 (copy ). Admittedly, the possession of the premises inquestionwas delivered to the petitioner and his tenancy commenced from 1/12/1971, at the same rent on which the premises stood let out to the previoustenants. The terms of the tenancy came to be incorporated in two agreements,one pertaining to the accommodation and the other regarding the hire chargesfor electrical equipments, fittings and furnishings. Those agreements wereexecuted on December 20, 19/1, which are Ex. AW12/5 and marked x necessary deficiency in the stamp duty and the pena. The terms of the tenancy came to be incorporated in two agreements,one pertaining to the accommodation and the other regarding the hire chargesfor electrical equipments, fittings and furnishings. Those agreements wereexecuted on December 20, 19/1, which are Ex. AW12/5 and marked x necessary deficiency in the stamp duty and the pena. lty imposed thereupon badbeen already deposited by the respondent and only objection which was raisedwith regard to admissibility of this particular document was about its nonregistration However, the Additional Rent Controller has, after makingreference to the case law on the point, come to the conclusion that the term withregard to the letting purpose incorporated in this particular document can beread into evidence as a collateral term in view of Section 49 of the Registrationact. This legal proposition hasnot been challenged before me. So, accordingto the written agreement between the parties, the premises had been let outto the petitioner for residential purposes only. ( 4 ) SHAHIDA Latif and her family members continued to live in thenorthern portion of the said house till 1974. In 1974, her husband shiftedto a London University as he obtained some fellowship there. He took hiswife and children alongwith him admittedly he has been in service outsideindia since then and presently he has got a job in the World Bank since 1976and is living in U. S. A. alongwith his wife and children but the luggagebelonging to Shahida Latif continued to remain in the northren portion of thesaid house and it is a fact that Shahida Latif and her family members havebeen visiting India almost every year and staying in the said portion of thehouse for 2-3 monhts regularly every year. The Additional Rent Controllerhas given in detail the period when Shahida Latif and her family members cameback to India and lived in that portion of the house. This portion was alsotemporarily given by Shahida Latif to her close friend Mrs. Bhatifor someperiod in 1975-76. The Additional Rent Controllerhas given in detail the period when Shahida Latif and her family members cameback to India and lived in that portion of the house. This portion was alsotemporarily given by Shahida Latif to her close friend Mrs. Bhatifor someperiod in 1975-76. There was one domestic servant named Bachan, whooriginally was employed by the respondent but after the respondent shiftedto Allahabad, that Bachan came in the employement of Shahida and it isproved on record from various documents that Shahida had been payinghim his salary and he continued to reside in the servant quarter of thenorthern portion with his wife and children and for a short period even hewas taken to Colombo when Shahida s husband came to be posted there ( 5 ) THE respondent s assignment at Allahabad was going to close, sohe in anticipation wrote a letter dated 1/09/1978, Ex. LCA/2,requesting the petitioner to vacate the house. In this letter it was clearlymentioned by the respondent that he wanted to reside in his own houseafter shifting from Allahabad as his assignment is to come to an end byseptember 1979. He also made reference to an understanding already givenby the petitioner for vacating the house when respondent was to finish hisassignment at Allahabad. The petitioner had sent the reply (Ex. AW10/r4)dated September 1978 wherein he denied that he had given any such understanding for vacating the house and he refused to vacate the house mentioning that the respondent has sufficient accommodation for his residence in thenorthern portion of the said house. The respondent had served a legalnotice dated 7/ 8/03/1979, copy Ex. AW10/7, in which it was clearlypleaded by the respondent that the premises in question had been lets out tothe petitioner for residential purposes and he required the petitioner to vacatethe premises and he terminated his contractual tenancy. The petitioner hadsent the reply (Ex. AW 10/12) dated 27/03/1979, wherein while controverting the need of the respondent for the premises in question, the petitionerdid not specifically controvert the fact that the premises in question had beenlet out to him for residential purposes only. The petitioner hadsent the reply (Ex. AW 10/12) dated 27/03/1979, wherein while controverting the need of the respondent for the premises in question, the petitionerdid not specifically controvert the fact that the premises in question had beenlet out to him for residential purposes only. ( 6 ) IT is the case of the respondent that the northern portion of thehouse has been given by him to his adopted daughter and the same is inpossession of the daughter and is not available for residence to the respondentand his wife, so he bonafide requires the premises in question for his ownresidence and for residence of his wife. ( 7 ) THE petitioner filed an application seeking leave to defend in whichhe pleaded that after the expiry of 11 months mentioned in the leasedeed, month to month tenancy came into exsitence and the respondent methim and he apprised him that he was using the premises for his office aswell and the respondent agreed to the same. So, a clear case was set upeven in the written statement by the petitioner that after the initial tenancyof II months terminated, there was an agreement between the parties thatthe petitioner could use the premises in question for his office as well. ( 8 ) THIS leave to defend application was allowed on 6/11/1979allowed on 27/11/1979, the respondent gave an application to thecompetent Authority under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Actseeking