JUDGMENT 1. THE plaintiff-appellant filed Title Suit No. 1 of 1976 in the court of the learned Massif at Dan tan, District Midnapore against the defendant-respond eats inter alia for declaration. of title in the suit property and for permanent injunction. The plaintiff's case as made out in the plaintiff inter alia was, that Dag No. 601 appertaining to the original C. S. Khatian No. 581 belonged to one Kamal Maisal who had three sons namely, Sibu, Durga Prasad alias Durgi and Hiru and on the death of the said Kamal Maisal, his said three sons inherited the entire estate of their deceased father including the suit land in equal shares. The said three brothers later on, had partitioned their said inherited properties amicably and started enjoying and possessing their respective lands separately and their respective individual status were also recorded in the record of rights which was made Exhibit No. 4 in the suit. Out of the original Plot No. 601 two data plots were created being plots Nos. 601/1180 and 601/1181. Plot No. 601 having an area of. 24 decimals was recorded in the name of Hiru; Plot No. 601/1180 with an area of. 27 decimals and lying on the adjacent east of Plot No. 601, was recorded in the name of Sibu and Plot No. 601/1181 with an area of. 25 decimals and lying just to the west of Plot No. 601, was recorded in the name of Durgi. 2. HIRU sold his entire. 24 decimals of land in Plot No. 601 to Durgi by executing a deed of sale dated May 11, 1920 which was registered on June 21, 1920. Of the said brothers, Hiru died first, next died Sibu leaving his widow Niroda as his sole heir. On the death of Niroda, Durgi being the nearest reversioner, inherited Plot No. 601/1180 in the share of Sibu and Durgi thus became the absolute owner of all those aforesaid three plots. Durgi had no son but one daughter named Rashamoyee. Plaintiff is the eldest son of Rashamoyee. Durgi executed a registered deed of gift on November 25, 1949 in respect of his several plots including Plot Nos. 601 and 601/1180 in favour of his wife Chandramoni and Chandramoni began to possess the same absolutely by amalgamating those two plots. Durgi had no son but one daughter named Rashamoyee. Plaintiff is the eldest son of Rashamoyee. Durgi executed a registered deed of gift on November 25, 1949 in respect of his several plots including Plot Nos. 601 and 601/1180 in favour of his wife Chandramoni and Chandramoni began to possess the same absolutely by amalgamating those two plots. Durgi died before the preparation of the R. S. Record-affrights and on his death his widow Chandranoni inherited his properties including Plot No. 601. 1181, as a life estate which, however, with the passing of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, ripened into absolute ownership and she thus became the full owner of all the three aforesaid Plots in C. S. Khatian No. 581 and she made a gift. of the entire jote covering the aforesaid Plot Nos. 601, 601/1 180 and 601/1181 under the said Khatian in favour of the plaintiff one of her grandsons, by a registered deed of gift dated 27. 10. 61 being Exhibit-1 along with other, plots and the plaintiff started possessing the same by amalgamating the above three plots. Plot No. 602 lying adjacent to east of plot No. 601/1180 belonged to the plaintiff and his brother. By an amicable partition between the plaintiff and his brother, the plaintiff got the western half of Plot No. 602 which he also merged with the suit plot. The cause of action for the suit, according to the plaintiff, arose in Chaitra 1380 B. S., when the defendant No. 2 Bholanath Das, describing himself as the Secretary of then Ram Krishna Paramahanse Sevak Sangha, disclosed for the first time to the plaintiff that Dag No. 601 had been recorded in his name as the Secretary of the said Sangha who was the Defendant No. 1 in the suit and asked the plaintiff to vacate the suit plot on the allegation that Niroda, the widow of Sibu had executed a deed of gift covering Plot No. 601 in favour of defendant No. 1 Sangha, but according to the plaintiff Dag No. 601 did never belong to Sibu and in fact it was recorded in the name of Hiru in the C. S. Khatian who sold it to Durgi by a registered deed dated 1 1. 5. 1920 as stated above and that the R. S. Record -of- Rights in respect of the suit plot was also erroneous. 3. 5. 1920 as stated above and that the R. S. Record -of- Rights in respect of the suit plot was also erroneous. 