ORDER Srinivasan, J. 1. The first respondent herein filed R.C.O.P. No. 209 of 1976 and obtained an order of eviction. In the execution proceeding, the petitioner herein was shown as the second respondent. The petitioner objected to the sustainability of the execution proceeding on the ground that he was not a party to the eviction proceeding, The Rent Controller overruled that objection and directed delivery of the property by 20.9.88. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner preferred the appeal before the appellate authority under Section 23 of the Act. The appellate authority held that Section 18(2) of the Act prevented any appeal being filed against the order of the Rent Controller passed under Section 18(1) of the Act. 2. It is vehemently contended by learned Counsel for the petitioner that the order passed by the Rent Controller in this case cannot be said to be one under Section 18(1) of the Act. Learned Counsel contends that Section 8(1) refers to orders under Sections 10,14,15,16 and 17 and under those sections, orders could be passed only against the tenants who are parties to the proceedings thereunder. In the present case, learned Counsel contends that the petitioner not being a party to the proceeding under Section 10 of the Act, the order passed by the Executing Court cannot be treated as one under Section 18(1) of the Act consequently, it is argued that Section 18(2) of the Act would not apply to the order passed by the Rent Controller Learned Counsel placed reliance on a decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Fathima Automobiles v. P.K.P. Nair (1985) 2 M.LJ. 31. In that case, the Bench had to consider whether an order passed by the Rent Controller under Order 20, Rule 97 of the Code of the Civil Procedure was appealable. The Bench held that the order passed directing the removal of obstruction would not fail under Section 18(1) of the Act. The Bench observed as follows: The object of Section 18(2) is to see that unlike an order of eviction which could be subject to appeal under Section 23 or revision would lie against an order passed under the section direction delivery in execution under Sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the Act. Section 23 of the Act provides for an appeal to an Appellate Authority constituted under the Act against an order by the Rent Controller. Section 23 of the Act provides for an appeal to an Appellate Authority constituted under the Act against an order by the Rent Controller. It is significant to note that Section 23 does not refer to an order passed under Sections 10,14,15,16 and 17. Thus, a close reading of Section 18 and Section 13 indicates that there may be orders passed by the Rent Controller which may not fall within Section 18(1) and that those orders may be subject to appeal under Section 23 of, the Act. It is further significant to note that Section 23(1)(b) confers right of appeal to 'any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Controller. The use of the expression 'any person' in Section 23(1)(b) seems to suggest that it is not only the parties to the eviction order but also persons affected by any order by the Rent Controller could file an appeal. If the filing of the appeal under Section 23 is contemplated only by the parties to the eviction proceedings, then the Legislature would have used the words 'any party aggrieved' instead of 'any person aggrieved'. The use of the general expression like 'person' would indicate that, as already stated, an appeal could be maintained not only by a party to the eviction proceeding but also by a person Who feels aggrieved by any order passed by the Controller. In this case, the executing court has passed an order directing the tenants to delivery possession of the property in pursuance of the order of eviction. That order alone can be taken to be an order passed under Section 18(1). Subsequent to such an order the appellant herein has obstructed the delivery and an application under order has been passed by the Rent Controller on that application. The order passed by the Rent Controller in an application under Order 21, Rule 97 cannot, in our view, be taken to be an order passed under Section 18(1) of the Act. That should be taken to be an independent order passed under the Civil Procedure Code and not under the Rent Control Act. The order passed by the Rent Controller in an application under Order 21, Rule 97 cannot, in our view, be taken to be an order passed under Section 18(1) of the Act. That should be taken to be an independent order passed under the Civil Procedure Code and not under the Rent Control Act. Though the order is actually passed by the Rent Controller in an application under Order 21, Rule 97, C.P.C. that should be taken to have been passed by him in exercise of the powers of a civil Court as provided in Section 18(1) of the Act, We are not therefore in a position to construe the order passed by the Rent Controller in an application under Order 21, Rule 97, C.P.C. as an Order passed by the Rent Controller under Section 18(1) so that the bar under Section 18(2) could be invoked. 3. The decision of the Bench will not apply to the facts of the present case. The order passed by the Rent Controller in the present case is undoubtedly one made in execution of the order passed under Section 10 of the Act. It may be that the petitioner was not a party to the order of eviction. It may be open to him to contest the said order for eviction or contend that the Executing Court had no power to pass an order against him when he was not a party to the main proceeding for eviction. That would not take the order of the Rent Controller outside the purview of Section 18(1) of the Act. Even if it is a wrong order, it will fall only within that Sub-section. As it is an order passed under Section 18(1) of the Act, Sub-section (2) would automatically apply to the said order. Hence, the appeal filed by the petitioner before the appellate authority is not sustainable. 4. The conclusion of the appellate authority holding the appeal as not, is correct. In the result, the civil revision petition fails and it is dismissed. It is stated that the petitioner has already preferred a revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the order of the Rent Controller in E.P.No.125 of 1987 and that the same is pending in this Court in C.R.P.No.2125 of 1988. The petitioner has every right to prosecute the same. 5. It is stated that the petitioner has already preferred a revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the order of the Rent Controller in E.P.No.125 of 1987 and that the same is pending in this Court in C.R.P.No.2125 of 1988. The petitioner has every right to prosecute the same. 5. This will not in any way prejudice the same. There will be no order as to costs.