premission to gift the northern portion of the said house to his adopteddaughter Shahida Latif. On the following day necessary premission wasgranted. On 28/11/1979, Shahida Latif executed the Special Powerof Attorney in favour other husband who had come to India and the respondent made an oral gift of the northern portion of the house in favour ofshahida Latif which was accepted by her husband on her behalf and a memorandum of the said oral gift was duly executed on November 30, 1979 andthereafter the respondent amended his eviction petition in order to take theplea that as he had gifted the northern portion of the house in favour of Shahidalatif, so the same is not available to the respondent for his own residence. The petitioner has challenged this oral gift pleading that the same is a shamand bogus transaction and at any rate amounts to self-induced insufficiencyof accommodation on the part of the respondent which disentitles him toclaim eviction of the petitioner on the ground of bonafide requirement. Hehas pleaded that this dubious gift has been brought into existence by therespondent in order to defeat the petitioner right as tenant and the sameshould be completely ignored and it must be held that northern portion ofthe house is available to the respondent and his wife for their residence andas a matter of fact they have been residing in that portion after the respondent s assignment at Allahabad came to an end. It is also the case ofthe petitioner that at any rate, he has been using the premises in questionfor his office as well from the very inception of the tenancy to the knowledgeof the respondent who has been visiting him in his office at different periods,so the respondent is now estopped from urging that the premises had beenlet out only for residential purposes. It was also pleaded that the respondenthas been on very friendly terms with the petitioner and at one point oftime the petitioner had made a gift of a whisky bottle to the respondent whenhe visited him in his office on the ground floor of the premises in questionand so the letting purposes of the premises stood changed as the respondentnever protested or objected to the use of the premises by the petitioner forhis office purpose for all these years. ( 9 ) I would first deal with the question of letting purpose. The standtaken belore the Additional Rent Controller by the petitioner was that firstlythe lease-deed in question cannot be looked into at all as it was required tobe registered compulsorily and being not so registered is inadmissible in evidence to prove the terms of the lease incorporated in that document; secondly,that the tenancy had commenced with effect from 1/12/1971, byoralagreement with delivery of possession through the agency of Kalbe Ali Khanand it was agreed between Kalbe Ali Khan and the petitioner that the premises could be also used by the petitioner for his professional office. Boththese pleas were negatived by the Additional Rent Controller with elaboratereasons and discussion of evidence. Boththese pleas were negatived by the Additional Rent Controller with elaboratereasons and discussion of evidence. I also agree with the reasons given by theadditional Rent Controller in giving the finding that unregistered document oflease can be looked into to know the purpose of letting because the said termcan be deemed to be collateral matter. I would have elaborated the reasonsin support of this conclusion with reference to the case law already REFERRED TOto in the judgment of the Additional Rent Controller but fortunately Dr. Singhvi did not challenge the finding of the Additional Rent Controller thatinitially the letting purpose was residential in nature as per the term settledin the leass-deed. It is not out of place to mention that there was no pleataken by the petitioner in the written statement that any agreement of lettingtook place between him and the Kalbe Ali Khan, rather in reply to the noticebefore the filing of the eviction petition the petitioner had categoricallyadmitted that the initial letting took place for 11 months as per written leasedeed and thereafter he became a statutory tenant on the same terms andconditions So, this plea of the petitioner that initially the agreement wasmade for enabling the petitioner to use the premises for office purpose was anafter thought plea urged only during the course of evidence and final arguments. It is because of this reason that now the finding of the Additional Rentcontroller that initially letting permitted only residential user of the premisesis not being controverted before me. ( 10 ) IT is also significant to mention that in exchange of correspondencebetween the parties already REFERRED TO to above, the petitioner never came upwith the plea that he had been let out the premises in question for compositepurposes and thus the ground of bonafide requirement for residence beingurged by the respondent is not available to him in accordance with law. Ingovind Ram Bansal v. Narinder Singh, 25 (1980 DLT (SN) 4, the landlord hadserved a notice pleading that the premises had been let out for residentialpurpose and he bonafide required the premises for occupation for residencefor himself but in reply to the said notice the tenant did not controvert theaverment of the landlord that the premises had been let out for residentialpurposes only but in the pleadings the tenants tried to set up the case that thepremises had been let out for residential-cum-commercial purpose. The Courtheld that this particular plea of the tenant is an after-thought plea and keepingin view the other facts and circumstances of the case it was held that thepremises had been let out for residential purposes only. It is to be rememberedthat notice to quit has been served on the petitioner, who is a lawyer byprofession and he in his reply to the notice bad challenged the need of thelandlord for the premises in question for his own residence pleading that thelandlord is in possession of the other house which is more than reasonablysuitable for him but with regard to