3. THE defendant No. 2 contested the suit as the Secretary of the defendant No. 1 Sangha by filing written statement wherein it was alleged inter alia that the suit was not maintainable in the present form inasmuch as the defendant No. 1 Sangha being an unregistered Society a suit against such a Sangha in the name of its Secretary only, without complying with the provisions of Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code of Procedure was not maintainable and that the suit was also barred by limitation as the defendant No. 1 Sangha was in possession of the suit property for more than twelve years prior to the institution of the suit. It was also alleged in the written statement that by an amicable partition between Sibu, Durgi and Hiru, Sibu got Plot No. 601 and it did not go to Hiru. As Hiru did not possess Plot No. 601, he had no right to sell the same to Durgi and consequently, Durgi had no right to gift it away to Chandramoni and the C. S. Record-of-Rights were also erroneous. It was alleged further in the written statement that Sibu was a devotee of Sri Ram Krishna Paramahansa Deb and at his initiative defendant No. 1 Sangha was founded and established at Mongraj, that Sibu expressed his will to make a gift of Plot No. 601 to the Sangha for its maintenance and promised to execute the necessary deed of gift but he died suddenly before he could execute such a deed of gift, and his widow Nirode made a gift in respect of Plot No. 601 to the Secretary of the Sangha by a registered deed (Exhibit 'a') dated 28. 12. 48 in accordance with the pious desire of her deceased husband and made over possession of the said plot to the defendants and since when the defendants were in possession thereof and it was also recorded in the name of the Sangha in the R. S. Record- of- Rights. 12. 48 in accordance with the pious desire of her deceased husband and made over possession of the said plot to the defendants and since when the defendants were in possession thereof and it was also recorded in the name of the Sangha in the R. S. Record- of- Rights. The said deed of gift, however., was challenged by the plaintiff on the ground that there was no existence of Sri Ram Krishna Paramahansa Sevak Sangha' as even in the said deed of gift the description of the donee was given as 'paramahansa Sevak Sangha' and there were many Paramahansas but there was only one Ram Krishna Paramhansa and the description of the donee in the disputed deed of gift was this vague. 4. THE learned Munsif after considering the pleadings of the parties and going through the evidence on record, held that there was no existence of any Sangha named 'mongraj Sri Ram Krishna Sevak Sangha' and Niroda, at the time of executing the disputed deed of gift (Exhibit 'a'), held only a life estate and as such she was incompetent to transfer or alienate the suit property which she had] inherited from her husband as a widow's estate; there was no evidence to show that the defendant No. 2 possessed the suit land ever, on the contrary, the evidence on record conclusively proved that the plaintiff was in possession of suit plot by amalgamating and/or merging the same with the lands on both sides of the disputed land which also belonged to the plaintiff, but the learned Massif decreed the suit only against the defendant No. 2 but he dismissed the suit against the defendant No. 1 as it was held by the learned Massif that there was no existence of any Sangha name 'mongraj Sri Sri Ram Krishna Sevak Sangha'. The learned Massif further held that R. S. Record -of- Rights was without any basis. The learned Massif further held that R. S. Record -of- Rights was without any basis. On appeal, the lower appellate court, however, allowed the appeal setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial court, inter alia upon the findings, that if according to the learned Massif there was no existence of the defendant No. 1 Sangha, the immediate conclusion should have been that the plaintiff's suit was bad for want of cause of action and as such the learned Massif should have dismissed the suit but according to the lower appellate court, impleading the Sangha as defendant No. 1 in the suit and then to deny the existence could not be contemplated simultaneously. The lower appellate court also held that the R. S. record -of- Rights would prevail over the C. S. Record -of- Rights being of a later date as in the case of two conflicting Record -of- rights, it was the law that the later one would prevail. So far as (Exhibit 'a') the deed of gift by Niroda in favour of defendant No. 1 was concerned, the lower appellate court held that it was true, that in 1948, Niroda held only a life estate, but it is not the law that an alienation by the holder of such life interest should be held to be ab initio void. On the contrary, the law is, that such an alienation was not void but at best only voidable. Such an alienation was valid when it was made for religious purpose and considering the disputed deed of gift (Exhibit 'a') it held it to be a genuine document. The lower appellate court also held that plaintiff had not led any evidence to show any overt act to repudiate the alienation within twelve years from the date of death of Niroda as no date of death of Niroda could be spelt out from the evidence on record. The suit was filed in 1976 while the disputed alienation was made on December 28, 1948 and according to the lower appellate court, the plaintiff not having pleaded or proved the date of death of Niroda or that he had come to the court within twelve years from the date of her death, it was no longer open for the court to hold that the disputed alienation by Niroda was void. