S. G. DODDAKALE GOWDA, J. ( 1 ) THE fertile field of legal controversy on the theory of repugnancy has given scope for these litigations. ( 2 ) THE common question that arises for consideration in all these cases is whether the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 'p. P. Act') which provides for eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises belonging or taken on lease by a Corporation established by or under the Central Act and controlled by the Central Government is ultra vires and whether the Karnataka Rent Control Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'k. R. C. Act') would prevail over the P. P. Act ? ( 3 ) ISSUE arises thus:-"petitioners are all tenants of premises belonging to public sector Corporations such as Banks, Government Companies etc. Owners have resorted to evict tenants under the provisions of the P. P. Act.- The competent authority appointed under the P. P. Act after over-ruling objections has ordered eviction and orders confirmed in appeal by the District Judges. In some cases notices is sued to show cause as to why persons in occupation should not be evicted under the p. P. Act itself is challenged. It is futile to give resume of these two Acts as precedents have set out/referred to these provisions while examining the scope and ambit of these two Acts. Though the petitioners have taken the contention that P. P. Act is ultra vires, at the time of argument, submission was confined as to whether KRC Act would prevail over the PP Act or vice-versa. I think the learned advocates are right in confining their arguments to repugnancy in view of catena of decisions of the Supreme Court starting from indu Bhutan v Rama Sundari (A. I. R. 1970 sc 228); V. Dhanapal Chettaiar v Yesodai animal (A. I. R. 1979 SC 1745) and latest decision in Accountant and Secretarial Service pvt. Ltd. and ANR. v Union Of India and others (Civil Appeal No. 900 of 1987 - AIR 1988 SC 1708 ) wherein it is held "that all the legislations coming up for consideration in the present case are referable to entries in the Concurrent List and the topic of legislations is not referable to entry 18 of the List ii. Ltd. and ANR. v Union Of India and others (Civil Appeal No. 900 of 1987 - AIR 1988 SC 1708 ) wherein it is held "that all the legislations coming up for consideration in the present case are referable to entries in the Concurrent List and the topic of legislations is not referable to entry 18 of the List ii. " ( 4 ) THE theory of repugnancy is founded on the plea that the KRC Act as amended by act 17 of 1983 is a subsequent Act and as it has received the assent of the President it would prevail over the P. P. Act by virtue of art. 254 (2) of the Constitution of India. By karnataka Act No. 17 of 1983 the duration of the Act has been extended up to 31st december 1992, but for which the life of the act would have expired on 31st December 1982. ( 5 ) SUBMISSION of Sri K. R. D. Karanth, learned Advocate, who addressed the leading argument was that on account of 'infusion of life' by Act 17 of 1983 the KRC Act must be treated as if it is a subsequent Act and the provisions of that Act alone would prevail notwithstanding the inconsistent provisions in the P. P. Act. For proper understanding of this submission, it may be relevant to know the distinction between a permanent Act, temporary Act and what is generally understood as an 'amendment'. ( 6 ) A permanent, or perpetual Act, is one whose operation is not limited to a particular term of time but which continues in force until it is duly altered or repealed. A temporary Act, on the other hand, is one whose life or duration is fixed for a specified period and continues in force, unless sooner repealed, until the expiration of the period. The life of the Rent Act in the State of Kar- nataka is extended from time to time ever since 1951. The word 'amendment' has different connotations, but generally meant 'an alteration or change of an existing provision of statute so as to make more complete or perfect or effective. By Act 17 of 1983, State legislature has only amended sub-section (2) of Section 1 by substituting the words 'december 1992' in place of 'december 1982' and inserted Section 21 (B) enabling the military personnel to recover their possession. By Act 17 of 1983, State legislature has only amended sub-section (2) of Section 1 by substituting the words 'december 1992' in place of 'december 1982' and inserted Section 21 (B) enabling the military personnel to recover their possession. Amendment is to the existing Act. ( 7 ) NEITHER Act 17 of 1983 repealed 1961 Act nor effaced it re-enacting a new statute. Supreme Court of America in United states of America v Neat Powers (307 U. S. 213) wherein Connally (Hot oil) Act of 1935 was Amended by Act (15 U. S. C. A) extending the life of the former Act for a further period of two years has stated thus :-"by its original terms it would have expired June 16, 1937. But it never expired, for on June 14, 1937, the whole act was continued in effect until June 30, 1939. Its substantive phases were not altered one whit or title; its sanctions were neither reduced nor increased. Precisely the same acts continue to be prohibited after the amendment as before. The amendment merely perpetuated the