D. P. Wadhwa, J. ( 1 ) THIS is the plaintiff s second appeal. He failed in boththe courts below (the Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court) in thesuit seeking principally the relief of his reinstatement as a clerk in the office ofthe defendant, the Delhi Development Authority (for short the DDA ). Thed. D-A. is a statutory Corporation and was constituted under the Delhidevelopment Act, 1957. Service conditions of its employees are governed bythe Delhi Development Authority (Salaries, Allowances and Conditions ofservice) Regulations, 1961 (for short the Regulations) framed under the aforesaid Act. Under Section 53-B of the Act, no suit can be instituted againstthe D. D. A. in respect of any act done or purporting to have been donein pursuance of this Act or any Rule or Regulation made thereunderuntil the expiration of two months after notice in writing has been leftat its office and unless such notice states explicitly the cause of action, thenature of relief sought, the amount of compensation claimed and the nameand place of residence of the intending plaintiff and unless the plaint containsa statement that such notice has been so left at the office of the D. D. A. Nosuch suit is to be instituted after the expiry of six months from the date onwhich the cause of action arises. There is an exception by which notice canbe waived, but that is not applicable in the present case. ( 2 ) THE plaintiff was employed as a lower division clerk (L. D. C.)in thed. D. A. on 12. 4. 1961 (Exhibit D-l ). While so working, he, by letter dated2. 11. 1962 (Exhibit D-3), requested the Vice-Chairman, D. D. A. , to work asdamages collector in the vacancy caused Shri D. N. Verma who has sincebeen relieved . The plaintiff, offered to deposit the necessary security. He wasthereafter appointed damages collector and by reference of his letter dated20. 11. 1962 (Exhibit D-4), he pledged 12 years national plan certificate infavour of the D. D. A. On 14. 9. 1962, the plaintiff was transferred from thegeneral Administration Section to the Land Section (Exhibit D-ll ). He wasdeclared quasi permanent as from 1. 7. 1964 (Exhibit D-5) while workingin the Damages Section. He was appointed to officiate as upper division clerk (U. D. C.) on provisional basis by office order dated 5. 10. 1966 (Exhibit D-6 ). 9. 1962, the plaintiff was transferred from thegeneral Administration Section to the Land Section (Exhibit D-ll ). He wasdeclared quasi permanent as from 1. 7. 1964 (Exhibit D-5) while workingin the Damages Section. He was appointed to officiate as upper division clerk (U. D. C.) on provisional basis by office order dated 5. 10. 1966 (Exhibit D-6 ). The plaintiff was still shown to be working in the Damages Section. By theoffice order effective from 1. 5. 1967 (Exhibit D-7),) various L. D. Cs. wereappointed to officiate as U. D. Cs. but in the case of the plaintiff he was directedto be reverted as L. DC. Earlier, by order dated 12. 4. 1967 (Exhibit D-2), theplaintiff was placed under suspension with immediate effect by the Vice-Chairman, D. L ). A. , in exercise powers conferred upon him by Regulation 13 (1) of the Regulations. It was mentioned that disciplinary proceedingswere contemplated against the plaintiff. By letter dated 22. 5. 1967 (Exhibit P-2),the plaintiff was informed that it was proposed to hold an inquiry against, himunder Regulation 16 of the Regulations. He was served with statement ofarticles of charge (Exhibit P-2/a), statement of imputations of misconduct ormisbehaviour in support of articles of charges (Exhibit P-2/b), list of documents (Exhibit P-2/c) and list of witnesses (Exhibit P-2/d ). It will beappropriate to reproduce the statement of articles of charges framed againstthe plaintiff at this stage itself : article-ITAMPERING with papers i. e. unauthorised alteration in thedates of service of Forms "f" in respect of S/shri Hoshiar Singhand Inder Singh by Shri L. C. Goyal while working as Damagescollector with a motive to provide undue benefit to the assessees. Article-IIGrant of irregular rebate amounting to Rs. 290. 38-by Shril. C. Goyal while working as Damages Collector on the basis ofalteration in the dates of the records mentioned in article-I. Article-IIILoss of Rs. 290. 38 to the D. D. A. on account of misconductof the said Shri L. C. goyal. mr. Kaushal Kishore, Lands Sales Officer, conducted the inquiry and submittedhis report dated 14 12 1967 (Exhibit P-6/a ). He held Article I as not havingbeen proved beyond reasonable doubt. He however, held that the secondand third articles of charge stood proved against the plaintiff. mr. Kaushal Kishore, Lands Sales Officer, conducted the inquiry and submittedhis report dated 14 12 1967 (Exhibit P-6/a ). He held Article I as not havingbeen proved beyond reasonable doubt. He however, held that the secondand third articles of charge stood proved against the plaintiff. Vice Chairman,d. D. A. agreed with the findings of the Inquiry Officer regarding Articles IIand III of the charge, but he disagreed with his finding relating to Article Iof the articles of charge. The Vice-Chairman held that Article I also stoodproved. A memorandum dated 3/127. 