ORDER A.N. Dikshita, J. - By means of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the petitioner has prayed for issuing a writ of certiorari for quashing the order dated 26-3-1982 passed by the Vice-Chancellor, Gorakhpur University and the order dated 25-5-83 passed by the Chancellor, Gorakhpur University as well as the resolution of the Committee of Management of Lal Bahadur Shastri Degree College, Moughalsarai, Varanasi dated 14-2-82 dismissing the petitioner from service. 2. Facts as emerging from the records are that on 16-10-1973 the petitioner was appointed as a lecturer in Lal Bahadur Shastri Degree College, Moughalsarai, Varanasi and was also working as the Head of the Department of Education in the said College. This college is affiliated to Gorakhpur University. Respondent 3 and its Principal Sri Ambika Prasad Chaube wanted the petitioner to commit certain irregularities but as he did not succumb or yield to their such tactics it earned him their displeasure so much so that the petitioner was placed under suspension on 18-3-80 by the respondent 3. The petitioner received a charge-sheet containing certain charges on 25-3-80. A reply to the charge-sheet was submitted by the petitioner denying the truthfulness of the charges and also submitting that the charges are vague inasmuch as the petitioner never instigated the students of the college for its closure or for the postponement of the practical examination for B.Ed. degree. After considering the reply of the petitioner to the charges framed against him the respondent 3 in its meeting held on 21-9-80 without giving any opportunity to the petitioner passed a resolution removing the petitioner from service. Pursuant to this resolution the respondent 3 sent the papers to the Vice- Chancellor of the Gorakhpur University, respondent 2 for approval as contemplated under S. 35(11) of the U.P. State Universities Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The respondent 2 issued a show cause notice to the petitioner on 13-1-81 to which a reply was submitted by him on 20-1-81. The respondent 2 disapproved the proposal of respondent 3 for the removal of the petitioner from service by the order dated 15/24-3-1981. The respondent 2 found that the procedure as contemplated by Statute has not been followed. The respondent 2 issued a show cause notice to the petitioner on 13-1-81 to which a reply was submitted by him on 20-1-81. The respondent 2 disapproved the proposal of respondent 3 for the removal of the petitioner from service by the order dated 15/24-3-1981. The respondent 2 found that the procedure as contemplated by Statute has not been followed. It was found by the respondent 2 that there is no clear indication of the documents and the statements of the witnesses in support of the charges so as to enable the petitioner to meet the charges and set forth his defence. It was found by the respondent 2 from the record that the conduct of the Manager and the petitioner smacks of prejudice against each other than real facts. It was also found that no opportunity much less an adequate one was given to the petitioner to defend himself in accordance with the said Statute and, therefore, the approval to the decision was refused. However, the respondent 2 directed that the respondent 3 would hold proper inquiry into the charges levelled against the petitioner and gave him adequate opportunity as contemplated by law before taking a decision in the matter. Feeling aggrieved against such a direction the petitioner made a reference to the Chancellor of Gorakhpur University, respondent 1 within the meaning of Section 68 of the Act which was rejected by the respondent 1 by an order dated 9-7-81. 3. A fresh charge-sheet dated 28-5-1981 was then issued against the petitioner who was required to submit his reply within a month. An Inquiry Committee consisting of Sri Bal Krishna Singhania and Sri Ambika Prasad Chaube was constituted. The petitioner while submitting his reply on 8-8-1981 alleged that the charges are vague and absolutely false. It was also alleged by the petitioner that the constitution of the Inquiry Committee was illegal inasmuch as Sri Ambika Prasad Chaube who was the Principal at the time of making the complaint which was the basis for issuing the charge-sheet and as such he could not have been appointed as a member of the Inquiry Committee. It was further alleged that the charges in the second charge-sheet were similar or identical to the charges as contained in the first charge- sheet. 4. It was further alleged that the charges in the second charge-sheet were similar or identical to the charges as contained in the first charge- sheet. 4. After such a disapproval of the resolution of respondent 3 by the respondent 2 the petitioner presented himself in the college but was not permitted to join his duties thus compelling the petitioner to file a representation to the Deputy Director of Education on 13-11-1981 and seeking a direction to the respondent 3 for the payment of his salary. The Deputy Director of Education by his order dated 2-2-1982 directed the respondent 3 to permit the petitioner to join his duties and also to pay his entire salary. But neither the petitioner was permitted to join his duties nor was paid the amount of salary. 