entire act for another term. " ( 8 ) IN view of these circumstances, it seems clear beyond question that it was the purpose of Congress, expressed in the amendment of June 14, 1937, to treat this act precisely in the same way as if by its original terms it was to expire on June 30, 1939. Due to the amendment, the Act has never ceased to be in effect. No new law was created; no old one was repealed. Without hiatus of any kind, the original Act was given extended life. There was no first connally Act followed by a Second connally Act. During the periods in question there was but one Act. (emphasis supplied) supreme Court dealing with a similar situation in inder Singh v The State Of Rajasthan (A. I. R. 1957 SC 510) dissenting from the ratio in Jatindra Nath Gupta v The province of Bihar (A. I. R. 1949 F. C. 175) that the power to extend the life of an enactment cannot be conferred on an authority other than the legislature as it would amount to delegation of a legislative authority, held that the power to extend the life of an Act was in the realm of a conditional legislation. The relevant portion reads thus:- 10. The petitioners do not dispute this. The relevant portion reads thus:- 10. The petitioners do not dispute this. What they contend is that while it may be competent to the Legislature to leave it to an outside authority to decide when an enactment might be brought into force, it is not competent to it to authorise that authority to extend the life of the Act beyond the period fixed therein. On principle, it is difficult to see why if the one is competent, the other is not. The reason for upholding a legislative provision authorising an outside authority to bring an Act into force at such time as it may determine is that it must depend on the facts as they may exist at a given point of time whether the law should then be made to operate, and that the decision of such an issue is best left to an executive authority. Such legislation is termed conditional, because the Legislature has itself made the law in all its completeness as regards "place, person, laws, powers," leaving nothing for an outside authority to legislate on, the only function assigned to it being to bring the law into operation at such time as it might decide. And it can make no difference in the character of a Legislation as a conditional one that the Legislature, after itself enacting the law and fixing, on a consideration of the facts as they might have then existed, the period of its duration, confers a power on an outside authority to extend its operation for a further period if it is satisfied that the state of facts which called forth the legislation continues to subsist. 11. In the present case, the preamble to the Ordinance clearly recites the State of facts which necessitated the enactment of the law in question, and section 3 fixed the duration of the Act as two years, on an understanding of the situation as it then existed. At the same time, it conferred a power on the Rajpramukh to extend the life of the Ordinance beyond that period, if the state of affairs then should require it. When such extension is decided by the Rajpramukh and notified, the law that will operate is the law which was enacted by the legislative authority in respect of "place, person, laws, powers" and it is clearly conditional and not delegated legislation as laid down in 5 Ind. When such extension is decided by the Rajpramukh and notified, the law that will operate is the law which was enacted by the legislative authority in respect of "place, person, laws, powers" and it is clearly conditional and not delegated legislation as laid down in 5 Ind. App 178 (B), and must, in consequence, be held to be valid. It follows that we are unable to agree with the statement of law in 1949 F. C. R. 595 (A. I. R. 1949 F. C. 175) (A) that a power to extend the life of an enactment cannot validly be conferred on an outside authority, (emphasis supplied) chagla, CJ,, speaking for the Court in state Of Bombay v Reman Santlal (A. I. R. 1952 Bombay 16) has stated thus;-"therefore, when the Legislature by Act 11 (2) of 1950 extended the Act for two years, it was not passing any new legislation, but it was doing exactly what the Provincial Government by notification could have done under Act XXXIII (33) of 1948. To use the language of the Privy council, it destroyed agency which it had created and took the matter directly into its own hands" (emphasis supplied) ( 9 ) IN view of these principles it is impossible to accept the plea that the extension of life of krc Act for a further period of ten years by act 17 of 1983 would constitute it as a new or a subsequent Act to P. P. Act. This ground alone would have been sufficient to dismiss all these petitions. However, as learned Advocates have stressed the plea of repugnancy and the KRC act would prevail over the P. P. Act, it has become necessary to deal with that aspect also. This ground alone would have been sufficient to dismiss all these petitions. However, as learned Advocates have stressed the plea of repugnancy and the KRC act would prevail over the P. P. Act, it has become necessary to deal with that aspect also. Relying on sub-section (7) of Section 2 of the KRC Act which has exempted only premises belonging to