T. N. SINGH, J. ( 1 ) THESE two matters we heard together because a common question of some importance bearing on the interpretation of a benignant statute is involved in these cases. ( 2 ) PETITIONERS in both cases have a common grievance that the private respondent, namely, respondent No. 3 in each case, was not entitled to avail the benefit of the Madhya Pradesh Samaj ke Kamjor Vargon Ke Krishi Bhumi-Dharakon ka Udhar Dene Walon ke Bhumi Hadapane Sambandhi Kuchkron Se paritran Tatha Mukti Adhiniyam, 1976, for short, the 'adhiniyam', for several reasons. However, the common contention of law in both cases is that the Adhiniyam must be read as a Temporary Enactment and not Perpetual one, or, in other words, enacted with a limited life, which has expired More precisely, Shri Arun Mishra, appearing for the petitioners, has contended the adhiniyam was meant to take care of certain past transactions and it had accordingly merely retrospective operation, in respect of a specified "time-zone". ( 3 ) THE several aspects of counsel's contention above-referred have indeed raised an important question of law for our decision. It is no doubt true that the Legislature is competent to enact both perpetual and Temporary statutes, but it is equally true that the life of a statute, when it is limited, clear indication of its intention in that regard is expressed by the Legislature by making an express provision in the enactment itself in that regard. Indeed, Emergency statutes, such as the Preventive Detention Act, 1949 or the Defence of India Act, 1962 are instances of the Legislature enacting Temporary statutes, when in terms the life of the statute and expiry the were mentioned. A permanent or perpetual statute is such which contains no provision indicating its limited life or duration of operation and would, therefore, continue to be operative indefinitely, to have evidently full force of law until the statute is either expressly or impliedly repealed. In any case, the position which cannot be disputed is that the extent or operation of a statute or its duration of operation has to be read in the provision of statute itself. In any case, the position which cannot be disputed is that the extent or operation of a statute or its duration of operation has to be read in the provision of statute itself. Bearing this elementary principle of statutory interpretation, we scanned through the whole gamut of the matter enacted in the Adhiniyam beginning with the long title of the Adhiniyam, but our critical enquiry has confirmed our tentative view that counsel's contention is wholly meritless. ( 4 ) WE extract first the first clause of the long title of the Adhiniyam and also the fifth or the last clause, in extenso :"an Act to better economic condition of holders of agricultural land in the weaker sections of the people by providing further relief from agricultural indebtedness by nullifying the land grabbing designs resorted to in many a form by lenders of money while and after extending credit to them and matters connected therewith. ""and whereas it is necessary to relieve the holders of agricultural land in the weaker sections of the people from such exploitation by nullifying such past transaction of loan as also to put a stop to such transactions. " (Emphasis supplied)if anything can be read in the object of the enactment in the language used by the Legislature itself, there is little scope for any doubt that the Adhiniyam was enacted as a Permanent measure in the implementation of the Directive Principles enshrined in Art. 38 of the Constitution. Indeed, this view we have already expressed very recently in the case of Dayaram v. State of Madhya Pradesh (Misc. Petition No. 418 of 1984, decided on 4-2-1988 ). The Adhiniyam must be read as a piece of beneficent legislation meant for the protection of "whether Sections" of the people to secure to them social and economic justice, to relieve such people against such social evil and inequity as agricultural indebtedness". Those of "weaker sections" who are cared for by the Adhiniyam are agriculturists having small holdings, prone to exploitation and destitution, succumbing easily to "land grabbing designs" of unscrupulous moneylenders in rural areas. The concluding clause afore-quoted clearly spells out the object of the Adhiniyam that it was meant to nullify "past transaction of loan as also to put a stop to such transactions" in future. This ought to dispel any doubt about the unlimited duration of operation of Adhiniyam and its unlimited or perpetual nature. The concluding clause afore-quoted clearly spells out the object of the Adhiniyam that it was meant to nullify "past transaction of loan as also to put a stop to such transactions" in future. This ought to dispel any doubt about the unlimited duration of operation of Adhiniyam and its unlimited or perpetual nature. It will be foolish to presume the Legislature taking myopic view of social conditions obtaining in the State in considering "agricultural indebtedness" to have perished from the society and making provision only to purge the past sins. ( 5 ) AN overall view of the remaining provisions of the Adhiniyam would be also rewarding. S. 1 speaks of short title and commencement only. S. 2 embraces the definition clause and clause (a) thereof speaks of "appointed day" to mean the first date of Jan. 1971 which, according to S. 1 (2), is also the date of commencement of