1968 (Exhibit P-3) was served on theplaintiff by the Vice-Chairman. He was given a copy of the inquiry report. He was also informed that in respect of Article of Charge I, the Vice-Chairmanalso held. that the same was also proved and further that the Vice-Charimanhad provisionally come. to the conclusion that the plaintiff was not a fitperson to be retained in service and that it was proposed to impose on himthe penalty, of dismissal from service. The plaintiff was given an opportunityof making a representation on the penalty proposed. The plaintiff submittedhis representations and was also granted a personal hearing. By order dated8. 11. 1968 (Exhibit P-5), the plaintiff was dismissed from the service of thed. D. A. under Rule l4 (g) read with Rule 15 (1) of the Regulations withimmediate effect The plaintiff appealed to the Chairman, D. D. A. His appealwas rejected and the order of rejection was communicated to the plaintiff byletter dated 20. 5. 1969 (Exhibit P-7) of the Secretary, D. D. A. ( 3 ) THE plaintiff sent a notice dated 11. 6. 1969 (Exhibit P-9) addressedto the Chairman, D. D. A. through an Advocate and described it as noticeunder Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code . By this notice, the plaintiffcalled upon the D D. A. to reinstate him to his U. D. C s posts as was held by-the plaintiff at the time he was suspended from service and to pay to himdamages equal to his full salary of his service. . during the relevant period. Theplaintiff, in this notice, REFERRED TO to the inquiry held against him and said thatthough in the inquiry case was not proved against him he was still dismissedfrom service against law and the rules of natural justice. He said, his appealwas also dismissed without providing him any opportunity for his defence. . during the relevant period. Theplaintiff, in this notice, REFERRED TO to the inquiry held against him and said thatthough in the inquiry case was not proved against him he was still dismissedfrom service against law and the rules of natural justice. He said, his appealwas also dismissed without providing him any opportunity for his defence. He also complained that he was illegally reverted as L. D. C. during hissuspension which was also in violation of the provisions of law and the rulesgoverning his service. He termed his dismissal from service as illegal, ultravires and arbitrary. Since there was no response to his notice, the plaintifffiled the present suit. It was filed on 26. 8. 1969, and, in the first instance,it was a suit for declaration with consequential relief He sought a declarationthat his dismissal was illegal and that he was entitled to be reinstated asu. D. C. with full salary from the date of his suspension. He also sought adeclaration that his reversion to the post of L. D. C. by order dated 29. 4. 1967was also illegal. During the pendency of the case, the plaintiff got his plaintamended, and by this amendment he also wanted a decree for Rs. 4. 460. 00 beingthe amount of emoluments to which be was entitled from the dale of bissuspension to the date of filing of the suit, as UDC. ( 4 ) I need not refer to the pleadings in detail at this stage except tonote that in the written statement filed by the D. D. A. it was stated that theplaintiff was reverted back to the post of L. D. C, not on account of anydepartmental proceedings against him, but as he was found unsuitable for thepost of U. D. C. by the Departmental Promotion Committee. ( 5 ) ON the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed ; 1. Whether the dismissal of plaintiff from service is illegal andunauthorised and malafide as alleged? OPP 2. Whether the reversion of the plaintiff to L. D. C. was illegal andwithout jurisdiction and against the principle of naturaljustice? OPP 3. Whether the suit is bad in the absence of notice u/s 53-B of thedelhi Development Act? 4. Whether and if so to what amount the plaintiff is entitled asarrears of salary? OPP 5. Relief. thereafter, on the application of the D. D A. , the following additional issuewas framed: 1a. OPP 3. Whether the suit is bad in the absence of notice u/s 53-B of thedelhi Development Act? 4. Whether and if so to what amount the plaintiff is entitled asarrears of salary? OPP 5. Relief. thereafter, on the application of the D. D A. , the following additional issuewas framed: 1a. Whether the suit is not within time? OPD. the Trial Court held all the issues in favour of the plaintiff except issue No. 3holding that the suit was not maintainable in the absence of notice undersection 53-B of the Act and dismissed the suit by judgment and decree dated15. 5. 1979. The plaintiff appealed. The learned Additional District Judgeheld all the issues against the plaintiff. and dismissed the appeal by his judgment and decree dated 2. 1. 