JUDGMENT S.D. Agarwala, J. - A suit No. 264 of 1976 was filed by Thakur Prasad against Brij Mohan Lal Gupta for ejectment on the allegation that Thakur Prasad was the tenant of the property in suit and Brij Mohan Lal Gupta was a licensee. He having terminated his license, was entitled to the decree for ejectment against Brij Mohan Lal Gupta. The property in dispute is house No. 188, situate in Baluaghat, Allahabad. This suit was based on the allegation that originally late R. Mitra was the owner and landlord of the accommodation in question. He gave this property in dispute on rent to Thakur Prasad as well as house No. 189, which is adjacent to the house in dispute. It was further alleged that Ram Lal who was the original defendant in the suit and father of Brij Mohan Lal Gupta was his distant nephew, who was running in financial crises and, consequently, he permitted Ram Lal to occupy the ground floor portion of house No. 188, which is the subject-matter of dispute. It was further stated that subsequently, as the family of Ram Lal had expended, he permitted Ram Lal to occupy the first floor also as a licensee. It has also been stated that Ram Lal subsequently got another house constructed in Mohalla Baluaghat, Allahabad for his son Brij Lal Gupta and consequently, he requested Ram Lal to vacate the premises in suit, but since he failed to vacate the property, the suit was filed for ejectment and recovery of damages at the rate of Rs. 12 per mensem. This suit was contested on the ground that Ram Lal became the owner of the property by virtue of adverse possession. It appears that during the trial of the suit, a case of tenancy was also set up by Ram Lal though, in fact, the said case was not pleaded in the written statement. 2. On 4th August, 1978, Smt. Rashmi Keshari purchased the house No. 188 in dispute by a registered sale-deed from Smt. Isha Bagchi and son Prakash Bagchi for a consideration of Rs. 20,000. After the purchase by Smt. Rashmi Keshari another suit No. 166 of 1980 was filed by her against Thakur Prasad and Brij Mohan Gupta for ejectment. 2. On 4th August, 1978, Smt. Rashmi Keshari purchased the house No. 188 in dispute by a registered sale-deed from Smt. Isha Bagchi and son Prakash Bagchi for a consideration of Rs. 20,000. After the purchase by Smt. Rashmi Keshari another suit No. 166 of 1980 was filed by her against Thakur Prasad and Brij Mohan Gupta for ejectment. It was alleged in the said suit that Thakur Prasad was the tenant of the property in dispute and Brij Mohan Lal Gupta was the licensee of Thakur Prasad. Thakur Prasad did not pay rent since Ist June, 1975 inspite of repeated demands, Brij Mohan Lal Gupta denied her title and inspite of notices of demand and termination of tenancy, the house was not vacated and hence the suit was filed for ejectment of the defendant for recovery of arrears of rent and for damages. It may, at this stage, be stated that Thakur Prasad is the father-in-law of Smt. Rashmi Keshari. He admitted that he is the tenant of the property in suit, but the suit, in fact, was contested by Ram Lal and after his death, by Brij Mohan Lal Gupta on the ground that they have become the owners of the Property by virtue of adverse possession. Both the suits were decided by a common judgment of the Judge Small Cause Court, Allahabad on 30th September, 1982 and the same were decreed. Against the judgment dated 30th September, 1982 two appeals were filed, one being Civil Appeal No. 228 of 1982 arising out of judgment in suit No. 264 of 1976 and the other being Civil Revision No. 713 of 1982 arising out of suit No. 166 of 1980. Both the civil appeal as well as the civil revision were dismissed by VIth Additional District Judge, Allahabad by the judgment dated 19.1.1984. Since in suit No. 166 of 1980, a revision had been filed in the Court below, the judgment dated 19.1.1984 was challenged by writ petition No. 2766 of 1984 in this Court. The judgment dated 19.1.1984 arising out of suit No. 264 of 1976 was challenged by means of a Second Appeal No. 643 of 1984. 3. Writ Petition was admitted on 8th November, 1984 and it was directed that the writ be connected with the second appeal mentioned above. The judgment dated 19.1.1984 arising out of suit No. 264 of 1976 was challenged by means of a Second Appeal No. 643 of 1984. 3. Writ Petition was admitted on 8th November, 1984 and it was directed that the writ be connected with the second appeal mentioned above. In the circumstances both the writ petitions as well as the second appeal have come up for hearing before me together. Since both the writ petition as well as the second appeal arise out of the same property in dispute and were decided by a common judgment of the Courts below, the same are being decided by a common judgment. 4. I have heard Sri K.N. Tripathi on behalf of Sri Brij Mohan Lal Gupta and Sri S.N. Agarwal, on behalf of respondent No. 3, Smt. Rashmi Keshari in both the cases. Learned counsel for Brij Mohan Lal Gupta has urged that the judgment given by the trial Court as well as Appellate Court is vitiated in law, as the Courts below have ignored material evidence as well as the admission made by the respondents in their evidence. 