the Adhiniyam. S. 3 contemplates that the provisions of the Adhiniyam shall have overriding effect. S. 4 is relied on by Shri Arun Mishra and it may, therefore, be quoted in extenso :"it is hereby declared that all claims in relation to a prohibited transaction of loan subsisting on the appointed day or entered into thereafter but on or before the date of publication of this Act in the Gazette shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code or any other enactment for the time being in force or any decree or order, if any, of any court or authority, be subject to protection and relief in accordance with the provisions of this Act. " (Emphasis added)s. 5 provides, "a holder of agricultural land who is a party to any transaction of loan subsisting on the appointed day or entered into thereafter may apply to the Sub-Divisional Officer within such time; and in such form and manner as may be prescribed for protection and relief under this Act. " (Emphasis added ). S. 6 is also of signal relevance, because it confers power on the Sub-Divisional Officer to act "on his own motion in any transaction of loan" beside acting "on receipt of an application under S. 5". " (Emphasis added ). S. 6 is also of signal relevance, because it confers power on the Sub-Divisional Officer to act "on his own motion in any transaction of loan" beside acting "on receipt of an application under S. 5". S. 7 contemplates holding of enquiry by the Sub-Divisional Officer, to declare the transaction of loan to be void and pass an order "setting aside the transfer of land to the lender of money and consequently restoring the possession to the holder of agricultural land". The proviso to S. 7 (1) keeps alive the "right to recover the loan advanced by him (money-lender) to the holder of agricultural land under such transaction by due process of law within a period of three months from the date of final declaration of prohibited transaction of loan". S. 14 bars jurisdiction of civil courts expressly to "settle, decide or deal with any question" required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Sub-Divisional Officer or Collector (in appeal under S. 8) in accordance with the Adhiniyam. ( 6 ) SOME other provisions which have a material bearing on the controversy may now be noted. S. 12 also clearly expresses intention of the Legislature that the Adhiniyam was enacted as a permanent measure as it prohibits money-lenders from entering into a prohibited transaction of loan on any future date after commencement of the Adhiniyam. Indeed, Sub-Section (2) thereof contemplates that any transaction completed "in contravention of the provisions of Sub-Section (1) shall be absolutely null and void and no court shall entertain any application or suit to enforce any claim of lender of money arising out of prohibited transaction of loan". S. 15 makes void transfer by a money-lender of any land which may be subject-matter of a prohibited transaction of a loan by envisaging that "such transfer shall be deemed to have been made to defeat the provisions of this Act and be null and void". Another provision of crucial significance is S. 16 which empowers the State Government to remove "any doubt or difficulty (which arises in giving effect to the provisions of this Act" by making such provisions not inconsistent "with the purpose of the Act" as may be necessary or expedient for removing the doubt or difficulty. Another provision of crucial significance is S. 16 which empowers the State Government to remove "any doubt or difficulty (which arises in giving effect to the provisions of this Act" by making such provisions not inconsistent "with the purpose of the Act" as may be necessary or expedient for removing the doubt or difficulty. S. 18 is the ultimate provision conferring power on State Government to make rules to give effect to the provisions of the Act for providing for such matters among others as the time within which and form and manner in which application shall be made under S. 5". ( 7 ) WE have analysed carefully almost all the important provisions of the Adhiniyam following the elementary principle of statutory interpretation to divine its ambit, object, purpose and life or extent. We have failed to notice any whisper in the language or purport of any provision suggestive of limited duration or exclusively retrospective restrictive ?) operation of the Adhiniyam. The several provisions affect past, present as also future transactions of the kind prohibited thereunder, defined in S. 2 (f) under the rubric "prohibited transaction of loan". The prospective operation of the Adhiniyam and its permanent character is writ large in its object and several provisions. ( 8 ) LET it be noted now that the Adhiniyam was published in Gazette on 31st Jan. 1977 and that Rules framed under the Adhiniyam, which may be shortly called "1978 Niyam", were published in the Gazette on 12-5-1978. Because reliance is placed by Shri Arun Mishra on some of the Rules, those may be noted. Rule 1 is in two parts of which sub-rule (1) contains the short title of the rules and sub-rule (2) gives the date of commencement as the date of publication thereof in the Gazette. Rule 3 may be quoted in extenso : "the application under S. 5 shall be made in Form I to the Sub-Division Officer within a period of 12 months from the date specified in sub-rule (2) of Rule 1". ( 9 ) COUNSEL has laid great stress on the language of Ss. 