1981. The present appeal was admitted fordetermining the following questions of law :. (I) Whether the lower appellate court failed to appreciate thatthe appellant had been found guilty of a matter with which hewas not charged ? (II) Whether the finding of the appointing authority, which resultedin the dismissal of the appellant, was arrived at in violationof the principles of natural justice or is otherwise untenable inlaw? (III) Whether the lower appellate court ought to have held that theallegation in the plaint regarding the sending of a notice undersection 80, Civil Procedure Code, should be read as alsohaving reference to a notice under section 53-B of the Delhidevelopment Act? (IV) Whether the lower appellate court was right in holding thatthe suit of the appellant was barred by time? ( 6 ) WHEN the plaintiff filed the suit he did not pray for a decree forarrears of salary. He only wanted declarations that (1) his dismissal wasillegal; (2) he was entitled to be reinstated as UDC with full salary from thedate of suspension and; (3) the order reverting him to LDC was illegal. Subsequently he was allowed to amend his plaint. He alleged that he wasillegally reverted from UDC and was entitled to emolumepts as UDC for thesuspension period and from the date of dismissal to the date of institution ofthe suit, which he calculated at Rs. 4,460. 00. On the prayer of the plaintiff hewas allowed to sue as an indigent person as regards his relief for arrears ofsalary amounting to Rs. 4,460. 00. It appears plaintiff filed his first appeal alsoas an. indigent person. 4,460. 00. On the prayer of the plaintiff hewas allowed to sue as an indigent person as regards his relief for arrears ofsalary amounting to Rs. 4,460. 00. It appears plaintiff filed his first appeal alsoas an. indigent person. By the impugned order the learned Additionaldistrict Judge directed that court fee payable in the appeal as well as on theplaint be realised from the plaintiff. In this second appeal the plaintiff hasgiven the value for the purpose of jurisdiction as Rs. 4. 790. 00 and for thepurpose of court fee as Rs. 330. 00. A court fee of Rs. 32. 50 has been paid inthe appeal. It would, therefore, appear that the plaintiff has not paid anycourt fee on the relief towards arrears of salary amounting to Rs. 4,460. 00otherwise, he was required to pay court fee on that amount (Section 4 of the Court Fees Act 1870) or he should have preferred TO the appeal as an indigentperson (Order 44 of the Code) Under Rule 3 of Order 44 of the Code wherethe plaintiff has been allowed to sue or appeal as an indigent person in thecourt from whose decree the appeal is preferred TO, no further enquiry in respectof the question whether or not he is an indigent person shall be necessary ifthe appellant has made an affidavit staling that he has not ceased to be anindigent person since the date of the decree appealed from. No such affidavithas been filed. In the circumstances, therefore, the appeal as regards relieffor Rs. 4,460. 00cannot be maintained. ( 7 ) THE principal reliefs claimed in the suit pertained to the dismissal of the plaintiff from service and also his reversion to the post of LDC. Theseare two separate reliefs. Defendant has contended that reversion of the plaintiff to LDC had nothing to do with the disciplinary proceedings taken againsthim. When the plaintiff was reverted he objected and by letter (Ex. D-8) hewanted the order or reversion to be cancelled or withdrawn. He. also threatenedthat if it was not done he would seek redress in a court of law. In this theplaintiff also pointed out that reversion was one of the major penaltiesmentioned in Regulation 14 and this penalty could not be imposed against himwithout following the procedure prescribed. Plaintiff also imputed motives tothe defendant in reverting him. The defendant in its reply dated 14. 6. 67 (Ex. In this theplaintiff also pointed out that reversion was one of the major penaltiesmentioned in Regulation 14 and this penalty could not be imposed against himwithout following the procedure prescribed. Plaintiff also imputed motives tothe defendant in reverting him. The defendant in its reply dated 14. 6. 67 (Ex. D-20) informed the plaintiff that he bad not been reverted as LDC as aresult of any departmental proceedings. His request to withdraw or cancelthe order of reversion was declined. The matter rested at that as far asdefendant was concerned. The plaintiff took no further action and ultimatelyafter the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings against him when he wasdismissed from service on 8. 11. 68, he filed an appeal dated 2. 1. 69 underregulation 22. He also REFERRED TO to his reversion as LDC which he termed asillegal. Under Regulation 24 an appeal is to be filed within three months fromthe date on which the appellant receives a copy of the order appealed against. On sufficient cause being shown the appellate authority can entertain theappeal even after the expiry of the period of three months. It would, thus, beseen that against the order of reversion if it was to be termed as one underregulation 14, as contended by the plaintiff, he was to file appeal within threemonths of the order weich is dated 29. 4. 67. No appeal was filed within thisperiod. Under sub-section (2) of Section 53 B of the Act a suit challenging areversion could not be instituted by the plaintiff after the expiry of six monthsfrom the date on which the cause of action arose. It is a different matter ifplaintiff could file a suit without exhausting his remedy of appeal under Regulation 22. That question I need not consider. The suit of the plaintiff quathe relief of reversion is, therefore, clearly barred by limitation. ( 8 ) IN the impugned judgment it has been held that the suit as regards relief for declaration against dismissal of the plaintiff was also barred by limitation. The court held that cause of action arose on 8. 11. 