the letting purpose being residential whichwas clearly highlighted in the notice by the respondent-landlord the petitionerdid. not utter even a single word denying that averment. In this backgroundit is to be seen. whether the other plea of the tenant-petitioner that there hadcome about any other agreement between the parties after the expiry of fixedperiod of tenancy mentioned in the lease deed has any merit. The findinggiven by the Additional Rent Controller is that no such fresh agreement cameinto existence He has noticed the averments made by the petitioner himselfthat after the expiry of the fixed period of tenancy given in the lease deed hebecame statutory tenant. If that is so, obviously there could not have comeabout any oral agreement between the parties with regard to the terms of thetenancy although in the written statement the petitioner specifically pleadedthat after the expiry of the fixed period of tenancy an oral agreement badcome into existence between the parties but in his testimony in Court hedearly did not support this plea by giving any categorical statement that atany particular point of time any agreement was made between him and therespondent with regard to the letting purpose. ( 11 ) THE only contention raised before me by the learned counsel forthe petitioner is that the petitioner has been using the demised premises for hisoffice purpose as well to the knowledge of the respondent and the respondenthaving not raised any protest or objection to such user it should be held thati the letting purpose changed from residential to residential-cum-office purposeit appears that during the course of the trial the petitioner had given a longlist of witnesses to prove that in fact his clients have been coming and seeinghim in the room described as drawing room which he has been using as office. The Additional Rent Controller has not allowed that application for summoning so many witnesses as the list of witnesses was filed belatedly and nogood reason was given for not filing the list of witnesses in time. The matterwent up in appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal. The Tribunal disposedof the matter on the basis of statements made by the parties which I reproduce as follows: "statement of Shri A. N. Pareekh, appellant on SA. . . . . . . . . . I have been using the entire ground floor for my professionaland office purposes. ". . . and one room on the upper floor whenever there is a over flow ofclients with the knowledge and consent of the landlord who hasseveral times visited the premises and also attended parties whereother persons were also there. The landlord had been frequentlycoming from Allahabad to Delhi and has been residing in theadjoining portion and he is residing in the adjoining portion forpretty long period. They are even now residing in the adjoiningportion. RO and AC sd/-R. C. T. Delhi27. 3. 1985. Statement of Shri N. H. Naqvi, respondent on SA. Without prejudice to the inadmissibility of any oral evidenceregarding the purpose of letting in the face of the lease agreementbetween the parties, it is stated that the appellant has beenunauthorisedly and incidentally and without my consent or knowledge usikng for his professional work a small part of the tenantedpremises, the whole of which were specificallyet out for use forresidential purpose for himself only. RO and AC sd/-R. C. T. Delhi. "27. 3. 1985. ( 12 ) ON the basis of these statements the rent Control Tribunal heldthat no evidence is required to be led by the petitioner-tenant to prove thathe had been using the permises for his professional purpose as well. . Thelearned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that the Additionalrent Controller was wrong in still giving the finding that the petitioner hasnot been using the premises for his office work when this fact stood admittedby the respondent-landlord before the Tribunal. This criticism of the judgmentof the Additional Rent Controller on this point is not justified. It is to benoted that there was no admission made by the respondent-landlord that anyparticular portion of the building is being exclusively used by the tenant forhis office purpose. This criticism of the judgmentof the Additional Rent Controller on this point is not justified. It is to benoted that there was no admission made by the respondent-landlord that anyparticular portion of the building is being exclusively used by the tenant forhis office purpose. So, in order to determine whether the letting purposehas changed or not with any implied consent of the respondent-landlord itwas absolutely necessary for the Additional Rent Controller to have gonethrough the evidence in order to determine whether any portion has beenused exclusively by the tenant for his office purpose and the Additional Rentcontroller has discussed the evidence in detail and has come to the conclusionif I may say rightly that no portion of the premises has been earmarked bythe petitioner-tenant for use as office exclusively. Apart from the fact that thetenant never set up the plea in the reply to the notice that the premises inquestion had been let out or should be deemed to have been let out forcomposite purposes, the petitioner-tenant also did not even in his pleadings atall specified that any particular portion of the demised premises has beenexclusively used by him for his office purposes. Even believing the statementsof witnesses examined by the petitioner himself fully even then it never cameout clearly that the drawing room and the dining room on the ground floorwere being used exclusively by the petitioner, for office purposes. It wasalso not possible for the petitioner, in my view, to have earmarked anyparticular portion on the ground floor for his office purpose as admittedlyhe has only three bed rooms on the first floor for living and he had to usethe ground floor premises for his drawing room, dining room and for entertaining his guests. The kitchen also is located on the ground floor. So, whathas been admitted by the landlord before the Tribunal was that the petitionerhas been