State Government or central Government or Municipal Corporations, Municipal Council or other Municipal bodies, definition of tenant, the protective umbrella of section 21 of the KRC Act and the decision of the Supreme Court in V. Dhanapal Chettiar v Yesodai Animal (A. I. R. 1979 S. C. 1745) wherein it is declared that even after determination of lease, the possession of the tenant is not considered as unauthorised, it was contended that on mere determination of lease, possession of persons like petitioners will not become unauthorised and the protection or applicability of KRC act cannot be denuded. ( 10 ) THE fallacy of this submission ignores the binding ratio of catena of decisions of the supreme Court and of this Court. Supreme court in Jain Ink Mfg. Co. v L. L. C of India (A. I. R. 1981 S. C. 670) distinguishing northern India Cater's Case which dealt with the provisions of Punjab Premises Land eviction and Rent Recovery Act, 1959 has held thus:-"in these circumstances, therefore, the case of the appellant squarely falls within the ambit of definition of 'unauthorised occupation' as contemplated by Section 2 (2) (g ). There is yet another aspect of the matter which distinguishes the present case from the language employed in the punjab Act. Section 2 (2) (g) is an inclusive definition and consists of two separate limbs - (1) where a person is in occupation in relation to any public premises without authority for such occupation, and (2) even if the possession or occupation of the tenant continues after the lease is determined. In the instant case, the lease was doubtless determined by the landlord by a notice under Section 106 of the transfer of Property Act whose validity for purposes of deciding the question of law has not been questioned by the learned counsel for the appellant. Therefore, there can be no doubt that the appellant was in unawhoirsed occupation of the premises once the lease was determined. Therefore, there can be no doubt that the appellant was in unawhoirsed occupation of the premises once the lease was determined. "further - on it is held thus:-"in these circumstances, therefore, the premises Act being subsequent to the rent Act would naturally prevail over and over-ride the provisions of the Rent Act. It was further contended by Mr. Rao that the Rent Act being a special law as compared to the Premises Act, it will over-ride the Premises Act without going into the question as to which of the two acts were prior in point of time. "after referring to non-abstantie clause contained in both these Acts and on examining whether both these Acts operate in the same. field or have two different sphere though there may be some amount of overlapping, has held thus:- so far as the Premises Act is concerned it operates in a very limited field in that it applies only to a limited nature of premises belonging only to particular sets of individuals, a particular set of juristic persons like companies, corporations of the Central Government. Thus, the premises Act has a very limited application. Secondly, the object of the premises Act is to provide for eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises by a summary procedure so that the premises may be available to the authorities mentioned in the premises Act which constitute a class by themselves. That the Authorities to which the premises Act applies are a class by themselves is not disputed by the counsel for the appellant as even in the case of northern India Caterers Pvt. Ltd. v State of Punjab, (1967) 3 SCR 399 : ( AIR 1967 sc 1581 ) such authorities were held to form a class and, therefore, immune from challenge on Art. 14 of the Constitution. Similarly, 'the summary procedure prescribed by the Premises Act is also not violative of Art. 14 as held by this Court in maganlal Chhagganlal (P.) Ltd. v municipal Corporation of Greater bombay, (1975) 1 SCR 1 : ( AIR 1974 SC 2009 ). ( 11 ) THUS, it would appear that both the scope and the object of the Premises Act is quite different from that of the Rent Act. ( 11 ) THUS, it would appear that both the scope and the object of the Premises Act is quite different from that of the Rent Act. The Rent Act is of much wider application than the Premises Act inasmuch as it applies to all private premises which do not fall within the limited exceptions indicated in section 2 of the Premises Act. The object of the Rent Act is to afford special protection to all the tenants or private landlords or landlords who are neither a Corporate bodies. It would be seen that even under the rent Act, by virtue of an amendment a special category has been carved out under section 25 B which provides for special procedure for eviction to landlords who require premises for their personal necessity. Thus, 25b itself becomes a special law within the Rent Act. On a parity of reasoning, therefore, there can be no doubt that the premises Act as compared to. the Rent Act, which has a very broad spectrum, is a special act and override the provisions of the Rent act. ( 12 ) DEALING with Section 3 of the Delhi Rent control Act which is similar to sub-section (7) of Section 2 of the Rent Act, has stated thus:-"this, in our opinion, does not advance the case of the appellant any further because once the Premises Act becomes