68 when the plaintiff wasdismissed and suit should have been filed within six months from that date. I do not think that is a correct view to take. Regulations have been framedunder Section 57 of the Act and they are statutory in nature. The court held that cause of action arose on 8. 11. 68 when the plaintiff wasdismissed and suit should have been filed within six months from that date. I do not think that is a correct view to take. Regulations have been framedunder Section 57 of the Act and they are statutory in nature. These providefor an appeal against the order imposing penalty on an employee of the DDA. It is a statutory remedy. It has been repeatedly held that appeal is a continuation of the original proceedings. In the present case cause of action wouldarise only after the plaintiff was communicated the orderdismissing his appeal. In this connection reference may be made to a decision of the Supreme Courtin Raghubir Jha v. State of Bihar and others ( AIR 1986 SC 508 ), In this casethe plaintiff had filed a suit for declaration that the order of his dischargefrom service was illegal. He was discharged from service on 27. 7. 61. He filedan appeal before the Commissioner, Bhagalpur Division which was dismissedand another appeal to the Board of Revenue also met the similar fate. Theplaintiff thereafter filed a revision before the State Government which thestate Government rejected on 5. 8. 65. The order rejecting the revision wascommunicated to the plaintiff on 19. 12. 65. He filed the suit on 7. 8. 68. Thesupreme Court held that period of limitation is to be computed from 19. 12. 65,the date of communication of the order of the State Government and the suitwas therefore within time. ( 9 ) BOTH the courts held that the persent suit was not maintainable inthe absence of notice under Section 53-B of the Act. I think both the courtsadopted rather an extreme technical approach. and their reasonings appearto be erroneous. The plaintiff did serve a notice (Ex. P-9) before filing the suit. Period of notice has to be excluded while computing the limitation. In thisnotice the plaintiff REFERRED TO to his dismissal which he termed as illegal. He alsosaid that his appeal was dismissed without providing any opportunity forhis defence. He said his dismissal was arbitrary, illegal and against theprinciples of natural justice. He called upon the D. D. A. to reinstate him asudc) a pust held by him before he was suspended, and to pay to himdamages equal to his full salary of his service during that period. He said his dismissal was arbitrary, illegal and against theprinciples of natural justice. He called upon the D. D. A. to reinstate him asudc) a pust held by him before he was suspended, and to pay to himdamages equal to his full salary of his service during that period. He said ifthis was not done he would file a suit for declaration for the purpose. Thisnotice was sent by the plaintiff through his advocate and gave the name ofthe plaintiff and also REFERRED TO to the departmental proceedings against him. Itclearly stated that the plaintiff was an employee of the D. D. A. and was working as UDC in the Land Sales Account Section, Vikas Bhawan, New Delhi. ( 10 ) IN the plaint the plaintiff stated that he had served a legal noticeunder Section 80 of the Code calling upon the defendant to reinstate, him to hispost of UDC but that no reply had been received till the time of filing of thesuit. He had REFERRED TO to the cause of action having arisen firstly on 8. 11. 68when he was served with the dismissal order and again on 20. 5. 6 9 when hisappeal was finally rejected and then on 14. 8. 69 after the expiry of the period ofthe notice. There was also reference to the reversion of the plaintiff as LDC. Then by seeking amendment of the plaint the plaintiff also claimed arrearsof his salary. He calculated this amount at Rs. 4,460. 00 claiming differencebetween the sub-spension allowance as a UDC and LDC and then salary for theperiod from 9. 11. 68, to 238. 69, that is from the date of dismissal to the institution of the suit. The plaintiff thus fully complied with the provisions of subsection (1) of Section 53-B of the Act. The notice in question explicitlystated the cause of action and the nature of relief sought and the name andplace of residence of the plaintiff. The plaint also in effect contained astatement that notice as required had been left at the office of the defendant. The amount of compensation claimed was notice specifically given but thenit is merely a question of artihmetic calculation. No fault can be found inthe notice on that account. The plaint also in effect contained astatement that notice as required had been left at the office of the defendant. The amount of compensation claimed was notice specifically given but thenit is merely a question of artihmetic calculation. No fault can be found inthe notice on that account. Provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 53-Bare similar to Section 80 of the Code except that where in Section 80 causeof action has to be stated, in Section 53b (l) cause of action has to bestated "explicitly. " I don t think the word "explicitly" makes much difference,though in the present case I have held that notice did explicitly state thenature of cause of action It is not the case of the defendant that any prejudicewas caused to it on the plaintiff s terming the