incidentally using for his professional work a small part of the tenanted premises although the whole premises had been let out for use for residentialpurposes. Now if the tenant, who is a lawyer by profession, has been usinghis drawing room for living purpose as well as for his office purpose it wouldnot really mean that he bad earmarked any particluar portion of the demisedpremises exclusively for use as office. It has not come in evidence as to whatsort of practice the petitioner is having. Now if the tenant, who is a lawyer by profession, has been usinghis drawing room for living purpose as well as for his office purpose it wouldnot really mean that he bad earmarked any particluar portion of the demisedpremises exclusively for use as office. It has not come in evidence as to whatsort of practice the petitioner is having. The petitioner might be havingsome selected practice of being retainer of certain companies which need notrequire the regular visits, of his clients as it happens with a professionallawyer which would require an exclusive room as an office. May be the petitioner was having his library books in the drawing room but that by itselfwould not convert the drawing room into an office exclusively. Admittedly,the petitioner was having his dining table and the chairs in the dining room. So that room also was not being used by the petitioner for his office purposesexclusively. The respondent has examined witnesses to show that he hasbeen staying at Gymkhana Club while visiting Delhi in order to show thathe perhaps did not have the knowledge that the petitioner was having hisprofessional office in the demised premises. It is not necessary to elaboratelydiscuss that evidence because the respondent was not ignorant about theprofession of the petitioner when he accepted him as tenant. It is not thecase that the petitioner was having any professional office at any other placein Delhi. So, it is not possible to believe that the respondent remainedunaware of the petitioner meeting his clients in the demised premises for hisprofessional work. But when a professional man takes particular premisesfor residential purposes and starts meeting his clients in a particular portionof the building besides using that portion for his living purpoese that wouldnot, in my opinion, mean that the letting purpose would change evne thoughthe landlord might be aware of this fact because no landlord could raise anyobjection to the visit of the clients to see the professional man at his residenceeven though that professional man may not have any separate office anywhere. The landlord could raise objection only if he finds that the tenant who isaprofessional man has earmarked a particular portion of the building exclusivelyfor office purposes and if having that knowledge he fails to raise objectionthen it could be held that he has acquiesced in the change of letting purpose. Such was the case in Dr. Gopal Dass Verma v. Dr. Such was the case in Dr. Gopal Dass Verma v. Dr. S. K. Bhardwaj and another, air 1963 SC 337 , on which reliance has been placed by the learned counselfor the petitioner. In that case a substantial portion of the permises came to beused by the tenant for commercial purposes with the knowledge of the landlordand it was held that as the landlord had falied to raise any objection theletting purpose would be deemed to have changed from residential to composite purpose. In P. N. Khana v. T. P. Balkani, 1986 RLR (Note) 70, it wasobserved. that if a person carries on even his trade or business or professionin his residential house the same would not change the letting purpose andin such a case letting purpose has to be determined from the fact of predominant purpose for which the building is used. In the present case, the factsare even stronger for the case of the respondent because here the lettingpurpose admittedly was residential and it could not change till there has beenany fresh agreement between the parties or the tenant had used any particularportion of the premises predominantly exclusively for his professional purposesto the knowledge of the landlord. Such is not the case here. Counsel forthe petitioner has REFERRED TO to Dr. Dip Kaur v. Smt. Savitri Devi and Another,1978 (2) RCR 149, this judgment is completely on different facts. In thecited case, the tenant was using a particular portion for her clinic and therewas no evidence led by the landlord to prove as to what was the letting purposeagreed upon between the parties. It was also found as a fad that the tenanthas used the particular premises for commercial purposes with the consent ofthe landlord. He has also made reference to Munshi Ram Sakhuja v. Col. Ram Parshad (Retd), 20 (1981) DLT 37. In the cited case there was noevidence with regard to initial letting purpose. As a fact it was found thatthe premises had been used both for residence and also for running a clinicby the tenant to the knowledge of the landlord without any objection. So, itwas held that the premises would be deemed to have been let out forresidential-cum-commercial purposes and reliance was placed on the case ofdr. Gopal Dass (supra ). ( 13 ) COUNSEL for the respondent has brought to my notice Bipan Beharitawakley v. Kishori Lal Mehra and. So, itwas held that the premises would be deemed to have been let out forresidential-cum-commercial purposes and reliance was placed on the case ofdr. Gopal Dass (supra ). ( 13 ) COUNSEL for the respondent has brought to my notice Bipan Beharitawakley v. Kishori Lal Mehra and. Others, 1981 (1) R. C. R. 386. In the citedcase also the tenant was a lawyer by profession, but it was found on factsthat the predominant purpose for which the premises had been used wasresidential. Hence, it was held that the letting purpose was residential innature only. The case of Dr. Gopal Dass (supra) was distinguished on facts. In Mrs. C. Colaco v. Urban D silva, AIR 1970 Mysore 297, it was held thateven though a house is taken for residential purpose by a professional manit does not pervent him from carrying on some professional work in thehouse during spare