a special Act- dealing with premises belonging to Central Government, corporations and other statutory Bodies, the Rent Act stands superseded. We have to consider the provisions of the two Acts, they having been passed by the same legislature, viz. , Parliament, and the rule of harmonious construction would have to apply in such cases. " (emphasis supplied) ( 13 ) THE above observations and the ratio of the Supreme Court in M. Chhagganlal v greater Bombay Municipality (A. I. R. 1974 SC 2009) will answer the contentions of Sri U. L, narayana Rao, that these provisions confer unguided and arbitrary power of eviction. Supreme Court dealing with such contention in M. Chhagganlal's case has held thus :- the very policy and the purpose of the enactments clearly make it apparent that the legislature intended to make them applicable to a special class (1) the property belonging to the Government, and (2) Property belonging to the Bombay municipal Corporation and provide for a speedy method of recovering those properties. 15, To summarise: where a statute providing for a more drastic procedure different from the ordinary procedure covers the whole field covered by the ordinary procedure, as in anwar Ali Sarkar's case 1952 SCR 284 = ( AIR 1952 SC 75 ) and Suraj Mall Mohta's case (1955) 1 SCR 448 = ( AIR 1954 SC 545 ) without any guidelines as to the class of cases in which either procedure is to be resorted to, the statute will be hit by Art. ( 14 ) EVEN there, as mentioned in Suraj mall Mohta's case, a provision for appeal may cure, the defect, bhagwati J. ,. has stated thus:- 24. So far as Ch. VA of the Municipal act is concerned, and what we say in regard to Ch. VA of the Municipal Act must also apply equally in relation to the Government Premises Eviction act with the words "government premises" substituted for the words "municipal Premises" the statement of Objects and Reasons for the introduction of this Chapter, as also the provisions contained in it, clearly indicate that this Chapter was enacted to provide to the Municipal Corporation a speedier remedy for eviction of unauthorised occupants from Municipal premises, as against the ordinary remedy of a civil suit involving expense and delay, so that the Municipal corporation should be able to carry out effectively "its, policy of slum clearance, speedy development of the estates of the Corporation and providing more housing accommodation. " chap. VA of the Municipal Act, no doubt, differentiates occupiers of municipal premises from occupiers of other premises, but there is a socially valid and legally intelligible differentiation between the two classes of occupiers, so far as Municipal Premises are concerned, the members of the public are vitally interested in seeing that such premises are freed from unauthorised occupation as speedily and expeditiously as possible in order that the Municipal Corporation should be able to implement its policy of clearance, speedy development of municipal estates and providing for more housing accommodation, which are projects redounding to public benefit. This element of public interest in speedy and expeditious recovery of possession from unauthorised occupants is absent in case of premises belonging to private parties. This element of public interest in speedy and expeditious recovery of possession from unauthorised occupants is absent in case of premises belonging to private parties. The speedy machinery for eviction of unauthorised occupants from Municipal premises is, therefore, justified, in that it is in the interest of the public that speedy and expeditious recovery of municipal premises from unauthorised occupiers is made possible through the instrumentality of a speedier procedure, instead of the elaborate procedure by way of civil suit involving both expense and delay. Speedy justice is to-day, in view of the existing procedural skein of an ordinary suit, an almost impossible feat. There is, thus, a valid basis of differentiation between occupiers of municipal premises and those of other premises, and there is a rational relation and nexus between the basis of the classification and the object of the legislation. The constitutional validity of the impugned provisions in the two statutes cannot, in the circumstances, be assailed on the ground that they make unjust discrimination between occupiers of Government or municipal premises and occupiers of other premises. ( 15 ) THE main ground of attack against the constitutionality of the impugned provisions, however, was that even if occupiers of Government or Municipal premises form a class by themselves as against occupiers of private owned properties and such classification is justified on the ground that they require differential treatment in public interest, the impugned provisions discriminate amongst occupiers of Government or municipal premises inter se and or, therefore, violative of the equality clause. The petitioners appellants contended that the special procedure for determining the liability to eviction laid down in the impugned provisions is more drastic and prejudicial than the ordinary procedure of a civil suit and both these procedures operate in the same field without there being any guidelines provided in the impugned provisions as to when one