JUDGMENT 1. 1. This writ petition is for quashing the order (Annexure D) dated August 24, 1977, passed by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Rajasthan, Jaipur. levying maximum amount of damages permissible under Section 14-B of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act. 1952 (for brevity, the Act'). The only question is, whether there is any ground for interference in this writ petition against such an order? 2. Admittedly, the employer committed default in payment of contributions to the provident fund due for the periods between November, 1973 and October, 1976. The employer filed reply dated August 24, 1977, mentioning the grounds to explain delay on his part and a prayer was made therein for taking lenient view while directing recovery of damages under Section 14-B of the Act. The very same day, i. e. August 24, 1977, the impugned order Annexure D) was passed by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner levying hundred percent damages equal to the amount of arrears. 3. The impugned order (Annexure D) is in a printed form containing some blanks which alone have been filed (sic filled) to indicate ; that they relate to the present petitioner. This order in printed form was passed on August 24, 1977 the very same day on which reply was filed by the employer. The reasons given in support of the order are all printed and there is nothing in this printed form to indicate anything therein pertaining to the grounds set up by the employer to explain the delay was considered afresh it is indeed very interesting to find that a printed endorsement at the bottom of the order bears the date, 10th June, 1977, which is obviously the date on which this form was got printed or cyclostyled it is with reference to the contents of such an order that the requirement of section 14-B of the Act have to be tested. To say the least, it would be too much to hold that a printed order form which was got printed on June 10, 1977 could have visualised and could have also taken note of the grounds set out by the employer much later in his reply dated August 24, 1977, so as to incorporate in this printed order form even reply to those ground is in our opinion. bare look at the impugned order (Annexure D) which came to be made in this manner in a printed form, is sufficient to disclose a total non-application of mind by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, in the present case. 4. Ordinarily, what we have stated above would be sufficient to dispose of this petition. However, we would like to mention some arguments which were streneously urged by Shri Narendra Jain, learned counsel for the respondent, to support even such an order. Shri Jain contended that the only requirement of section 14-B of the Act is that reasonable opportunity of being heard should be given to the employer, and the amount of damages levied should not exceed amount of arrears or in other words, the damages should not be more than hundred percent of the amount of arrears. There can no dispute with this argument. However, his farther argument is that where the amount of damages levied do not exceed hunted percent, there is no scope for interference in the writ petition since quantum of damages to be levied within the permissible limit is a matter entirely within the discretion of the Authority. Stated as proposition of law there is no difficulty even for accepting this contention. Difficulty, however, is about the manner in which the learned counsel wanted us to apply this proposition. His argument is that we are not hearing appeal but merely a writ petition and once we find that the amount of damages levied does not exceed amount of arrear, we have no further jurisdiction in the matter. We are unable to accept this contention. 5. It is no doubt true that the quantum of damages to be recovered under Section 14-B of the Act is a matter primarily within the discretion of the Authority levying damages. It follows from the same that the discretion which the Authority has to exercise cannot be arbitrary and it must be exercised on settled principles. It is too, well known to require reiteration that arbitrariness is the very negation of rule of law, and it is very well settled by now that non-arbitrariness is an essential component of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is too, well known to require reiteration that arbitrariness is the very negation of rule of law, and it is very well settled by now that non-arbitrariness is an essential component of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is, therefore clear that in order to avoid any invalidity on this ground, exercise of discretion by the Authority should not suffer from defect of arbitrariness and it must appear that the same his he in exercised on some discrenible principle. It is equally clear that in such matters the principle which had led to the ultimate decision or in other words, guided the authority in reaching the decision, should be reasonable and it should appear from that document itself. 6. There can be no doubt that in exercise of writ jurisdiction of this Court it is not only our power but also our duty to see that the Authority which has been conferred with such discretion has not acted arbitrarily in exercise thereof. We may here observe that while upholding the validity of section 14-B of the Act, the Supreme Court in Organo Chemical Industries v. Union of India, AIR 1979 S.C. 1803 had clearly indicated that the provision was valid because it contained guidelines providing for fixing quantum of damages and that the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner has not only to apply his mind to the requirement of section 14B of the Act, but is cast with duty of making a speaking order after conforming to the rules of natural justice. The giving of reasons is an essential requirement of natural justice which in turn requires making a speaking order. It is, therefore, fallacious to contend that this Court has no jurisdiction in a writ petition to see anything more except that a notice of hearing had been given to the employer, and that the quantum of damages does not exceed amount of arrears. 7. There is another aspect which we would like to mention. It is not as if the levy of maximum amount of damages permissible under section 14-B of the Act is automatic on the happening of a default. When a default occurs, the jurisdiction of the Authority is attracted to direct the recovery of damages. 7. There is another aspect which we would like to mention. It is not as if the levy of maximum amount of damages permissible under section 14-B of the Act is automatic on the happening of a default. When a default occurs, the jurisdiction of the Authority is attracted to direct the recovery of damages. At that stage, after giving a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the which means considering the grounds set out by the employer to explain the delay, it has to he decided by the Authority as to what is the amount of damages, which would be a reasonable compensation in the facts of a particular case, bearing in mind that the maximum amount which can be awarded should not exceed amount of arrears, itself. The exact amount levied as damages within the permissible limit is required, therefor, to be determined in this manner. It is in this sense that the Authority has discretion in this matter as already pointed out. The exercise of discretion is to be governed by the settled principles, and the decision reached should he based on some discernible principle. When the decision of the Authority is challenged as in the present case, validity of action has to be tested on the basis of the contents of the impugned order itself by which maximum amount of damages has been levied and not by supplementing the same with additional reasons found elsewhere or which can be supplied in reply to the notice of the writ petition. We find that the impugned order (Annexure D) does not satisfy this requirement of section 14-B of the Act. It cannot, therefore be sustained. 8. Consequently, this writ petition is allowed. The impugned order (Annexure D) dated August 24, 1977 passed by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner (respondent No. 1) is quashed. The respondent No. 1 will now proceed to decide afresh the quantum of damages in accordance with law with advertence to the above observations.No costs.Petition allowed. *******