time. Some occupation and profit-making activitiesby such person in a small portion of the house unostentatiously and withoutrunning a shop or causing any nuisance do not amount to conversion of aresidential premises into a non residential one. As a matter of fact a professional man taking the premises for residential purpose can be supposed to carryon his professional work from the residential premises as well. It is only wherethe said professional man, who has taken the premises for residential purposes,starts using some substantial portion of the demises permised exculsivelyfor his professional work with the knowledge of the landlord withoutany protest from the landlord then it can be held that the letting purpose stoodchanged as was held by the Supreme Court in Dr. Gopal Dass s case (supra ). Itis to be again emphasized that it was not even in the mind of the petitioner tillthe eviction petition was filed that letting purpose at any time had changed withhis using the drawing room also for his office purpose. The petitioner onlytried to make out a ground of composite letting purpose during the pleadingsin order to defeat the case of the landlord for bonafide requirement forresidence. He went on to elaborate that even one bed room on the first flooralso used to be used for his waiting clients when there was rush of clientageon a particular day. No such plea was taken anywhere in the pleadings. He went on to elaborate that even one bed room on the first flooralso used to be used for his waiting clients when there was rush of clientageon a particular day. No such plea was taken anywhere in the pleadings. Even if it is to be be believed that there has been some occasion when certainclients of the petitioner had been accommodated for waiting purposes inone of the bed rooms on the first floor that would also not lead to any inferencethat any portion of the demised premises had been exclusively used forprofessional purposes by the petitioner. It is also to be remembered thatthe petitioner himself had described the premises as residential while anemployee from the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, who visited the permisesfor survey purposes, has described the drawing room not as an office but asa study room. ( 14 ) IT is even the case of the petitioner that he has been meeting therespondent in the drawing room and has even given him a gift of whiskybottle. It is not the case of the petitioner that he is having any other roomfor accommodating his guests and friends like respondent. It is obvious thathe has been using the drawing room not only for his professional purposesbut also for his social purposes which go alongwith his residential use. Theadditional Rent Controller, in my opinion, was also right in giving the findingthat even if the respondent had visited the petitioner in his drawing roomthat would not mean that the respondent is to be deemed to have come toknow that the petitioner has kept any room in the demised premises exclusively for his professional work. So, there could be no question of therespondent having acquiesced in the user of the premises tor compositepurposes. After all the findings given by the Additional Rent Controller areon facts after due appraisal of the evidence and unless it is shown that thosefindings are perverse, the High Court has no jurisdiction to intervene withsuch findings of fact. The High Court exercises only the revisional and notappellate jurisdiction under Section 25-B (8) of the Act. The High Courtis to examine the records in order to satisfy itself that a decision of thecontroller is according to law. It is true that this Section confers a revisionaljurisdiction wider than under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure,still it has its limitations. The High Courtis to examine the records in order to satisfy itself that a decision of thecontroller is according to law. It is true that this Section confers a revisionaljurisdiction wider than under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure,still it has its limitations. In Smt. V. L. Kashyap v. R. P. Puri, 1977 RCR 449,it has been held that the order of the Controller can be interfered with ifthe same is without jurisdiction or contrary to law or to the express provisions of the Act or where he has given findings which are wholly perverse,contrary to evidence or based on no evidence or where some proceduralirregularity has been committed ressulting in miscarriage of justice. In thepreseat case, the Additional Rent Controller has dealt with every piece ofevidence and there is no misreading of any evidence or misconstruing of anypart of the evidence by the Controller which could entitle this Court to interferewith the well considered judgment of the Additional Rent Controller on question with of facts. So, I endorse the finding of the Additional Rent Conirollerand hold that it was proved that the premises in question had been let out tothe petitioner only for residential purposes. ( 15 ) THE findings of the learned Additional Rent Controller with regardto the bonafide need of the respondent for the demised premises for his ownresidence and the respondent being not in possession of reasonably suitableaccommodation are strongly challenged by the learned counsel for the petitioner. It has been argued that the learned Additional Rent Controller wentwrong in culling out an. admission of the petitioner from his letter dated 1/09/1978, Ex. LCA/2, that the petitioner has recognised the needof the landlord for the demised premises and it amounts to misreading ofthe particular document. It is true that the Additional Rent Controller had,while making reference to the aforesaid letter, observed as follows : respondent himself admilted the need of the petitioner for thehouse and wrote back to the petitioner vide letter Ex. AW10/r4dated 17/09/1978 that he was glad to learn that the petitioner was proposing to stay at Delhi permanently. "i have gone through the whole of the letter and find that in that letter thepetitioner categorically asserted that the respondent has in his possession