or the other procedure shall be followed with the result that the impugned provisions permit discrimination amongst occupiers of Government or Municipal premises in that some may be subjected to the special procedure while others may be subjected to the ordinary procedure. The occupiers of Government or Municipal premises can be proceeded against under the impugned provisions as also under the ordinary procedure of a civil suit, and there being no principle or policy to guide the authority as to when the special procedure should be adopted, or the case should be dealt with under the ordinary procedure, it would be open to the authority to make a discriminatory choice amongst occupiers of Government or municipal premises, and this absolute and unguided power of selection, though exercisable within the class of occupiers of government or Municipal premises, is discriminatory. The vice of discrimination, it was argued, consists in the unguided and unrestricted power of singling out for being subjected to the special procedure some amongst a class of persons, namely, occupiers of Government or Municipal premises, all of whom are similarly situate and circumstanced, leaving others to be dealt with according to the ordinary procedure. This argument was sought to be supported by the majority decision of this Court in (1967) 3 scr 399 = ( AIR 1967 SC 1581 ). We do not think that this argument is sound. The majority decision in (1967) 3 SCR 399 = ( AIR 1967 SC 1581 ) has no application in the present case, and in any event, we are of the view that that decision does not represent the correct law. Khanna, J. , has stated thus:-"42. I agree that the writ petitions be dismissed, but I would base any conclusion on the ground that the procedure prescribed by the impugned provisions is not onerous or drastic when compared with that contained in the Civil Procedure code. My learned brother Alagiri- swami, J. , has analysed the impugned provisions contained in the Bombay municipal Corporation Act as well as those contained in the Bombay government Premises (Eviction) Act. It would appear therefrom that some of the infirmities from which the punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act of 1959 suffered are not present in the impugned enactments. The impugned provisions provide for the giving of notice to the party affected. Such a party has to be informed of the grounds on which the order of eviction is proposed to be made and has to be afforded an opportunity to file a written statement and produce documents. The party can also be represented by lawyer. The impugned provisions provide for the giving of notice to the party affected. Such a party has to be informed of the grounds on which the order of eviction is proposed to be made and has to be afforded an opportunity to file a written statement and produce documents. The party can also be represented by lawyer. The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding summoning and enforcing attendance of persons and examining them on oath as also those relating to discovery and production of documents provide a valuable safeguard. The aggrieved party has a right of appeal and the appeal lies not to an administrative officer but to a judicial officer of the status of a principal Judge of the City Civil Court or a District Judge. It is also apparent that if the officer concerned acts beyond his jurisdiction, his order would be liable to be assailed under articles 226 and 227 of the constitution. I would, therefore, hold that the procedure envisaged in the impugned provisions is not onerous and drastic as would justify an inference or discrimination. The simple fact that there are two forums with different procedures would not justify the quashing of the impugned provisions as being violative of Article 14, especially. when both procedures are fair and in consonance with the principles of natural justice. I agree with my learned brother Bhagwati, J. , that what is necessary to attract the inhibition of Article 14 is that there must be substantial and qualitative differences between the two procedures so that one is really and substantially more drastic and pre judicial than the other and that we should avoid dogmatic and finical approach when dealing with lifes' manifold realities. " ( 16 ) SRI U. L. Narayana Rao, learned Counsel, laying stress on words "determined for any reason whatsoever" found in the definition of unauthorised occupation in Section 2 (g) of p. P. Act, submitted that public sector corporations are conferred with unbriddled power of determining the lease and on such fanciful determination, possession of a tenant cannot be treated as unauthorised. Similar words are found in Section 30 of the Rent act. The implication of these words must be understood with reference to Section 111 read with Section 106 of the Transfer of property Act. Similar words are found in Section 30 of the Rent act. The implication of these words must be understood with reference to Section 111 read with Section 106 of the Transfer of property Act. Section 111 enumerates the grounds on which lease can be determined and Section 106 provides for mode or manner of determination. These words are considered as ample words of conferment. More than anything else, when