notice as one under Section 80of the Code or that the defendant was misled on that account. Mentioningof a wrong section or non-mentioning of a section in the notice under whichit is sent is not material unless any prejudice is shown to have been causedon that account. A bare reading of the notice in the present case showsthat the defendant was left in no doubt as to who the plaintiff was and whathe was claiming. Notice has to be seen as a whole and so also the plaint. In the State of Madras v. C. P. Agencies and another ( AIR 1960 SC 1309 ) thesupreme Court following its earlier decision, in Dhiansingh Sobhasingh v. Union of India ( AIR 1958 SC 274 ) on the interpretation of Section 80 of thecode observed that though the terms of that section should be strictly compliedwith but that did not mean that the terms of the notice should be scrutinizedin a pendantic manner or in a manner completely divorced from commonsense. The court further observed as under :- "the object of S. 80 is manifestly to give the Goverment or thepublic officer sufficient notice of the case which is proposed to bebrought against it or him so that it or he may consider theposition and decide for itself or himself whether the claim of theplaintiff should be accepted or resisted. The court further observed as under :- "the object of S. 80 is manifestly to give the Goverment or thepublic officer sufficient notice of the case which is proposed to bebrought against it or him so that it or he may consider theposition and decide for itself or himself whether the claim of theplaintiff should be accepted or resisted. In order to enable thegovernment or the public officer to arrive at a decision it isnecessary that it or he should be informed of the nature of the suitproposed to be filed against it or him and the facts on which thecalim is founded and the precise reliefs asked for. " ( 11 ) I, therefore, do not find any fault in the notice and in my viewit meets the requirements of sub-section (1) of Section 53-B of the Act ( 12 ) AT this stage I may note that in the suit filed the plaintiff did notchallenge the order in appeal dated 20. 5. 69, though in the body of the plainthe did mention that the appeal was dismissed without giving any reasonableground for the same. The plaintiff even mentioned that cause of action alsoarose on the rejection of the appeal. In the present appeal by an order dated19. 11. 84 Goswamy, J. allowed the plaintiff to amend. his plaint to challengeboth the orders of dismissal dated 8. 11. 68 and the order in appeal dated20. 5. 69. If reference is made to the plaint, this is how the plaintiff stated hischallenge to the aforesaid two orders. "6. That the plaintiff had, categorically, pleaded not guiltyupon which an enquiry was held and nothing was found againstthe plaintiff. However, the enquiry officer found the plaintiff guiltyof carelessness by overlooking the alterations in the relevant datedand had suggested penalty but the same was also done minorprejudically and without any reasons whatsoever. 7. That after the above said enquiry the plaintiff was servedwith a show cause notice dated 12/07/1968 by the Vicechairman with new allegations which were held by the enquiryofficer as not proved against the plaintiff of which the plaintiff hadsubmitted a very satisfactory reply but of no avail. 8. 7. That after the above said enquiry the plaintiff was servedwith a show cause notice dated 12/07/1968 by the Vicechairman with new allegations which were held by the enquiryofficer as not proved against the plaintiff of which the plaintiff hadsubmitted a very satisfactory reply but of no avail. 8. That the plaintiff was served with dismissal orders dated 8/11/1968 by the Vice Chariman, Delhi Developmentauthority surpassing all the bounds of justice and thus the plaintiffwas dismissed from his services miserably without any reasonbleground and thus penalised him with the highest penalty providedin the law for the offence which the plaintiff never committed. 9. That the abvoe said orders of the Vice Chairman areillegal ultra vires and without jurisdiction against the naturaljustice infringing the fundamental rights of the plaintiff enshrinedin the constitution of India. 10. That the plaintiff filed an appeal against the above saidillegal orders but the same was also dismissed without giving anyreasonable ground for the same. "in the written statement the defendant denied all these allegations. Itstated that show cause notice dated 12. 7. 68, as provided in the Regulations,was issued by the Vice Chairman who was the competent authority and replyof the plaintiff dated 15. 7. 