JUDGMENT - DESHPANDE M.S., J.:—This Letters Patent Appeal by the land-holder Vikramaditya is directed against the order dated 6-8-1986 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 2925 of 1980 quashing the order passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal while purporting to review its earlier order affirming the order passed by the Surplus Lands Determination Tribunal, Akola (S.L.D.T. for short), by which it had declared 17.29 acres of land as surplus. While reviewing the earlier order, the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal found that in view of the lease in favour of respondent No. 2 Chandrakant, there was no surplus. 2. Proceedings were initiated before the S.L.D.T. upon a Return filed by Vikramaditya under section 12 of the Ceiling Act. The S.L.D.T. found that Vikramaditya's total holding was 74.26 acres, the transfers during the period from 26-9-1970 to 2-10-1975 were in respect of 23.29 acres, Potkharab land worked out to 2.37 acres and at the time of enquiry Vikramaditya's total holding was, therefore, 71.29 acres. The family unit which consisted of 5 members could hold 54 acres of dry land and the family unit was, therefore, in possession of surplus land to the extent of 17.29 acres. Chandrakant who felt aggrieved by the order passed by the S.L.D.T. that the lease in his favour of field surveys Nos. 54/3 and 66/2 of village Kapileshwar, was not valid because he was not an agriculturist on the date on which the lease was purported to have been made, questioned the order passed by the S.L.D.T. by filing an appeal before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. The appellant Vikramaditya also filed an appeal against the decision of S.L.D.T. before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. The Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal decided the appeal by the judgment dated 5th February, 1979 in the absence of both Chandrakant and Vikramaditya, after hearing the representative of the respondent-State and dismissed the appeals on merits. Against these dismissals, Chandrakant and Vikramaditya filed Review Applications Nos. CELC. 4/79 and CELC. 5-79. 3. The Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal while deciding the review applications on 24th January, 1980 was satisfied that there was good cause for the non-appearance of the applicants before it and set aside the dismissals of their appeals on merits and after re-hearing the appeals, held that Chandrakant was the tenant of the two fields admeasuring 23.29 acres and, therefore, Vikaramaditya was not in possession of any surplus land. These decisions were challenged by the State by filing Writ Petition No. 2925 of 1980. The learned Single Judge was of the view that as there was no power in the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal to review its own orders, the later decision of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal could not be supported. He, therefore, quashed the order made by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal in review. 4. In this Letters Patent Appeal by Vikramaditya against the decision of the learned Single Judge, it was urged by Shri Bobde, the learned Counsel for the appellant that the position in the present case was not that an order by following proper procedure passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal was reconsidered and reviewed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. He conceded that there was no power in the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal to review its own earlier order, but he pointed out that the earlier order came to be passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal on merits in the absence of the appellants and the only course which was open to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, in the absence of the appellants, was to dismiss the appeals for default and not to decide the appeals on merits. Chapter VII of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 (Ceiling Act for short) deals with Procedure and Appeals. Sections 30 to 32 relate to the power of Collector in making inquiries, manner of recording decisions of Collector and Service of notices. Section 33 relates to appeals. Under sub-section (3) thereof, it is provided that in deciding such appeal the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal shall exercise all the powers which a Court has and follow the same procedure which a Court follows, in deciding appeals from the decree or order of an original Court, under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The right of appeal is a creature of Statute and the manner in which the appeal is to be decided would depend strictly upon the provisions of the Statute conferring those powers. Sub-section (3) of section 33 of the Ceiling Act does not relate merely to procedure or matter of form. While investing the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal with the authority to hear an appeal, it regulates the mode and manner of exercising that power by referring to the corresponding provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Sub-section (3) of section 33 of the Ceiling Act does not relate merely to procedure or matter of form. While investing the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal with the authority to hear an appeal, it regulates the mode and manner of exercising that power by referring to the corresponding provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Since its powers would be only those which an Appellate Court has in deciding appeals from the decree or order of an original Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, it cannot have a power larger than provided under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 5. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 17 of Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure provides as follows: "17(1). Where on the day fixed, or on any other day to which the hearing may be adjourned, the appellant does not appear when the appeal is called on for hearing, the Court may make an order that the appeal be dismissed." By Act 104 of 1976, section 87(vii), the following Explanation is added to sub-rule (1): "Explanation.—Nothing in this sub-rule shall be construed as empowering the Court to dismiss the appeal on the merits." The effect of sub-rule (1) read with Explanation is that the only power which the Court of Appeal would have when the appellant is absent, would be to dismiss the appeal in default of the appearance of the appellant, if it does not wish to adjourn the appeal, and not the power to dismiss the appeal on merits. Since the power to decide the appeal on merits in the absence of appellant is expressly excluded, it was not open to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal to decide the appeals on merits. The only course which was open to it, if it was so inclined, was to dismiss the appeals for default. Here it is clear that the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal did not choose to dismiss the appeals in default of appearance of appellants. Since the whole matter is before us and we find that the dismissal on merits cannot be sustained upon the clear provisions of the Statute, we must take it that the appeals continued to be on the file of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal and could be taken up for hearing at a later stage and decided upon hearing the appellants. 6. 6. Shri Deshbhratar, the learned A.G.P. while urging that it was open to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal to decide the appeals before it on merits in the absence of appellants, relied upon the decision of this Court in (Gerald Joseph Saldanha and others v. The State of Maharashtra and others)1, 1986(1) Bom.C.R. 491 . There, it was observed that where the appellants and their Counsel were both absent at the time when the appeal was taken up for hearing, it could not be said that the Court should not have proceeded to dispose of the appeals on merits. These observations came to be made in respect of the writ petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India because under Explanation to section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure the expression 'proceeding' does not include any proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. This Court was dealing with writ petitions in the aforesaid case and not with the appellate powers of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal conferred under the Ceiling Act. 7. In the present case the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal when apprised of the reasons which led to the absence of the appellants, re-heard the appeals and decided the appeals on merits after hearing the appellants. There was a jurisdictional error in passing the initial order. The appellant in effect seeks the correction of that error and we find that the earlier order in the circumstances, cannot be allowed to stand. Though the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal purported to pass the later order in exercise of power of review, in fact there was no question of reviewing its own order. The effect was that it heard the appeals before it in accordance with law and that was the only operative decision of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. This position was not brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge. Before him the only question raised was absence of power of review and having regard to the facts which we have stated, it appears to us that the later decision of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal could not have been set aside on the sole basis that it had no power to review its decision. 8. Since the learned Single Judge had not referred to the merits of other grounds raised by the State in its writ petition, we asked the learned A.G.P. whether he wanted to address us on merits. 8. Since the learned Single Judge had not referred to the merits of other grounds raised by the State in its writ petition, we asked the learned A.G.P. whether he wanted to address us on merits. He urged that the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal's finding that the lease by Vikramaditya to Chandrakant was valid, was perverse because no evidence was led before the S.L.D.T. regarding creation of lease on 1-5-1970. This, however, is not correct. The S.L.D.T. was of the view that a lease had in fact been created but it was not a valid lease because Chandrakant was not an agriculturist on the date on which the lease was created and the transfer was in contravention of section 89(1) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarba Region) Act, 1958. The factum of lease was not in dispute before the S.L.D.T. The Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal in its later judgment pointed out that Chandrakant was holding Survey No. 7/2 area 8.1 gunthas in the year 1970-71 and was its tenure-holder and was in cultivating possession of that field. The Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, therefore, took the view that Chandrakant was an agriculturist on 1-5-1970 when the disputed field Survey Nos. 54/3 and 60/2 were taken on lease from Vikramaditya and the lease was valid. That was a finding of fact recorded on the basis of the material which was before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal and nothing has been pointed out to us to show that the finding was perverse. We are, therefore, bound by the finding of fact recorded by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal and its later decision is not open to challenge. 9. We, therefore, allow this Letters Patent Appeal, set aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge and restore the order dated 24-1-1980 passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal in appeal. There would, however, be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed. -----