5. The respondent 3 again passed a resolution on 14-2-1982 dismissing the petitioner from service. Necessary papers were sent to respondent 2 for according his approval. It is alleged that the Inquiry Committee did not inform the petitioner of the dates on which the inquiry was to be conducted nor any opportunity was afforded to him to adduce evidence in defence. It was also alleged that neither any witness was examined nor any evidence was recorded by the Inquiry Committee and the entire proceedings took place behind the back of the petitioner. Even before passing the resolution on 14-2-82 the petitioner was neither supplied a copy of the report of the Inquiry Committee nor was given an opportunity to submit his reply thereto and thus the resolution dated 14-2-82 was in violation of the by-laws of the society and more so in the absence of the President no resolution can be passed by the respondent 3. The petitioner however, came to know, as is disclosed in the petition, about these developments for the first time on 31-5-82 when the Deputy Registrar of the Gorakhpur University informed him that he has been dismissed from service in view of the approval of the proposal of the respondent 3 by the respondent 2. This communication of the Deputy Registrar, Gorakhpur University was in pursuance to the letter of the petitioner to the respondent 2 for the payment of his salary. Before according the approval to the resolution of the respondent 3 for dismissing the petitioner from service no opportunity to show cause was ever given to the petitioner. 6. This communication of the Deputy Registrar, Gorakhpur University was in pursuance to the letter of the petitioner to the respondent 2 for the payment of his salary. Before according the approval to the resolution of the respondent 3 for dismissing the petitioner from service no opportunity to show cause was ever given to the petitioner. 6. The petitioner then made a reference to the Chancellor under Section 68 of the Act. The respondent 3 also made a similar representation. The respondent 1 dismissed the reference made by the petitioner by his order dated 25-5-83. It is emerging from the perusal of the petition that the respondent 1 invited comments from the respondent 2 and the respondent 3 and consequently by his order dated 25-5-83 held that adequate opportunity was given to the petitioner to put in his defence before the Inquiry Committee but it was not availed of by him. It is also stated in the petition that the petitioner was never informed of the order dated 26-3-82 whereby the approval for the dismissal of the petitioner from service was accorded by respondent 2. 7. The petitioner has thus claimed that the order dated 26-3-82 passed by the respondent 2 as well as the order dated 25-5-83 passed by the respondent 1 as well as the resolution dated 14-2-1982 passed by respondent 3 dismissing the petitioner from service are illegal and inoperative. Hence this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution has been filed by the petitioner for quashing the orders dated 26-3-1982, 25-5-1983 as well as the resolution dated 14-2-1982. 8. A counter-affidavit has been filed by one Adbhut Prasad. A counter-affidavit on behalf of the respondent 3 has been filed by Sri Paras Nath Tiwari while one Krishna Kumar Sharma has filed a counter affidavit on behalf of the respondent 4. A supplementary counter-affidavit has also been filed by one Jai Shankar Misra on behalf of the respondent 3. By these counter-affidavits the allegations as set forth in the writ petition have been denied. It has been stated in the counter-affidavits that the petitioner was dismissed from service according to law. It has been reiterated that the respondent 3, after the respondent 2 had disapproved the resolution for removing the petitioner from service, had a right to hold proper inquiry as was directed by the respondent 2. It has been stated in the counter-affidavits that the petitioner was dismissed from service according to law. It has been reiterated that the respondent 3, after the respondent 2 had disapproved the resolution for removing the petitioner from service, had a right to hold proper inquiry as was directed by the respondent 2. It has been admitted that the charges levelled against the petitioner were on the basis of the report submitted by Sri Ambika Prasad Chaube, Principal of the said college. However, it is denied that Sri Ambika Prasad Chaube was in any way personally interested in the matter. It is also averred that the petitioner was informed to participate in the inquiry otherwise the matter would be decided ex parte. It is further stated in the counter- affidavit that instead of submitting his reply to the charge-sheet dated 28-5-81 (second charge-sheet) the petitioner challenged the constitution of the respondent 3 and also denied the truthfulness of the charges levelled against him. It has also been stated in the counter-affidavit that the petitioner demanded several documents but the documents sought for had no relevance with the allegations contained in the charge-sheet and as such were not supplied. The petitioner was again informed by letter dated 1-9-1981 to submit his reply within 15 days along with the names of his witnesses and the documentary evidence. In response to the letter the petitioner vide his letter dated 22-9-81 informed the respondent 3 that till the documents are made available it is not possible for him to meet the charges as no effective reply can be prepared in the absence of such documents. As the petitioner did not participate in the inquiry, the Inquiry Committee submitted its report to the management with the recommendation for the removal of the petitioner from service of the college. The allegation of the petitioner that he was not afforded any opportunity to defend himself was denied. The petitioner has also been paid his salary due to him up to 26-3-82 as per the order of respondent 1. It is also admitted that after the respondent 1 sought for the comments from the respondent 3 the same were submitted. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent 4 it has been reiterated that the order passed by respondents 1 and 2 are perfectly correct and wholly legal and do not require any interference by this Court. It is also admitted that after the respondent 1 sought for the comments from the respondent 3 the same were submitted. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent 4 it has been reiterated that the order passed by respondents 1 and 2 are perfectly correct and wholly legal and do not require any interference by this Court. 9. Counter-affidavits and rejoinder- affidavit have been filed. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner Sri A.K. Sharma has been heard and records have been perused by me. 11. None appeared on behalf of the respondents. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the Inquiry Committee comprising of Ambika Prasad Chaube was not validly constituted. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that Ambika Prasad Chaube was the Principal of the College, at the relevant time and on the basis of the complaints it submitted a report against the petitioner to the respondent 3. This report was made the basis for the charges levelled against the petitioner. There is no denying the fact that Ambika Prasad Chaube was a member of the Inquiry Committee and as such the constitution of the Inquiry Committee being wholly invalid any report submitted by it would be wholly illegal. The submission has force and has radiant merit as well. Sri Ambika Prasad Chaube was admittedly the Principal of the College at the relevant time when the complaints were made. It is also true that he submitted a report to the respondent 3. It has on the basis of this report that the charge-sheet was submitted to the petitioner. While submitting the report Sri Ambika Prasad Chaube's mind was reflected which became the basis of the charges. To constitute such an inquiry committee of which Ambika Prasad Chaube was a member is apparently invalid inasmuch as an accuser cannot be a judge himself. 12. In the case of A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 150 the Supreme Court held : "The dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi-judicial power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated. 12. In the case of A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 150 the Supreme Court held : "The dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi-judicial power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated. For determining whether a power is an administrative power or a quasi-judicial power one has to look to the nature of the power conferred, the person or persons on whom it is conferred, the framework of the law conferring that power, the consequences ensuing from the exercise of that power and the manner in which that power is expected to be exercised. In a welfare State like ours it is inevitable that the organ of the State under our Constitution is regulated and controlled by the rule of law. In a welfare State like ours it is inevitable that the jurisdiction of the administrative bodies is increasing at a rapid rate. The concept of rule of law would lose its validity if the instrumentalities of the State are not charged with the duty of discharging their functions in a fair and just manner. The requirement of acting judicially in essence is nothing but a requirement to act justly and fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously. The procedures which are considered inherent in the exercise of a judicial power are merely those which facilitate if not ensure a just and fair decision. In recent years the concept of quasi-judicial power has been undergoing a radical change. What was considered as an administrative power some years back is now being considered as a quasi-judicial power." .......................... "With the increase of the power of the administrative bodies it has become necessary to provide guidelines for the just exercise of their power. To prevent the abuse of that power and to see that it does not become a new despotism, Courts are gradually evolving the principles to be observed while exercising such power. In matters like these public good is not advanced by a rigid adherence to precedents. New problems call for new solutions. It is neither possible nor desirable to fix the limits of a quasi-judicial power. But for the purpose of the present case we shall assume that the power exercised by the selection board was an administrative power and test the validity of the impugned selections on that basis." ..................... New problems call for new solutions. It is neither possible nor desirable to fix the limits of a quasi-judicial power. But for the purpose of the present case we shall assume that the power exercised by the selection board was an administrative power and test the validity of the impugned selections on that basis." ..................... "The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past it was thought that it included just two rules, namely (1) no one shall be a judge in his own cause (Nemo debet esse judex propria causa), and (2) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (audi alteram partem). Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and is that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice. Till very recently it was the opinion of the courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the law under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the application of the rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is not questioned. If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries. Oftentimes it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries. Enquiries which were considered administrative at one time are now being considered as quasi-judicial in character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far reaching effect than a decision in a quasi- judicial enquiry." 13. Enquiries which were considered administrative at one time are now being considered as quasi-judicial in character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far reaching effect than a decision in a quasi- judicial enquiry." 13. It is this very fact that Sri A.P. Chaube was a member of the Inquiry Committee must have had its own impact on the result of the inquiry in view of his earlier submitting a report to the respondent 3 against the petitioner. He was an active participant and it is not difficult to hold that his bias was radiantly reflected. It has to be held that the constitution of the committee was wholly improper and absolutely illegal. A report by a committee of which one of its members had bias against the delinquent teacher would be not in conformity with law and such a report has to be found as invalid and inoperative. This report so submitted by the Inquiry Committee to the respondent 3 cannot be made the basis for the dismissal of the petitioner from his services.With the induction of Sri A.P. Chaube as a member of the Inquiry Committee he donned the role of prosecutor and Judge and performed in reaching the decision on the facts which were within his knowledge. Such a view that a prosecutor cannot be a judge himself has been taken in the case of Meenglas Tea Estate v. The Workmen, AIR 1963 SC 1719 . 