68 was duly considered and rightly rejected. It wasthen stated that orderofdismissalwasperfectlylegal,validandjustified. Asregards appeal it was stated that it was rightly dismissed by the Chairman ofthe defendant. In the replication the plaintiff added that in the inquiry madeagainst him the penalty suggested by the inquiry officer was minor, thoughthe same was also wrong, the defendant removed the plaintiff on the basisof findings of the inquiry which was beyond the limitations of the inquiryreport and no separate reasons were given whatsoever for the removal of theplaintiff from the service. ( 13 ) IT will be thus seen that the plaintiff did not. state material facts andgave no particulars in the plaint. It is not that the inquiry was held in breachof the regulations or the procedure prescribed. The penalty was imposed afteraffording opportunity to the plaintiff of being heard. In the inquiry he crossexamined the witnesses and also produced 3 witness in his defence. He fullyparticipated in the inquiry proceedings. Before imposing the penalty of dismissalthe plaintiff was again heard. There are no grounds to suggest that the inquirywas motivated or the order imposing the penally on him in any way malafide. In the inquiry he crossexamined the witnesses and also produced 3 witness in his defence. He fullyparticipated in the inquiry proceedings. Before imposing the penalty of dismissalthe plaintiff was again heard. There are no grounds to suggest that the inquirywas motivated or the order imposing the penally on him in any way malafide. It was also not stated that there was no evidence to bring charges home tothe plaintiff or even that the evidence brought on record in the inquiryproceedings was not sufficient for the purpose of the charges against theplaintiff. This led Mr. M. L. Bhargava, learned counsel for the D. D. A. tocontend that the plaintiff cannot travel beyond his pleadings and he cannotbe heard on the points not stated in the pleadings. Inshort Mr. Bhargavasaid that the plaintiff could not make a new case outside the pleadings. ( 14 ) EVIDENCE in the suit primarily consists of documents. Plaintiffexamined himself only as a witness and the defendant also examined only onewitness, namely, Mr. G. C. Jain who was working at the relevant lime asadministrative Officer in DD. A. He merely stated that the promotion fromldc to UDC was made first on temporary basis and if the work was foundsatisfactory and a permanent post was available in the UDC cadre, then casefor permanent appointment was considered. The witness added that provisional appointment was just like a temporary appointment. The plaintiff inhis statement proved various documents principally the show cause noticeincluding articles of charge, report of the inquiry officer, order of dismissal,his appeal to the Chairman, D. D. A. and the order rejecting his appeal. He wasstated that he was never communicated any adverse remarks against him andthat promotion to UDC from LDC was on the basis of seniority cumfitness and that his promotion as UDC was not provisional. He also stated thathis dismissal was wrong and that the department was prejudiced against him and that was why be was turned out. He also said that Mr. C. L. Sharma wasearlier the auditor and that he had given a report against the plaintiff whichwas filed. There is no other evidence. The plaintiff did no bring on recordthe evidence recorded before the inquiry officer. ( 15 ) MR. G. D. Gupta, learned counsel for the plaintiff, submitted that therewas no evidence in-support of the first charge. C. L. Sharma wasearlier the auditor and that he had given a report against the plaintiff whichwas filed. There is no other evidence. The plaintiff did no bring on recordthe evidence recorded before the inquiry officer. ( 15 ) MR. G. D. Gupta, learned counsel for the plaintiff, submitted that therewas no evidence in-support of the first charge. He said no amount of suspicioncould take the place of positive proof and that the authority could not acton mere surmises and conjectures. He said that there was no evidence eitherdirect or circumstantial to prove that it was the plaintiff who tampered withthe papers. Mr. Gupta said that if charge (1) fell, other to charges which wereinter-connected with the first charge also fell. It was also the contention ofmr. Gupta that findings by the inquiry officer as well as the disciplinaryauthority were perverse. He said the plaintiff could at best be charged withnegligence in the facts and circumstances of the case but then there was nocharge of negligence. Mr. Gupta. also said that the entire attention of theplaintiff during the course of the inquiry was diverted to the first charge. Hereferred TO to the report of the inquiry officer (P-6/a) wherein he said thatcharges 2 and 3 were related and depended on the findings in respect ofthe first charge and for that reason the inquiry officer had dealt with allthe three charges together in his report. Mr. Gupta contended that it wasa case where principles of natural justice had been violated and the plaintiffwas condemned unheard. Mr. Gupta also REFERRED TO to a few reported decisionsin support of his submissions. ( 16 ) I have set out the articles of charge above. Under the Publicpremises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958d. D. A. assessesdamages for unauthorised occupation of public premises. This order undersub-section (2) of Section 7 of the aforesaid Act is served on the person concerned in Form-F. By Resolution No. 202 the D. D. A. modified its earlierresolution and now allowed rebate of 10% on the amount paid by theencroacher who. made full payment of damages within sixty days from thedate of assessment or thirty days from the date of service of the assessmentorder, whichever was later. made full payment of damages within sixty days from thedate of assessment or thirty days from the date of service of the assessmentorder, whichever was later. The duties of damage collector comprised of (i)service of Form-F through the process server (ii) maintenance of assessmentand recovery register, and (iii) realisation of damages after allowing rebatewherever due In the case of Hosbiar Singh Form-F was handed overto the plaintiff by the assessment clerk on 29. 