the validity of the Act has been upheld by the Supreme court with reference to intendment and the object to be achieved this court is bound by the declaration. ( 17 ) EVEN in the latest case - Accountant and secretarial Service Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v Union of India and others (A. I. R. 1988 S. C. 1708) harmonious construction is applied and on referring to earlier views in Zaverbhai amaidas v State ( AIR 1954 SC 752 ) and hoehst Pharmaceuticals v State [ 1983 (3) scr 130 ], it is stated thus:-"the present case is clearly governed by the primary rule in article 254 (1) under which the law of Parliament on a subject in the Concurrent List prevails over the state law. Art. 254 (2) is not attracted because no provision of the State Acts (which were enacted in 1956 and 1962) were repugnant to the provisions on an earlier law of Parliament or existing law. The fact that the 1956 Act was enacted, after being reserved for the President's assent is, therefore, immaterial. Even if the provisions of the main part of article 254 (2) can be said to be somehow applicable, the proviso, read with article 254 (1), reaffirm the supremacy of any subsequent legislation of Parliament on the same matter even though such subsequent legislation does not in terms amend, vary or repeal any provision of state Legislation. The Provisions of the 1971 Act will, therefore, prevail against those of the State Acts and were rightly invoked in the present case by the respondent Bank. " ( 18 ) THE decision of the Madhya Pradesh high Court in L. S. Nair v Hindustan Steel ltd. The Provisions of the 1971 Act will, therefore, prevail against those of the State Acts and were rightly invoked in the present case by the respondent Bank. " ( 18 ) THE decision of the Madhya Pradesh high Court in L. S. Nair v Hindustan Steel ltd. Bhilai (A. I. R. 1980 M. P. 106) has been approved by the Supreme Court and the ratio in Nair's case reads thus:-"the Central Act of 1971 being a law later to the M. P. Act of 1961 will prevail over the 1961 Act in view of Art. 254 (2) proviso inspite of the fact that the 1961 act had received the assent of the president. The fact that the 1971 Act by section 20 was given retrospective effect from 1958 does not mean that the Act was enacted in 1958. The effect of 1971 Act is that accommodations belonging to Govt. companies are taken out from the operation of 1961 Act and are exclusively governed by the former because the two acts in this respect cannot stand together. " ( 19 ) IN this view, I find no substance in the plea of repugnancy. Though the Supreme Court in the latest case has negatived the plea of bias, the learned Advocates for the petitioners relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Mis. Krishna Bus Service P. Ltd. v State Of haryana (A. I. R. 1985 SC 1651) and the decision of this court in B. Rahamathulla khan and Others v The State of Kamataka and others (Writ appeal No. 333 of 1988 and other connected cases, DD : 26-8-1988), contended that exercise of power by the Law officer, appointed as competent authority is vitiated by bias. This issue is also answered by the Supreme Court in the very same decision and it reads thus:-"in the very nature of things, only an officer or appointee of the Government, statutory authority or Corporation be thought of for implementing the provisions of the Act. That apart, personal bias cannot necessarily be attributed to such officer either in favour of the bank or against any occupant who is being proceeded against, merely because he happens to be such officer. Moreover, as pointed out earlier, the Act provides for an appeal to an independent judicial officer against orders passed by the Estate officer. These provisions do not, therefore, suffer from any infirmity. In fact, Dr. Moreover, as pointed out earlier, the Act provides for an appeal to an independent judicial officer against orders passed by the Estate officer. These provisions do not, therefore, suffer from any infirmity. In fact, Dr. Chitale did not pursue this objection seriously. " ( 20 ) THE same is the view of this Court in indian Bank v M/s. Blaze and Central (p) Ltd (ILR 1986 Kamataka 743) which reads thus:-"13. As far as the procedure for eviction of an unauthorised occupant of a public premises is concerned, the Act prescribes a special procedure for eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises instead of compelling public authorities to file a civil suit. Just as special provision is made under several enactments for recovery of public monies as arrears of land revenue, the Act provides a special remedy in the matter of eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises. In such case, there is nothing unusual to confer power on an officer of the same department or authority to pass an order of eviction. For instance the power to inquire as to whether a person is in unauthorised occupation of Government land and to pass an order of eviction against an unautho- rised occupant is conferred on the Deputy Commissioner, an officer, of the Government to whom the land belongs, in the land revenue laws. To such cases the principle of 'no person should be a judge in his own cause' is hardly applicable. It is a statutory power to take action against a