JUDGMENT: The plaintiff in O.S.No.1623 of 1978, District Munsif's Court, Coimbatore; is the appellant in the second appeal and the petitioner in the civil revision petition. Briefly stated, the circumstances giving rise to these proceedings are as follows: According to the case of the plaintiff, the Devasthanam is the owner of the suit property, which was under the occupation of deceased Narayanan (1st defendant in the suit) as a tenant on a monthly rent of Rs.40 payable on the first of every English calendar month upto 30.4.1977. Though with reference to other buildings in the locality, the Deputy Commissioner, H.R.& C.E. Department, enhanced the rent, in respect of the building in the occupation of deceased Narayanan, the rent was not enhanced, but deceased Narayanan was a chronic defaulter and was in arrears of rent to the tune of Rs.1,186, which had not been paid despite repeated demands and requests. Thereupon, a notice was issued by the plaintiff to deceased Narayanan on 3.9.1977 terminating the tenancy and also demanding delivery of possession of the property in his occupation as a tenant, but he did not accede to the demands so made even after the receipt of the notice. It was thereafter that the plaintiff instituted O.S.No.1623 of 1978 on 29.8.1978 against deceased Narayanan praying for recovery of possession of the suit property and Rs.1,186 towards damages for past use and occupation and future damages at the rate of Rs.40 per mensem from 1.8.1978 till delivery of possession. 2. In the written statement filed by deceased Narayanan, he pleaded that he took on lease the vacant site measuring 27’ east to west and 17’ north to south prior to 19.2.1958 and had put up a superstructure thereon and thus became entitled to claim the benefits of Madras City Tenants Protection Act, 1921 (hereinafter referred to as the Act’). It was also his further case that originally the rent was Rs.5 for the vacant site, which was gradually raised to Rs.13 per mensem, and therefore, the claim that the rent was Rs.40 per mensem, was not in order. Reiterating that he was entitled to the benefits of the Act, it was also contended that the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, would apply and the suit instituted was not maintainable. It was therefore prayed that the suit should be dismissed. 3. Reiterating that he was entitled to the benefits of the Act, it was also contended that the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, would apply and the suit instituted was not maintainable. It was therefore prayed that the suit should be dismissed. 3. Consistent with the stand taken in the written statement that he is entitled to claim the benefits of the Act, deceased Narayanan filed, I.A.706 of 1979 under section 9 of the Act, praying that the plaintiff in the suit should be directed to sell the site of the suit property to him for a price to be fixed by Court. That application was resisted by the plaintiff in the suit contending that deceased Narayanan was not entitled to claim the benefits of the Act and the application filed by him claiming the benefits under section 9 of the Act was not sustainable. While matters stood thus, Narayanan, against whom alone O.S.No.1623 of 1978 had been instituted on 29.8.1978, died on 18.2.1981. Thereupon, the plaintiff in the suit filed an application in I.A.No.40 of 1981 under Order 22 , Rule 4, Code of Civil Procedure praying that the respondents in the second appeal, inclusive of the sole respondent in the civil revision petition, should be impleaded as the legal representatives of deceased Narayanan. That application was ordered on 4.9.1981. Thereafter, the respondent in the civil revision petition, one of the legal representatives of deceased Narayanan, filed I.A.No.239 of 1981 on 19.9.1981 under section 9 of the Act, claiming that the lease in favour of his deceased father, Narayanan, was prior to 19.2.1958, and that his father and himself had put up the superstructures thereon, and therefore, after the death of his father, he would be entitled to claim the benefits of the Act as he continued to remain in possession of the suit property. On 25.9.1981, the application in IA.No.706 of 1979 filed earlier by deceased Narayanan, was dismissed on an endorsement to the effect that the petitioner therein had died and in view of the filing of the application in I.A.No.239 of 1981, that application was not pressed. On 25.9.1981, the application in IA.No.706 of 1979 filed earlier by deceased Narayanan, was dismissed on an endorsement to the effect that the petitioner therein had died and in view of the filing of the application in I.A.No.239 of 1981, that application was not pressed. In the counter filed by the plaintiff in I.A.No.239 of 1981, it was contended that the application filed by the respondent in the civil revision petition (hereinafter referred to as ‘the respondent’ for short) in I.A.No.239 of 1984 was not maintainable and that the claim that deceased Narayanan and the respondent had put up the superstructure, after deceased Narayanan took on lease the vacant site, was false and that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff in the suit and the respondent. It was also contended that the respondent had no right to claim any tenancy rights and therefore was also not entitled to the protection of the Act and the prayer for a direction for the sale of the site was misconceived. 