4. 66 who in turn gaveit to Dharampal, peon for service. Service was effected on Hoshiarsingion3. 5. 66dharampal handed over the Form-F after service to theplaintiff on 11. 5. 66. The date 3. 5. 66 was subsequently changed to 23. 6. 66. Plaintiff returned Form-F to the assessment clerk on 30. 5. 66. It was therefore,contended that the date. 23. 6. 66. was substituted afterover by the plaintiff to the assessment clerk and he was, therefore, not reponsable for the interpolation. On the basis of Form-F having been served onhoshiar Singh on 23. 6. 66 the plaintiff allowed him rebate under Resolution202 of the D. D. A. Hoshiar Singh made payment of Rs. 790-97 on 14. 7. 66and was allowed rebate of Rs. 87-88. The plaintiff came up with the plea that he got the date of service of Form-F on Hoshiar Singh from the assessment clerk and he himself did not see Fom-F and it was for the assessmentclerk to have pointed out ther interpolation in the date of service of Form-Fwhich was apparent even to a -naked eye. The disciplinary authority heldthat the date when Form-F was graven to Dharampal for service and the dateon which it was returned after service to the plaintiff should have been notedby him in his register. The disciplinary authority was also of the viewthat since Form-F was not in possession of the damage collector at the timeof grant of rebate and he had failed to make an entry regarding the date ofservice in his register, he should have personally verified the date of serviceof the form before allowing the rebate. Thedamage collector should havealso consulted the process server s register to ascertain the correct date ofservice. The authority was, therefore, of the view that these factors constitutedstrong circumstantial evidence to prove that tampering and interpolation hadbeen done by the plaintiff himself and if at all by someone else, then thatwas with the connivance and knowledge of the plaintiff. Thedamage collector should havealso consulted the process server s register to ascertain the correct date ofservice. The authority was, therefore, of the view that these factors constitutedstrong circumstantial evidence to prove that tampering and interpolation hadbeen done by the plaintiff himself and if at all by someone else, then thatwas with the connivance and knowledge of the plaintiff. This, disciplinaryauthority held, was done in order to allow undue benefit to the assessee inthe form of rebate. The disciplinary authority also observed that only thedamage collector came in direct contact with the assessee when the lattermakes the payment and the alteration in the date of service could not serveany motive of any other person forging the form. Only the damage collectorwas to allow the rebate, in the case of the second assessee Inder Singh Form-Fwas handed over the plaintiff by the assessment clerk on 5. 2. 66. He gave itto Chote Ram, process server for service. The service on Inder Singh waseffected on 11. 2. 66. Thereafter, the process server returned the Form-F tothe plaintiff. The date of service on this form was changed to 11. 8. 66. Arebate of Rs. 202-50 was allowed to Inder Singh by the plaintiff under Resolution 202 Of the D D. A. to which Inder Singh otherwise would not have beenentitled if he was served of Form-F on 11. 2. 66. After the date of service, i. e. ,11. 2. 66, Inder Singh made the following payments which were received by thedamage collector, i. e. , the plaintiff :-Form-F relating to Inder Singh was returned to the assessment clerk on26. 10,66, There was no reason why Form-F should have remained with theplaintiff for all this period after service on Inder Singh. The explanationof the plaintiff for having allowed rebate to Inder Sir. gh was the same as thatin the case of Hoshiar Singh. The disciplinary authority observed that whilethe plaintiff as damage collector was repeatedly receiving payments fordamages from Inder Singh, there was no valid reason why Form-F could nothave been served on Inder Singh during the months February 196 6/08/1966. The interpolated date of Form-F relating to Inder Singh was 11 8 66. The disciplinary authority observed that whilethe plaintiff as damage collector was repeatedly receiving payments fordamages from Inder Singh, there was no valid reason why Form-F could nothave been served on Inder Singh during the months February 196 6/08/1966. The interpolated date of Form-F relating to Inder Singh was 11 8 66. This is yet another factor in the case of Inder Singh All these were takeninto account by the disciplinary authority to come to the conlusion that theseconstituted strong circumstantial evidence to prove that tampering andinterpolation was done by the plaintiff himself and if at all by someone elsethen with the connivance and knowledge of the plaintiff. ( 17 ) I do not find any fault in the reasoning of the disciplinary authorityfor me to hold that findings are based on no legal evidence or that conclusionis one to which no reasonable man would come. The plaintiff, to my mind,was quite aware of what he was charged and what case he had to meet. Penalty of