theother portion of the house in which the respondent can comfortably reside. So. AW10/r4dated 17/09/1978 that he was glad to learn that the petitioner was proposing to stay at Delhi permanently. "i have gone through the whole of the letter and find that in that letter thepetitioner categorically asserted that the respondent has in his possession theother portion of the house in which the respondent can comfortably reside. So. it is true that there is no admission of the petitioner in this letter thatthe respondent-landlord bonafide needs the demised premises for his ownresidence. Even the Additional Rent Controller was aware of this fact whenhe REFERRED TO to the other part of the letterwhere the tenant-petitioner hadcontroverted the need of the landlord for the demised premises. So. nothingturns on this particular reference by the Additional Rent Controller to thealleged admission of the petitioner. The thing only highlighted by the Additional Rent Controller is that even the tenant does not dispute the fact thatthe landlord-respondent bonafide wants to live in Delhi in his own house andthat fact is clear from the evidence itself. So, it cannot be held that thecontroller has given the finding on merits by misreading any evidence. ( 16 ) AS far as the facts are concerned, they are almost undisputed withregard to the way the landlord is accustomed to live. The landlord retiredfrom a very high Government job and had constructed the present house forhis own residence. From 1966 to 1969 the landlord lived in whole of the housewith his wife and from 1966 onwards his married adopted daughter with herfamily members also started living with the respondent in that very house. At no point of time the respondent thought of letting out any portion ofthe house as long as the respondent remained in Delhi. After the respondenttook up a temporary assignment at Allahabad he did not think of lettingout the house, rather he allowed his adopted daughter to continue to live inthe northern portion of the house where she continued to reside with herfamily members. The other portion was not even let out till Shahida wroteto the respondent regarding thefts having taken place in the neighbourhoodand it became advisable for the landlord to let out the other portion forsecurity reasons and also that the other portion may be kept neat and cleanif it remained occupied. While narrating the facts I have already emphasizedthat the landlord was not keen of getting any higher rent whenever theprevious tenants vacated the premises. While narrating the facts I have already emphasizedthat the landlord was not keen of getting any higher rent whenever theprevious tenants vacated the premises. The petitioner was chosen by him as atenant for the said portion because be was a close friend of respondent sfriend. The correspondence exchanged prior to the creation of the tenancyalso amply made it clear that the premises are being let out for residentialpurposes and even landlord is not keen to have more than on month s rentas security and had not even cared to ask for any enhancement of rent fromthe petitioner. He charged same rent which was being paid by earlier tenants. It is also pertinent to mention that the landlord is accustomed to live in commodious houses as a Government high functionary he was allotted a palatialresidence at C-1/7, Harding Avenue and while he-remained posted atallahabad, there also he was provided a palatial bungalow consisting of adrawing-cum-dining, two bed rooms with attached bath rooms, a big hall,kitchen pantry, a small store on the ground floor and two bed rooms withattached bath and big verandah on the first floor and three servant quarters,a garage and two big lawns. The landlord never wanted the tenancy of thepetitioner to be terminated at any earlier point of time although the landlordhad let out the premises to the petitioner for a fixed period of 11 months. Atno point of time the landlord required of the petitioner to enhance the rentduring the period the contractual tenancy of the petitioner contiunedorthereafter. It is abundantly clear and not disputed before me that the respondent had brought up Shabida from her very birth, got her educated upto postgraduate degree and then performed her marriage and the landlord and hiswife have been making numerous gifts even of immoveable property tothe said daughter. The landlord s testimony in this regard remained unquestioned in the cross-examination. ( 17 ) THE Additional Rent Controller has examined the need of thelandlord from all points of view. Taking the case of the tenant at the worstthat whole of the northern portion of the house is available to the landlordfor his own residence even then the Additional Rent Controller had givena finding that he bonafide requires the demised premises as well for occupationfor residence for himself and for his wife. Taking the case of the tenant at the worstthat whole of the northern portion of the house is available to the landlordfor his own residence even then the Additional Rent Controller had givena finding that he bonafide requires the demised premises as well for occupationfor residence for himself and for his wife. It is undisputed that both thelandlord and his wife are very much advanced in ages and on the face of itthey need at least some bed room on the ground floor for their residence andin the northern portion there is no bed room on the ground floor. The landlord swife is admittedly now residing on the first floor while the landlord is residingon the Barsati. These events happened during the pendency of the evictioncase. The Additional Rent Controller was right in giving the finding thatat least one bed room is needed by the aged couple on the ground floor whichis not available at all in the northern portion Hence, on that score itself thelandlord could be held to be in bonafide need of the demised premises foroccupation for himself and for his wife. However, in the present case overwhelming evidence has been led by the landlord which remained unrebuttedwhich goes to show that the northern portion has been