4. Before the trial court, on behalf of the plaintiff, Exs.A.1 to A.21 were marked and P.Ws.1 and 2 were examined, while, on behalf of the respondents in the second appeal Exs. B.1 to B.20 were filed and D.Ws.1 and 2 gave evidence. On a consideration of the oral as well as the documentary evidence, the trial court held that the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act , are inapplicable and that the suit is maintainable, that all the respondents in the second appeal are the heirs of deceased Narayanan and they are also necessary parties to the suit, that though the subject matter of the lease in favour of deceased Narayanan was the vacant site, the respondent is not entitled to claim the benefits of section 9 of the Act and that the plaintiff is entitled to recover vacant possession of the suit property after removal of the superstructure by the respondents in the second appeal within two months and also to recover past damages from 1.2.1976 to 31.7.78 at Rs.13 p.m. less Rs.235 and relegated the question of future damages to separate proceedings under Order 20 , Rule 12, Code of Civil Procedure. In accordance with the findings so rendered, a decree was granted in favour of the plaintiff in O.S.No.1623 of 1978 and I A.No.239 of 1981 filed by the respondent was dismissed. Aggrieved by this, the respondent alone preferred A.S.No.115 of 1985 against the decree in O.S.No.1623 of 1978 and C.M.A. 61 of 1984 against the dismissal of I.A.No.239 of 1981 in O.S.No.1623 of 1978. By a common judgment, the learned District Judge found that the respondent is entitled to claim the benefits of the Act and plaintiff in the suit should be directed to sell the suit site to him. It was also further found that the entire area of the site was necessary for convenient enjoyment the market value of which was also fixed at Rs.7,500. In view of the conclusions so arrived at, the decree for recovery of possession granted in O.S.No. 1623 of 1978 was vacated and the plaintiff was directed to sell to vacant site of the suit property to the respondent for Rs.7,500 by allowing the appeal in C.M.A.No.61 of 1984. A further direction was also given that the respondent should deposit a sum of Rs.7,500 on or before 27.11.1985, upon which; the plaintiff should execute the sale deed for the entirety of the vacant site in the suit property in favour of the respondent on or before 27.12.1985, failing which the sale deed could be got executed through court. It is the correctness of this that is questioned by the plaintiff in this second appeal and the civil revision petition. 5. Learned counsel for the plaintiff first contended that having regard to the institution of the suit in O.S.No.1623 of 1978 on 29.8.1978 against deceased Narayanan and the filing of an application by him in I.A.No.706 of 1979 claiming the benefits of the Act and the dismissal thereof on 25.9.1981, the second application in I A.No.239 of 1981 at the instance of the respondent was not maintainable under section 9 of the Act. Strong reliance in this connection was placed by the learned counsel for the plaintiff upon the decision in Syed Ibrahim v. Jalma Syed Ibrahim v. Jalma (1968)2 MLJ.83. 6. Strong reliance in this connection was placed by the learned counsel for the plaintiff upon the decision in Syed Ibrahim v. Jalma Syed Ibrahim v. Jalma (1968)2 MLJ.83. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent, who is also the main contesting respondent in the second appeal, contended that though the decision in Syed Ibrahim v. Jalma Syed Ibrahim v. Jalma (1968)2 MLJ.83 would appear, at first sight to cover this case, yet, in view of the amendments introduced by the amending Acts. to the Act, viz., The Madras City Tenants Protection (Amendment) Act, 1972, Act 4 of 1972 and the Madras City Tenants Protection (Amendment) Act. 1973, Act 24 of 1973 , a person like the respondent, would be’ a tenant’ in his own right and is entitled to claim rights under the Act, as a heir of a person falling under section 2(4)(ii) (b) of the Act, and therefore, the decision relied on would be inapplicable, thereby enabling the respondent to claim such benefits. 7. Before proceeding to consider the contention thus raised, it would be necessary to set out a few undisputed facts. Originally, the suit O.S.No.1623 of 1978 was instituted only against deceased Narayanan as the sole defendant. In I.A.No.706 of 1979, deceased Narayanan filed an application claiming the benefits of section 9 of the Act and that application was eventually dismissed on 25.9.1981, after the death of Narayanan on 18.2.1981. The legal representatives of deceased Narayanan, viz, all the respondents in the second appeal, inclusive of the respondent in the civil revision petition, were all brought on record in an application I.A.40 of 1981 filed under Order 22 , Rule 4, Code of Civil Procedure, on 4.9.1981. Thereafter, in I A.No.239 of 1981 the respondent had claimed the benefits of section 9 of the Act exclusively for