5. Learned Counsel has placed before me the oral evidence of Thakur Prasad, P.W. 1 and the evidence of Ram Chandra, P.W. 3, who is the husband of Smt. Rashmi Keshari. After reading the evidence of Thakur Prasad it was urged that since it is admitted by Thakur Prasad that he does not know English and as such the rent receipts filed by him, cannot be held to be proved. The submission cannot be permitted to be raised at this stage. In fact, the rent receipts in favour of Thakur Prasad have been exhibited in the Courts below. There was no challenge to the documents being exhibited. This question is being raised for the first time in this Court at the second appellate stage. Even otherwise, I have gone through the statement of Thakur Prasad. He has clearly admitted that he recognises the signature of the original landlord as well as his successor, as he has seen them writing. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that merely because Thakur Prasad admitted that he did not know English, the rent receipts could not be held to be have been proved. In my opinion, this submission is wholly without substance. 6. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that merely because Thakur Prasad admitted that he did not know English, the rent receipts could not be held to be have been proved. In my opinion, this submission is wholly without substance. 6. It has been further urged by learned counsel on the basis of statement of Thakur Prasad that since he has admitted that he is living in house No. 189, which is the house adjacent to the house in dispute, therefore, the Courts below have erred in holding that he gave the portion of the house No. 188 in dispute to the licensee Ram Lal. In my opinion, this submission is also without substance. It is Thakur Prasad's clear case that rent receipts have been issued in his favour for both the houses No. 188 and 189, Baluaghat, Allahabad. By the mere fact that he has stated in his statement in the year 1982 that he is at present Living in house No. 189, it cannot be held that he did not have house No. 188 in his possession. In fact, the case of Thakur Prasad throughout has been that he had been given the ground floor and, therefore, the first floor of house No. 188 to Ram Lal, which case has been clearly believed by both the Courts below. I do not find that this statement of Thakur Prasad, in any way, vitiates the findings in regard to licenses recorded by both the Courts below. From the statement of Ram Chandra also, nothing has been pointed out to me as to which is that categoric admission which the Courts below have ignored or discarded. In the circumstances, it can't be said that the findings recorded by the Courts below are either based on ignorance of material evidence or is against the admissions made by the plaintiffs in the two suits. It was next urged by learned counsel that it has been found by the Courts below that rent was only paid by Thakur Prasad till 1953 and since after 1953 there is no evidence of payment of rent and as such, it should be held that Thakur Prasad had paid the rent till 1953, he continues to remain tenant in the property. It is another thing that if he does not pay the rent, he may be liable for eviction as a defaulter, but he does not cease to be the tenant merely because the rent was not being paid. This argument, as stated above, is wholly fallacious. 7. It has been further urged that since it has been admitted by Thakur Prasad that after the sale-deed was executed in favour of Smt. Rashmi Keshari, Thakur Prasad gave the third storey of the house to Rashmi Keshari and consequently, on the basis of the statement, Thakur Prasad had surrendered the tenancy in favour of Smt. Rashmi Keshari. If the tenancy itself was surrendered, the argument further is that Thakur Prasad cannot be held to be the tenant and the suit could not have been decreed. In my opinion, this argument is also fallacious. Thakur Prasad did not surrender the tenancy in favour of Smt. Rashmi Keshari. Since Smt. Rashmi Keshari was his daughter-in-law and she became the owner by virtue of the sale-deed executed in her favour on 4th August, 1978, he permitted her to occupy the third storey. By the mere fact that the owner of the property has been given permission to live in a portion of the property in dispute, does not by itself mean that the tenant should be held to have surrendered the entire tenancy. The relationship of landlord and tenant still continues to remain and as such in my opinion, this submission, as stated above, does not have substance. 8. Both the Courts below, have, after examining the entire evidence on record categorically found that Thakur Prasad was the tenant and Smt. Rashmi Keshari became the owner of the property by virtue sale-deed dated 4th August, 1978. A portion of the property in dispute was given to Ram Lal as a licensee, which is now being occupied by Brij Mohan Lal Gupta. It has been further found that the case of adverse possession set up by Brij Mohan Lal Gupta has not been established. In view of these concurrent findings arrived at by the Courts below, it cannot be said that the decrees passed are, in any manner, erroneous in law. 9. In the result, the writ petition as well as the second appeal fails and are dismissed accordingly. Parties are directed to bear their own costs. In view of these concurrent findings arrived at by the Courts below, it cannot be said that the decrees passed are, in any manner, erroneous in law. 9. In the result, the writ petition as well as the second appeal fails and are dismissed accordingly. Parties are directed to bear their own costs. The interim orders dated 22.2.1984 and 8.11.1984 are hereby vacated.