given by the landlordfor use and occupation by his adopted daugter and daughter s family. Afterthe landlord had shifted to Allahabad with his wife and had taken his wholeluggage to Allahabad from the house in question, it was Shahida and herfamily members who remained in occupation of the house in question andafter the southern portion was let out to the petitioner in 1971, it is Shahidawho has been sharing the maintenance expenses of the portion in heroccupation. She had been getting her luggage insured since 3969 lying in thesaid portion of the house. Documents Ex, AW10/39 to AW10/41 clearlydepicted that it was Shahida who has been making the payments with regardto common amenities to the knowledge of the petitioner. Exs. AW3/l toaw/11 show that it is Shahida who has been making payments of telephonebills through her account and her husband s account. Exs. AW4/1 to AW4/6show the reimbursement made by Shahida to the respondent regarding theexpenses parlaming to the northern unit. Ex. AW10/14 letter of Shabida,ex. AW5/1 statement of account of the landlord s bank, Ex. Aw6/1 the rationcard of Shahida and her family members, Ex. Exs. AW4/1 to AW4/6show the reimbursement made by Shahida to the respondent regarding theexpenses parlaming to the northern unit. Ex. AW10/14 letter of Shabida,ex. AW5/1 statement of account of the landlord s bank, Ex. Aw6/1 the rationcard of Shahida and her family members, Ex. AW6/2 ration card of Bachan,servant of the family, Exs, AW7/1 to AW7/2 air baggage tickets showingshahida s luggage coming from U. S. A. and Exs. A! to A5 the railway receiptsshowing the despatch of goods belonging to the landlord from Delhi toallahabad and the numerous letters written by Shahida to her parentsexs. AWIO/14 to AW10/26, AW10/28 to AW10/29, AW10/31, AW10/33,aw10/35-36, AW10/38 to AW10/41 amply go to show that out of love andaffection for his adopted daughter, the daughter Shahida was allowed to livein the northern portion of the house independently and as a licensee withoutany payment. Even after Shahida and her husband and two daughters havegone abroad as Shahida s husband had taken up employment abroad, even thenshahida and her family members have been continuously and regularly comingto India and staying for 2-3 months at a time every year in the northernportion of the house. Bachan, who was earlier the servant of the landlord, cameinto the employment of Shahida after landlord shifted to Allahabad. Thisfact is also not disputed and is evident from the documents Exs. AW6/2 andaw10/14. From all these facts could it be said that the northern portion of thehouse is conveniently available to the landlord and his wife for their residence. It is obvious that if the landlord and his wife decide to occupy the northernportion for their residence they would not be having any comfortable livingin that portion because they cannot possibly require that their beloved adopteddaughter Shahida and her family members should not stay in the northernportion on their regular visits to India every year. So, the Additional Rentcontroller was fully right in taking into consideration these realities of lifeto which the landlord is accustomed to live and also the social status of thelandlord in corning to the conclusion that even though the northern portion ofthe house could be deemed to be available for residence by the landlord andhis wife even then that portion by itself is not reasonably suitable for thebonafide need of the landlord for residence. ( 18 ) THE making of the gift during the pendency of the case after leaveto defend application of the tenant had been allowed loses importance butkeeping in view the background of the landlord and his relationship with theadopted daughter it is not possible to hold that this transaction of oral giftis a dubious one or smacks of any malafide on the part of the landlord. After all it is proved by the landlord that he has lot of love and affection forher adopted daughter inasmuch as when the house was constructed in theyear 1966, his adopted daughter with her family members shifted to the houseand resided with the landlord. When the landlord shifted to Allahabad, heallowed his adopted daughter to continue to reside in the northern portionof the house and the correspondence exchanged between the daughter and herparents reveal close affectionate mutual relationship and the mind of Shahidain treating the northern portion as her own for setting up her own independenthouse. The fact which has already come into existence was only given a legalshape by the landlord in making the oral gift of the said house. It is truethat the landlord took hurried steps to make the oral gift of the said northernportion of the house after leave to defend application of the tenant wasallowed but that would not make that transaction of gift malafide or illegal Italso cannot be argued that the landlord has self-induced insufficiency of accommodation in order to make out any ground of eviction against the petitioner. It may be that the tenant has a right to show whether a particular transation oftransfer of property by the landlord is malafide or sham transaction as wasthe case in Civil Revision No. 982/84, Smt. Sushila Devi and Others v. A. C. Jainand Others, decided by N. N. Goswamy, J. , but in the present case keeping inview the facts and circumstances enumerated above, which have been clearlymarshalled by the Additional Rent Controller in his elaborate judgment,leave little room for doubt that this transaction of oral gift is in any mannerdoubtful or not genuine. Counsel for the petitioner has made reference toamarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain, AIR 1987 SC 741 . Counsel for the petitioner has made reference toamarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain, AIR 1987 SC 741 . in which it wasobserved that "if the landlady or landlord could have reasonable accommodation after his or her need arose and she by her own conduct disentitled herselfto that property by letting it out for higher income, she would be disentitledto evict her tenant on ground of her