himself. Now, the question is whether he is so entitled to claim the benefits of the Act. The expression ‘tenant’ is defined in section 2(4) of the Act, as- (4) ‘Tenant’ in relation to any land (i) means a person liable to pay rent in respect of such land under a tenancy agreement express or implied, and (ii) includes- (a) any such person as is referred to in sub-clause (i) who continues in possession of the land after the determination of the tenancy agreement. (b) any person who was a tenant in respect of such land under a tenancy agreement to which this Act is applicable under sub-section (3) of section.1 and who or any of his predecessors- in interest had erected any building on such land and who continues in actual physical possession of such land and building notwithstanding that- (1) Such person was not entitled to the rights under this Act by reason of the proviso to section 12 of this Act as it stood before the date of the publication of the Madras City Tenants' Protection (Amendment) Act, 1972 (T.N. Act4 of 1972): or (2) a decree for declaration or a decree or an order for possession or for similar relief has been passed against such person on the ground that the proviso to section 12 of this Act as it stood before the date of the publication of the Madras City Tenants Protection (Amendment) Act, 1972 (T.N. Act 4 of 1972) disentitled such person from claiming the right under this Act, and (c) the heirs of any such person as is referred to in sub-clause (i) or sub-clause (ii) (a) or (ii) (b) but does not include a sub-tenant or his heirs.” Under section 9(1)(a)(i) of the Act, any tenant, who is entitled to compensation under section 3 , and against whom a suit in ejectment has been instituted by the landlord, may within one month of the date of the publication of the Madras City Tenants Protection (Amendment) Act, 1979 in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, or, of the date with effect from which this Act is extended to the municipal town, township, or village, in which the land is situate, or, within one month after the service on him of summons, apply to the Court for an order that the landlord shall be directed to sell for a price to be fixed by the Court, the whole or part of extent of land specified in the application. Here, it is not the case of the respondent that he would be a ‘tenant’ under section 2(4)(i) of the Act. There was no tenancy agreement, either express or implied, by which, he was liable to pay rent. Here, it is not the case of the respondent that he would be a ‘tenant’ under section 2(4)(i) of the Act. There was no tenancy agreement, either express or implied, by which, he was liable to pay rent. Likewise, he would also not fall within section 2(4)(ii)(a), for, it is not his case that where was an earlier tenancy agreement, which had determined, and even thereafter, he continued in possession of the land. In this case, even according to deceased Narayanan, the tenancy agreement was between the plaintiff and himself. Sub-Cl.(b) to section 2(4)(ii) was introduced by Madras City Tenants Protection (Amendment) Act, 1972 ( Act 4 of 1972). That amendment was introduced to delete the saving provision underS.12 of the Act, which as it till then stood, provided that the Act will not effect any stipulation by the tenant in writing registered regarding the erection of buildings after the date of such contract. The amendment was introduced deleting the saving provision, rendering nugatory contracts entered into by the tenants and the effect of this was that a tenant, who had constructed a building in violation of the express contract, would also be entitled to the protection of the Act. That protection was further made available even in cases where a decree for declaration or a decree for possession or other similar reliefs had been granted by a Court on the ground that the Proviso to section 12 of the Act disentitled such a person from claiming benefits under the Act. It is thus seen that the object of introducing section 2(4)(ii)(b) by the amending Act, Act 4 of 1972, was totally for a different purpose. It is not the case of the respondent that he was a tenant in respect of the land under the plaintiff and therefore, the first part of section 2(4)(ii) (b) would be inapplicable to him. Even on the footing that either the respondent or his prececessor-in-interest had erected any building and continued in possession, that should be notwithstanding the proviso under section 12 of the Act or a decree for declaration or a decree for possession or other similar reliefs on the ground that the Proviso to section 12 disentitled such a person from claiming rights under the Act. In so far as the respondent is concerned, it is seen that there is no question of the applicability of the proviso to section 12 of the Act to him or a decree for possession having been passed against him, on the ground that the Proviso to section 12 of the Act disentitled him from claiming rights under the Act. Therefore, the respondent would not fall within the definition of ‘tenant’ under section 2(4)(ii)(b). Indeed, even deceased Nara-i yanan would not have fallen under the definition of ‘tenant’ contained in section 2(4)(ii)(b), and the respondent claiming right as his legal representative, cannot be in a better position. The applicability of section 2(4)(ii)(b) either to deceased Narayanan or even to the respondent, thus being ruled out, if at all the respondent can claim rights under the Act, it could be only under the first part of section 2(4)(ii)(C), which takes in the heirs of ‘a person’ referred to in sub-Cl. (a) or sub-Cl.