4 and 5 as also Rule 3 aforequoted in support of his contention. Indeed, he has, also relied on the amendment of Rule 3 which was published in Gazette dated 31-1-1983. ( 9 ) COUNSEL has laid great stress on the language of Ss. 4 and 5 as also Rule 3 aforequoted in support of his contention. Indeed, he has, also relied on the amendment of Rule 3 which was published in Gazette dated 31-1-1983. It says, "in the said rules, in rule 3, for the figures "1983" the figures "1984" shall be substituted". Counsel's precise contention is that Rule 3 having contemplated that application to avail benefit of the Adhiniyam under S. 5 could only be made within a period of 12 months from the specified date which has to be read as 1984 in virtue of the said amendment, beyond 1985 nothing survives. The Adhiniyam must be deemed lapsed in 1985 as no application under S. 5 could be entertained by the Sub-Divisional Officer after 1985. This contention, if accepted, according to us, would render S. 6 otiose in as much as the Sub-Divisional Officer is empowered thereunder to Act also "on his own motion", without there being an application under S. 5 of the Adhiniyam, to take action in respect of any "prohibited transaction of loan" and to give relief in respect thereof suo motu. For this short reason, the contention pressed by Shri Mishra must be rejected. Courts are not allowed to adopt such construction as may make any part of the statute meaningless or ineffective. That apart, it is difficult to relate the years 1983 or 1984 to anything that is contained in the language of afore-quoted Rule 3. We do not propose to say further about Rule 3 at this stage. More about, it later, on its defective drafting. ( 10 ) WE turn now to the provisions of Ss. 4 and 5 to test counsel's contention that the Adhiniyam is not meant to take care of "prohibited transactions of loan" beyond a particular "time-zone", duly specified. According to counsel, the operation of the Adhiniyam has to be limited to the period extending between the appointed day, namely, last day of Jan. 1971 and 31st Jan. 1977 being the date of publication of the Adhiniyam in the Gazette. This submission is evidently prompted by the cumbersome language of the inartistically drafted S. 4 which may yield to more than one construction. However, as Maxwell suggests, construction ut res magis valent quam parent must prevail in such circumstances. 1971 and 31st Jan. 1977 being the date of publication of the Adhiniyam in the Gazette. This submission is evidently prompted by the cumbersome language of the inartistically drafted S. 4 which may yield to more than one construction. However, as Maxwell suggests, construction ut res magis valent quam parent must prevail in such circumstances. We must seek light from Lord Shaw's dictum - "where alternative constructions are equally open, that alternative is to be chosen which will be consistent with the smooth working of the system which the statute purports to be regulating; and that alternative is to be rejected which will introduce uncertainty, friction or confusion into the working of the system. " ( 11 ) FOR removal of obscurity in the language of S. 4, the modern rule of purposive interpretation must apply. Law is well-settled that grammatical or literal construction must make room for liberal construction that fulfils the object of beneficent legislation. Indeed, for the same reason it is necessary to read harmoniously Ss. 4, 5 and 6 as operating in different field with different purports. Obviously, only Ss. 5 and 6 deal with powers of Sub-Divisional Officer to act under the Adhiniyam, in one case on the application of the debtor-agriculturist and in the other case suo motu. On its own language S. 4 merely "declares" that "all claims" in relation to prohibited transactions as "subsisting" on different dates mentioned therein ("appointed day"; "entered thereafter" but on or before the date of publication" of the Adhiniyam) must be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Adhiniyam notwithstanding anything to the contrary under any law as also under any "order" or "decree" of any "court" or "authority" in order to fulfil the object and purpose of the Adhiniyam, namely, for the "protection and relief" of the debtor-agriculturist. 11a. S. 2 (f) describes different "modes" of prohibited transactions which has an obvious nexus with different dates aforementioned of "all claims" referred in S. 4. Indeed, the word "all" qualifying "claims" is significantly indicative of the object and ambit of the declaration under S. 4, ensuring that even the claim of "lender of money" (defined in S. 2 (d)) whether under an instrument mentioned in sub-cls. (i) to (iv) or under an "order" or "decree" mentioned in sub-cl. Indeed, the word "all" qualifying "claims" is significantly indicative of the object and ambit of the declaration under S. 4, ensuring that even the claim of "lender of money" (defined in S. 2 (d)) whether under an instrument mentioned in sub-cls. (i) to (iv) or under an "order" or "decree" mentioned in sub-cl. (v), would not be enforceable at any other forum including a civil court, albeit except to the extent saved under proviso to S. 7 (1 ). The declaration under S. 4 acts as an embargo on "subsisting" claims as respects past transactions being enforced at other forums. It does not deal with future transactions entered after the "appointed day" or after publication of the