14. The petitioner was from the very beginning challenging the constitution of the inquiry committee. Why such a plea was discarded may be any one's guess. It clearly shows the interest of the respondent 3 in constituting such a committee. Even the respondents 2 and 3 failed to consider this aspect. Any recommendation of the Inquiry Committee which was not duly constituted would not be deemed to be compliance with the principles of natural justice. 15. No one can be a judge of his own cause is one of the fundamental principles of our jurisprudence. If there is a reasonable likelihood of any bias, natural justice and commonsense warrant that the justice likely to be so biased should be incapacitated. 15. No one can be a judge of his own cause is one of the fundamental principles of our jurisprudence. If there is a reasonable likelihood of any bias, natural justice and commonsense warrant that the justice likely to be so biased should be incapacitated. It may be that the judge is not actually biased or may decide partially it is pertinent to find whether there is a real likelihood of bias. In such a case it is not that the decision is tilted with bias but the circumstances are so revealing as to create a reasonable apprehension in the mind of others that there is likelihood of bias affecting the relation. An independent mind has to be applied to arrive at a fair and just decision between the two rival contentions. It is the duty of all those who are expected to decide fairly between the rival parties that justice is done. It is not confined only to courts alone. It is vital to the maintenance of rule of law in a welfare State that the authorities exercising power apply the sacred precepts of the rule of law. It is expected that the administrative bodies, instrumentalities of the State discharge their functions in a fair and just manner. In the case of Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, AIR 1987 SC 454 : 1986 Lab IC 1417, it was held as under: "It is one of the fundamental principles of our jurisprudence that no man can he a judge in his own cause and that if there is a reasonable likelihood of bias it is in accordance with natural justice and commonsense that the justice likely to be so biased should be incapacitated from sitting." 16. It has further been urged that the petitioner was claiming supply of the copies of various documents. This was required to set forth a formidable defence and to establish his innocence. Non-supply of the copies of the documents has resulted in deprivation of the right of the petitioner to defend himself. In the counter-affidavit it has been stated that the copies of the documents sought for by the petitioner were not material. This was required to set forth a formidable defence and to establish his innocence. Non-supply of the copies of the documents has resulted in deprivation of the right of the petitioner to defend himself. In the counter-affidavit it has been stated that the copies of the documents sought for by the petitioner were not material. However, a perusal of Annexure 8 to the writ petition which is the reply to the charge-sheet clearly indicates that an effective reply can be submitted only on the basis of the documents and the material in support of the charges. It would be a futile exercise to go into each of the documents but it is indicative of the fact from a perusal of Annexure 8 that certain documents material to the charges were not supplied to the petitioner. In the case of Chandramma Tiwari v. Union of India, 1987 (II) Scale 1058 : 1988 Lab IC 339 the Supreme Court following the decision in the case of Kashi Nath Dikshit v. Union of India, (1986) 3 SCC 229 : 1986 Lab IC 1939 held that if necessary copies of relevant and material documents are not supplied to the delinquent officer the inquiry would be vitiated for the violation of the principles of natural justice. 17. Another merited submission has been made on behalf of the petitioner by Sri A. K. Sharma that the copy of the inquiry report was not supplied to him nor was the petitioner afforded an opportunity to submit his reply to the inquiry report before the respondent 3 considered it. A specific plea to this effect has been raised in the petition. In the counter- affidavit in regard to such plea it has been set out that the entire records of the case after the recept of the inquiry report was placed before the respondent 3 in its meeting held on 14-2-82 which resolved to dismiss the petitioner from service after obtaining requisite approval from respondent 2. It is very significant that nowhere in the counter- affidavit it has been shown that the copy of the report of the Inquiry Committee was ever given to the petitioner. It is very significant that nowhere in the counter- affidavit it has been shown that the copy of the report of the Inquiry Committee was ever given to the petitioner. In the case of U.P. Government v. Sahir Hussain, AIR 1975 SC 2045 : 1975 Lab IC 1493, it has been held that the non-supply of the inquiry report to the delinquent officer and non-availability of an opportunity to show cause would render the order illegal. In the circumstances it has to be held that the resolution of the respondent 3 dismissing the petitioner from service was illegal. 