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree of the lower appellate court, the plaintiff Has preferred the present second appeal in this Hon'ble Court. 5. REGARDING the competence of a Hindu female to alienate her deceased husband's properties, in which she had only a limited interest (widow's estate) it cannot be said that the female had no power whatsoever to alienate any of her deceased husband's properties over which she enjoyed only a limited interest or which she held as a widow's estate. Within the limits imposed upon her, the ferrate holder has the most absolute power of enjoyment and is accountable to no one. The Privy Council observed in the case of Janata Ammal v. Narayanaswami Aiyer (43 IA 207) inter alia as follows :- "her right is of the nature of a right of property; her position is that. of owner; her powers in that character are, however, limited"; but, to use the familiar language of Mayne's Hindu Law (12th Ed.), paragraph 624, p. 866, "so long as she is alive no one has any vested interest in the succession. " 6. A limited owner could alienate the properties, of course under certain conditions namely, for legal necessity and for religious purposes. Reference may be made to Articles 181 and 181a of the Mulla's Hindu law (Fifteenth Edition) which dealt in extensor with the right of alienation by a widow under the Hindu Law prior to the passing of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 in general and also for religious and charitable purposes. In Article 181 it is stated that a widow or other limited heir had no power to alienate the estate inherited by her from the deceased owner except For the following, names i) Religious or Charitable purposes. ii) Other purposes amounting to legal necessity. Article 181a again has divided the power of alienation by a widow or other female heir for religious or charitable purposes into two classes, namely :- a) The performance of the obsequial ceremonies of the deceased owner, namely, performance of the funeral and shradoha ceremonies of the deceased owner and the payment of his debts even though barred by limitation whether during his life time or after his death. These acts were essential and obligatory. These acts were essential and obligatory. b) The performance of religious ceremonies of persons as for instance, the sharddha of the husband's mother and where a daughter inherited her father's estate the performance of her mother's sharddha and also religious or charitable acts which were supposed to conduce to the spiritual welfare of the deceased owner. Such ceremonies, however, were not essential or obligatory. 7. THE first class related to acts, which were essential and obligatory while the second class related to acts which although not indispensable or obligatory were still pious purposes which conduced to the benefit of the soul of the deceased. . For the purposes of the first class, a widow or other limited heir had a larger power of disposition than that for the purpose of the second class and reference may be made on this point to the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Collector of Masulipatam v. Cavaly Vencata Narrainapah (8 Moors Indian Appeals, 529), there the Board point out the difference between alienations made by a widow for secular purposes and those made with religious motives. The Master of the Roils, who delivered the judgment in that case, said as follows: "it is admitted, on all hands, that if there be collateral heirs of the husband, the widow cannot of her own will alienate the property except for special purposes. For religious or charitable purposes, or those which are supposed to conduce to the spiritual welfare of her husband, she has a larger power of disposition than that which she possesses for purely worldly purposes. To support an alienation for the last she must show necessity. " Subsequently, in the case of Raj Lukhee Debea v. Gokool Chunder Chowdhury (13 Moors Indian Appeals, 209) the Board also gave expression to the same opinion. The Privy Council in its later decision in the case of Sadar Singh and Ors. v. Kunj Behari Lal and Ors., (49 I. A. 383) inter alia referring to the above decisions in the cases of Collector of Musalipatam (supra) and Raj Lukhee Debea (supra) also held on the question of the widow's power to alienate, that there could be no doubt, upon a review of the Hindu Law, taken in