(b) of clause (ii) to section 2(4) of the Act. Already, it has been seen how even deceased Narayanan could not claim to fall under sub-Cl (c) or sub-Cl (b) of Cl.(ii) to section 2(4) of the Act, and therefore, there is no question of the respondent maintaining an application under section 9 of the Act, as the heir of ‘a person’, referred to as ‘a tenant’ in section 2(4)(ii)(a) or (b). The only other clause, which may be pressed into service by the respondent to maintain his application under section 9 is, that he is the heir of his father under section.2(4)(ii)(c) who was a person liable to pay rent, in respect of such land under a tenancy agreement, express or implied under section 2(4)(i). Even on the footing that the respondent can be considered to be the heir of his father, the question still remains whether he can maintain the application under section 9 of the Act on its terms. Earlier, it has been seen that the respondent along with several others, was brought on record in I.A.No.40 of 1981 by an order of Court under Order 22 , Rule 4, Code of Civil Procedure. Under that provision, the legal representative of a deceased defendant is brought on record, when the right to sue survive in them, to enable the Court to proceed with the suit. Under that provision, the legal representative of a deceased defendant is brought on record, when the right to sue survive in them, to enable the Court to proceed with the suit. It will be useful also in this connection to refer to Section 21(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, which provides that the rule that when a new plaintiff or defendant is substituted or added, the suit shall, as regards him, be deemed to have been instituted, when he was so made a party, though it is open to the court to order that the suit as regards a new plaintiff or a defendant shall be deemed to have been instituted on any earlier date, does not apply to a case where a party is added owing to assignment or devolution of any interest during the pendency of a suit. It is therefore clear that by the order passed in I.A.No.40 of 1981, considering its effect under Section 21(2) of the Limitation Act, the respondent cannot claim that he became a party to the proceedings in order to enable the continuation of the proceedings only on and from the date on which he is impleaded. In other words, though by reason of the applicability of Section 21(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, the respondent can at best be deemed to be added or substituted as a party to the suit since its inception, it cannot be considered that the suit in ejectment itself had been instituted against him, as contemplated under section 9(l)(a) of the Act. It is in this connection that some of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure deserve attention. Under section 26 of the Code, it is provided that every suit shall be instituted by the presentation of a plaint or in such other manner, as may be prescribed. Order 4 , Rule 1, states that every suit shall be instituted by presenting a plaint to the court or such officer as it appoints in this behalf. It is thus established by the aforesaid provision of the Code of Civil Procedure, that the words 'institution of a suit’ have a very clear and definite connotation. section 9(1)(a)(i) of the Act contemplates ‘a tenant against whom a suit has been instituted’ in the sense of the presentation of the plaint against him. It is thus established by the aforesaid provision of the Code of Civil Procedure, that the words 'institution of a suit’ have a very clear and definite connotation. section 9(1)(a)(i) of the Act contemplates ‘a tenant against whom a suit has been instituted’ in the sense of the presentation of the plaint against him. It may be that in a given case, the suit is instituted as such against one or more of the heirs of a tenant, who may also be ‘tenant’ within the meaning of the Act, in which case, it may perhaps be open to him or them to claim the benefits of the Act. It is in this context that the decision in Syed Ibrahim v. Jalma Syed Ibrahim v. Jalma (1968) 2 MLJ.83 is instructive. In that decision, the tenant, against whom the suit had been instituted did not file an application under S.9 of the Act within the time prescribed and thereafter, on his death, his legal representatives, who had been brought on record as parties to the suit, sought to agitate their right under section.91 of the Act. Considering the question whether such an application could be entertained, it was pointed out that the expression ‘to institute’ has got a definite connotation in law and in relation to any proceedings, there can be only one institution and that is when the machinery is set in motion and proceedings are instituted or initiated and that the bringing