18. Learned counsel for the petitioner has very strenuously urged that even the respondent 2 while according approval to the resolution for the dismissal of the petitioner from service did not afford any opportunity to show cause before granting the approval. A plea was raised in para 25 of the writ petition which has been denied on behalf of the respondent 3 in paragraph 13 of the counter-affidavit. While replying to paragraph 24 of the writ petition by paragraph 9 of the counter-affidavit it has been stated on behalf of the respondent 3 that the Vice-Chancellor (respondent 2) after looking into the records and considering them carefully had taken the decision that the resolution deserves approval. However, again there is no whisper that the respondent 2 ever afforded an opportunity to the petitioner to show cause before according approval to the resolution of the respondent 3 for the dismissal of the petitioner from service. The respondent 2 while granting approval acts as a quasi-judicial authority and a quasi-judicial authority is bound to follow the principles of natural justice by affording an opportunity before taking a decision as has been laid in the case of A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 150 (supra). Earlier the respondent 2 had given such an opportunity to the petitioner when the approval was sought for to the resolution of the respondent 3 in the meeting held on 21-9-80 for the dismissal of the petitioner from service. But this time the respondent 2 did not afford such an opportunity and this also would render these approval had in law. 19. Respondent I on a representation being made by the petitioner sought for certain comments from the respondent 2 as well as the respondent 3. The copy of such comments was not furnished to the petitioner. But this time the respondent 2 did not afford such an opportunity and this also would render these approval had in law. 19. Respondent I on a representation being made by the petitioner sought for certain comments from the respondent 2 as well as the respondent 3. The copy of such comments was not furnished to the petitioner. These comments were considered by the respondent I while rejecting the representation. In the case of Chandrama Tiwari v. Union of India, 1988 Lab IC 339 (SC) (supra) it has been held that if some material is taken to the consideration copies whereof have not been supplied to the delinquent officer, the order is vitiated. In the case of A.K. Shukla v. Chancellor, Allahabad University, 1984 UPLBEC 477 : 1984 All LJ 427 a Division Bench of this Court held that where the petitioners were not given opportunity, the principles of natural justice stood violated rendering the order of Chancellor null and void. In para 10 of the Report the Division Bench held as under : "The petitioners' further grievance is that the question of non-publication of the advertisement in three issues of two newspapers had been raised by G. S. Tewari in his initial representation made by him and a copy of which had never been supplied to the petitioners and they were given no opportunity to meet the questions raised in the supplementary representation. In para. 2 of the affidavit filed by Shri V. K. Singh on behalf of the Chancellor it is admitted that the additional representation was not sent to any of the petitioners for their comments because it was considered that the University alone was in a position to throw light on the point. The admitted facts made it apparent that the petitioners were not afforded any opportunity to make their submissions on the question raised in the additional representation relating to the non-compliance of the sub-section (10) of Section 31 of the Act with regard to the publication of the advertisement in three issues of two newspapers. The petitioners who had been selected and appointed as Lecturers were vitally interested and as such the petitioners were entitled to opportunity. The plea raised on behalf of the respondents that even if opportunity had been given to the petitioners it would have made no difference as the facts were admitted by the University is without any substance. The petitioners who had been selected and appointed as Lecturers were vitally interested and as such the petitioners were entitled to opportunity. The plea raised on behalf of the respondents that even if opportunity had been given to the petitioners it would have made no difference as the facts were admitted by the University is without any substance. The principles of natural justice know of no exclusionary rule dependent on whether it would have made any difference if natural justice had been observed. The non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. See S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, AIR 1981 SC 136 . Moreover, if the petitioners had been afforded opportunity they could have persuaded the Chancellor that the underlying purpose and object of sub-sec. (1) of Section 31 of the Act had been achieved by the University inasmuch as wide publicity had been given to the advertisement throughout the country. The principles of natural justice required the Chancellor to afford opportunity to the petitioners on the questions raised in the additional representation made by G. S. Tiwari. Since the petitioners were not given opportunity the principles of natural justice stood violated rendering the order of the Chancellor null and void." 20. In view of the above it has to be held that the impugned orders are grossly violative of the principles of natural justice and are as such illegal and without jurisdiction. The petitioner has been wrongfully dismissed from service. 21. In the result the petition succeeds and is hereby allowed with costs. The orders dated 26-3-82 and 25-5-83 made at the behest of the resolution dated 14-2-82 passed by respondent 3 are hereby quashed. The petitioner will be deemed to be in service and would be entitled to all the emoluments and benefits due to him w.e.f. 27-3-82. The respondents 3 and 4 are further directed to make the entire payment of salary and other allowances due to the petitioner within a month from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The petitioner shall also be granted and accorded all benefits in regard to seniority and promotion etc.