dismissal was imposed on him after holding an inquiry underregulation 16 of the Regulations and the plaintiff also availed of his right ofappeal under Regulation 22 as well. In the ground of appeal to the Chairman,d. D. A. , the plaintiff did not say that he was in any way misled or prejudicedin his case. His plea that date of service of Form-F were given to him bythe assessment clerk was obviously an after thought. No principles of naturaljustice have been violated in the present case and none have been alleged inthe plaint to have been violated. To say in the plaint that principles ofnatural justice were violated without more is not enough. Mr. Bhargava iscorrect in his submission that there is no proper plea and no evidence to hold that the plaintiff had been found guilty of a matter of which he was notcharged or that the order of his dismissal was arrived at in violation ofprinciples of natural Justice or was otherwise untenable in law. The court hasto go by the pleadings and evidence on record. To my mind the inquiry hasbeen properly held. The court hasto go by the pleadings and evidence on record. To my mind the inquiry hasbeen properly held. The departmental authorities are the sole judges of factsand as observed by the Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Sreerama Rao ( AIR 1963 SC 1723 ) "if there besome legal evidence on whichtheil findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is nota matter which can be permitted to be canvassed be fore the High Court ina proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution. "i may alsorefer to another decision of the Supreme Court in R. C. Sharma v. Union ofindia and others ( AIR 1976 SC 2037 ). This. appeal had arisen out of a suitfiled by the appellant challenging his reversion from the post of an income-taxofficer to that of income-tax inspector. One of the arguments was that theevidence before the inquiring officer did not support the charges levelledagainst the. appellant. It was also contended that the appellant was not givena reasonable opportunity to lead evidence and to be heard. The court observedthat this was largely a question of fact and it was only when an opportunitydenied was of such a nature that contravened a mandatory provision of law ora rule of natural justice that the denial it could vtitate the whole departmentaltrial. Prejudice to the government servant resulting from an alleged violarionof a rule must be proved. The court also observed that unless the exclusion ofevidence of a kind which amounted to a denial of natural justice or wouldhave affected the final decision it could not be said to be material. The courtthen observed as under :- "a suit challenging the validity of departmental proceedings cannotbe treated as an appeal from the findings in the departmental pro-ceedings or the punishment inflicted upon the Govt. servant even ifthese are erroneous. A question which could affect the result in acivil suit has to be of such a nature that it goes to the root of thejurisdiction and the conduct of the departmental trial and vitiates theresult. It is only if the departmental proceeding is null and voidthat a plaintiff in such a suit could obtain. the reliefs he has askedfor. We are unable to see what point had been raised by theappellant which could have had that effect upon the departmentalproceedings. It is only if the departmental proceeding is null and voidthat a plaintiff in such a suit could obtain. the reliefs he has askedfor. We are unable to see what point had been raised by theappellant which could have had that effect upon the departmentalproceedings. " ( 18 ) IN the present case there is no pleading and no evidence thereon tohold that the impugned order is null and void. Regulation 16 prescribes adetailed procedure for holding of an inquiry against a delinquent officer. It isnot necessary to set out the regulation which contains various sub-rules. Buti would say that it incorporates all the relevant principles of natural justice. It is not the case of the plaintiff that any of the rules pertaining to the inquiryhas been contravened in the present case. This court is not sitting in appealfrom the findings of the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority. Evidence which was led before the inquiring officer has not been brought onrecord in the present suit. The statutory authorities have acted within theregulations and there could be no challange to their action. I am quite awarethat pleadings are not to be construed strictly or examined minutely, but thenthe rules relating to pleadings cannot be given a complete go-by. The courtcannot look beyond the pleadings when examined as a whole and the evidencein support of the pleadings. It appears to me that all the relevant facts hadbeen examined by the disciplinary authority and the impugned orders cannotbe said to be illegal or invalid on any of the submissions made by the plaintiff. Because of the view which I nave taken, it is not necessary for me to refer toother judgment cited at the bar though those were mostly rendered with reference to the provisions of Article 226 of the Constitution. ( 19 ) THE appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed. Since the matter hasbeen pending in court all this period, I will not like to burden the appellantwith costs.