conjunction with the decided cases, that the Hindu system recognized two sets of religious acts. One was in connection with the actual obsequies of the deceased, and the periodical performance of the obsequial rites prescribed in the Hindu religious law, which were considered as essential for the salvation of the soul of the deceased. The other related to acts which although not essential or obligatory, were still pious observances which conduced to the bliss of the deceased's soul. 8. MR. Justice Bijan Kumar Mukherjee in his Tagore Law Lectures on the Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trust (1983 Ed. pp 93 to98) had also discussed the said question with fulness and clarity. It is unnecessary to analyse the various decisions which the learned author had considered because the true position on the subject was crystallised in the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sm. Kamala Devi v. Bachulal Gupta ( AIR 1957 SC 434 . The Supreme Court in its later decision in the case of Mst. Sheo Kuer v. Nathuni Prosad Singh ( AIR 1976 SC 709 ) also observed while discussing the same question, that such question had been the subject-matter of several decisions of the Indian High Courts as also of the Judicial Committees and the true position on the subject was crystallised in the decision in Kamala Devi's case (supra. The law must now be taken as well settled that a Hindu widow possessing a widow's estate could not alienate the property which had devolved on her except for special purposes. To support an alienation for purely worldly purposes she ought to have proved necessity but she had a larger power of- disposition for religious and charitable purposes or for those purposes which were supposed to conduce to the spiritual welfare of her husband. The Hindu system recognised two sets of religious acts : those which were considered as essential for salvation of the soul of the deceased owner and others which, though not essential or obligatory, were still pious observances which conduced to the bliss of the deceased's soul. The powers of a Hindu female to alienate property were wider in respect of acts which conduced to the spiritual benefit of her deceased husband. The widow was entitled to sell the property, even the whole of it, if the income of the property was not sufficient to cover the expenses for such acts. The powers of a Hindu female to alienate property were wider in respect of acts which conduced to the spiritual benefit of her deceased husband. The widow was entitled to sell the property, even the whole of it, if the income of the property was not sufficient to cover the expenses for such acts. In regard to alienations for pious observances which were not essential or obligatory, her powers were limited to alienating only a small portion of the property. The Supreme Court, while making the above observations, referred to the earlier decisions of the Privy Council in the cases of Collector of Masulipatam (supra), Sardar Singh v. Koochbehari (supra) its own decision in Kamala Devi v. Bachu Lal Gupta (supra) and also Mr. Justice Bijan Kumar Mukherjea's Tagore Lectures on the Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trust. In the present case Niroda, the widow of Durga, had made the disputed gift to the defendant No. 1 Sangha for a purpose, which according to me, was to conduce to the spiritual benefit of her deceased husband as would clearly appear from the recitals in the deed of gift dated 28th December, 1948 (Exhibit 'a') itself, wherein it was clearly stated by the donor Sm. Niroda Moni Dasi, that her husband had donated the suit property to the defendant No. 1 Sangha but the necessary deed of gift could not be registered due to his sudden death and as such and as such his widow namely, Niroda was executing the said deed of gift (Exhibit 'a') to honour and/or confirm her deceased husband's said pious act. Therefore, it can safely be held judging the purpose of the disputed gift, that the donor had validly executed a deed of gift of the disputed property in favour of the defendant No. l Sangha and she was within her rights even as a limited owner, to execute such A. deed of gift and the disputed deed of gift (Exhibit 'a') as such, must be held to be legal. 9. 