person who occupies a public premises without authority or having occupied the premises with authority refuses to vacate after the authority to occupy comes to an end. It cannot be said that it is unrea- sonable to confer such a power on an officer of the public authority, concerned. We do not find any substance in the contention that the provision, in order to be reasonable should provide for the appointment of an officer outside the establishment of the public authority concerned. Of course, if the power conferred is arbitrary and without procedural safeguards, it would be a different matter. In Chagganlal's case, the Supreme Court considered the constitu- tional validity of similar provision contained in Chapter - V of the bombay Municipal Corporation Act. Of course, if the power conferred is arbitrary and without procedural safeguards, it would be a different matter. In Chagganlal's case, the Supreme Court considered the constitu- tional validity of similar provision contained in Chapter - V of the bombay Municipal Corporation Act. The power to pass an order evicting an authorised occupant of a premises belonging to Bombay Municipal corporation was conferred on its Chief executive Officer, namely, the Municipal commissioner under the Act. The procedural safeguards prescribed under that act were similar to those contained in the act. An appeal to the City Civil Court was provided for, against the order of the competent officer. . . . . . . Under the Act also there are similar in built safeguards". (emphasis supplied) ( 21 ) IN decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Haryana State Corporation and of this Court in Rahmathulla's Case, there was no scope for redressal of grievance as against the validity or otherwise of the seizure unless vehicle was produced before the competent authority. The Court examining the power with reference to fundamental right under article 19 (l) (g) of the Constitution of India stated that power should be entrusted to a person who is expected 'to exercise them fairly without bias'; whereas, in cases under the Act, appeal is provided to District Judge as against an order of eviction and as stated in Chagganlal's case 'appeal may cure the defect'. Hence, the ratio of those cases has no resemblance. Now, coming to merits of eviction orders, contention of some of petitioners was that initiation of eviction proceedings by a competent authority/estate officer/law officer itself without holding an enquiry regarding bona fide need and ignoring the withdrawal of some of the eviction cases, initiated under the KRC Act, vitiates the eviction orders. Before the lower authorities, petitioners trusted more on constitutional infirmity and less on establishing that their possession was not unauthorised for want of proper determination of lease. The scope of enquiry under the Act is explained thus by this Court in Indian Bank's case:-"apart from this the observance of rules of natural justice is not a ritual. As pointed out earlier in the absence of any plea on behalf of the first respondent that their tenancy had not been validly terminated and that their occupation had not become unauthorised, there was nothing for the Estate Officer to inquire. As pointed out earlier in the absence of any plea on behalf of the first respondent that their tenancy had not been validly terminated and that their occupation had not become unauthorised, there was nothing for the Estate Officer to inquire. He could have straightaway passed an order of eviction under Section 5 of the act as his jurisdiction under the said provision was only to be satisfied as to the unauthorised occupation of the person concerned and not about the bona fide requirements of the public authority or about comparitive hardship, just because the respondent chose to raise the pleas as they were not relevant to the inquiry under Section 5 of the Act. Therefore, the order of eviction passed by the Estate officer was unexceptionable and was very rightly upheld by the learned District judge pointing out that the points raised by the first respondent were outside the purview of the Act. " ( 22 ) THESE decisions on vires of the Act and the scope of enquiry in such matters have met uniformally except the decision of Bombay High Court in Accountant and Secretarial service Pvt. Ltd. case which gave a little jolt and even that has been watered down by the supreme Court. As could be seen at para 17 of the judgment, Supreme Court has declined to defer decision awaiting the decision of the larger Bench on the ground that the issue involved in cases pending. before the larger Bench is dissimilar or distinct and separate. As every one of the contentions urged have been answered either by the decision of this Court or of the Supreme court, these writ petitions are liable to be dismissed. ( 23 ) FOR the reasons stated above, these writ petitions are dismissed. Rule discharged in cases where rule is issued. Petitioners who are faced with eviction orders are given six months time from to-day to vacate the premises subject to payment of rent regularly and in cases, where petitioners have challenged only show cause notice emanated by competent authority are at liberty to offer their explanation within four weeks from to-day. --- *** --- .