need. " There is no doubt about thislegal proposition but in the present case there is no malafide of the landlordin making the oral gift of the northern portion in favour of his adopteddaughter for whom he and his wife have lot of love and affection. It is nota case where the landlord has any ulterior motive of getting any higher rentfrom any tenant by letting out any vacant portion or by evicting the petitioner and seeking to have any new tenant at a higher rent. It is a clearcase of a landlord who has constructed the whole house for his own needs andafter his assignment at Allahabad had terminated her has bonafide desire ofliving in the whole house with his wife and allow her adopted daugher toreside in the northern portion whenever she visits India. It is also not outof place to mention that it is not the case where the said daughter is notcoming to India at all and has shifted to a foreign countey with bag andbaggage and with a view to break all links with the country of her origin. ( 19 ) COUNSEL for the petitioner also relied upon Kailash Chand v. Sakhirchand. 24 (1983) DLT 202, where it was held that where the landlord is livingwith his mother and has set up the case that mother had required him tovacate the house, the Controller could go into the question whether notice bythe mother to her own son for vacating the house is a collusive notice or not. On facts the judgment is clearly distinguishable. There is no collusion betweenthe respondent and the respondent s adopted daughter as far as the user ofthe northern portion of the building is concerned. The landlord had giventhat portion to his daughter even before the premises in question were let outto the petitioner. So, there was no collusion between the landlord and hisadopted daughter for setting up any false, need of the landlord for the demisedpremises. The landlord had giventhat portion to his daughter even before the premises in question were let outto the petitioner. So, there was no collusion between the landlord and hisadopted daughter for setting up any false, need of the landlord for the demisedpremises. Counsel for the petitioner also cited Kishori Lal v. Sumitra Devi. 1979 (1) RLR 107. In the cited case the landlord gave a portion of his house toa son who was not financially dependent upon him and thus created paucityof accommodation by his own act. It was held that such a landlord cannotmake a grievance of insufficiency of accommodation. In the present case thelandlord had not created any insufficiency of accommodation by giving anyportion to his adopted daughter after creation of tenancy with the petitioner. The facts show that the northern portion was given by the landlord to hisadopted daughter even before the tenancy was created in favour of thepetitioner. So, the mere fact that the reality has been given a legal shape bymaking an oral gift by the landlord does not mean that the landlord has self-created insufficiency of accommodation with him. Counsel for the petitionercited Inepector General of Registration and Stamps, Govt. of Hyderabad v. Smt. Tayapaba Begum, AIR 1962 Andhra Pradesh 199, In the cited case,question which arose for decision was whether a particular document by itselfis a gift deed or not and thus was required to be executed on stamp paper andgot registered? It was held that a particular document itself showed that itwas a gift deed, so was repuired to be registered. In the present case, thememorandum of gift clearly shows that the oral gift had taken place earlier. So, the judgment would not help the petitioner to show that this memorandumis by itself a gift deed which was required to be registered. ( 20 ) IT is not out of place to mention that in view of the facts comingon the record even the petitioner on whose behalf the written arguments werefiled before the Additional Rent Controller, it was construed that possessionof the northern portion by the respondent s daughter is of a licensee. Inphiroze Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel and Others, AIR 1974 SC 1059 ,it has been made clear that unless the landlord has a jurisdical right of possession the said portion would not be considered available to the landlord forhis own residence. Inphiroze Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel and Others, AIR 1974 SC 1059 ,it has been made clear that unless the landlord has a jurisdical right of possession the said portion would not be considered available to the landlord forhis own residence. In the present case, clearly the luggage of the adopteddaughter is lying in the northern portion which she has been getting insuredsince 1969 and she has been coming and residing in the said portion everyyear. So, it cannot be held that the landlord in juridically in possession of thatportion. It was for the landlord to terminate the licence of his adopteddaughter which he has not chosen to do so and no law can require a landlordto terminate the licence of his adopted daughter for the sake of keeping atenant. So, the portion which is in possession of the adopted daughter aslicensee cannot be considered available to the landlord for his own residenceeven though the landlord and his wife due to prevailing circumstances perforce have to reside in that portion. ( 21 ) SO, examined from any angle, I find that there is no illegality committed by the Additional Rent Controller in allowing the eviction petition, ratherthe judgment of the Additional Rent Controller is well based and does notsuffer from any infirmity. In Smt. Prativa Devi v. TV. Krishnan, JT 1987 (1)SC 764, it has been again reiterated by the Supreme Court that before aparticular premises could be deemed to be available to the landlord for hisown residence, it must be proved that the landlord had a legal right to occupythe said premises. The judgment of our High Court given in the case of Satpal v. Nand Kishore, 1983 ILR (Delhi) 73, which took contrary view wasover-ruled. ( 22 ) HENCE, I find no merit in this revision which I hereby dismiss withno order as to costs. I give one month s time to the petitioner for vacating thepremises.