9. SO far as the question of limitation regarding the filing of the suit by the plaintiff is concerned, admittedly, the plaintiff filed the suit against the defendant for declaration of his title in the suit property and also for permanent injunction, on the basis of the purported deed of gift executed in his favour by Chandmoni in the year 1962, although in the plaint, the plaintiff- did aver that Niroda had a limited interest and she was not entitled to make the alleged alienation in favour of the defendant No. 1 Sangha. On a first blush, it may be said that a suit of such nature is governed by Article 58 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 which states inter alia that the suit with a prayer for declaration is to be filed within three years from the date when the right to sue first accrues. In the plaint, the plaintiff had stated inter alia that in his right to sue accrued in Chaitra, 1980 B. S. (corresponding to March/april, 1973) when the defendants for the first time resisted the plaintiff from entering the suit land and also asked him to vacate the same on the allegation that the defendant No. 1 Sangha had obtained the suit property in the year 1948 from Niroda, the widow of Sibu by way of gift and the name of the defendant No. l was also recorded in the R. S. record -of- Rights and the suit having been filed on the 15th day of January, 1976 by the plaintiff for a declaration of his title and also for a declaration that the R. S. Record -of- Rights was erroneous with a prayer for permanent injunction, may be said to have been filed within three years from the date when his right to sue first accrued. 10. THE Lower Appellate Court, however, held that since the plaintiff did not come to the court within 12 years from the date of death of Niroda, it was not open for the plaintiff to challenge the disputed alienation by Niroda. 10. THE Lower Appellate Court, however, held that since the plaintiff did not come to the court within 12 years from the date of death of Niroda, it was not open for the plaintiff to challenge the disputed alienation by Niroda. The lower appellate court came to such a finding presumably acting under the belief that Article 108 of the Indian Limitation act, 1963 would be attracted in the present case, but in fact the said Article does not apply inasmuch as, the said Article 108 clearly states that in order to declare an alienation by a Hindu or Muslim female void, the reversioner has to file the suit within 12 years from the date of such alienation and that too during the life time of such a Hindu or Muslim female. Admittedly, in the present case, the suit was filed not during the life time of such Hindu female namely, Niroda, and this is sufficient to get the suit out of the purview of the said Article 108. Let us now see whether the provisions of Article 58 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 would apply. A suit based upon an injury clone by an entry in the record- of- rights is to be brought within the period as provided under Article 58 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 (Article 120 of the old Limitation Act of 1908. If, however, the plaintiff retains possession, he is evidently not at all affected by an entry in the record- of- rights at least so long as an open challenge is not thrown out to him on the strength of such an entry and in such a case also the said Article 58 will apply. Reference may be made to the cases in Kumeda Prosunna v. Secretary of State, 19 CWN 1917 and Saroj Kumar v. Umedali, 25 CWN 1022. 11. THE trial court relying on the above principle of law held that the invasion of the plaintiff's right in the suit property in the present case, really speaking, started with the commencement of the proceeding under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the defendant No. 2 before the Sub divisional Massif, Contain on 9th January, 1976 and as such, the suit having been filed on or about 15th January, 1976, was not barred by limitation. The Lower Appellate Court, however, decided the question of possession against the plaintiff and also held that the presumption of the entries in the. R. S. Record- of- Rights in the present case, had not been rebutted. 12. ADMITTEDLY, Niroda made a deed gift in respect of the disputed property in favour of the defendant No. l Sangha in the year 1948 and the R. S. Record- of- Rights, in which, the name of the defendant No. l Sangha was recorded as in exclusive possession of the disputed Plot No. 601 was attested even according to the plaintiff, in the year 1956. No doubt, in the C. S. Record- of- Rights the suit plot No. 601 was recorded in the name of Hiru and not in the name of Sibu, the deceased husband of Niroda but it is well settled that in the case of conflict between two record- of- rights, the later shall prevail. [raja Durga Singh v. Tholu and Ors., AIR 1963 SC 361 ; Susanta Mondal v. Probodh Ranjan Mazumdar, 1976 (1) CLJ 84; Hrishikesh Bari v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1978 Cal. 556 and Sri Bhabendra Thakur v. Sm. Parul Bala Das, 1979 (2) CLJ 44]. 