Adhiniyam. Of other "prohibited transactions of loan" which had taken place later, beyond the "time-zone" of S. 4 care is taken by Ss. 5 and 6 and indeed also Ss. 12 and 15 operating prospectively to interdict such transactions from taking place in future, beyond 1978. Because S. 4 deals with transactions taken place between 1971 (appointed day) and 1978 (date of publication of the Adhiniyam) it cannot be said that the Adhiniyam as a whole is a Temporary Act and operates only retrospectively. Ss. 5 and 6 clearly and unambiguously empowers Sub-Divisional Officer to act in relation to all transaction without any limitation of the "time-zone" of S. 4. Clause (v) of S. 2 (f) makes it clear using' the word "includes" in relation to the transactions of the "time-zone" of S. 4. Sub-cls. (i) to (v) of S. 2 (f) refer expressly to transactions covered by instruments ("agreement to sell"; "outright sale") but the residuary clause (v) inclusively refers to those covered "otherwise" but also by "decree" mentioned in S. 4. ( 12 ) ALTHOUGH an application under S. 5 may be made in "such form and within the time and manner as may be prescribed" to avail protection and relief under the Adhiniyam, the power of the Sub-Divisional Officer to act suo motu under S. 6 is not affected thereby. True, there is some doubt about the time within which such application may be made as Rule 3 of 1978 Niyam is not clear. True, there is some doubt about the time within which such application may be made as Rule 3 of 1978 Niyam is not clear. But, on that account, due to defect in Rule 3, jurisdiction to initiate, continue or conclude proceedings by the Sub-Divisional Officer under the Adhiniyam cannot be denied to him, when a defective application is made, not conforming to the requirement of Rule 3 law is well-settled. Rules cannot control or defeat any provision of the parent Act. According to us, it would be competent for the S. D. O. to act "on his own motion" when any "prohibited transaction of loan" is brought to his notice informally, in other words, in a manner which does not conform to the strict requirement of S. 5 of the Adhiniyam or Rule 3 of 1978 Niyam. ( 13 ) THE power of the S. D. O. to act suo motu under S. 6 is not circumscribed. Indeed, neither in S. 5, nor in 6, nor in any other provision of the Adhiniyam, nor in Rule 3 itself, any specified period of limitation is postulated. Limitation is a matter of procedure. Unless it is envisaged as a condition-precedent annexed to the enforcement of a substantive right, it is not permissible to create any time-bar on the basis of ambiguous subsiduary provision so as to impair the substantive right, making it unenforceable. Law of limitation, it is well settled is construed always in favour of the right to proceed. ( 14 ) HAVING given our careful consideration to the language of Rule 3 of 1978 Niyam, we are convinced that the bad drafting is inexcusable as it is ambiguous beyond redemption. We are not at all prepared to agree with Shri Arun Mishra that the rule-making authority has clearly expressed in Rule 3 that no application under S. 5 can be entertained after 1985. Although Rule 3 speaks of "a period of twelve months from the date specified in sub-rule (2) of Rule 1", on referring thereto, one is left aghast and baffled as it is not possible to read any "date specified" therein. It does not speak of any specific date which may be considered for the purpose of limitation as terminus a quo although Rule 3 does specify "12 months" as terminus ad quem. It does not speak of any specific date which may be considered for the purpose of limitation as terminus a quo although Rule 3 does specify "12 months" as terminus ad quem. ( 15 ) THE purport of sub-rule (2) of Rule 1 is clear, definite and limited. It indicates merely the date of coming into force of the Rules and nothing beyond that. It is difficult to read together Rules 3 and 1 (2) as laying down clearly any period of limitation debarring application under S. 5 being made beyond a particular period. A statute of limitation being regarded as a statute of repose, any substantive right enforceable at any forum is debarred by such statute with reference to the date when the cause of action arises. This position is manifested even in the scheme of Limitation Act, 1963 and particularly in the Schedule of the said Act. Nothing of this sort has to be read in Rule 3 which fixes terminus a quo with reference, vaguely and unfortunately, to the provision of sub-rule (2) of Rule I which has a different purpose. Indeed we fail to understand how the amendment in Rule 3, published in the Gazette dated 31-3-1983, could refer to two figures, "1983" and "1984" which does not fit in the scheme of Rule 3 or Rule 1 (2) inasmuch as there is no "date specified" in sub-rule (2) of Rule 1 of which mention is made in Rule 3. ( 16 ) DESPITE the obvious misadventure of the draftsman reflected in the language of Rule 3 as also the amendment thereof made on 31-3-1983, we are prepared to accept that under S. 18 (2) (i), the State Government can prescribe limitation period. It is unfortunate that an unsuccessful attempt is made to do so in Rule 3, but on that account, we are not prepared to accept that the substantive right contemplated under the Adhiniyam is not enforceable. What only remains to be stressed is that the Legislature was well aware of the position that "doubt or difficulty" could or might arise in the