on record of the legal representatives, would amount to their being made parties to a pending suit instituted originally against a person who died subsequently. This decision, no doubt, was rendered with reference to the definition of ‘a tenant’ prior to the introduction of the amendments, referred to already, in section 2(4) of the Act. Even so, as pointed out earlier, the only method by which the respondent can claim any right, would be as a heir of a person, referred to in clause(i) to section 2(4) and it is precisely with reference to this definition that the decision was rendered. As pointed out earlier, the amendments introduced do not in any manner confer any right on the respondent, as he does not satisfy the requirements under section 2(4) (ii)(a) and (b). Therefore, what remains is the consideration of the question with reference to the first part of section 2(4)(ii)(C). As pointed out earlier, the amendments introduced do not in any manner confer any right on the respondent, as he does not satisfy the requirements under section 2(4) (ii)(a) and (b). Therefore, what remains is the consideration of the question with reference to the first part of section 2(4)(ii)(C). In so far as that is concerned, there is no change in the definition of ‘tenant’ and therefore, it follows that the decision in Syed Ibrahim v. J alma Syed Ibrahim v. J alma (1968) 2 MLJ.83 would cover this case as well. It follows that in as much as the suit had not been instituted against the respondent, he cannot maintain the application under section 9(l)(a) of the Act. 8. Learned counsel next contended that the course adopted by the court below in determining the extent of land and fixing the market value thereof and directing the execution of a conveyance on payment of that amount, in one combined order, is opposed to the provisions of the Act, as interpreted by the decision of Division Bench of this Court in Arasan Chettiar v. Narasimhalu Naidu's Estate Trust (1980)2 MLJ.303. Learned counsel is certainly well founded in this contention, for in the decision referred to, the several stages in which the application under section 9 of the Act as well as the suit in ejectment should be dealt with, have been clearly indicated, and, particularly, it has been pointed out that the view that the provision of section 9 contemplates a composite order regarding the right of the tenant to have the land sold to them, the extent to be sold and the price for which it has to be sold and the date of such order is the relevant date, is unacceptable. Precisely that had been done by the lower appellate court in this case and this runs counter to the decision of the Division Bench, referred to above, and therefore, the directions given by the lower appellate Court regarding the extent of land, its market value and the deposit of the amount and the execution of the conveyance, cannot at all be supported and on this ground-also, the composite order passed by the lower appellate court has to be set aside. However, in as much as it has already been held that the application filed by the respondent under section 9(1) (a) of the Act has not been made by a person against whom, a suit had been instituted, as required under section 9(1)(a) of the Act, it is unnecessary to pursue this matter further. 9. There is also one other aspect, which had been omitted to be noticed by the lower appellate Court. As many as 15 persons have been brought on record as the legal representatives of deceased Narayanan. It is not very clear from the record as to how, out of the aforesaid 15 persons, only the respondent claim exclusively the right to make an application under section 9 of the Act. Ordinary, when several persons step into the position of a deceased party in a proceeding, all of them together would be entitled to the rights or obligations of the deceased person. In other words, even assuming that the stand taken by the respondent is correct, the tenant for purposes of making an application under section9(1)(a) of the Act would be the whole body of the heirs of deceased Narayanan and not the respondent alone. The record does not disclose that the other legal representatives of deceased Narayanan had either relinquished or disclaimed their rights and in the absence of any material to that effect, in my view, the application filed by the respondent in the revision petition solely, cannot be sustained. 10. Thus, on a consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case in the light of the relevant statutory provisions, it has to be held that the lower appellate court was in order in having entertained I.A.No.239 of 1981 filed by the respondent and issued the directions it did. It follows that if the application under section 9(1)(a) of the Act is not maintainable, then the plaintiff would be entitled to a decree in ejectment against the respondent in the second appeal. Consequently, the second appeal and the civil revision petition are allowed, the judgments and decrees of the lower appellate court are set aside and those of the trial court in O.S.No.1623 of 1978 and I.A.No.239 of 1981 will stand restored. There will be, however, no order as to costs. B.S. ----- Petitions allowed.