13. AN entry in the record- of- rights is presumed to be correct until the contrary is shown" [mahantha Krishna Dayal Giri v. Rani Bhubaneshwari Kuar and Ors., 35 CWN 921 (P. C.); Anup Mahato v. Mita Dusadh and Ors., 59 CLJ 147 (P. C) and such presumption must be given effect to unless the correctness of the entry is disapproved by evidence. It is a clear duty on the part of the court to give effect to such presumption unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence (Kanku Sardar and Anr. v. Shafizuddi and Ors., 55 CLJ 569. When the presumption is in favour of a party, it is not necessary for him to establish the correctness of the entry by clear evidence (Madhav Chandra v. Tilattama, AIR 1928 Cal. 751. So also a party relying upon the statutory presumption is under no obligation to establish the foundation for it (Rani Harshmukhi Desi v. Kshitendra Deb Roy and Ors., 47 CWN 662. 751. So also a party relying upon the statutory presumption is under no obligation to establish the foundation for it (Rani Harshmukhi Desi v. Kshitendra Deb Roy and Ors., 47 CWN 662. It is presumptive evidence of the matter referred to in the entry as also the condition of thing which existed at the time the record was prepared or in other words a presumption of the correctness of the entry refers to the time of the preparation of the record. Generally speaking, there can be no presumption backwards from the record- of- rights. Sometimes, however, a retrospective presumption may be drawn from the entries in a record- of- rights. The Court' having regard to the facts of a particular case and the surrounding circumstances, is entitled to presume both a forward and a backward continuity of the said entries (Bhabendra Nath Thakur v. Sm. Parul Bala Das, Supra. 14. NO doubt, an entry in the record- of rights does not create any title in favour of any person as raising a preemption is not creating a title nor does it extinguish a right either. The entry creates no, nor takes away any, right, as it is made on the basis of possession. (Raj Krishna v. Barbani Coal Concern, 60 CLJ 477; Ahmed Hussein v. Digendra Narain, 40 CWN 22), but at the same time, it may be said that it is a proof of title so far as the title is based on possession (Ronald Duncan Cromatic v. Sri Sri Iswar Radha Damodar Jew, 62 CLJ 10. The party challenging an enquiry must adduce evidence to rebut the presumption of its correctness (Lakhi Nath Bera and Ors. v. Nabadwip Chandra Nandi and Ors., 31 CWN 192. No doubt, the presumption -arising out of an entry in a record- of- rights loses its importance when evidence on the point in controversy is gone into in extenso on both Slides and such evidence discloses no foundation for the presumption (Kirarn Chandra v. Srinath, 31 CWN 135) and if the foundation is found rotten, the presumption goes (Debendra Kumar v. Pramada Kanta, 37 CWN 810), but at the same time it should be borne in mind, that the settlement entries form an important piece of evidence as to the rights of parties and is conclusive until it is rebutted by contrary evidence (Bepin Behari v. Trailokya Nath, 31 CWN 448. Accordingly, on the basis of R. S. Record -of- Rights it can be presumed that at least at the time of preparation of such Record- of- Rights or at the time of its attestation, which according to the plaintiff himself was made in the year 1956, the defendant No. 1 Sangha was in occupation of the disputed Plot No. 601. Let us now see whether the plaintiff had been able to rebut such presumption. 15. IN the present case, the plaintiff gave evidence oral and documentary and examined witness ess in support of his contention that all along he was in possession of the suit property since his acquisition of the said plot from Chandmoni and prior to such acquisition, it was first possessed by Durgi and thereafter by Chandmoni herself and that the adverse entry in the record- of- rights was wrong which was, however, controverted by the defendants by leading counter evidence both oral and documentary and the lower appellate court, which is the final court of fact, discussing the entire evidence on record in details, held the question of possession against the plaintiff. 16. MOREOVER, admittedly, the plaintiff had taken loan from the United Bank of India, Kharagpur Branch, District - Midnapore by securing the suit land, in the year 1970 and he also produced the certified copy of the Re-visional Settlement Record- of- Rights in respect of the suit land before the Bank at the time of getting such loan. The certified copy of the said Record- of- Rights was obtained by the petitioner in the year 1964. In the said record- of- rights,- it was clearly stated that the defendant No. l Sangha had 5 annas and odd gandas share in the entire Khatian No. 581 which included the suit plot No. 601 and the suit plot was also recorded therein in the name of the defendant No. 1 Sangha and the defendant No. 2 as its Secretary to be the exclusive possessor of the said plot. It is thus quite clear that, at least in the year 1964, it was within the knowledge of the plaintiff that the defendant. No. 1 Sangha was in possession of the suit plot No. 601. It is thus quite