enforcement of the provisions of the Adhiniyam and accordingly, it had enacted S. 16 by which State Government was authorised to remove the doubt or difficulty so that the purpose of the Adhiniyam was fulfilled. ( 17 ) HAVING noticed the defective draftsmanship of Rule 3 of 1978 Niyam, it becomes our constitutional duty to point out the fact so that the State Government discharges its own statutory duty in terms of S. 16 by having recourse to S. 18, or otherwise, Indeed, in our opinion, the State Government would be well-advised to amend Rule 3 of the Adhiniyam to make it clear and effective but not destructive of the purpose of the Adhiniyam. When an attempt is made to amend the said Rule, the State Government would be well-advised to bear in mind the construction we have placed on the provisions of Ss. 4, 5 and 6 of the Adhiniyam. The period of limitation for filing application under S. 5 of the Adhiniyam may be laid down clearly and properly and indeed in a reasonable, sensible and meaningful manner as may conform to accepted norms of draftsmanship. ( 18 ) NOW, a few words on contentions raised by learned counsel on the merits of the impugned order. The main contention is that in the orders, there is no finding recorded as to whether the applicants in each case were "holders of agricultural land" within the meaning of the term used in S. 2 (c) of the Adhiniyam. The short answer to this contention is provided in each case by the application and the reply thereto filed by the petitioners in each case. In each case, applicants had given their status, occupation, amount of loan and area of the agricultural holding alienated which was not in excess of the area mentioned in S. 2 (c ). In both cases, in their reply, the non-applicants did not contest the statement of fact made in the applications. That being the position, there was no scope for any finding to be recorded inasmuch as the entitlement of the applicants in regard to the requirement contemplated under S. 2 (c) was considered as admitted by the non-applicants in each case. Indeed, from application (Annexure-P/1 in each case) it is found that the applicants were actual tillers and Harizans, contracting small loans such as Rs. 900/- and Rs. 1,200/- respectively. Indeed, from application (Annexure-P/1 in each case) it is found that the applicants were actual tillers and Harizans, contracting small loans such as Rs. 900/- and Rs. 1,200/- respectively. ( 19 ) HOWEVER, what we read in impugned orders in each case is that the Sub-Divisional Officer as also, the Collector on appeal, have recorded clear finding in respect of each alienation, finding the transaction in each case to be a "prohibited transaction of loan". It has been found that although the sale deed was executed in each case, there was no acknowledgment of receipt of consideration to be read in the sale deed in each case. There is also a finding in each case that, the document was executed to secure a loan advanced and the sale deed was got executed exercising undue influence and deceipt inasmuch as the small amount of loan secured thereunder was far too inadequate in terms of market-value of those lands. ( 20 ) ANOTHER contention which is also forcefully pressed is that the courts have not made any order for repayment of the loan secured under those documents. But, the contention must be said to be made in ignorance of the proviso to S. 7 (1) of the Adhiniyam. We have already alluded earlier to the said proviso wherein remedy for the money-lender to enforce his right to recover the loan is kept alive and legislature has given to the money-lender the direction that such right would be enforceable in a Civil Court. The last contention also, in our opinion, is wholly meritless. Shri Arun Mishra contended that petitioners in each case had improved the land and they were entitled to compensation for the improvement made. But on referring to the "reply" which the petitioners had filed before the Sub Divisional Officer, we have not been able to read even a single word about improvement, which is now claimed. There is no factual foundation for such claim to be read in the records. ( 21 ) FOR the reasons aforesaid, we have no hesitation to hold that the petitioners in both cases have failed to make out any case for interference and, therefore, both petitions must fail. The petitions are accordingly dismissed, but without any order as to costs in the facts and circumstances of the case. ( 21 ) FOR the reasons aforesaid, we have no hesitation to hold that the petitioners in both cases have failed to make out any case for interference and, therefore, both petitions must fail. The petitions are accordingly dismissed, but without any order as to costs in the facts and circumstances of the case. ( 22 ) LET it be mentioned that we have disposed of the matter at the admission stage having considered it unnecessary to notice the private respondents. Still, we have heard Shri M. C. Jain, learned Deputy Advocate General who has supported the impugned orders passed by the first and second respondent in each case. ( 23 ) IN parting with the records, we consider it appropriate to make a direction herein that a copy of this judgement shall be forwarded to the Law Secretary, Government of Madhya Pradesh, Bhopal, so that necessary steps may be taken by the State Government in the light of observations made by us in respect of Rule 3 of 1978 Niyam. Petitions dismissed. .