clear that, at least in the year 1964, it was within the knowledge of the plaintiff that the defendant. No. 1 Sangha was in possession of the suit plot No. 601. No doubt, the plaintiff produced a deed of 1920 showing that the suit plot was transferred by Hiru' to Durgi, the predecessor- in- interest of the plaintiff in support of his contention that the suit plot never belonged to Sibu the deceased husband of Niroda, none the less, judging the entire facts and circumstances of the case and the materials on record it can be said that the defendant No. 1 Sangha was in actual possession of the disputed land being Plot No. 601 at least at the date of preparation and/or attestation of the finally published Re-visional Settlement Record- of- Rights i. e., in the year 1956 and as such, it had acquired title to the disputed property by adverse possession against the plaintiff and the suit was hit by Article 65 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 having been filed in the year 1576 i. e., more than 12 years after the date when the possession of the defendant No. 1 Sangha had become adverse to the plaintiff in respect of the suit property and it cannot be said that the suit is. governed by Article 58 of the. said Act inasmuch as, the said Article has no manner of application in the present case as the plaintiff has not been able to rebut the statutory presumption attached to an entry in the Record- of- Rights (R. S. Record- of- Rights in the present case) regarding possession of the defendant No. 1 Sangha in the suit land at least from 1956. Finding on the question of possession, is a question of fact, and in second appeal the High Court would not ordinarily interfere with such finding unless such finding is perverse and considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case and the materials on record, I do not think that the finding of the court of. appeal below on the question of possession can in any way be termed as perverse. appeal below on the question of possession can in any way be termed as perverse. Regarding the framing of the suit, the trial court no doubt held that no leave was obtained by the plaintiff under Order I Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the objection raised by the defendants that the defendant No. 1 Sangha being an unregistered body, only its Secretary namely, the defendant No. 2 could not be made party to the suit representing the said Sangha, was well founded, but the trial court ultimately came to the conclusion that the plaintiff was saved by the provisions of Order I Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure since he alleged in the plaint that there was no Sangha like the defendant No. 1 Sangha. The lower appellate court, however, held the said point against the plaintiff observing inter alia that the suit without complying with the provisions of Order I Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure against an unregistered society was not tenable. So far as the suit against an unregistered society is concerned, only the Secretary of such a society can not be sued except by obtaining permission of the court under Order I Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure and a suit brought against an unregistered society without such permission is not proper suit at all and such a suit is not maintainable. Applying such principle of law it can therefore be safely held that the plaintiff's suit, brought against the defendant No. 1 Sangha which is an unregistered one, being represented by its secretary only who is the defendant No. 2, without impleading all the members of the said Sangha as party defendants and in the alternative without obtaining due permission of the Court, is not a properly constituted representative suit under Order I Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure and as such is not Maintainable at all. Moreover, the plaintiff's suit in the present case is also not protected under Order I Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure inasmuch as no prayer for addition of party or amendment of the plaint was made by the plaintiff either in any of the courts below or even in the present second appeal. Moreover, the plaintiff's suit in the present case is also not protected under Order I Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure inasmuch as no prayer for addition of party or amendment of the plaint was made by the plaintiff either in any of the courts below or even in the present second appeal. I, accordingly, find no reason to interfere with the finding of the lower appellate court on the question of framing of the suit. The result is, that the present second appeal fails and is dismissed on contest, without, however, any order as to costs. The judgment and decree of the court of appeal below are hereby affirmed. Appeal Dismissed.